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Our common industrial heritage provide insights into the complex relationship between 
scientific knowledge, technological development, industrial exploitation and society. One 
of the cornerstones within industrial archaeology, are the combination of written 
documents, photos and maps, with the systematic study of structures and artefacts. By 
combining these two sources- of sets of data (as I have done in this book), we can test 
the validity of the written sources, but perhaps more importantly, we gain knowledge of 
how and why actors in the past have interacted with – and used the surrounding 
landscape for different purposes and in different ways. This approach opens up new, 
interesting and multifacetted perspectives and explations to historical processes in the 
polar regions and elsewhere. I hope that more scholars and professionals see the 
importance and value of this approach – and that the preservation, experience and 
research of our industrial heritage not only is relevant today, but important for future 
generations.  
 
I have enjoyed studying and working with polar history, natural resource exploitation 
and industrial heritage research  since 1999, and along the way, I have had the great 
pleasure to work togehter with some outstanding people - many of whom I regard as 
close friends. Many of these have contributed greatly to the outcome of this book. I am 
however sadly aware of the fact that I cannot mention you all here. I am nonetheless 
very greatful to you all. 
 
The Arctic Centre in Groningen has to a large extent been my academic base throughout 
the project. This rather small, but highly vibrant and interdiciplinary institute are a part 
of the Groningen Institute for Archaeology (GIA). I would like to thank you all – past and 
present - for the warmth, friendship, laughters, and constructive feedback that you have 
given me throughout this study. I am very greatful for the opportunity Louwrens 
Hacquebord gave me, being a part of this environment. I first met Louwrens at 
Longyearbyen Airport in 2003, and found that we shared an interest the history of 
natural resource exploitation in the polar reguions, in perticular in whaling. I am also 
greatful for his support, critical questions, and feedback.  
 
  
I am thankful to my co-supervisor Dag Avango, for his constructive and critical feedback 
throughout this process, and for his relentless support and interest in the study. Dag and 
me met for the first time at the Academy of Sciences in Stockholm in 2000, a few months 
prior to our first fieldwork season in Svalbard together. We have in the course of almost 
two decades, discussed and shared many ideas and thoughts related to the history of the 
Arctic and the Antarctic, among many other things. I cannot imagine a better and more 
dedicated co-supervisor than Dag.  
 
I would especially like to mention and thank Frits Steenhuisen and Erwin Bolhuis – gis 
magicians, excellent photographer, great people during fieldwork and much more, for 
their kind support in editing many of the maps that appear in this book. I have also been 
spoiled working with photographers and heritage professionals like Gustav Rossnes 
(Bear Island, South Georgia, South Orkney Islands and the Shouth Shetlands), and Ben 
Bekooy (Svalbard). Not only did they produce a great deal of excellent photos that 
appear in this book, but whos comradery and spirit during fieldworks has been 
invaluable to me. 
 
I would also like to thank Luuk Tol, who kept control over the financial aspects of my 
project, and Daan Raemakers for the many opportinities I had to present and discuss 
issues with fellow collegues at GIA and the Factult of Arts.  
 
I would like to thank Bjørn L. Basberg for his willingness to share much of his knowledge 
of the history of modern whaling, and for his continous support and interest in the 
study. I would also like to mention Cameron Hartnell, Seth Depasqual, Hidde De Haas, 
Ypie and Wietske Aalders, Sarah Dresscher, Vadim Starkov and his team, Judith Labohm, 
and many others whom have shared their knowledge and interest for the history of the 
polar regions in one way or another.  
 
This project include the study and documentation of four former whaling stations in the 
Arctic and the Antarctic in the period 2007-2010. I feel humble and privilegied to the 
fact that I have been given the opportunity to spend much time at locations that few of 
us get to visit. This would not have been possible however, without the financial support 
of the Dutch Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO), the Dutch Polar Programme 
  
(NPP), and The Swedish Research Counsil (Svenska Vetenskapsrådet). I am also greatful 
to the Swedish Polar Research Secretarial for their logististic support in this project, and 
ever since my first fieldwork in 2000. I would also like to thank Mr. Fredrik Poulsen and 
the South Georgia Heritage Trust (SGHT), as well as Swan Hellenic Cruises for their 
logistic support in 2009. There are others have throughout this project have supplied 
logistic support and shared their friendship, expertise, gastronomic interest and 
historical knowledge: Stig and Hilde Henningsen (Svalbard), Jerome Poncet (Antarctic), 
Hamish, Kate, Helen and Anna Laird (South Georgia). Together they have provided for – 
and been an excellent research platform to me and my colleagues during the many 
weeks we spent doing fieldwork each year.  
 
As much as fieldwork has been an important part of this project, so has the archival 
work. I would like to thank the archivists and private persons who kindly shared their 
expertize and made their sources accessible. Many greatful thanks to those who helped 
me at the British Antarctic Surveys (BAS), the Falkland Islands Archive, the Norwegian 
National Archives (Riksarkivet), the Norwegian Polar Institute archives (NP), Sandefjord 
Whaling Museum, Tromsø State Archives, the Norwegian National Library (NB), the 
Michigan Technological University archives, the DutchNational archives, the Swedish 
National Museum of Science and Technology,  as well as the private archives of the Hay-
Ingebrigtsen family and Glenn McIntosh.  
 
Finally and most important; my family. I started this study in 2007, and it took me more 
than a decade to finish it. I truly owe much to the completion of this book to my wonder-
wife Hana. Not only has she been extremely patient, but more importantly, she has 
throughout this entire project helped me by listening to my thoughts and ideas, and 
helped me to re-structure them into many of the arguments that appear in this book. It is 
true that behind every man, there is an even stronger (and smarter) woman.  
I also want to thank my two amazing children Adam and Emma – for the energy they 










In 1993, the Norwegian historian Thor Bjørn Arlov wrote an article where he 
hypothesised that the modern whaling industry played a geo-political role in the 
Norwegian government’s secret struggle to gain sovereignty over the Arctic Archipelago 
(then known as Spitsbergen, today Svalbard).1 In many ways, this hypothesis was the 
seed for this PhD project. In previous research on the history of the polar regions, 
historians seeking to explain the growth of polar science and resource exploitation there 
have revealed a complex web of scientific, economic, and political interests that play a 
role. Together, these formed a framework of larger social and cultural trends that 
rendered polar science and resource exploitation legitimate and desirable. However, the 
whaling industry – one of the largest economic utilisations of the polar regions – has 
rarely been explained in the same way. Whaling in the polar regions has been seen as yet 
another quick profit-making activity of an industry that is always ready to move to new 
hunting grounds all over the world. However, there are more factors than economic 
interests and markets to explain modern whaling activities in polar regions – these 
include geo-political factors and the ability of the industry to deal with the 
environmental and geographical conditions in the Arctic and Antarctic. 
 
Therefore, the main objective of this dissertation is to analyse and explain the rise and 
fall of modern station-based whaling in the opening decades of the 20th century in a 
multi-disciplinary way, including all the above-mentioned factors. Why did modern 
station-based whaling emerge, develop, and decline in the polar regions? Which larger 
societal processes provided windows of opportunity that motivated actors in the 
whaling industry to establish whaling operations in the Arctic and Antarctic? Which 
actors and interests made this possible, and how did they attract and maintain support 
for their whaling operations? 
 
                                                 
1 Arlov. T.B. Whaling and Sovereignty – The role of whaling in the struggle for supremacy over Svalbard 
(Spitsbergen). In Whaling & History – Perspectives on the Evolution of the Industry. Publication no 29, 
Commander Chr. Christensens Whaling Museum, Sandefjord, Norway. 1993, Pp: 81–90. 
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Inspired by methodological and theoretical approaches from historical archaeology and 
industrial heritage research, I also want to include whaling sites in my analysis. Without 
this analysis, I cannot get sufficient knowledge of local environmental and geographical 
conditions for operating whaling stations in my case study areas and how the whaling 
companies coped with these conditions. For this reason, I will consider the material 
remains of the whaling stations – how did the whaling companies deal with the 
geographical, environmental, and political circumstances in the Arctic and Antarctic, and 
why? How did they adapt their productions systems, settlements, and social 
organisation to these conditions? In this way, it will be possible to provide a new and 
multifaceted explanation of the rise and fall of station-based whaling in the Arctic and 
Antarctic. 
 
To answer my research questions, I have focused on four case study areas. Two of these 
are located in the Arctic (at Spitsbergen and Bear Island) and two are in the Antarctic 
(South Orkney and South Georgia). These locations are particularly suitable case study 
locations because, a) they have been subject to intense competition for antarctic whale 
populations and political influence through the 20th century and, b) there is a rich source 
of relevant materials for answering my research questions, including archival sources 
and archaeological remains of whaling activities. 
 
This research is very relevant because debates about the future of the Arctic and its 
natural resources are ongoing. Over the last few decades, interest in the polar regions 
has increased because global warming has affected the Arctic and parts of the Antarctic 
in a more profound manner than elsewhere in the world. Actors within resource 
industries, politics, and the media have argued that melting sea ice in the Arctic Ocean 
will make it easier to exploit natural resources and open up shorter shipping routes 
between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. In the wake of this debate, Arctic rim states are 
increasing their efforts to extend their exclusive economic zones under the United 
Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), while other states are proposing 
themselves as stakeholders in the Arctic, trying to gain influence in a region they believe 
may become important in the future.2  
                                                 
2 Avango, D and Högselius, P. Under the Ice: Exploring the Arctic’s Energy Resources, 1898–1985. In 
Christensen, M., Nilsson, A. & Wormbs, N. (eds.), When the Ice Breaks:Media and the Science and Politics of 
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There are many parallels between present day debates about resources and political 
influence in the Arctic and those that took place almost one century ago.3 In the 
Antarctic, natural resource exploitation and quests to attain national sovereignty have 
been hampered by the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) of 1959, which not only governs 
the continent, thereby freezing competing sovereignty claims, but also defines 
Antarctica as a continent for science, where natural resource exploitation is all but 
outlawed.4 In 1991, a moratorium on mineral prospecting was signed, which will last 
until 2048.5 However, despite the treaty, there is interest in mapping mineral resources 
on the continent. In this changing world, international agreements under the treaty may 
also change. 
 
Since prospecting and exploitation of natural resources in the Arctic and the Antarctic is 
not a recent phenomenon, there is great potential to explore and draw lessons from 
previous rushes for natural resources and the political influences in those regions. For 
centuries, the Arctic and Antarctic have experienced waves of exploration, exploitation, 
scientific research, and geo-political rivalry. These have been narrated in literature, 
media, and propaganda, which have subsequently shaped imaginations and 
understandings of these regions. In the Arctic, indigenous people have utilised the land 
for thousands of years. Large-scale exploitation of natural resources in the Arctic, 
however, started in the 16th century by actors from outside the region. These included 
whalers from the Basque region, the Netherlands, and Britain – who started hunting 
walruses and bowhead whales along the coasts of Spitsbergen (Svalbard).6 Whaling 
                                                                                                                                                        
Climate Change. 2013. Paglia, E. The Northward Course of the Anthropocene: Transformation, Temporality 
and Telecoupling in a Time of Environmental Crisis. 2016 
3 Balch. T. W. The Arctic and Antarctic Regions and the Law of Nations. 1910. P: 265. In: The American 
Journal of International Law. Vol 4, No 2. Pp: 265–275. Arlov TB. A Short History of Svalbard. 1989. Oslo: 
Norwegian Polar Institute. Avango D. Sveagruvan: Svensk Gruvhantering Mellan Industri, Diplomati och 
Geovetenskap. Stockholm: Jernkontoret. 2005. Berg R. From Spitsbergen to Svalbard’: Norwegianization in 
Norway and in the ‘Norwegian sea, 1820–1925. Acta Borealia 30(2): 154–173. 2013. Blom I. Kampen om 
Eirik Raudes Land: Pressgruppepolitikk i Grønlandsspørsmålet 1921–1931. Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag. 
1973, Friedman RM. Å spise kirsebær med de store. In: Drivenes E.A, Jølle HD (eds) Norsk Polarhistorie 2: 
Vitenskapene. Oslo: Gyldendal, 331–420. 2004, Ulfstein G. The Svalbard Treaty: From Terra Nullius to 
Norwegian Sovereignty. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press. 1995, Wråkberg U. Vetenskapens Vikingatåg: 
Perspektiv på Svensk Polarforskning 1860–1930. Stockholm: Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences. 1999, 
Berg. R. Norge på egen hånd 1905–1920, bind 2 i Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie. 1995. 
4 The Antarctic Treaty of 1959. See also: Abbink. P. Antarctic Policymaking & Science in the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Germany 1957–1990. 2009. 
5 See https://www.ats.aq/e/ep.htm. Webpage for the Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty. 
6 Hacquebord, L. 1984. Smeerenburg. Het verblijf van Nederlandse walvisvaarders op de westkust van 
Spitsbergen in de zeventiende eeuw. PhD thesis University of Amsterdam. Hacquebord, L. 2001. Three 
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created competition between whaling companies and political conflicts between the 
nations from where the whaling companies came.7 In the Antarctic, exploitation started 
in the 19th century when American and British sealers started hunting for seals. The 
modern whaling industry established itself in the High Arctic and Antarctic in 1903–
1904 and not only contributed to incorporating the polar areas into global capitalism, 
but also resulted in one of the largest man-induced alterations of the global ecosystem.8 
By increasing our knowledge of the complex web of drivers responsible for previous 
waves of resource exploitation in the polar regions and the consequences of these 
exploitations on the geo-political situation in polar areas and the local environment, I 
wish to educate decision makers and the general public so that informed decisions can 
be made pertaining resource exploitation in polar regions today and in the future. 
 
The large scale historical exploitation of polar areas (LASHIPA) 
project 
I wrote this PhD thesis within the framework of the LASHIPA project, which was an 
International Polar Year (IPY) 2007–2008 project. The objective of the LASHIPA project 
was to explain the large-scale exploitation of natural resources in the polar regions from 
the 16th century until today, and the economical, geo-political, technical, social, and 
environmental consequences of this exploitation.9 The project included researchers 
from Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway, Great Britain, USA, and Russia, and included 
several PhD and post-doc projects studying hunting, trapping, whaling, and mining. The 
LASHIPA project was an attempt to break away from national frameworks that were 
common in polar history and seek to understand and explain the development and 
                                                                                                                                                        
Centuries of Whaling and Walrus Hunting in Svalbard and its Impact on the Arctic Ecosystem. 
Environment and History 7 (2001) 169–185.  
7 Hacquebord, L and Avango, D. Settlements in an Arctic Resource Frontier Region. In Arctic Anthropology. 
Vol 46, No 1–2. Pp: 25–39. 2009 
8 Clarke argue that the extinction of a resource might occur within two social conditions; common-
property competitive exploitation on the one hand, and private-property maximization on the other, 
where exploitation of resources with low reproductive capability will lead to its depletions. See: Clarke. C. 
W. The Economics of Overexploitation. In: Science. No 17, 1973. Vol: 181. Pp: 630–634. Commercial hunting 
and exploitation of whales started in Finnmark in northern Norway already in the 1880s, which is a part 
of the Arctic. The modern whaling industry did not however move their activities to the High Arctic 
(Spitsbergen and Bear Island) until 1903/1904. 
9 Avango, et al. Between markets and geo-politics: natural resource exploitation on Spitsbergen from 1600 
until present day. In: Polar Record 47. (240). Pp: 29–39. 2011. See also: Hacquebord L. and Avango, D . 
Settlements in an Arctic resource frontier region. Pp: 25–39. In: Arctic Anthropology. No 46 (1–2). 2009. 
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consequences of industry in the polar areas from an international and comparative 
perspective. 
Using a common theoretical and methodological frame and approach, the project 
compared different branches of resource exploitation in different time periods and 
regions using a similar analytical language. My dissertation is the only major case study 
of the modern whaling industry within the LASHIPA framework and therefore 
represents some of the key results from this IPY project.10 
 
Objectives and research questions 
The main objective of this thesis is to explain how and why the modern whaling industry 
established itself in the polar areas in the opening decades of the 20th century. Inspired 
by a theoretical approach designed to analyse the growth of resource exploitation in the 
polar areas,11 I will study the structures and actors of whaling history. On the one hand, I 
will explore the larger societal contexts and structures that have influenced the actors in 
the whaling industry and have determined the success of their industry in the polar 
areas. On the other hand, I will study the actors and how they have used these contexts 
to build their whaling industry and why and how they adapted their operations to the 
political, environmental, and geographical conditions in the polar regions. I will do so by 
comparing how companies operated in four different locations in the polar regions: 
Bjørnøya (Walrus Bay whaling station) and Spitsbergen (Finneset whaling station) in 
the Arctic, and South Georgia (Prince Olav Harbour whaling station) and South Orkney 
(Signy Island whaling station) in the Antarctic. These whaling stations were in operation 
at more or less the same time (1904–1932). To avoid the pitfalls of assuming that the 
whaling industry can only be explained by economic factors, I will also explore political, 
scientific, technical, organisational, and social factors. 
 
To meet these objectives, I have formulated research questions on two levels: an 
overarching level concerning historical contexts, and a project level with questions 
pertaining to the actors and how they built their networks. On the overarching level, my 
                                                 
10 The LASHIPA Archaeological Expedition Reports, No 1–9. 2003–2011. Arctic Centre. University of 
Groningen. 
11 Avango. D, Nilsson. A and Roberts. P. Assessing Arctic Futures: resources, voices and governance. The 
Polar Journal. Vol 3, no 2, Pp 431–446. 2013. 
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main research question is what historical contexts influenced the growth and decline of 
the four whaling enterprises in the Arctic and Antarctic? On the project level, I would 
first like to explore how companies behind the stations built their global networks – how 
did they attract investors and political support for their whaling enterprises? Which 
investors and state/political actors did they enrol and why? What interests did those 
actors have – economic, geo-political, or a combination of both? Secondly, I will explore 
how they built their local networks – how did the companies design whaling operations 
that were capable of producing the desired results under the environmental and 
political conditions in the Arctic and Antarctic? What were the consequences of their 
choices? What were the differences and similarities in these respects between the four 
whaling stations in the Arctic and Antarctic and why? 
 
The project level research questions are particularly important because I answer them 
using a combination of archaeological and historical methods and sources, thereby 
making a unique contribution to research on the history of the arctic and antarctic 
whaling industries. The rationale for this approach is simple – explaining how and why 
the whaling industry established sustained operations in the polar areas requires us to 
examine how these companies adapted their strategies, technologies, and settlements to 
the challenging environmental, geographical, and political circumstances – far from the 
required materials and labour, with low temperatures, strong winds, sea ice, unsettled 
legal statuses, and a general absence of state power. Exploring how companies built 
their local network in this cross-disciplinary way will allow me to explain how they 
created whaling operations that were productive under such conditions. 
 
At the turn of the 20th century, parts of the polar regions were still regarded as no man’s 
land, or had at least an uncertain legal status. During this period, colonial powers in 
Europe and North America were increasingly interested in those areas and sometimes 
tried to assert sovereignty over them. In these attempts, state actors assembled different 
resources to attain their goals, such as claims of historical ties and geographical vicinity, 
or various acts meant to represent effective occupation – an important concept within 
international law pertaining to claiming sovereignty over so-called no man’s land areas. 
An important means to effective occupation was creating various material symbols in 
the areas the states intended to claim. In the polar regions, such material symbols often 
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consisted of scientific research stations, established with state support. However, as 
Avango, Mathisen, Berg, Hacquebord, Arlov, and Wråkberg have shown, state actors 
could also use facilities established by extractive industries to attain their goals. 
Hacquebord has shown that whaling stations were already used as markers for 
territorial claims in the 17th century.12 Other well-known examples are the coal mining 
settlements at Spitsbergen and Bear Island (Svalbard), which, apart from delivering coal 
to northern energy markets, also became useful for the geo-political ambitions of 
Norway, Sweden, and Russia in the north in the early 20th century. The mining 
settlements were used to represent effective occupation during sovereignty claims of 
Spitsbergen and Bear Island.13 
 
Like the mining settlements on Svalbard, modern whaling establishments in the Arctic 
and Antarctic at the turn of the 20th century could have played a role in the political 
discussion of state actors who wanted to increase their political influence there. When 
the first whaling companies arrived in Spitsbergen, the coal mining industry had not 
really begun and only consisted of small-scale prospecting firms and their camps. It is 
reasonable to question, as Arlov did in his article in 1993, whether the modern whaling 
industry was used by the Norwegians to gain sovereignty over the archipelago. Based on 
the above-mentioned research, it is more than reasonable to assume that industrial 
activities such as whaling represented different things to different actors, depending on 
their goals. For actors with economic ambitions, whaling was a business activity that 
would hopefully generate a profit. For actors with (geo-) political ambitions, however, 
the same activity could be used to promote effective occupation of a certain territory. If 
such geo-political ambitions did exist, it is also interesting to explore to what extent 
these political goals were supported by the whaling industry. Perhaps the whaling 
industry simply used the political situation to gain political support for their activities – 
support that could be valuable during conflicts over territories and resources. 
                                                 
12 Hacquebord, L. Back to the Future. The Past, Present and Future of Resource Development in a changing 
Arctic. Journal of Northern Studies 2, 2009, p:14. 
13 Avango. D. Sveagruvan- Svensk gruvhantering mellan industri, diplomati och geovetenskap. 2005. 
Mathisen. T. Svalbard in International Politics- 1871–1925. 1954. Singh. E. B. The Spitsbergen (Svalbard) 
Question: United States Foreign Policy, 1907–1935. 1980. Berg. R. Norge på egen hånd 1905–1920. 1995. 
Arlov. T.B. Svalbards Historie. 2003. Wråkberg. U. Politik och vetenskap i A.E. Nordenskiölds 
ockupationsförsök av Spetsbergen år 1871–1873. In: Arktisk gruvdrift: Teknik, historia och 
industriminnesvård i norr. Editor. Wråkberg, U. 1999, and Vetenskapens Vikingatåg: Perspektiv på svensk 
polarforskning 1860–1930. 1999. L.Hacquebord, 2009. Back to the Future. The Past, Present and Future of 




Exploring the relationship between economic and political interests is a new approach 
to researching the history of the modern whaling industry and how it developed. 
 
Delimitations 
This thesis will focus on four former whaling stations in the Arctic and Antarctic that 
were in operation from 1904 to 1931. I chose 1904 as the start of my study because this 
was the year that modern whaling became established in the Arctic and Antarctic, and 
1931 as the end of my study because this was when many whaling stations in the polar 
regions were closed down in favour of pelagic whaling operations. The stations are: 
Finneset whaling station at Green Harbour in Spitsbergen (Svalbard), Walrus Bay 
whaling station on Bear Island (Svalbard), Prince Olav Harbour whaling station in South 
Georgia (sub-antarctic), and Signy Island whaling station on the South Orkney Islands 
(antarctic). I chose these stations because they were all in operation at more or less the 
same time. In addition, their geographical distribution within the Arctic and Antarctic 
offer comparative perspectives. These whaling stations were owned and operated by 
Norwegian, South African, and British companies, allowing comparisons of different 
technologies, strategies, and geo-politics. 
 
Where comparisons are suitable, I will include the results from previous research 
projects performed by Hacquebord (on Deception Island) and Basberg (in South 




Research on the history of the modern whaling industry has often focused on the 
economic development and activities of the industry. While economic aspects explain 
why the industry was established, they do not explain why or how whaling companies 
from different nations sustained their industrial operations in the Arctic and Antarctic. 
Neither do economic aspects explain how and why they achieved this by adapting 
technologies, organisations, strategies, and structures to these regions – and what the 
 9 
 
consequences of these choices were for their activities. Economic aspects alone do not 
provide insight into how and why different actors from different nations chose to exploit 
natural resources, and how this is reflected in different industrial cultures, symbolism, 
technology, and strategies used. To understand and explain how the modern whaling 
industry was established and sustained in the Arctic and Antarctic during 1904–1931, 
one has to consider (geo-) political, technical, social, and natural factors in addition to 
economic factors. 
 
Research into modern whaling history has often been written within a narrow national 
framework and with nationalistic undertones. Modern whaling has been described as a 
noble cause that fulfils the duty to harvest Gods creation,14 or as a heroic act of 
seamanship linked to polar heroism and a fascination for the sublimity of the polar 
regions.15 However, it is mostly considered as one of the most controversial industries in 
world history.16 
 
One of the most important works on whaling history is Tønnesen and Johnsen’s series of 
volumes entitled Den modene hvalfangstens historie – Opprinnelse og utvikling/The 
history of modern whaling – origin and development (1959–1970).17 There is a 
discrepancy between the title and the content, however, since it creates an expectation 
that their work encompasses a global history of whaling. In reality, it does not. Instead, it 
focuses almost exclusively on Norwegian whaling companies and their activities. This is 
in contrast to Jackson’s work from 1978, which has the more realistic title, The British 
Whaling Trade.18 Common characteristics of all these volumes are their business history 
and economic history approaches, which focus on the global economic trends that 
fuelled the whaling industry while paying less or no attention to how the whaling 
companies carried out their activities, how and why they designed their whaling 
stations, and how well these stations functioned. The authors do not explain how or why 
the whaling companies adapted their technologies, settlements, and social organisation 
                                                 
14 Hughes. T.P. Human-Built World: How to think about Technology and Culture. 2004. P: 10. 
15 Johnsen. A.O. Finnmarksfangsten. Vol: 1. 1959. P: 639. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse 
og utvikkling. See also: Nielsen. J.P. Ishavet er vår åker. 2004. P: 107. In: Norsk Polarhistorie. Vol 3. 
Drivenes. E.A & Jølle. H.D (editors). 
16 See for example Heazle. M. Scientific Uncertainty and the Politics of Whaling. 2006. 
17 Tønnesen, J.O.H and Johnsen, A.O. Den moderne hvalfangst historie. Vol 1–4. 1959–1970. 
18 Jackson, G. The British whaling trade. In: Research in maritime history. No 29. 1978. 
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to the environmental and political conditions in the polar areas. Neither do they 
consider the whaling companies’ strategies for controlling key resources or helping state 
actors to exercise sovereignty in areas where they carried out their whaling activities. 
However, despite my critical remarks in the above, it is fair to say that Tønnesen and 
Johnsen’s four volume work; Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikling 
(1959–1970) remains one of the most comprehensive works written on the history of 
the modern whaling industry. This work has also been published in English as an 
abridged single-volume version, entitled The History of Modern Whaling (1982). The 
books deal with many aspects of the industry, from its early developments in the 19th 
century up until the decay of the antarctic hunting grounds in the 1960s and the global 
closure of many whaling stations. As Basberg points out, the books coincide with the 
decline of whaling in the Antarctic.19 Their work has been an important source of 
knowledge in the process of writing this thesis, but I have found it necessary to read its 
content with a critical eye. Tønnesen and Johnsen’s work was commissioned and 
financed by the Norwegian whaling companies that operated in the Antarctic, which also 
appointed a reading committee that consisted of actors with interests in the industry.20 
The one-sided composition and funding of the work is reflected throughout the work, 
which often lacks analysis of how and why, favouring narratives with plenty of empirical 
detail but few explanations. 
 
Another important whaling historian was Risting, who in 1922 presented a similar 
explanation for the evolution of the industry and its expansion in Av Hvalfangstens 
Historie. Risting portrayed the history of the whaling industry as an almost exclusively 
Norwegian affair.21 An explanation for this might be that printing of the book was 
funded by several whaling companies in Norway.22 Yet the book provides detailed and 
useful information on the activities of the industry. Just like the work of Tønnesen and 
Johnsen, Risting’s book must be interpreted with some care. Risting was an active 
supporter of the whaling industry. He acted as secretary for the Norwegian Whaling 
                                                 
19 Basberg. B.L. In the wake of Tønnesen and Johnsen: Trends in whaling history research after 1970. 
Discussion Paper 19/05. Norwegian School of Economicsand Business administration. Economic history 
section. P: 2. 2005. 
20 Johnsen. A. O. Finnmarksfangstens Historie 1864–1905. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie-
Opprinnelsen og Utvikkling. Vol: 1. P: 9. 
21 Risting. S. Av Hvalfangstens Historie. 1922. 
22 Risting. S. Av Hvalfangstens Historie. 1922. See the introduction. 
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Union from 1918 to 1935 and as chief-editor of the periodical Norsk Hvalfangst Tidende. 
Another of Risting’s contributions was to initiate the International Whaling Statistics in 
1930. The above-mentioned The British Whaling Trade has been a useful source of 
knowledge.23 Jackson offered a more multifaceted explanation of the global growth and 
decline of British whaling, including the Antarctic, and focused on shifting markets and 
political circumstances. 
 
Nationalistic narratives that signal historical ties with polar regions are also a 
reoccurring feature in more recently published literature about polar history. One 
example is Into the Ice (2006), which depicts and glorifies Norwegian exploration and 
exploitation of polar regions.24 The authors argue that the modern whaling industry 
represented Norway’s first oil adventure – an idea suggested by Elstad in the three-
volume work Norsk Polar Historie (2004), on which the English edition is based.25 I 
agree that this is an interesting parallel to Norwegian companies’ more recent crude oil 
extractions, which have had a significant impact on “oil” communities in addition to 
Norway’s overall economic development. The modern whaling industry had similar 
effects in Sandefjord, Tønsberg, and to some extent also in Larvik. However, the volume 
contains some unfortunate errors. The authors argue that the first Norwegian whaling 
station in the South Atlantic Ocean was Grytviken in South Georgia.26 Although a 
Norwegian citizen (C.A. Larsen) played a key role as initiator and local station manager, 
this statement raises more than one eyebrow, since the company that founded, 
operated, and owned it was the Argentinean company Cia Argentina de Pesca,27 based in 
Buenos Aires. This company was owned by Argentinean capitalists and its board 
consisted of Argentinean citizens.28 
 
I would also like to mention Klaus Barthelmess here. He made substantial contributions 
to research on the modern whaling industry. His work on the German plans and 
                                                 
23 Jackson, G. The British whaling trade. In: Research in maritime history. No 29. 1978. 
24 Drivenes. E.A, and Jølle. H.D (Editors). Into the Ice: The History of Norway and the Polar Regions. 2006. 
25 Elstad. Å. Den første norske oljealderen. 2004. Pp: 275–315. In: Norsk PolarHistorie: Rikedommene. Vol: 
3. Drivenes. E.A & Jølle. H.D (editors). See also: Drivenes. E.A, and Jølle. H. D (editors). Into the Ice: The 
History of Norway and the Polar Regions. 2006. P: 171f. 
26 Drivenes. E.A & Jølle. H.D (editors). Into the Ice – The History of Norway and the Polar Regions. 2006. P: 
171. 
27 Hart. I.B. PESCA: A History of the Pioneer Modern Whaling Company in the Antarctic. 2001. Pp: 1–564. 
28 Headland. R. K. The History of South Georgia. (2009, 2nd edition). P: 64f. 
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strategies to claim Bear Island in the Arctic has been of great value to me in this thesis.29 
Unfortunately, Klaus passed away before he could share and publish more of his 
knowledge of the modern whaling industry. 
 
In addition to these more overarching studies on the industry, there is a rich literature 
focusing on specific geographical locations and whaling stations. Dickinson and Sanger’s 
book Twentieth Century Shore-Station Whaling in Newfoundland and Labrador (2005) is 
an excellent example. The authors not only analyse the driving forces behind the 
establishment of the whaling industry there, but also its social implications. Another 
example is Bockstoce’s Steam Whaling in the Western Arctic (1977), and Whales, Ice, and 
Men; The History of Whaling in the Western Arctic (1995), which focuses on the whaling 
industry in Alaska and Canada. In much of his work, Bockstoce demonstrated an often 
overlooked aspect of the whaling industry in the Arctic – the interactions between the 
whaling industry and their employees, and how important the local knowledge of the 
indigenous Inuit population was for the outcome of whaling activities. The author placed 
the whaling industry in context of a nationalisation process of northern Alaska and 
Canada, and showed how the authorities actively used the whaling industry’s presence, 
activities, and installations to enhance and enforce territorial control. Another author is 
Webb, who focused on whaling in the Pacific in On the Northwest – Commercial Whaling 
in the Pacific Northwest 1790–1967 (1988). Here, he focuses on the whaling industry in 
the coastal waters of Washington, British Columbia, and south-eastern Alaska. Much like 
Bockstoce, Webb also deals with the social dimensions of the industry. Other work 
worth mentioning here is Davis, Gallman, and Gleiter’s In Pursuit of Leviathan. 
Technology, Institutions, Productivity, and Profits in American Whaling, 1816–1906 
(1997). Recent work on the American whaling industry has also focused on the material 
remains of the whaling industry, in particular Hershel Island, which was recently 
documented. The results of this survey provided an interesting basis for future 
comparative circumpolar studies on the design of whaling stations in terms of 
                                                 
29 Barthelmess. K. The Bear Island Expeditions of the German Sea Fisheries Association as Camouflage for 
Secret German Government Plans to Occupy the Island, 1897–1900. 1998. In: Aspects of Arctic and Sub-
Arctic History. Editor: Sigurðsson. I, and Skaptason. J. Also in: Bäreninsel 1898 und 1899: Wie Theodor 
Lerner eine Geheimmission des Deutchen Seefischerei-Vereins zur Schaffung einer deutchen Arktis-Kolonie 
unwissentlich durchkreutze. 2009. In: Polarforchung 78 (1–2). Pp: 67–71. Barr. W. The Helgoland 
Expedition to Svalbard: Die Deutche Expedition in das Nördliche Eismeer, 1898. 1988. In: Arctic, Vol: 41. No 




technology and settlement plans in different environmental circumstances and cultural 
contexts. 
 
Much literature has focused on the activities and history of individual whaling 
companies. Some of these are jubilee publications, such as Firma Thor Dahl of H. Bogen 
(1937).30 Others are celebratory jubilee narratives, like Aktieselskabet Ørnen 10/1 1903- 
10/1 1953. 50 Års Hvalfangst (1953),31 and Femti år I konkurranse og fremgang; 
Aktieselskabet Tønsberg Hvalfangeri 1907–1957 by Wasberg.32 Although these books 
were written as popular history, essentially presenting success stories in a top-down 
manner, they provide important information on individual companies. More recently, 
two comprehensive studies have been published on the former whaling industry in 
South Georgia. One is Ian. B. Hart’s Pesca: The History of Compaña Argentina de Pesca 
Sociedad Anónima of Buenos Aires – An Account of the Pioneer Modern Whaling and 
Sealing Company in the Antarctic (2001), which is a comprehensive and highly detailed 
book on the history of this Argentinean company. The book is highly descriptive, 
however, and lacks a central hypothesis and research question. The same author has 
also written Whaling in the Falkland Islands Dependencies 1904–1931: A History of Shore 
and Bay-Based Whaling in the Antarctic (2006). Here, Hart focused more on the overall 
development of the modern whaling industry within the British-claimed sector in the 
Antarctic, rather than on any individual company. Similar to his earlier work, the book is 
detailed and provides interesting information on the industry, and is as such an 
important contribution to our knowledge of the industry in the Antarctic. In spite of this, 
much of the information presented in these two books is difficult to verify, since the 
author does not provide any references. 
 
Elliot’s book, A Whaling Enterprise: Salvesen in the Antarctic (1998), narrates the history 
of Christian Salvesen & Co, but also describes the family history as the author is the great 
grandson of the company’s founder. The book presents a chronological overview of the 
company and its activities without questioning or analysing many of their activities in a 
larger context. The work, which is largely based on the author’s memories, is 
                                                 
30 Bogen. H. Firma Thor Dahl, Sandefjord 1887–1937, 1 Oktober. Jubileumsskrift. Oslo 1937. 
31 Bogen. H.S.I. Aktieselskabet Ørnen 10/1 1903– 10/1 1953, 50 Års Hvalfangst. Sandefjord 1953. 




occasionally linked to Johnsen’s and Tønnensen’s four-volume work. A more recent and 
important contribution is Odd Galtelands Hvalfangst på Syd Georgia: A/S Sandefjords 
Hvalfangerselskab / A/S Vestfolds fangst fra landstasjonen Strømnes 1906–1931 (2009). 
The author approached and analysed the history of the whaling company as a network 
of individuals, and described how they operated in relation to economic, political, and 
technical factors on a national and international scale, through the merger with A/S 
Ocean in 1920 until the station was closed in 1931.33 In summary, it can be concluded 
that the publications mentioned here are rich in detail, which has occasionally been 
valuable for this work, but with little explanation of the emergence, development, and 
decline of the companies being discussed. 
 
The material culture of the modern whaling industry has not been well studied on site. 
The Norwegian Antarctic Research Expeditions (NARE) have done so during three 
fieldwork campaigns in South Georgia. A similar industrial archaeological expedition 
was done by Dutch researchers. This expedition focused on documenting the remains of 
the Hektor whaling station at Deception Island, which was partly covered by volcanic 
activity.34 This expedition has made important comparisons of the design and layout of 
the whaling stations included in this thesis. The NARE expeditions in South Georgia 
yielded a number of fieldwork reports, articles, and a book entitled The Shore Whaling 
Stations at South Georgia: A Study in Antarctic Industrial Archaeology. Basberg, 
Nævestad, and Rossnes have argued that the industry’s technological development can 
easily be studied and understood with the help of patents and archives.35 It is true that 
these sources provide an insight into the development of the industry, as well as the 
possible ambitions of the companies – however, they do not provide any information on 
why, how, and in which contexts these solutions developed, and what consequences 
they had on the sustainability of the industry as a whole. One hazard of basing one’s 
analysis entirely on these types of sources is that many of the designs and patents 
adopted by the companies were often re-designed, altered, and adapted in the polar 
                                                 
33 Galteland. O. Hvalfangst på Syd Georgia: A/S Sandefjords Hvalfangerselskab / A/S Vestfolds fangst fra 
landstasjonen Strømnes 1906–1931.. P: 11. 2009 
34 Hacquebord, L. Hector station on Deception Island (South Shetland Islands, Antarctica), an environmental 
assessment study of a whaling station. Pp: 72–97. In: Circumpolar Journal. 1–2, Volume 7, Antarctica; 
Research and nature conservation, future prospects.1992. 
35 Basberg. B. L, Nævestad. D, and Rossnes. G. Industrial Archaeology at South Georgia: methods and results. 
P: 51. In: Polar Record. No 32 (180). Pp: 51–66. 1996. 
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environment to the circumstances under which the industry operated. What is 
important here is that these changes were rarely reported.36 I would therefore argue 
that to be able to understand and answer questions about adaptation, it is important to 
use a methodological approach that combines written sources with the study and 
documentation of material remains on site. Basberg has, in addition to the publication 
mentioned above, written extensively on technology, patents, and on the history of 
modern whaling elsewhere. These publications have been important in the course of this 
research. 
 
In addition to the above-mentioned works, there is an abundance of reminiscent and 
descriptive books and articles, which in themselves are highly interesting as they give an 
insight into everyday life on whaling stations. A few examples include Fraser’s Shetland’s 
Whalers Remember (2001), Gordon’s Whaling Thoughts Recalled, and Pettersen’s Syd 
Georgia-Eventyrenes øy (1999). 
 
Another set of volumes has been produced over the last decade that document scientific 
research on the history of whaling promoted by Christian Christensen’s Whaling 
Museum in Norway. All four volumes, entitled Whaling and History, are conference 
publications from four international conferences on different aspects of whaling 
history.37 Parallel to this, the museum has also published an annual year book entitled 
Ambra, which contains a number of whaling related themes. 
 
Research on the relationship between industrial exploitation and geo-political ambitions 
in the polar regions has been incorporated more into historical research over the last 
few decades. In the Arctic, the relationship between industry and geo-politics is 
especially well documented. In his thesis, Avango shows how the Swedish and the 
Norwegian governments actively used and endorsed the presence of coal mines owned 
by companies from their own countries through support purchases and covert funding. 
                                                 
36 Gustafsson, U.I, and Basberg, B.L. From NARE to LASHIPA…and Beyond. In: Proceedings of SGHT 
Conference in Dundee, Scotland. 2011. 
37 See Whaling & History: Perspectives on the Evolution of the Industry. Publication no 29/ 1993, Whaling & 
History II; New Perspectives. Publication no 31/ 2006, and Whaling & History III; Papers presented at a 
symposium in Sandefjord on the 18th and 19th of June 2009. Publication no 33/ 2010. Ringstad. J.E (editor) 
2006, 2010, and Ringstad. J.E, Basberg. B.L, and Wexelsen. E (editors). Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s 
Hvalfangstmuseum, Sandefjord, Norway. 
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The industrial activities of these coal mining companies, and the territorial claims they 
made in Spitsbergen and Bear Island (Svalbard), played important roles during the 
negotiations of the legal status of the archipelago.38 This process is also discussed by 
Singh in The Spitsbergen (Svalbard) Question: United States Foreign Policy 1907–1935 
(1980). In this work, the author takes a starting point in the industrial activities of the 
American coal mining company Arctic Coal Company.39 Berg takes a different approach 
in Norge på egen hånd 1905–1920 (1995). He focused on the development of a 
Norwegian polar policy and the strategies aimed at gaining sovereignty over the 
archipelago. He placed this in context of the imperialistic ambitions of a newly 
independent Norway. With Europe involved in the First World War, the Norwegian 
government gained ownership over industrial projects on the archipelago. During the 
same period, scientific expeditions and telegraph stations were used to enhance 
presence and claims.40Arlov discussed the relationship between industry and geo-
politics in his ambitiously titled book Svalbards Historie (2003), but perhaps not as 
extensively as others. As mentioned earlier, Arlov hypothesised a potential relationship 
between the modern whaling industry and Norway’s geo-political ambitions in his 
article Whaling and Sovereignty: The Role of Whaling in the Struggle for Supremacy over 
Svalbard (Spitsbergen).41 In a 2008 article, Gustafsson discussed these issues further and 
revealed new information on the relationship between whaling and geo-politics.42 
 
Similar relationships between science and politics have been researched thoroughly by 
Wråkberg, Sörlin, and Friedmann. In a number of publications, they demonstrate that 
the driving forces behind the accumulation of cartographical and geographical 
knowledge during the 19th and 20th centuries can be linked to contemporary 
imperialistic ambitions. These expeditions were difficult undertakings, and in their wake 
followed tales of hardship that were often written by the expedition members 
                                                 
38 Avango. D. Sveagruvan- Svensk gruvhantering mellan industri, diplomati och geovetenskap. 2005. 
39 Singh. E. C. The Spitsbergen (Svalbard) Question: United States Foreign Policy, 1907–1935. 1980. 
40 Berg. R. Norge på egen hånd 1905–1920. 1995. In: Norsk Utenrikspolitikks Historie. Vol: 2. See also: 
Ruud. J. Spitsbergen Radio 1911, et ledd i norsk suverenitetsstrev?. Master dissertation in History. NTNU. 
2000. 
41 Arlov. T.B. Whaling and Sovereignty. The role of whaling in the struggle for supremacy over Svalbard 
(Spitsbergen). 1993. In: Whaling & History. Publication no 29. Editors: Ringstad. J.E, Basberg. B.L, and 
Wexelsen. E. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum, Sandefjord, Norway. Of the same author, 
see also: Svalbards Historie. 2003. 
42 Gustafsson. U.I. Modern Whaling Industry in Spitsbergen as a tool for territorial claiming and national 
sovereignty strives. 2008. In: Patrimoine de l’industrie/ Industrial Patrimony; Resources, Practices, 
Cultures. TICCHI. Editor: Bergeron. L. 
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themselves. These narratives linked to a sublime fascination for great unknown 
frontiers, and became in many ways integrated into the identity of the polar regions.43 
In his book, Pink Ice: Britain and the South Atlantic Empire (2002), Klaus Dodds 
discusses and analyses the political struggles in the Antarctic, and how and with what 
results different nations used different strategies to secure territorial control. Peder 
W.C. Roberts’s thesis A Frozen Field of Dreams: Science, Strategy, and the Antarctic in 
Norway, Sweden, and the British Empire 1912–1952 (2010) is a new and important 
contribution to the field of antarctic exploration and its political and commercial 
relationships. The author has also published several articles on political strategies and 
policy making in the Antarctic. 
 
Patricia Seed’s book Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World 
1492–1640 (1995) does not focus on the polar regions but on the rituals and ceremonial 
acts aimed at securing ownership and control of territories. 44 These are as valid today as 
they were centuries ago and can be used to analyse similar strategies and symbols in the 
polar regions. 
 
Today, whaling is, perhaps more than ever, a heated and debated topic that incorporates 
governmental and non-governmental bodies, as well as commercial companies involved 
in tourism. Although the ethical and moral aspects are outside the scope of this thesis, I 
would like to mention the recent studies by Kalland,45 Freeman,46 Heazle,47 and Stoett,48 
which discuss and analyse the complexity of whales and whaling and the many 
stakeholders involved. 
 
                                                 
43 Wråkberg. U. Vetenskapens Vikingatåg: Perpektiv på svensk polarforskning 1860–1930. 1999. See also: 
The Politics of Naming: Contested Observations and the Shaping of Geographical Knowledge. 2002. In: 
Narrating the Arctic: A Cultural History of Nordic Scientific Practices. Sörlin. S, and Bravo. M (editors). Pp: 
155–198. Sörlin. S. Rituals and Resources of Natural History: The North and the Arctic in Swedish Scientific 
Nationalism. 2002. In: Narrating the Arctic: A Cultural History of Nordic Scientific Practices. Sörlin. S, and 
Bravo. M (editors). Pp: 73–124. See also: Framtidlandet: Debatten om Norrland och naturresurserna under 
det industriella genombrottet. 1988. Friedmann. R. M. Nansenismen. 2004. In: Norsk PolarHistorie. Vol: 2. 
Pp: 107–174. 
44 Seed. P. Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World 1492–1640. 1995. 
45 Kalland. A. Unveiling the Whale: Discourses on Whales and Whaling. 2011, and Miljøkonflikter: Om bruk 
og vern av naturresurser. 2001. 
46 Freeman. M. Elephants and Whales: Resources for Whom? 1995. 
47 Heazle. M. Scientific Uncertainty and the Politics of Whaling. 2006. 
48 Stoett. P.J. The International Politics of Whaling. 1997. 
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During the last two decades, a few industrial archaeological research projects were 
undertaken in the Arctic and Antarctic. These have combined written sources with the 
study and documentation of material remains in the polar landscapes. Two projects in 
particular have, as mentioned earlier, focused on the remains of former whaling stations 
and used them as sources for historical research. These are The Netherlands Antarctic 
Expedition executed in 1990/91 by the Arctic Centre/University of Groningen, and the 
NARE South Georgia Industrial Archaeology Project executed from 1989/90 to 1996/97. 
These two projects supplied vital data, which have been integrated into this thesis for 
comparisons. While the results of the Dutch expedition are presented in Antarctica: 
Research and Nature Conservation, Future Prospects,49 (1992), the results of the NARE 
expedition are available in a number of site-reports, which include site maps and photo 
documentary. In addition to these, the book The Shore Whaling Stations at South 
Georgia: A Study in Antarctic Industrial Archaeology was published in 2004.50 
Participants of the NARE expedition reported on other aspects of the whaling industry in 
a number of articles, where they focused on various technical and organisational 
aspects, as well as the documentation of industrial heritage.51 
 
In addition to these two projects, a similar methodological approach was adopted by the 
Swedish Cultural Science Research Programme (1998–2001), which was executed by 
the Swedish Academy of Science and the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm. 
During this project, several industrial and scientific sites in the Arctic were visited and 
documented. One of the outcomes of this project was the previously mentioned PhD 
                                                 
49 Circumpolar Journal. 1–2, Volume 7, Antarctica; Research and nature conservation, future prospects. See 
especially: Hacquebord. L. Hector station on Deception Island (South Shetland Islands, Antarctica), an 
environmental assessment study of a whaling station. Pp: 72–97. 1992. 
50 See: Dokumentasjon av hvalfangststasjonen Husvik Harbour/ Syd Georgia, and Dokumentasjon av 
hvalfangststasjonen Stromness Harbour/ Syd Georgia. 1989/90, Dokumentasjon av hvalfangststasjonen 
Grytviken/ Syd Georgia. 1992/93, Dokumentasjonen av hvalfangststasjonen Leith Harbour/ Syd Georgia. 
1996/97, and: Basberg. B.L. The Shore Whaling Stations at South Georgia; A Study in Antarctic Industrial 
Archaeology. 2004. 
51 See for example: Basberg. B.L. Productivity in the 20th Century Antarctic pelagic and Shore Station 
Whaling. Growth and Stagnation in two Technical Regimes. In: The Great Circle. Vol: 19, No 2. 1997, and 
The Floating Factory: Dominant Designs and Technological Development of the Twentieth Century Whaling 
Factory Ships. In: The Northern Mariner. Vol: 8, No: 1, 1998.A Ship Ashore? Organisation and living 
conditions at South Georgia whaling stations, 1904–1960. In: International Journal of Maritime History. Vol: 
XIV, No: 1, 2002. See also: Rossnes. G. Hvalfangsten og kulturminner. Hektor Hvalfangststasjon. In: Norsk 
Sjøfartsmuseums Årbok. 1996, and Overvintringsfeltet I økologisk og kulturteoretisk perspektiv- fangstfeltet 
som kulturlandskap. 2008. In: Polarboken 2007/2008. 
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thesis by Avango. In addition to this, a number of articles were published by M. Nisser, U. 
Wråkberg, U.I. Gustafsson, K. Awebro, and S. Sörlin.52 
 
Theory and method 
To generate explanations and answer the research questions, I have used a theoretical 
framework based on actor-network theory (ANT) developed by Bruno Latour and John 
Law. I have several rationales for doing so. Firstly, in line with research into the history 
of technology over the last decades, I take it as a point of departure that industrial 
activities, such as whaling, need to be understood and studied as socio-technical entities. 
This is essential because whaling industrialists needed to do much more than invent a 
technological artefact as a harpoon with an explosive arrow-head and fire it from a 
harpoon gun on a steam powered ship to successfully develop whaling in the polar 
regions. Although such inventions were important, whaling industrialists needed to 
place the technological component of their production within wide-ranging networks 
consisting of technology, personnel (workers, foremen, and engineers), organisations 
distributing and selling whale oil and by products, investors, and political decision 
makers. The growth of whaling in the polar regions cannot be explained without taking 
the full range of societal components into consideration. Secondly, while the societal 
dimensions are fundamentally important, I am convinced that social determinism would 
deliver equally unsatisfying results. The whaling industry in the polar regions was 
developed in an environment that was more challenging than in other parts of the world. 
Therefore, it is necessary to consider the environment as fundamental to the large 
networks that whaling companies built. To be able to include the arctic and antarctic 
environments in my analyses, the obvious choice among the many social constructivist 
approaches to the history of technology was ANT. ANT has been employed successfully 
in analyses of the growth of large production (or other) systems because it includes 
technologies, settlements, individual and organisational actors, and natural 
environments in its analysis.53 
                                                 
52 See for example: Narrating the Arctic: A Cultural History of Nordic Scientific Practices. 2002. Sörlin. S, and 
Bravo. M (editors), and Nisser. M. A Modern Concept of Industry within Traditional Boundaries. 2007. In: 
Industry and Modernism. Pp: 98–122. Kervanto Nevanlinna. A (editor), and Industry in the Nordic and 
Baltic Region and its Role in Urban Transformation, an overview. 2008. In: Cinis. 
53 Avango, D. Sveagruvan- Svensk gruvhantering mellan industri, diplomati och geovetenskap. 2005, Avango. 




ANT supplies a set of theoretical and methodological tools that can be used to analyse 
and explain how and why industrial projects (such as whaling) commence, develop, and 
eventually close. A central concept within the ANT framework is the network builder – 
the leaders of the whaling companies being studied. I will use this term instead of other 
more common but diffuse terms, such as leading actors, to designate the actors who 
construct and control actor networks.54 The term “network builder” is more adequate 
for describing what the whaling company leaders did. 
 
To build successful industrial operations, network builders construct an actor network 
consisting of two closely integrated parts – a global and a local network. 55 The global 
network consists of actors who have the necessary financial resources and political 
influence to make the industrial projects possible. These global network actors may 
invest money in whaling company shares, buy whale oil, or give concessions for whaling. 
To get the resources necessary to launch whaling operations in polar regions, the 
network builders had to enrol such actors to their global network. The local network, on 
the other hand, consists of the industrial operations themselves. In this thesis, the local 
network is comprised of the whaling stations and the infrastructures that connected 
them to the world markets. The local networks of whaling companies consisted of 
technological artefacts, such as ships with harpoon guns, whaling stations with 
cookeries for blubber, meat and bones, housing units, service buildings, and docks. They 
also consisted of employees – whaling station workers, workers on board the ships, 
foremen, engineers, and higher level managers. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Vol 3, no 2, Pp 431–446. 2013, Law, J. Technology and Heterogenous Engineering: The case of Portuguese 
expansion. In: The Social Construction of Technological Systems – New directions in the sociology and 
history of technology. Pp: 111–134. 1989. 
54 See Avango, D. Sveagruvan- Svensk gruvhantering mellan industri, diplomati och geovetenskap 2005, Law, 
J and Callon. M. The life and death of an aircraft: A network analysis of technical change. In: Shaping 
Technology/ Building society – Studies in sociotechnical change. Bijker,W.E and Law, J. (editors). Pp:21–52. 
1992. 
55 The actor network includes people, funding and politics, as well as technologies, knowledge’s and the 
natural environment, elements and factors that directly or indirectly might have an effect on the outcome 
of the industrial project. See: Summerton. J. Stora Tekniska System: En introduction till forskningsfältet. 
1998. Pp: 19–44. In: Den Konstruerade Världen: Tekniska system I historiskt perspektiv. Blomquist. P, and 
Kaijser. A (editors). See also: Law. J and Callon. M. The Life and Death of an Aircraft: A Network Analysis of 
Technical Change. 1992. P: 29. In: Shaping Technology/ Building Society: Studies in SocioTechnical 
Change. Bijker. W. E, and Law. (editors).  
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The network builder’s most important task was to enrol actors to become part of these 
networks. These actors can be individuals and organisations, but also non-human actors, 
such as technological artefacts or environmental elements (e.g., a melt-water stream or a 
natural harbour). Non-human actors do not usually act or speak for themselves; instead 
they do so through actor spokespersons (usually the network builder). Non-human 
actors are called actants. 
To ensure whaling industries were successful ventures, the network builders had to 
build sufficiently strong global and local networks, and make sure that there was a 
constant flow of resources between the local and global networks. The local networks 
(the whaling stations) had to produce whale oil products for the market, thereby 
providing the actors in the global networks with the expected economic (or political) 
returns. The actors in the global network on the other hand, had to deliver the resources 
necessary to maintain production, i.e., additional investments or new concessions. If the 
network builder is unable to maintain their position as the obligatory point of passage, 
they can no longer control the resources supplied by the global network, and are 
therefore not able to claim responsibility for the success of the local network and profit 
from it.56 
In this thesis, I will focus on the leaders of the whaling companies and the network 
builders, and study how they built and maintained their local and global networks in the 
Arctic and Antarctic. 
 
A third rationale for using ANT is that it provides me with a theoretical and 
methodological tool for widening the scope of sources by including archaeological 
sources. ANT scholars of the history of technology and leading archaeologists have 
convincingly shown that material objects form an active part of any society. They are not 
passive reflections of those societies, but take part in their construction by, for instance, 
legitimizing power, naturalizing certain ideas, or othering social groups. In the ANT 
model I am using, artefacts form an important part of the local networks and must 
function well if the local networks are to deliver. Thus, artefacts are involved in 
historical change and therefore need to be included in the analyses if we want to 
                                                 
56 Law. J, and Callon. M. The Life and Death of an Aircraft: A Network Analysis of Technical Change. 1992. P: 
31f. In: Shaping Technology/ Building Society: Studies in Socio-Technical Change. Pp: 20–52. 
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sufficiently explain historical change.57 Following this, the preferable method for 
gathering sources for this theses is a historical-archaeological approach that combines 
written sources with archaeological sources. For this reason, I have conducted both 
archival research and archaeological fieldwork at abandoned whaling stations in the 
Arctic and Antarctic (further described in the section on sources). 
 
It could be argued that information on the design of whaling stations down to individual 
artefacts might be found in archived documents, such as maps and patents. There are 
three problems with such an approach, however. The first is that these documents were 
drawn by people who knew the working of those stations inside out. The same cannot be 
said about the historical archaeologist who is trained in explaining the history of 
whaling engineering. By documenting and analysing the physical remains of the stations, 
I have acquired a deep understanding of how the production process and settlements 
were designed, and why they were designed the way they were. The second problem is 
that archived maps of stations are usually different from the way the stations were 
actually built because station engineers altered their designs, adapting them to local 
conditions.58 The third problem is the double nature of maps and reports. Even though 
some of them represented what the whaling companies had actually built in the Arctic 
or Antarctic, others were more like tools that companies used to convince others to 
support them (investors, customers, or political decision makers). They could be tools 
aimed at sustaining support from the global network for the companies’ activities. 
 
For all these reasons, it is important to use a methodological approach that combines 
traditional analyses of archived sources with surveys, documentation, and analysis of 
the sites in question. This approach is important as it allows the researcher to test and 
compare statements in reports and maps, and gives insight into the ambitions and plans 
of the network builders.59 Combining material remains with written sources, 
photographs, maps, and surveys has allowed me to ask how and why the modern 
                                                 
57 Avango, D. Industriarvet idag. In: Bebyggelsehistorisk tidskrift. Pp: 5–9. 2013. Tilley, M and Shanks, T.Y. 
Re-constructing Archaeology: Theory and Practice. 1992. Avango. D. Aktanter I Ingemanslandet: Den 
svenska gipsbrytningen på Svalbard.. P: 173. In: Industrins avtryck: Perspektiv på ett forskningsfält. 
Avango. D, and Lundström. B (editors). Pp: 173–206. 2003. 
58 Gustafsson, U.I, and Basberg, B.L. From NARE to LASHIPA…and Beyond.. In: Proceedings of SGHT 
Conference in Dundee, Scotland. 2011 
59 Avango, D and Hacquebord, L. The Value of industrial Heritage sites in the Polar areas as sources for 
Historical Research.. In: Proceedings of SGHT Conference in Dundee, Scotland. 2011 
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whaling industry developed in the polar areas because it extends beyond traditional 
explanations (such as market fluctuations) to include technical, social, environmental, 
and political factors. These factors are all important to explaining the driving forces 
behind the establishment, sustainment, and eventual closure of these whaling stations. 
 
To explain why network builders successfully built their actor networks, I will observe 
another methodological principle of ANT – to follow the process by which the actors 
built their industrial operations (i.e., their local and global networks). Only then is it 
possible to explain who they enrolled, why they enrolled them, what the consequences 
were, and why. It is important to do so without projecting any pre-determined 
explanation of which factors determined the development and outcome of the whaling 
projects.60 
 
Network builders construct their actor networks in different phases. In the construction 
phase of an actor network, the network builders define a problem to which they claim to 
have a solution. Such a problem might be a lack of oils and fats on the market. A solution 
to this problem could be to establish whaling stations in the Arctic and Antarctic where 
there are plenty of whale populations to harvest. To convince – or enrol – actors to their 
global network, the network builders create and use tools. Such tools can be scientific 
reports, prospects, and maps as well as a barrage of rhetoric explanation of the potential 
and feasibility of their projects. Network builders will typically use different tools 
depending on the interests of the actors they want to enrol or maintain support from. 
This is because different actors may have different goals for supporting whaling 
companies. While an investor and capitalist may have economic motives, state actors 
might have geo-political goals. Industrial projects can therefore be an economic activity 
and geo-political tool at the same time.61 Consequently, industrial projects in the polar 
                                                 
60 Latour. B. Science in Action: How to follow scientists and engineers through society. 1987. P: 145f. See 
also: Law. J. Technology and Heterogeneous Engineering: The Case of Portuguese Expansion. 1989. P: 130. 
In: The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of 
Technology. Pp: 111–134. 
61 Law. J and Callon. M. The Life and Death of an Aircraft: A Network Analysis of Technical Change.. P: 24. In: 




regions have an interpretative flexibility, depending on the interest of the actors 
supporting (or opposing) it.62 
 
Although this flexibility can apply to companies as a whole, production sites such as 
whaling stations could be a particularly important geo-political resource for state actors. 
As mentioned earlier, the legal status of several parts of the polar regions was uncertain 
and often disputed in the early 20th century. Based on the legal doctrine of the law of 
effective occupation, however, states that could prove continuous usage and settlement 
in a no man’s land would gain a better right to sovereignty there. This meant that if a 
British company built a station in an area where the British government wanted 
sovereignty, the British government would be able to claim effective British occupation 
there. Using ANT terminology, such a scenario would make the station an actant 
working on behalf of British colonialism. 
 
It could be argued that using an economic market theory that describes the circulation of 
goods and the distribution of resources between entrepreneurs is suitable when 
studying an industry such as the modern whaling industry.63 Arguing that the economic 
market is a part of any actor network would be incorrect, but actors in the economic 
market can arguably be an integrated part of an actor network, depending on their 
interests and goals. In this context, it should also be noted that within economic theory 
there is a strong school of ANT supporters who do not view the economic market as a 
unified whole, but rather as an intertwined system of actor networks that are linked to 
each other in a complex and multi-layered web. The evolution, stabilisation, and decay of 
industries, technologies, and technical projects such as the modern whaling industry, as 
well as their social, political, cultural, and environmental impacts is a complex process 
that can only be fully understood and analysed by applying a theoretical framework, 
such as ANT, which encourages us to incorporate all elements (human and non-human). 
                                                 
62 Misa. T.J.Controversy and Closure in Technological Change: Constructing steel. In: Shaping 
Technology/Building Society – Studies in sociotechnical change. Bijker. W.E & Law.J (editors). P: 109. 
1992 
63 Callon. M. Actor-network theory, the market test. In: Actor Network Theory and after. P: 182. 
 Law.J & Hassard. J. (editors). 1999 
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Sources and criticism 
The research questions have been answered using a combination of archival sources 
(photographs, diaries, logbooks, letters, official documents, maps, and drawings) and 
surveys and documentations of a number of industrial sites in the Arctic and Antarctic. 
In addition to this, the thesis builds on previous historical research and research 
projects, such as the Deception Island project of the First Netherlands Antarctic 
Expedition and the NARE South Georgia Industrial Archaeological Project. These 
projects provide a basis for contextualisation and comparative analysis on several 
aspects of the modern whaling industry. 
Archives 
◦ Norway: Norwegian Polar Institute, Tromsø Statsarkiv, Gamvik 
Museum, Sandefjord Whaling Museum, Vestfold Fylkesarkiv in 
Tønsberg, Larvik Museum, Norsk Teknisk Museum, the 
National Library, Norsk Telemuseum and Norsk Folkemuseum 
in Oslo, as well as the kind support and private contributions 
and interest of the Ingebrigtsen and Skontorp families. 
 
◦ Great Britain: The British Antarctic Surveys and the Scott Polar Research 
Institute in Cambridge, the British National Archives in 
London, and the United Kingdom Hydrographical Office, as 
well as the kind support of Dick Laws and the estate of David 
Wynn-Williams. 
 
◦ USA: Michigan Technological University archive in Houghton. 
 
◦ The Falkland Islands: Stanley museum archives and the Governor’s archives. 
 
◦ The Netherlands The Dutch National Archives, archives of the Arctic Centre 
University of Groningen. 
 




◦ Germany Senckenberg museum archives, Frankfurt. 
 
◦ Australia The private collection of Glenn McIntosh 
 
Fieldworks 
◦ 2007 LASHIPA 4 Archaeological Expedition on Svalbard. August 2–
25. 
 The purpose of this field campaign was to document the 
remains of Finneset whaling station/Spitsbergen and to survey 
and document other sites related to modern whaling industry 
activities here. The results of the expedition were published in 
the LASHIPA 4 Report.64 
 
◦ 2008 LASHIPA 5 Archaeological Expedition on Bear Island. July 27–
August 17. The purpose of this field campaign was to survey 
and document the remains of Walrus Bay whaling station and 
its related sites on Bear Island. Other sites on Bear Island were 
also documented to provide data for other projects within the 
LASHIPA IPY project.65 
 
◦ 2009 LASHIPA 6 Archaeological Expedition at South Georgia. March 
3–April 1. The purpose of this field campaign was two-fold: 1) 
to gather data and document the remains of Prince Olav 
Harbour whaling station in South Georgia, and 2) to gather 
data on how rituals and symbols were used in South Georgia, 
and what geo-political roles the whaling and research stations 
played. In addition, the team documented Ocean Harbour 
whaling station, the only remaining whaling station on South 
Georgia that was not documented before.66 
                                                 
64 LASHIPA 4 Archaeological expedition on Svalbard, August 2–25,2007. Arctic Centre, University of 
Groningen, Netherlands. 
65 LASHIPA 5 Archaeological expedition on Spitsbergen (and Bear Island) 27.July – 17.august 2008. Arctic 
Centre, University of Groningen, Netherlands. 




◦ 2010 LASHIPA 8 Archaeological Expedition in the Antarctic. March 
6–April 3. The purpose of this field campaign was to document 
the remains of the former whaling station and its related sites 
at Signy Island in the South Orkney Islands. The expedition 
also gathered data on how rituals and symbols were used, and 
what geo-political roles the whaling and research stations 
played in the South Orkney Islands, the Antarctic Peninsula, 
and the South Shetland Islands. The team also documented the 
Hektor Whaling station on Deception Island.67 
All data gathered during the above-mentioned fieldwork campaigns have also been post-
processed and stored in a database developed within the framework of the International 
Polar Year 2007–2008. This data is available at: 
http://gcmd.nasa.gov/getdif.htm?Historical_Resource_Exploitation_Avango_IPY10_NL. 
 
I have interpreted the official company records and statistical data found in archives 
with caution, since whaling companies in the Antarctic operated under concession 
where statistical catch data supplied the basis for taxation and fees. In other words, the 
whaling companies could have had an incentive to manipulate the data. This data has 
been collected and compiled by the International Whaling Commission. I have used their 
official catch data, with the additional catch data extracted from logbooks. 
 
Maps and reports commissioned or written by the whaling companies give insight into 
their activities and of the spatial layout of the stations. These reports could potentially 
be used as rhetorical documents to convince capitalists to invest in the company. These 
maps have been geo-referenced and tested in the field to test their validity. The source 
value of these derelict whaling stations for historical research must not be 
underestimated. Combined with traditional archival sources and used within a 
theoretical and methodological framework such as ANT, they can be a powerful tool for 
answering both how and why questions in historical research.68 
 
                                                 
67 Svenska Polarforskningssekretariatets årsbok 2010, pp: 10–12. 
68 Avango, D and Hacquebord, L. The Value of industrial Heritage sites in the Polar areas as sources for 
Historical Research. 2011. In: Proceedings of SGHT Conference in Dundee, Scotland p. 7–32. 
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Outline of this book 
This book is divided into eleven chapters. Two of these contextualise the development of 
the modern whaling industry in the Arctic and in the Antarctic and provide a general 
overview of economic and geo-political aspects. Four chapters are designated to the 
chosen sites, while comparative aspects and conclusions are presented in chapters 9 and 
10. Chapter 11 contains information on the sources and references used. 
 
In Chapter 1, I provide a brief introduction to the book and its framing. In addition, I 
discuss the research questions and why and how I intend to answer these questions 
using the theoretical and methodological framework provided by ANT. I have also 
discussed the status of historical research that is relevant to this thesis. 
 
In Chapter 2, I contextualise the necessary background for the chapters about the four 
case studies in the Arctic and Antarctic. I present and discuss the general history of the 
industry, as well as the development of a market for whale oil and other products, which 
created the economic enticement and an important driving force for the move of 
whaling to the polar regions. In this chapter, I also present and discuss the relevant geo-
political background, a discussion that is built on previous research. 
 
Chapter 3 is an introduction to Arctic whaling. I discuss the development of modern 
whaling in this part of the European High Arctic from 1904 to 1931. Furthermore, I 
present and discuss the activities and the two technical regimes used. I also explore how 
the companies organised their activities, and how they adapted to the archipelagos’ no 
man’s land status. This discussion provides an important background for the following 
two chapters. 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 describe the two Arctic case studies. In chapter 4, I present and discuss 
the whaling station at Finneset and the construction of global and local networks. 
Chapter 4 also deals with the actors that were involved while the station was in 
operation, the catches, economic and political results, and the technical and spatial 
development of the whaling station over time. Chapter 4 also deals with the whaling 
station’s and the company’s geo-political roles, introduced in the previous chapter. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the Walrus Bay whaling station at Bear Island. Similar to the 
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previous chapter, it deals with the construction of global and local networks, catches, 
results, and the development of the whaling station over time. 
 
In Chapter 6, I introduce antarctic whaling, including the general development of 
whaling stations, pelagic whaling, the concession system, and antarctic geo-politics. This 
is important background information for the following two chapters. I present and 
discuss Prince Olav Harbour whaling station in chapter 7, while Signy Island whaling 
station is presented and discussed in chapter 8. Each of these chapters follow the same 
structure as the Arctic chapters; the network builders, global and local network 
formation, the design, layout, and development of the station, social strategies, 
technological choices, and their geo-political roles. 
 
In chapter 9, I compare and discuss the development of the modern whaling industry in 
the Arctic and Antarctic. In chapter 10, I finalize the analysis and discuss the main 
conclusions. 
 



















2. The modern whaling industry in context  
Introduction 
Market demands for whale oil and whale by-products have, for centuries, encouraged 
Europeans to engage in commercial whaling. In the 16th and 17th century, whaling 
changed from a small-scale activity based in the Basque region of the Iberian Peninsula 
into a much larger scale, international activity as Dutch, English, and later North 
American whalers got involved in the industry. From the mid-18th century, whaling was 
widely considered as an activity connected with hardships, comradery, and heroic acts 
of courage;69 much like the expeditions exploring the polar regions a few centuries 
later.70 
 
In this chapter, I will explore the market for whale oil and how it changed over time. In 
addition, I will examine the larger global contexts that influenced the development and 
spread of the modern whaling industry into a global business. I will also discuss the 
technologies that were developed by the modern whaling industry, and why. The geo-
political situation in the polar regions and the consequences this had on the whaling 
industry will also be discussed. 
 
The polar regions 
The geographical delimitations of this thesis are the European High Arctic and the 
Western Antarctic. Even though the northern parts of mainland Europe are part of the 
Arctic and have a substantial whaling industry, I have chosen not to include northern 
Fennoscandia in this thesis. The main reason is that the conditions for whaling in the 
High Arctic were different from those on mainland Fennoscandia. The High Arctic and 
Subantarctic were remote, cold, windy, and inhospitable regions, located far from 
permanent settlements and resources that industrial companies normally had access to, 
                                                 
69 Famous books like Herman Melville’s Moby Dick, W. M. Davis Nimrod of the Sea, or the American Whale 
Man, R. Ellis Of Whales and Men, and T.W. Smiths A Narrative of the Life, Travels and Sufferings of Thomas 
W. Smith, and the many volumes of William Scoresby’s the younger whaling journeys to the Arctic, 
published by The Hakluyt Society, is only small a selection where narratives of these voyages are depicted. 
70 Wråkberg. U. The Politics of Naming: Contested Observations and the Shaping of Geographical Knowledge. 
2002. P: 156. In: Narrating the Arctic: A Cultural History of Nordic Scientific Practices. Editors. Sörlin. S, 
and Bravo. M. 
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such as energy, water, technology, and raw materials like wood, steel, and other 
commodities. In northern Fennoscandia, such resources were accessible, in addition to 
infrastructure such as railways and sea transport. This enabled industrialists to 
establish themselves and operate with lower costs and less effort than in the High Arctic. 
In the Subantarctic, the conditions were, from the perspective of industrialists, similar to 
the High Arctic. This is why I have included South Georgia and the South Orkney Islands 
in my study. 
                                  
Fig 1 and 2. The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programmes (AMAP) map defining the boundaries of the 
Arctic. Right: The location of the Antarctic Convergence, including Antarctica and the Periantarctic or 
Subantarctic Islands that surround it. 
 
Markets 
The development of the modern whaling industry in the 19th century is linked to the 
industrialisation of Europe and North America. Whale oil represented only a small 
percentage of the overall oil market, which was dominated by vegetable oils and animal 
fats. Whale oil was comparably cheap and came onto the market when the whaling 
season was over.71 As a consequence, merchants could buy large quantities at favourable 
prices. Since whale oil could be stored for long periods, profit could be increased by 
speculating on the market. In the latter part of the 19th century, the number of 
margarine factories grew rapidly and developed into one of the most important markets 
for whale oil.72 Increased demand created an economic enticement to produce oil that 
                                                 
71 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924. Del 1: 1883–1914. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie-
Opprinnelse og Utvikkling. Vol: 2. P: 499. 
72 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924. Del 1: 1883–1914. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie-
Opprinnelse og Utvikkling. Vol: 2. P: 494ff. See also: Wilson. C. The History of Unilever: A Study in 




promoted growth of the modern whaling industry. Within a decade, the industry became 
a global industry with hunting grounds off North America (Yukon, Newfoundland, and 
Labrador), Norway, Iceland, Russia, the Hebrides, Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and 
Hawaii, to mention a few. Expeditions were also sent to investigate potential hunting 
grounds in the High Arctic and Antarctic. 
 
Prices for whale oil and whale-related products have always been dictated by the 
availability and demand of whale oil on the world market. This demand was also, 
according to Basberg, influenced by the availability of competing oils like vegetable, 
mineral, animal oils, and fats on the market.73 The German city Hamburg held a 
dominant position as an export market for oils produced by the European sealing 
industry in the 19th century; a position that increasingly shifted to Great Britain, France, 
and eventually the Netherlands by the 1870s.74 The primary reasons behind the 
increased demand for oil and fats were industrialisation processes that needed oil to 
lubricate giant machines in the factories of Europe (and North America) and jute 
production.75 
 
Hygiene and diet products also used oils. An increasing number of people moved from 
the countryside into industrial areas to find employment. For most people, this meant 
improved income, and industrialisation led to the growth of the middle class. 
Throughout Europe and North America, margarine and soap factories were established. 
These factories primarily used solid animalistic fats as raw materials in their production 
line. The soap and margarine manufacturing industries were a product of an industrial 
society, as Wilson remarks.76 In Great Britain, the soap market expanded rapidly 
throughout the 19th century from an annual consumption of 24,106 tons in 1801 to over 
260,000 tons in the 1890s.77 The industrialised mass production of soap and margarine 
was made possible by an industrialised market for consumer goods, where 
                                                 
73 Basberg. B.L. Technological Transformation in the Norwegian Whaling Industry in the Interwar Period. 
1985. P: 93. In: The Scandinavian Economic History Review and Economic and History. Vol: XXXIII, No: 2. 
74 Johnsen. A.O. Finnmarksfangstens Historie 1864–1905. Vol 1. 1959. P: 494. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst 
Historie- Opprinnelse og Utvikkling. 
75 The phasing out of the linen export bounty in Great Britain in the early 1830s had an indirect positive 
effect for the whaling industry, after it had been discovered that dry jute fibres from Bengal, Bangladesh 
and India could be lubricated and softened with whale oil. 
76 Wilson. C. The History of Unilever; A Study in Economical Growth and Social Change. 1954. Vol 1. P: 3. 
77 Wilson. C. The History of Unilever; A Study in Economical Growth and Social Change. 1954. Vol 1. P: 9. 
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manufacturers could access large amounts of cheap raw materials as well as plenty of 
labour at a time when the textile industry went through a recession in Great Britain.78 
 
According to Brandt, prices for whale oil peaked in the 1870s.79 After this brief peak, 
prices for whale oil stagnated and declined gradually until 1905.80 This was because 
vegetable and mineral oils had flooded the market in large quantities, thereby causing 
oil prices to fall. There were also other contributing factors for falling whale oil prices. 
As Johnsen pointed out, the state of the British economy had a substantial influence.81 In 
the 1890s, the British economy went through a depression, which started easing off in 
1898. This was followed by a period of economic upraising that briefly improved whale 
oil prices. 
 
Whale oil is, much like coconut oil, palm oil, peanut oil, cottonseed oil, and linseed oil, a 
liquid oil and not a solid fat.82 The use of liquid oil has traditionally been limited to 
lighting and lubrication in the textile industry and tanneries.83 This relatively narrow 
market made the producers (in this case, the whaling companies) vulnerable to changes 
on the market. To counteract this situation, especially at the end of the 19th century, 
many whaling companies experimented with new ways of utilising and refining whale 
oil so that their business was less vulnerable to changes on the market. 
 
At the turn of the 20th century, liquid oil represented more than 60% of the total world 
production of oil and fat.84 Finding a way to harden liquid oil into solid fats became 
increasingly important, especially since whaling companies and the soap and margarine 
                                                 
78 Unilevers World. Anti-Report No 11. P: 18. 
79 Brandt. K. Whale oil- An Economic Analysis. 1940. See also: Basberg. B.L. Technological Transformation in 
the Norwegian Whaling Industry in the Interwar Period. 1985. In: The Scandinavian Economic History 
Review and Economic and History. Vol: XXXIII, No: 2. 
80 Johnsen. A. O. Finnmarksfangstens Historie 1864–1905. Vol: 1. 1959 P: 38. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst 
Historie- Opprinnelse og Utvikkling. 
81 Johnsen. A. O. Finnmarksfangstens Historie 1864–1905. Vol: 1. 1959 P: 511. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst 
Historie- Opprinnelse og Utvikkling. 
82 Talbot. G (editor). Specialty Oils and Fats in Food and Nutrition – Properties, Processing and Applications. 
2015. P: 249. See also Webb. R.L. On the Northwest: Commercial Whaling in the Pacific Northwest 1790–
1967. 1988. P:144f, and Commonwealth Economic Committee. Vegetable oils and Oilseeds – a review. 1967. 
P: 24f. 
83 Johnsen. A. O. Finnmarksfangstens Historie 1864–1905. Vol: 1. 1959 P: 498f. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst 
Historie- Opprinnelse og Utvikkling. 
84 Wilson. C. The history of Unilever – a study in economic growth and social change. 1954.Vol 2. P: 110. See 
also Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924. Del 1: 1883–1914. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie-
Opprinnelse og Utvikkling. Vol: 2. P: 500. 
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industry had economic interests in doing so.85 For the whaling companies, a successful 
hardening process would mean a larger and more diversified market, which would 
increase demand, improve prices, and generate higher profits. For the soap and 
margarine industry, which largely based their production on solid animalistic fats, a 
successful hardening of liquid oils into solid fats would reduce their raw material costs 
and increase profits. 
 
According to Patterson, the first patented successful laboratory hardening of liquid oil, 
or hydrogenation, took place in Germany in 1902.86 One year later, a patent was granted 
in Great Britain for combining hydrogen with oil, fat, or fatty acids in its liquid state in 
the presence of a metal, which acted as a catalyst to produce a fat with a desirable 
melting point.87 Even though large-scale hydrogenation was not possible until 1911–
1912, its initial success boosted investments in the industry as investors saw the 
potential for cheap whale oil.88 By altering and controlling the melting point, the 
hydrogenation process converted unsaturated fatty acids into saturated fatty acids, 
resulting in the conversion of liquid oils into solid fats, or semi-solid fats that could be 
used for soap and margarine production. Crosfield’s in England established the first 
commercial hydrogenation plant in 1906.89 Other factories were soon built in Germany, 
the United States of America, and the Netherlands. The success of the hydrogenation 
process opened a new market for whale oil that made the industry boom. Having access 
to cheaper raw materials did not create peaceful conditions among the soap producers, 
as Wilson has shown.90 On the contrary, it toughened the competition between 
Crosfield’s, Schicht’s, Jurgens’, Lever Gossage, and others. 
 
                                                 
85 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924. Del 1: 1883–1914. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie-
Opprinnelse og Utvikkling. Vol: 2. P: 499. 
86 Patterson. H.B.W. Hydrogenation of fats and oils. 1983. Introduction. 
87 Patterson. H.B.W. Hydrogenation of fats and oils. 1983. Introduction. 
88 Basberg. B.L. Technological Transformation in the Norwegian Whaling Industry in the Interwar Period. 
1985. P: 95. In: The Scandinavian Economic History Review and Economic and History. Vol: XXXIII, No: 2 
89 Patterson. H.B.W. Hydrogenation of fats and oils. 1983. Introduction. 
90 Wilson. C. The history of Unilever – a study in economic growth and social change. 1954. Vol 1 and 2. 
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Fig 3. Similar price development for solid fats and liquid oils after 1900. Prices for whale oil increased and 
peaked between 1915–1921, after which prices dropped rapidly. The cheap cottonseed oils were perhaps the 
largest competitor of whale oil, especially when they  flooded the market.91 
 
Despite competition, whale oil prices remained relatively stable between 1905 and 
1915. During the First World War, whaling and whale oil became increasingly politicised 
because glycerine could be extracted from whale oil to produce explosives. As a result, 
whale oil from Antarctica was classified as contraband by British authorities and placed 
under rigorous control. In a way, similar to many raw materials during and immediately 
after the First World War, prices for whale oil climbed continuously until 1920–1921, 
and thereafter dropped back to pre-war levels in the wake of the global economic crisis 
in the 1920s. 
                                                 
91 Based on data supplied by Wilson. C in The History of Unilever; A Study in Economical Growth and Social 
Change. 1954. Vol 2. Appendix 9, and Hart. I. B. Whaling in the Falkland Island Dependencies 1904–1931. A 




Fig 4. The estimated consumption of margarine per capita in Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Denmark between 1900–1934. The figure indicates an increased demand for whale oil on the market.92 
 
It appears that the drop came as a surprise to the market and for the margarine 
producing companies such as Lever Bros, Joseph Watson & Sons Ltd, Crosfield’s, 
Jurgens’, Van den Bergh, and Schicht’s.93 Many actors and companies expected a post-
war market with decreased salaries and increased unemployment, which they believed 
would create a cheap market for margarine. There were primarily three factors behind 
the declining prices for whale oil in 1920–1921. Firstly, the markets in mid- and eastern 
Europe failed partly because of costs the war had inflicted. Secondly, the political 
situation was so unstable that selling to many nations in Europe was considered a 
financial risk. Thirdly, there had been an overproduction of vegetable oils. Huge 
quantities were stored in the whale oil producing nations because the producers had 
been unable to ship it to Europe during the war. As freight rates became cheaper and 
cheaper throughout 1920, large quantities of vegetable oils entered the European 
market and forced the prices down.94 
 
When the whalers’ union approached the British agent, Meade-King, Robertson & Co Ltd 
of Liverpool, the union, according to Tønnesen, recommended storing the season’s 
                                                 
92 Based on data supplied by Wilson. C In: The History of Unilever: A Study in Economic Growth and Social 
Challenge. 1954. Vol 2. Appendix 6. 
93 See Wilson. C In The History of Unilever: A Study in Economic Growth and Social Challenge. 1954. 
94 Wilson. C In The History of Unilever: A Study in Economic Growth and Social Challenge. 1954. Vol 2. P: 
205ff. See also: Wamplew. W. Salvesen of Leith. 1975. P: 107. 
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produce and canceling the hunting season of 1921–1922.95 In a desperate attempt to sell 
the produce, the whalers’ union offered to sell at £35 per ton, which was turned down.96 
The economic situation toughened when the larger buyers in Great Britain and the 
Netherlands decided to merge and form a buyers pool. In response to this, several 
whaling companies formed a producers pool in early 1921. Through the producers pool 
the whaling companies could put pressure on the buyers pool by demanding a price of 
£32.10 per ton, which corresponded to approximately one-third of the prices paid in the 
previous season. 






















































Fig 5. Prices for whale oil (including average demarking line) in 1883–1915. Prices for whale oil fluctuated 
substantially, and only on a few occasions prior to 1905 did it go beyond the average of £19.23 per ton. After 
1905, however, prices increased as demands and beliefs grew as a result of the hydrogenation process.97 
 
Another important factor was that Lever Bros, which was one of the main margarine 
producing companies in Europe, became one of the largest producers of whale oil after 
the purchase of the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company Ltd and other whaling 
companies in 1919. Lever Bros controlled the market for whale oil throughout the 1920s 
                                                 
95 Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924. Del II: 1914–1924. Den Pelagiske Fangst 1924–1937. 1969. 
Vol: 3. P: 179. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
96 Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924. Del II: 1914–1924. Den Pelagiske Fangst 1924–1937. 1969. 
Vol: 3. P: 179. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
97 The figure is based on data supplied by: Johnsen. A.O. Finnmarksfangsten 1864–1905. 1959. Vol: 1. P: 
505f. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie-Opprinnelse og Utvikkling, Jackson. G. The British Whaling 
Trade. 1978. P: 244, Hart. I. B. Whaling in the Falkland Islands Dependencies: A History of shore and bay-
based whaling in the Antarctic. 2006. P: 316, and The International Whaling Statistics. 1942. P: 54. 
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by being both the largest buyer and by subsidizing De Nordiske Fabrikker (De-No-Fa).98 
The situation in 1920–1921 meant that competitors, despite attempts to counteract the 
situation, made huge losses and went bankrupt, strengthening Lever Bros’ already 
dominant position.99 Falling prices for raw materials was, of course, favourable for the 
soap and margarine producers who could buy whale and other oils cheap and stock up. 
Therefore, they largely went unharmed in spite of their prearranged contracts to buy 
whale oil. 
 
The result of the events in 1920–1921 was, as Tønnesen concludes, that producers and 
buyers were organised into competing pools.100 Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, 
prices for whale oils remained relatively stable. To generate large profits for their 
shareholders, the whaling companies, especially those that operated in the Antarctic, 
compensated for the prices by increasing the number of whale catches and the output of 
whale oil. Whales were exploited with little regard to the need for rejuvenation of 
populations and the effects on the ecosystem. 

























































Fig 6. Chart indicating the global production of whale oil in 1900–1930. Note the dominant position the 
Antarctic hunting grounds gained after 1906.101 
                                                 
98 Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924. Del II: 1914–1924. Den Pelagiske Fangst 1924–1937. 1969. 
Vol: 3. P: 186. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
99 Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924. Del II: 1914–1924. Den Pelagiske Fangst 1924–1937. 1969. 
Vol: 3. P: 187. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
100 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924. Del II: 1914–1924. Den Pelagiske Fangst 1924–1937. 1969. 
Vol: 3. P: 189. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
101 The right diagram is based on data compiled by Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924. Del 1: 
1883–1914. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og Utvikkling. Vol 2. 1967. P: 585. The 
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While prices for whale oil increased, prices for other whale products such as baleen 
(whalebone) dropped during the first decades of the 20th century. Prices for baleen had 
risen during the 19th century because of an increasing demand from the fashion industry 
where it was, for example, used to make corsets and to make fine textiles firmer. 
According to Bockstoce, the wholesale of baleen was without precedence in 1878 when 
it was valued at $3.25 per pound.102 This meant that a whaling company operating in 
America could make $5000 for baleen from a single bowhead whale. Similarly, in 
Iceland, the export value of baleen alone yielded Kr376,000 in 1900.103 Between 1900 
and 1910, baleen was, as Tønnesen remarks, commonly sold on the European market for 
Kr15,000 per ton.104 The market for baleen diminished rapidly when plastics and bakelit 
entered the market. By 1915, most whaling companies rarely bothered utilising the 
baleen that was commonly cut out and left on the beach. 
 
Fig 7. Discarded baleen lying on the beach beside Hektor Whaling station at Deception Island, Antarctica.105 
                                                                                                                                                        
diagram on the left is based on data collected on International Whaling Statistics, published by the 
Committee for Whaling Statistics. Oslo/ Norway. 1931. 
102 Bockstoce. J. R Whales, Ice, & Men: The History of Whaling in the Western Arctic. 1986. P: 208. 
103 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924. Del 1: 1883–1914. 1967. Vol 2. P: 42. In: Den Moderne 
Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
104 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924. Del 1: 1883–1914. 1967. Vol 2. P: 76. In: Den Moderne 
Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
105 Photo courtesy of the Norwegian Polar Institutes photoarchive, Tromsø. 
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A new technological system 
The early development of modern whaling – artefacts and cultural 
constructs 
Besides demands on the world market for materials produced from whales, another 
important factor that contributed to the development of whaling in the polar regions 
was the development of new whaling technologies. 
 
In research on the history of whaling, one man – Svend Foyn – has been singled out as 
the primary (and only) inventor of the technological system associated with the modern 
whaling industry. In this section, and in line with the findings of decades of research into 
the history of science and technology, I will argue that this technology came about 
because of the combined efforts of many actors.106 
 
There is no doubt that the modern whaling industry was narrated and thereby 
promoted within a framework of heroism and industrial development in the north. The 
place given to the Norwegian whaling entrepreneur Svend Foyn is a prominent example 
of this. He and his abilities have often been described as heroic. Nielsen, for example, 
writes that Foyn “was a rare example that the Norwegians could make a difference in a 
time of industrialisation. He had made pioneering inventions, which, when applied to 
catching sea mammals, put Norway at the forefront of the European nations and which 
made him famous in many nations. The message that comes back is that there was a close 
link between the Viking legacy and the Norwegian ability to contribute to modern 
society”107 Johnsen writes that “many others had invested heavily in solving this problem, 
but all in vain. Americans, British, Dutch, and Danes had to give this up during the years 
when Svend Foyn tirelessly experimented with his method. It is therefore understandable 
that the great man from Vestfold later spoke of the joy of having defeated four able actors 
of other nations. With the development of Foyn’s catching method, the modern whaling 
industry was born”.108 
                                                 
106 See for example Hughes. T.P Rescuing Prometheus. 1998, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western 
Society 1880–1930, and Bijker. W.E, Hughes. T.P, and Pinch. T (editors) The Social Construction of 
Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology. 1989, where the many 
actors and factors involved in the complex evolution of technologies are revealed. 
107 Nielsen. J.P. Ishavet er vår åker. 2004. P: 107. In: Norsk PolarHistorie, Vol 3. Drivenes. E. A & Jølle. H.D 
(editors). 
108 Johnsen. A.O. Finnmarksfangstens Historie 1864–1905. Vol 1. 1959. P: 209. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst 




Svend Foyn was undoubtedly important in the evolution and shaping of the modern 
whaling industry. However, awarding the development of any technical system or 
industry to one actor is exaggerated. This narrow view on technological development 
disregards the complex interactions, exchange of ideas, and innovations between actors 
and factors over space and time that are part of these processes. In the following, I will 
discuss what is modern about the modern whaling industry, and how and why this 
predominant narrow image has remained unchallenged in historical research. 
 
Modern whaling and its early development 
Tønnesen defined modern whaling as the hunting, killing, and processing of several 
whale species into a variety of products either at whaling stations or onboard floating 
factory ships.109 Tønnesen’s definition covers all aspects, and separates modern whaling 
from early modern whaling. Technically, modern whaling used steam-powered whale 
catching boats equipped with stern mounted cannons with grenade harpoons. These 
harpoons were connected to the boat through a whale line that allowed the crew to haul 
the dead whale from the depths using a steam winch. To avoid breaking the whale line, 
the boat was fitted with a compensator that allowed for movement. The boat and its 
crew could hunt and kill fast swimming whales such as blue, fin, and humpback whales, 
salvage the sinking carcass, and tow it to a whaling station for processing. Species 
diversification was decisive for the organisation of the industry, since it meant that the 
whaling companies could shift from species to species, depending on the availability and 
the season. 
 
In the early modern whaling industry, whalers used hand-powered rowing boats with 
the harpooner positioned in the front. This way, whalers could only hunt slow 
swimming right whales that floated after they were killed. The whaling historian and 
archaeologist Louwrens Hacquebord has shown that the dependence on one species not 
only meant that there was little enticement to establishing permanent whaling stations 
                                                 
109 The following is based on Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924- Del 1: 1883–1914. Vol 2. 1967. P: 
3–8. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og Utvikkling. 
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in the vicinity of the hunting grounds, but also that strong competition often rapidly 
depleted whale populations, forcing the companies to seek new hunting grounds.110 
 
Once the whale catcher had delivered its catch to the whaling station, the whale was 
hauled onto a wooden platform called the flensing plan. Here, the blubber layer was 
removed, cut into smaller pieces, and processed into oil. The remainder of the whale 
carcass was then towed to the lemming platform. Here, workers separated the meat and 
bones from each other, and processed them into oil separately. Different parts were 
cooked separately because the oil was extracted at different temperatures, pressures, 
and times. The raw material was well used since blubber, meat, and bones were all 
processed into whale oil and by-products, such as guano. Although the level of utilisation 
has varied over time, from company to company, and in accordance with different 
regulations in different areas, the whaling companies were technically able to use the 
whole whale carcass, unlike the early modern whaling industry, which only utilised the 
blubber and baleen.111 
 
The technological system associated with the modern whaling industry made it possible 
to hunt, kill, and process fast-swimming rorqual whales. This idea was not, according to 
Jackson, new when Svend Foyn picked it up in 1864.112 Webb suggests that attempts to 
use a harpoon cannon to catch whales had already been made in 1784.113 Although this 
particular attempt was primitive compared with later attempts, the idea was an 
important step forward. Throughout the 19th century, a series of inventions and ideas 
were introduced. Some of these inventions and ideas were successful, while others were 
not. What they all have in common is that they represent small, vital steps in the 
modernisation of the whaling industry. Developments in whale hunting technologies 
                                                 
110 Hacquebord. L. The hunting of the Greenland right whale in Svalbard, its interaction with climate and its 
impact on the marine ecosystem. In: Polar Research 18:2, 1999. Pp: 375–382. See also: Three Centuries of 
Whaling and Walrus Hunting in Svalbard and its Impact on the Arctic Ecosystem. In: Environment and 
history, 7:2, 2001. Pp: 169–185, and Hacquebord. L, Steenhuisen. F, Waterbolk. HJ. English and Dutch 
Whaling Trade and Whaling Stations in Spitsbergen (Svalbard) before 1660. In: International Journal of 
Maritime History XV, No 2, 2004. Pp: 117–134. 
111 Hacquebord, L. Whaling stations as bridgeheads for exploration of the Arctic Regions in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century. 1994. Pp: 289– 297. In: International Conference on Shipping, Factories and 
Colonization. See also: Hacquebord, L. Steenhuisen, F and Waterbolk. H. English and Dutch Trade and 
Whaling Stations in Spitsbergen (Svalbard) before 1660. 2003. Pp: 117–134. In: International Journal of 
Maritime History. XV. No 2. 
112 Jackson, G. The British Whaling Trade. 1978. P: 143. 
113 Webb. R.L. On the NorthWest – Commercial Whaling in the Pacific Northwest 1790–1967. 1988. P: 122 
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took two different paths: hand-held devices in North America and fixed harpoon 
cannons in Europe. 
 
The American hand-held devices included innovations such as the Pierce Gun, the 
Cunningham Gun, the Brand Gun, the Darting Gun, and the Rocket Harpoon, which were 
available on American markets from the 1850s.114 The limiting factor of this type of 
killing device was that salvaging the sinking carcass from the water was difficult. In 
addition, old traditions and fears of approaching the whales (which could result in 
death) left American whalers reluctant to try new technologies. However, American 
whalers from New Bedford, Nantucket Island, and California had decades of experience 
hunting sperm whales, which casts some doubt on whether fear to approach whales was 
really the reason for not adopting these new technologies. Socio-cultural and economical 
reasons may have played a role. Killing the whale was the role of the harpooner, which 
gave him a certain social role and status. These new technologies increased the 
operational costs, and their introduction corresponded with falling whale oil prices on 
the North American market. The economic incentive for investing in new technologies 
and organisational structures therefore appear to have been missing. 
 
A solution to the problem of hauling the sinking whale from the water was Thomas W. 
Roys’ invention – the whale raiser and compensator – which he introduced in the late 
1850s.115 In 1865, Roys established a whaling station in Seydisfjord, Iceland together 
with his companion Gustav A. Lilliendahl. From here, they operated with the steam-
powered whale hunting boat Visionary, using the rocket harpoon in combination with a 
90 kg heavy whale raiser.116 Despite using a steam-powered boat to hunt the whales, 
they still made use of small hand-powered whaleboats for the actual kill.117 Their 
whaling project was short-lived. Tønnesen and Johnsen argue that it failed because of 
the heavy investments, the long distance to the market, and the outbreak of the 
                                                 
114 Davis. L.E, Gallman.R.E, Gleiter. K. In Pursuit of Leviathan; Technology, Institutions, Productivity, and 
Profits in American Whaling, 1816–1906. 1997. P: 283f. See also: Spence. B. Harpooned; the story of 
whaling. 1980. P: 94f. Bockstoce. J.R. Whales, Ice, & Men; The history of Whaling in the Western Arctic. 1986. 
P: 58f. Matthews. L.H (ed). The Whale. 1968. P: 126f. 
115 In 1857 Thomas Welcome Roys patented his invention. For further reading see: Johnsen. A.O. Den 
Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. Vol 1. 1959. P: 179 & 288. 
116 Webb. R.L.On the NorthWest- Commercial Whaling in the Pacific Northwest 1790–1967. 1988. P: 125. 
117 Davis. E.D, Gallman. R.E & Gleiter. K. In Pursuit of Leviathan- Technology, Institutions, Productivity, and 
Profits in American Whaling, 1816–1906. 1997. P: 291. See also: Johnsen. A.O. Den Moderne Hvalfangst 
Historie- Opprinnelse og Utvikkling. Vol 1. 1959. P: 84. 
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American Civil War, during which prices for whale oil plummeted on the American 
market.118 Davis et al. argue that technological flaws combined with poor managerial 
and business capabilities were the reasons for their failure.119 Nonetheless, Roys and 
Lilliendahl’s new whale hunting technology played an important role in the 
technological development of modern whaling for two main reasons: firstly, because 
they introduced steam power, and secondly, because they invented and patented a 
compensator that prevented the whale rope from breaking by transferring power from 
the whale to the hull of the boat via a series of powerful rubber bands.120 A similar 
version of the compensator, based on metal springs, was later patented by Foyn, while A. 
Ellefsen and E. Sommerfeldt patented the so-called weight accumulator.121 Before the 
Americans withdrew from Iceland, they were visited by the Norwegian Svend Foyn who 
became interested in the whaling industry.122 
 
While North American whalers preferred to use shoulder-held devices, the harpoon 
cannon was further developed in Europe. In 1837, William Greener introduced an 
updated version of the harpoon cannon that was fitted with an explosive tip. He had 
problems solving ballistics and harpoon trajectories, therefore his invention was, 
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Fig 8 and 9. The North American Darting Gun and the European Greener Gun represent two different 
solutions aimed at solving the same problem: killing fast-swimming rorqual whales, such as blue and fin 
whales.124 
 
The idea to develop a system that allowed whalers to kill whales and salvage whale 
carcasses, re-surfaced in Norway during the 1840s with Jacob Nicolai Walsøe. Initially, 
he experimented with toxic harpoons. Although these killed the whales, the whalers had 
to wait for the carcass to decompose and resurface before they could process it. 
Furthermore, handling large quantities of toxins was hazardous and made the meat 
unsuitable for human consumption. In 1849, Walsøe got financial funding to develop his 
idea. A few years later, he demonstrated his invention, which fired an arrow-shaped 
projectile fitted with a delayed explosive charge.125 The inventions attracted much 
attention from the Norwegian government as well as private actors, such as Svend 
Foyn,126 whose financial contributions allowed Walsøe to continue his work. 
 
Walsøe later realised that the system could only be successful if it was combined with 
steam-powered boats with enough speed to pursue and kill the whales. This idea was 
adopted by Foyn in 1863, when he designed and commissioned the building of the 
world’s first purpose built whale catcher – the Spes et Fides (Hope and Faith).127 
                                                 
124 From Goddard. J. A Window of whaling in British Columbia. 1997. 
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Dahl and Amici made, as Johnsen and Spence have pointed out, other important 
contributions to the development of the industry by combining similar killing devices 
with steam-powered boats.128 In the early days of the development phase, it was not 
uncommon for the whale catchers to have several cannons that fired harpoons and 
grenades separately. The problem was not limited to combining the harpoon and 
grenade into one unit, like Walsøe and Dahl had done with relative success, but also to 
delay the explosion of the grenade until it had penetrated the whale’s body to effectuate 
the kill. Together with a local priest named Esmark, Svend Foyn worked to find a 
solution to these problems. A few years later, the duo solved the problem, which 
completed the system and allowed all the technical artefacts to operate as one.129 
 
Svend Foyn – the heterogeneous engineer 
By the 1850s, Foyn had become one of the most successful sealing entrepreneurs in 
Norway.130 He was looking for new business opportunities and for new ways to exploit 
the seas. One way he did this was to keep updated with ideas and technical 
advancements that could potentially be used in sealing.131 However, as seal stocks 
declined in the late 1860s because of overexploitation, Foyn abandoned the sealing 
industry in favour of whaling.132 Foyn was a religious man who regarded nature as God’s 
creation that was open to exploitation. He saw whales as “a pest, which is of no use for 
mankind. On the contrary, they disturb the activities of the fishermen and cause the demise 
of boats and crews”.133 In this context, technology represented a divine tool, which 
transformed the world into the Garden of Eden.134 
 
The greatest contribution of Svend Foyn’s to the development of the industry was not, to 
use Simon Ramos’ definition, in the direct invention and design of individual technical 
                                                 
128 Johnsen. A.O. Finnmarksfangstens Historie 1864–1905. Vol: 1. 1959. P: 93f, and 291. In: Den Moderne 
Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. For further reading, see also: Spence. B. Harpooned: The 
story of whaling. 1980. 
129 Jacobsen, A.R. Svend Foyn- Fangstpioneer og nasjonsbygger. 2008. P: 187. 
130 Jacobsen. A.R. Svend Foyn- Fangstpioneer og nasjonsbygger. 2008. 
131 He had given financial support to Walsøe and he had visited both Roys & Liliendahls whaling 
enterprise in Iceland and with Amici in Denmark. During these meetings, Foyn curiously made notes and 
sketches in his diary. 
132 Svend Foyn had completely abandoned the sealing industry in 1867 in order to focus his attention on 
whaling. For further reading, please see: Johnsen. A.O. Finnmarksfangstens Historie 1864–1905. Vol 1. 
1959. P: 200f. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
133 Jacobsen, A.R. Svend Foyn- Fangstpioneer og nasjonsbygger. 2008. P: 144. 
134 Hughes. T.P. Human-Built World: How to think about Technology and Culture. 2004. P: 10. 
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artefacts, but rather in shaping and finding a solution to make these function as one 
system.135 Unlike other entrepreneurs before him, Foyn had the ability, interest, and 
financial power to create unity from diversity and to achieve what others; he did not 
focus on the individual elements but rather on the interfaces of these individual 
components to form an integrated system. Perhaps then, a more suitable title for Svend 
Foyn would be that of a system-builder or heterogeneous engineer.136 This allows us to 
illuminate all actors and factors that contributed to the step-wise and trial and error 
process of developing the system, rather than awarding one actor the honour of its sole 
creator. 
 
Why has the image of the single innovator dominated historical research on the modern 
whaling industry? One possible explanation is the ten-year patent right that Foyn was 
awarded by Norwegian authorities in 1872 for developing the industry.137 The 
background for this patent can be linked to the industrialisation of northern Norway, 
and in that context can be interpreted as a strategic act by the Norwegian authorities 
aimed at keeping German actors from establishing whaling operations, which were 
regarded as potentially threatening to national economic and industrial interests. In 
contemporary political debates, nationalistic and protectionist arguments supported the 
idea to award Foyn a ten-year exclusive patent right in Norway for developing the 
technology.138 
 
Another important reason why Foyn’s role as creator persisted is the general cultural 
and ideological trends at the time. Nationalism and social Darwinism figured 
prominently. These ideals promoted peaceful competition among civilised nation states, 
and art, science, exploration, industrial development, conquest, and physical strength 
                                                 
135 According to him the design of a system are: the design of the whole as distinct from the design of the 
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played vital roles in these ideals. Friedmann has shown that Christian values and 
technological development were regarded as factors that separated civilised Europeans 
from indigenous people.139 In this way, Svend Foyn became a hero capitalist and a 
symbol of Norwegian seaman who not only challenged the polar seas and the 
environment by carrying out a divine quest to exploit God’s creation for the greater 
benefit of the nation,140 but who was also naturally suited to doing so.  
 
From the mid-19th century, Norway and Sweden industrialised rapidly. Within a few 
decades, Norway had become one of Europe’s leading suppliers of wood and iron. While 
southern Norway experienced a wave of emigration to America as a result of the push 
and pull effect, where scarcity of land, failed crops, and unemployment at home stood 
against beliefs in a better life through the Homestead Act of 1862, northern Norway 
experienced the opposite. This population of this region grew, primarily through 
migration from southern Norway and an influx of kvener from Finland. According to 
Niemi, kvener represented 24% of the entire population in Finnmark by 1875. The two 
larger groups were indigenous Sami (34%) and Norwegians (42%).141 As a consequence, 
Finnmark went through a Norwegianization process in the 1870s, aimed at integrating 
the region to the remaining nation. Teaching the Norwegian language in school and 
promoting Norwegian culture was, as Bottolfsen has shown, part of the strategy used.142 
 
Furthermore, to restrict land ownership by Finnish and Sami populations, the 
Norwegian authorities introduced a law under which only Norwegians and Swedish 
nationals could gain ownership of land. To gain citizenship, one had to be fluent in 
Norwegian.143 The background for this nationalisation process can be explained, 
according to Niemi, by Swedish–Norwegian fears of Greater Finland, which 
contemporary politicians regarded as an extension of Russia.144 In the 1850s, Norway 
and Sweden had both signed the November Treaty, which aimed at limiting Russia’s 
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access to territories in the north following the Crimean War.145 Simultaneous to these 
developments, Svend Foyn established his whaling operations in north-eastern Norway. 
This meant that Foyn and his whaling enterprise could be used by political actors 
seeking to strengthen the nation. Therefore, the patent right may have supported these 
political motives and explain why Foyn was depicted as the father of modern whaling 
early on. 
 
A new socio-technical system 
The development of the modern whaling industry during the 19th century was a complex 
process of trial and error that involved several innovators, entrepreneurs, and different 
ideas in various contexts.146 Many definitions of the modern whaling industry have 
focused on technical aspects,147 ignoring other factors, such as organisation, species 
diversity, and utilisation of the raw material – factors that distinguish modern whaling 
from earlier whaling activities. The technologies used in the modern whaling industry 
were unlike those used during previous whaling activities. While the early modern 
whaling industry used rowing boats from which a hand-held harpoon and lance were 
thrown at single species (right whales), the modern whaling industry used a grenade 
harpoon fired from a steam-powered catching boat by the gunner and captain. This 
harpoon acted like a hook, which connected the whale to the whale catching boat by a 
line that was connected to a compensator and a steam winch. The winch enabled the 
crew to salvage the sinking whale once it was dead. Furthermore, the modern whaling 
industry hunted all whale species (although some were preferred more than others). To 
succeed in their task, all these entities had to work as one system. Although the old and 
the modern systems had the same aim – killing the whale – they very much differed in 
how this was achieved. 
 
Whaling, its connected operations, and products include a production unit (shore-based 
whaling station or a factory ship) and the whale catchers – both of which were 
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dependent on and influenced by each other. Basberg argued that there is a strong 
resemblance between the two, which is why he wanted to call the whaling station “A 
Ship Ashore”.148 The naval element is, according to him, enhanced using a common 
terminology for certain functions and working positions. While the terminology was 
common, one could argue that the organisation of whaling station operations was 
similar to most other company towns or industrial facilities at the turn of the 20th 
century, which often had similarly rigid hierarchical divisions and functions. 
 
Whaling stations remained the dominant production platform for whale oil and guano 
until pelagic whaling developed in the Antarctic in the late 1920s. Although there were 
variations, most whaling stations had the following elements: 1) a production area with 
flensing and lemming platform, including cookeries for blubber, meat and bones, and a 
guano factory, 2) a storage area for whale oils, guano, fuels, and a piggery, 3) an 
accommodation area, 4) recreation or religious buildings like churches, football fields, 
cinemas, and a library, and 5) a steam engine house and freshwater supplies. 
 
All whale parts contain oil. Whaling companies separated blubber, meat, and bones at 
different times because oil from each part needs to be extracted at different 
temperatures. Open cookers remained the dominant method until the turn of the 20th 
century, when pressure cookers became increasingly common. The pressure cookers 
were sealed at the top and reduced the effective cooking time and sped up production. 
They also reduced the consumption of valuable coal and freshwater reserves, which 
were often limited resources, especially in the polar regions. Despite this, open cookers 
were frequently used to melt the blubber since it gave better quality oil. However, 
technological developments were limited until 1910 because there were plenty of raw 
material, which Rosenberg called innovative responses to material shortages.149 Later, 
as whale numbers increasingly depleted, more investment was made in technologies to 
improve processing and hunting materials. Hartmann and later the Kværner cookers 
were developed to maximise the yield of oil per whale. Also, catching boats were made 
larger and more powerful. Basberg suggests that the primary causes for this were the 
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movement to new hunting grounds and the transition to ice and pelagic whaling.150 
While some whaling companies chose to establish whaling stations, others used floating 
factory ships. 
 
Until 1910, whale oil was commonly stored at the whaling station or onboard the 
floating factory ships in wooden barrels. Storing oil in barrels was inconvenient for 
several reasons. Firstly, barrels were expensive. Secondly, the barrels tended to leak, 
which meant that valuable oil was lost. Because of this, whale oil was sold per barrel and 
the price of the wooden barrel was commonly included in the price. After 1910, when 
the whaling industry had established itself permanently in the Antarctic, it became 
common to store and transport whale oil in large metal tanks, although it was still 
measured and sold per barrel and everyone working at the station had a share. 
 
Access to freshwater and steam production were essential for all parts of whale oil 
production. The steam boiler house was commonly located in a central position and 
supplied power to the cookers and machinery. At some whaling stations, steam was also 
used to heat accommodation buildings and to provide warm water for hygiene. Constant 
access to freshwater was important. In South Georgia, the Subantarctic, the Antarctic, 
and in the no man’s land of Svalbard (Spitsbergen and Bear Island), freshwater and 
harbours dictated where whaling stations and floating factory anchorages were 
established. In an attempt to secure constant access to water, some companies built 
dams. Elsewhere, like Svalbard, the whaling companies fenced in and claimed a piece of 
land to protect water resources and good harbours from competitors. 
 
Storages were commonly located in the immediate vicinity of the production area. 
During the first decade of the 20th century, whale oil was stored in wooden barrels, 
which were expensive and tended to leak. After 1910, oil went through metal pipes 
directly into large metal tanks where it was stored until it was transported to the 
markets. Access to coal for steam production and heating was essential. In Svalbard, 
most whaling companies brought coal from mainland Norway and supplemented if 
necessary either by collecting it themselves or by buying from local coalmines. In South 
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Georgia and Antarctica, the situation was different. The companies that operated here 
had to bring coal for the entire season, or have a cargo ship refill their stores during the 
season. Many whaling companies also brought livestock like pigs and hens to have fresh 
meat and eggs during the season. The piggeries and hen houses were often located on 
the outskirts of the whaling station. In South Georgia, whaling companies introduced 
Norwegian reindeer to be able to hunt and have fresh meat. 
 
Fig 10. A general organisation of production in  modern whaling. Whales supplied the raw materials and 
were processed into a variety of products through separation, cooking, and refining processes. Although the 
primary production remained concentrated to one area of the whaling station, the whole station was  
designed to maximise output and profit. Therefore, it is difficult to separate accommodation, power supply, 
and workshops as non-integral units of this network. 
 
Floating factories and whale catchers 
The early floating factories should not be confused with later pelagic floating factory 
ships that became more common in the late 1920s. The early factory ships were, 
according to Tønnesen, semi-pelagic commonly converted sailing ships that were 
equipped with a few cookers.151 During the first two decades of the 20th century, only a 
few ships were designed as floating factory ships – one of the first was Christen 
Christensen’s Admiralen in 1905. 
                                                 





Fig 11 and 12. Christen Christensen’s & A/S Ørnen’s floating factory Admiralen at Spitsbergen in 1905, only a 
few months before the company moved their activities to Deception Island and Admiralty Bay in the Antarctic 
(left). A whale is being flensed by a worker alongside the hull of the ship (right). This is why these early 
factory ships needed sheltered bays to process whales. Note the small flensing boat beside the whale, which 
was used by the flensing workers, and the water barge on top of the deck, which was vital for collecting 
freshwater necessary to produce steam.152 
 
The whaling industry was constantly seeking new hunting grounds to exploit for 
economic profit. Profits could be increased by incorporating new technologies and 
developing the fleets. However, to exploit whale stocks in the open sea, technical 
developments in shipbuilding, design, and processing had to occur. 
 
Hauling whales onboard for processing was not a new idea. Attempts to do so had been 
made by the Norwegian whaler M.A. Ingebrigtsen on Bear Island in 1906.153 
Ingebrigtsen tried again in Africa in 1908.154 Other ideas and designs came from Th. 
Gjertsen, Davidsen, and many others.155 Although the idea to process whales onboard in 
open waters had existed for a long time, there was no enticement for doing so since 
whales were plentiful and within the range of the whale catchers. Despite this, some 
whaling companies, such as A/S Quilimane of Norway, invested in new technologies like 
the Sommermeyers rotating cooker, a guano plant, and evaporators, which enabled 
them to produce freshwater in 1911–1912.156 
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Fig 13. The wreckage of the floating factory ship Guvernøren (former Thrøger) of A/S Quilimane at Foyn 
Harbour, Antarctica. Photo: G. Rossnes. LASHIPA 8/2010. 
 
Even though the output of the whaling industry reached new heights in the Antarctic 
hunting grounds, there was relatively little progression in pelagic technologies until 
Petter Sørrle introduced his innovative ship design in the 1920s. According to Tønnesen, 
the primary reason behind the development of the stern slipway was the increasing time 
spent whaling in ice-filled waters.157 Sørrle’s design was decisive for the opening of new 
hunting grounds within the Antarctic, such as the Ross Sea and the expansion of the 
industry to uncontrolled and unrestricted international waters. This expansion resulted 
in political negotiations to control the exploitation of whale populations rather than 
limiting measures to a geographically confined area. 
 
The novelty of Sørrle’s innovation was that it moved the flensing process onboard. His 
patent was not limited to the stern slipway, which allowed whalers to haul the whale 
carcass onboard; it also included trimming of the ship using the internal tanks, as well as 
a production line across the length of the deck under the bridge, which separated the 
                                                 




flensing deck from the lemming deck. These pelagic floating factory ships were large 
enough to supply a whole fleet of whale catchers with coal and supplies, to 
accommodate many workers, and to store large quantities of whale oil in its internal 
tanks. Building and fitting these ships were huge investments, and the ships had to 
perform and deliver huge outputs. The development of pelagic technologies was, as 
Tønnesen has shown, a progressive process that started with converted wooden sailing 
ships fitted with a few cookers and wooden barrels for storing whale oil, to larger ships 
with steel hulls and internal tanks, to the enormous pelagic factory ships of the 1920s 
with stern slipways, whale claws, onboard flensing and lemming platforms, and guano 
plants.158 
    
Fig 14, 15, and 16. Three steps in pelagic shipbuilding in  1905–1925; the whaling company Alfa & Betas 
converted the wooden sailing ship Hecla in Spitsbergen (left), a steel hulled factory ship at Deception Island, 
South Shetland Islands (centre), to A/S Globus and Petter Sørrle’s pelagic ship Lancing in 1925 (right).159 
 
The whaling fleet also included whale catching boats and cargo vessels that operated in 
conjunction with a whaling station or a floating factory ship. The whale catchers 
underwent constant changes, and they were often designed for the specific area in which 
they would operate. The early catchers in the polar regions often used shipbuilding 
technologies from the sealing industry, drawing on their experience operating in ice 
floes. Hull designs changed rapidly as the industry moved into the Antarctic and began 
operating under some of the world’s toughest conditions. Commonly, the bow became 
higher to protect the gunner and the crew from large waves. Steam engines became even 
more powerful to increase speed and allow the catchers to pull in more whales. 
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The industry used several types of boats and ships for different purposes. The ones that 
have been presented and discussed here represent only a few from the industry as a 
whole. In the later site chapters, I will discuss the organisation of production and 
technologies more. 
 
To generate the high output and economic profit crucial to sustaining support from the 
global network, all units had to function as one uniform system. The task of the whale 
catchers, the gunners, and their crew was to hunt and kill whales, and bring them to the 
station or factory ship for processing. The crew and gunner on board the whale catcher 
were commonly paid by the number of whales and species they killed. The reason for 
this is very simple – the number of whales, species, sex, position, and season all 
determined how much oil could be extracted from each whale. Since it was the primary 
task of the whale catcher to supply the whaling stations with enough raw materials, the 
whaling companies adopted a salary system that encouraged the crew to kill as many 
whales as possible, and to focus their attention on larger whales, for which they were 
paid more. 
 
Products from a new system 
The narrow market and declining whale oil prices at the end of the 19th century 
prompted whaling companies to explore new ways of utilising the whales to create new 
products for new markets. The primary product was whale oil. According to Johnsen, 
whale oil was traditionally sub-divided into categories, varying from 0/1 to 4, depending 
on the quality of the oil, percentage of fatty acids, transparency, and smell.160 This 
system was only used for baleen whale oil; oils from sperm whales were kept separate 
because of its wax-like consistency. Unlike other whale species, the digestion system of 
sperm whales contains spermaceti or ambergris, a substance which was sought after by 
the cosmetic industry as a fixative of scents. The classification system sustained until the 
first decade of the 20th century, after which laboratories became increasingly common 
on whaling stations to help produce  better quality oil. 
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Catch data from pre-1910 are scarce because source material is lacking. In contrast, 
datasets from after 1910 are relatively accurate since whaling companies were made to 
report catches and production annually to authorities. In many areas, this was the basis 
for taxation and costs for the annual concession. For the Antarctic, accessible data is 
regarded as relatively reliable thanks to an International Whaling Commission (IWC) 
project, which estimated that 1,393,254 whales were killed in the Antarctic between 
1904 and 1978. From these whales, 83,360,382 barrels of whale oil were produced.161 
These figures are based on statistical analysis of historical whaling records, such as 
logbooks, journals, and diaries. The purpose of the project was to try to obtain historical 
whale stock sizes, loss rates in fisheries, management strategies, and much more.162 
Although uncertain and biased, these sources are the only data available to researchers 
for statistics analysis of whale stock sizes, geographical distribution, feeding and 
breeding patterns, catches, production, and utilisation. 
 
Whale oil was, as previously mentioned, primarily used for margarine and soap 
production. It was, however, also possible to extract glycerine from the oil, which was 
used to produce explosives. Therefore, whale oil was increasingly politicised and sought 
after during the First World War. Because of this, whale oil from Antarctica was 
classified as contraband. During the war years, the British authorities, who controlled 
the whaling industry in the Antarctic through concessions, eased restrictions on the 
number of whale catchers each company could use, as well as their demands on 
utilisation to maximise whale oil output for glycerine production. Whaling was, as 
Basberg remarks, by far the most economically important industry in the Antarctic.163 
 
Guano and bone meal plants became a part of the production line at the whaling stations 
early on. Guano was produced from the residues of whale oil production, and was fed 
into a cylindrical and rotating metal tube that was connected to a furnace. The heat 
generated by the furnace was accelerated into the cylindrical tube by a metal blower. 
The combination of warm air and tube rotation dried and crushed the residues into a 
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powder, which were packed in canvas bags and sold as fertilizer. Meat meal was, 
according to Johnsen, produced in a similar manner, and was sold on national and 
international markets as cattle food.164 As prices varied between 8–14 NOK per 100 kg 
bag at the turn of the 20th century,165 there was money to be made from utilising a 
greater percentage of the whale rather than discarding it, as had been done previously. 
 
Fig 17. The guano factory at the former whaling station Prince Olav Harbour at South Georgia. Photo: U.I. 
Gustafsson. LASHIPA 6/2009. 
 
Whale glue was another by-product of blubber and bone residues.166 Harrison has 
shown that, much like consumables, glue (and other commodities) was commonly 
presented at fairs and markets across Europe, such as the Paris fair in 1889, where 
Svend Foyn was awarded a gold medal for his glue.167 Some whaling companies also 
tried to sell canned whale meat for human consumption. In 1883, the first factory for 
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canned whale meat was established in northern Norway. That same year, its products 
were already on display and received awards at the London fair.168 In 1883, meat 
products were presented in Kristiania (present day Oslo). Newspapers reported that 
whale meat did not taste like fish liver but was rather similar to cattle meat in taste, but 
could be delivered at one-third the cost of cattle meat.169 The following year, 
consumable products were successfully exhibited at a fair in Bremen. Nonetheless, these 
products were only a small percentage of whale produce and most of the meat was 
consumed at the whaling stations.170 For several years, substantial amounts of canned 
whale meat and sausages were produced at the whaling stations in northern Norway. 
 
According to Solhaug, whaling companies commonly dried and cleaned baleen, which 
they sold to companies in Germany, France, and Great Britain to be used in corsets, 
riding whips, umbrellas, and brushes.171 The baleen plates, which are only found on 
baleen whales such as blue, fin, and humpback whales, were cut out, cleaned, and 
washed in soda before being dried and pressed into 75 kg bundles for export.172 Until 
the turn of the 20th century, baleen represented a significant percentage of the annual 
profits until demands stagnated and prices dropped.173 The average amount of baleen 
varied depending on the species (blue whales, 250 kg; fin whales, 125 kg; humpback 
whales, 100 kg; and sei whales, 80 kg). According to Johnsen and Risting, 60–440 tonnes 
of baleen were exported from Norway annually from 1890–1905.174 These attempts at 
product diversification may illustrate concerns among the whaling companies of 
instability of the British main market prior to the successful hydrogenation process that 
changed the whale oil market. 
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The globalisation of modern whaling 
Several authors have narrated the development and globalisation of the modern whaling 
industry. Although evolution of the industry was complex and involved a large number 
of actors, factors, nationalities, and cultural contexts, the early phase of the industry has 
commonly been described as a northern Norwegian story. The primary reason for this is 
that Svend Foyn and his followers established themselves and their system of whaling 
technologies in northern Norway. Jackson argued that the industry boomed in Norway 
because the technologies were available there, whales’ migration routes were in 
immediate proximity, and the Norwegians had decades of sealing and fishing 
experience.175 
 
In 1883, the number of whaling companies operating in northern Norway increased 
from eight to 16.176 By 1885, this figure has risen to 22 and they operated more than 33 
whale catchers and employed 828 men, which, according to Solhaug, were primarily 
from southern Norway.177 Whaling stations based on the same system were, according 
to Tønnesen, established in Iceland (1883), eastern Siberia and Korea (1889), the Faroe 
Islands (1894), Newfoundland and Labrador (1898), Japan (1899), and the Shetlands 
(1903).178 In the early 1890s, whale oil prices rose briefly from £12.00 to £32.99 per 
ton,179 and promoted exploratory surveys for new hunting grounds in the Antarctic. 
Throughout the 1890s, a few expeditions, such as Svend Foyn’s Arctic expedition to 
Spitsbergen,180 the Dundee expedition consisting of the Balaena, Diana, Arctic, and Polar 
Star,181 Christen Christensen’s Jason expedition of 1892, and Svend Foyn’s Antarctic 
expedition, went to the polar regions to survey the hunting grounds there.182 Although 
these expeditions reported abundant whale populations, there was little enticement to 
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establish whaling stations at this point because whales were still plentiful in the existing 
hunting grounds. Furthermore, the predominantly poor market conditions of the 1890s 
did not entice the whaling companies to spread their activities to the hazardous waters 
of the Arctic and Antarctic. Instead, whaling companies invested further in their 
established facilities and adopted new strategies to improve utilisation and product 
diversification, as described above. 
 
The local population often welcomed the whaling companies and their stations because 
they hoped they would bring employment opportunities and promote the financial 
situation of the region through increased taxation and revenues. However, to local 
frustration, few jobs were offered at the whaling stations and these were highly seasonal 
and low paid. Furthermore, the companies were reluctant to pay taxes to the local 
communities since they were already paying taxes in their home towns in the south. 
This meant that the initially good relationships between the local communities and the 
industry slowly turned negative. Johnsen suggested that the anger towards the whaling 
industry worsened as the cod stocks collapsed and catches dropped from more than 2 
million to just 700,000 within a few years.183 At the same time, bearded seal populations 
increased. Much of the blame was, as Risting has shown, pinned on the activities of the 
whaling companies. Anger was fuelled by the fishermen’s belief that whales scared the 
cod into shallower waters where the fishermen could exploit them. As a result, removal 
of the whales by the whaling industry was responsible for the lack of cod.184 That whales 
can be useful to man is, according to Matthews, mentioned in the Old Norse Speculum 
Regale or Konungs Skuggsjá from the year 1250 where the fish-driving skills of whales 
are described.185 In an attempt to stabilise the developing anti-whaling attitudes, the 
Norwegian government sent marine biologist Johan Hjort to investigate the correlation 
between whales and fisheries. Hjort’s conclusion that no such relationship existed 
simply fuelled the debate further.186 
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In 1901–1903, collapsing cod stocks coincided with governmental interference in the 
important Pomor trade with Russia.187 As a result, the anti-whaling movement, which 
included people, institutions, and organisations, turned into a class and national issue 
and people started calling for a whaling ban. This protest grew stronger and had an 
influence  in the political elections. Agitated, the press asked “what does Varanger mean? 
We have said it before and we say it again: It is a dangerous fjord, which in our time is 
twice as dangerous, when its beaches demarcate our border to the world’s most powerful 
nation. The Norwegian authorities should therefore grant it particular care”, and 
continued to ask “but where are the Norwegian people? Are they fed up with Finnmark 
and do they want to get rid of this part of the nation?”188 By June 1903, the alienated 
feelings and frustrations of the fishermen cumulated in an attack on Tanen whaling 
company’s station at Mehamn. Over two consecutive days, more than 2000 fishermen 
participated in destroying and hauling parts of its installations into the sea.189 
  
Fig 18 and 19. The remains of Tanens whaling station in Mehamn after the fishermen’s attack in 1903.190 
Right: A fisherman protecting a whale from being killed by Svend Foyn.191 
 
According to Berg, the Norwegian government was afraid the northern population 
would develop unnational sympathies if the basis of their livelihood was threatened, so 
they swiftly proposed a new law.192 The law banned all whaling operations in the three 
northernmost counties for a period of 10 years, and stated that “this law is in force from 
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the 1st of February 1904. Whaling establishments that have been operational throughout 
1903 will be allowed to continue their operations until one year after the mentioned date, 
but not with more catching boats than this year”.193 The modern whaling industry, which 
had contributed to the industrialisation of northern Norway, had promoted 
nationalisation strategies, and had an important socio-economical effect in towns like 
Sandefjord, Tønsberg, and Larvik, was now banned in northern Norway. 
 
The motive behind the 1904 ban was to strengthen national feelings in Finnmark, which 
was an important region in Norway. The number of people living there had grown 
steadily over the last few decades and these people could potentially vote against the 
government in coming elections in favour of left wing parties. Banning the whaling 
industry was an attempt by the government to gain popularity and avoid votes going to 
other political parties. The government in Oslo likely feared that its people had stronger 
ties with Russia after centuries of trade. This probably also played a key role in the 
government’s decision to ban whaling. One could therefore say that development of the 
modern whaling industry and the 1904 whaling ban were both geo-politically motivated 
events. The effects of the ban appear to have been limited. By that point, whale 
populations in northern Norway were severely depleted by decades of exploitation and 
competition and many whaling companies no longer operated in Norwegian waters. 
Instead, their whale catchers were stationed in Arctic waters throughout the hunting 
season and tug boats linked the catchers with the whaling stations, as described 
earlier.194 Tønnesen argued that the ban was the reason the whaling industry moved 
into the polar areas.195 Although the ban was an important factor, it does not completely 
explain why the industry established itself in the Arctic and Antarctic instead of less 
challenging seas. 
 
In Iceland, where the whaling industry had operated since 1883, similar events and 
conflicts between the whaling industry and local fishing communities resulted in a ban 
of foreigners from hunting whales. Risting argues that politicians refrained from taking 
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similar actions as in Norway because the industry was economically very important in 
Iceland.196 However, in 1913, a new law was introduced that banned the exploitation of 
whales. In Newfoundland, the Shetlands, the Hebrides, and Ireland, similar opposition 
was raised, according to Dickinson.197 Whaling also became a political affair in Great 
Britain when Balfour’s Unionist Party argued that “Norwegian whalers are conducting a 
business in British waters, which is so damaging for fish stocks that the Norwegian 
government banned whaling in its own territorial waters. Therefore, the Union Party 
believes that this matter demands the national protectionist policy”.198 
 
By the turn of the 20th century, the modern whaling industry was no longer a national 
affair. Whaling stations and companies had been established across the northern 
hemisphere where they interacted with and depended on actors and markets on an 
increasingly international scale. Although the industry was dominated by Norwegian 
entrepreneurs, technologies, and knowledge, its economic success attracted investors 
from Great Britain, Sweden, Argentina, Chile, Japan, and Russia. National governments 
and the industry ventured into areas where ownership and legal regime were uncertain. 
It is therefore important to analyse the whaling industry from an international 
perspective to explain why it became established in the polar regions. 
 
Geo-political factors 
So far in this chapter, I have discussed two factors that enabled the whaling industry to 
establish itself in the Arctic and Antarctic – demand for whale products on the world 
market and technological developments associated with modern whaling. In the 
following, I will discuss the third important factor, which, as discussed in the 
Introduction, has often been excluded – geopolitics. 
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The political history of Svalbard has been thoroughly researched by several historians 
since the mid-1950’s, such as Mathisen, Berg, Avango, Singh, and Arlov. Dodds, Sørlin, 
and others have studied similar processes in the Antarctic and the Subantarctic.199 I will, 
to a large extent, base this overview on their research, and return to this theme in the 
chapters discussing individual sites, to discuss the role of the modern whaling industry 
in Svalbard’s political history. 
 
In the wakes of the Berlin conference, actors in Sweden, Russia, and Norway turned 
northwards for natural resources and to find answers to the geo-history of their 
respective nations.200 At the same time, as Wråkberg has shown, researchers were 
expected to report any potential natural resources they discovered that could be of use 
to the nation. Some researchers, like the Finnish–Swedish Adolf Erik Nordenskiöld, 
claimed land and established a station for research and phosphate mining.201 His claim 
was quickly politicised as Norway and Russia protested. This started the geo-political 
process that ended up in the Spitsbergen Treaty in 1920, which granted Norway 
sovereignty of the archipelago. Historical ties, geographical vicinity, and economic 
activities were important tools that were actively used by many nations in this process – 
both at home and in Svalbard. Although the Netherlands had discovered the archipelago 
in 1596 and used it for two centuries, they did not claim sovereignty.202 Berg has shown 
that Norway covertly started forming a strategy to gain sovereignty of the archipelago 
after the peaceful breakup of the union between Norway and Sweden.203  
 
Norway was not alone; actors in Sweden and Russia had similar geo-political ambitions. 
In an attempt to solve this issue, three conferences were held in between 1910 and 
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1914.204 During the First World War, Norway and Sweden strengthened their respective 
positions by establishing new mining sites and companies and by performing research 
in the region. Once the treaty had been ratified, the geo-political motive to uphold 
industrial projects, research, and other activities declined rapidly. This, combined with 
rapidly declining prices for coal and other raw materials, meant that many industrial 
projects closed during the 1920s. 
 
The Antarctic continent was and still is a no man’s land that is governed by the Antarctic 
Treaty (1959). This has not prevented actors from making territorial demands to sectors 
in the name of their respective nations. At the turn of the 20th century, there was much 
uncertainty as to the legal status of much of the Subantarctic, as Klaus Dodds and Roald 
Berg have shown.205 In South Georgia and the South Shetland Islands, neither Cia 
Argentina De Pesca nor A/S Ørnen were met with formal protests from Britain or any 
other nation when they started their industrial activities there. As commercial interest 
increased, Britain reaffirmed its historic claims to South Georgia and the entire sector 
south of 50°S and between 20 and 80°W. Britain also claimed the South Shetland Islands 
through the Letters Patent of 1908. Howkins argued that the Letters Patent defined the 
legal title and status to the area in question that had existed for many years.206  
 
According to Dodds, the legal title to the South Orkney Islands was ceded to Argentina in 
1914.207 In 1917, however, a new Letters Patent was issued that clarified the extent of 
the Falkland Islands Dependencies on the Antarctic mainland, including South Georgia, 
the South Orkney Islands, and the South Shetland Islands. The British territorial 
ambitions and control over the resources and industrial activities in the Antarctic and 
the Subantarctic changed during the First World War. As whaling activities diminished 
and third party recognition of British sovereignty was reduced, Britain had to find other 
ways to uphold control and manifest ownership. Operation Tabarin was, as Dodds 
pointed out, launched in 1943–1944 to strengthen Britain’s occupation in the Antarctic 
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and Subantarctic.208 During this operation, a number of bases (such as base A, base B, 
base C, base D, and base E) were established – of which some are still operational today. 
In addition to establishing several buildings, signposts were placed in the surrounding 
landscape with the inscription “British Crown Land”. 
  
Fig 20 and 21. Signposts of this type were erected in the landscape close to the stations that were erected 
during operation Tabarin.209 Right: Base A at Port Lockroy. Photo by Ulf I. Gustafsson. LASHIPA 8/ 2010. 
 
There are still overlapping territorial claims in the Antarctic and Subantarcic. Although 
all territorial claims are frozen through the Antarctic Treaty, it is still important to 
maintain presence through research, tourism activities, post offices, and the production 
of maps to promote and strengthen claims. 
 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have pointed out four overarching contexts that dictated the 
establishment of the whaling industry in the Arctic and Antarctic – market demand for 
products manufactured from dead whales, technological innovations, new socio-
technical systems for whaling, and the geo-political situation in the polar areas. 
 
Nineteenth century industrialisation altered almost everything. It had far ranging socio-
economic effects as income levels rose and people could afford to buy more products. 
This increased the demand for various commodities, such as oil, fat, soap, margarine, 
textiles, and luxury products as people started living in more confined urban societies. 
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These societal changes occurred parallel to romantic and Darwinist ideals, which 
inspired a fascination for the unknown wild, from the Alps to the Arctic. In Scandinavia, 
industrialisation took a northern direction, focused on utilising natural resources in 
what was often described as the land of the future. 
 
The modern whaling industry was a part of this process. Attempts to adapt, transform, 
and modernise the industry to exploit and process large, fast swimming rorqual whales 
already started in the 18th century. The demands for cheap oil, such as vegetable, 
mineral, and whale oil rose in increasingly industrialised, techno-based, and populated 
western societies. This created incentives for the modern whaling industry to increase 
oil production. The economic actors and scientific knowledge associated with the second 
industrial revolution promoted the development of modern whaling and research on the 
solidification of liquid oil into hard fats (hydrogenation) as the expanding margarine and 
soap factories needed access to large amounts of raw materials. The success had positive 
socio-economic effects that extended beyond national borders. It created a diversified 
international market for the whaling industry, which drove prices up and attracted 
investment. By the first decade of the 20th century, market demands for whale oil 
promoted the spread of whaling stations to new prosperous hunting grounds in the 
Arctic and Antarctic where resources were abundant. In these regions, the industry had 
to conform and adapt to new legal regimes – or the lack thereof – and was often used as 
a tool by actors with geo-political motives, regardless of whether the industry itself 
supported these ambitions and goals. 
 
The four contexts described in this chapter strongly influenced the development of the 
modern whaling industry in the polar regions, and the establishment of whaling stations 
there. In the following chapters, I will discuss and analyse the driving forces behind the 
expansion of four former whaling stations in the Arctic and Antarctic, and the actor 








3. The modern whaling industry in the Arctic – an introduction 
 
Ever since Willem Barentsz discovered Spitsbergen (Svalbard) in 1596, human activities 
there have largely been involved in resource exploitation and research. Hacquebord has 
shown how British, Dutch, German, and Danish whaling companies exploited whales 
here during the 17th and 18th centuries, and how this resulted in over-exploitation and 
collapse of right whale stocks.210 Jasinski has described how and why Pomor trappers 
from northern Russia frequented the archipelago during the 18th  and 19th century, and 
how they established a network of basecamps and outposts there.211 In the 19th and 20th 
century, Norwegian hunters started operating here too, initially competing with the 
Pomors for resources. According to Rossnes, they hunted a variety of species.212 
While commercial ventures dominated human activities in the 17th and 18th century, 
research became increasingly dominant in the 19th century. Researchers like Kielhau, 
Andersson, Torell, De Geer, Nordenskiöld, Nathorst, and many others provided insights 
into the archipelago’s geo- and biological history,213 often with funding from actors with 
commercial interests or who wanted to be connected to the “aura” of polar research.214 
In the second half of the 19th century, the modern whaling industry developed into a 
global industry with numerous whaling stations across the northern hemisphere. The 
hunt for new potentially prosperous hunting grounds encouraged whaling companies to 
send out exploratory expeditions to investigate the waters of the Arctic and Antarctic. In 
1891, Svend Foyn sent a semi-pelagic expedition to Spitsbergen to investigate the 
whaling grounds there.215 Although they discovered that whaling could potentially be 
successful there, Foyn’s attempts resulted in huge material and financial losses when the 
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company lost its factory ship, Isbjørnen.216 This project was nonetheless an important 
step since it proved that it was technically and logistically possible to exploit fast 
swimming fin whales in the polar regions. The whaling industry in northern Norway 
had, as described earlier, successively diversified its production and changed its 
organisation to extend their hunting range and output. These measures were adaptive 
steps to changing market conditions and increasing competition for resources in 
Norway.217 Instead of having the whaling station as a base for whale catchers, several 
whaling companies tried to extend the operational range of their whale catchers using 
steam-powered tug boats to bring whales back to the station. This approach increased 
the available hunting grounds. The whale catcher was commonly stationed at Bear 
Island throughout the hunting season, while the tug boats linked the whaling station in 
northern Norway with the whale catchers – transporting resources, fuels, and food 
between the two.218 
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the development of the modern whaling 
industry in this part of the European High Arctic from 1904 to 1931. This will provide a 
background for two case studies presented in the following chapters. I will describe and 
discuss the technologies the companies used, how they organised their activities, and 
how they adapted their operations to the environmental and legal conditions at 
Spitsbergen and Bear Island. 
 
Svalbard 
Svalbard is an archipelago in the European High Arctic located approximately 800 km 
north of mainland Scandinavia. The largest of these islands is called Spitsbergen. This 
was also the formal name of the whole archipelago until it was changed by Norway 
when the Spitsbergen Treaty was ratified in 1925. The archipelago is approximately the 
size of Denmark and 60% of the island is permanently covered by glaciers. While the 
west coast of Spitsbergen is dominated by the pre-Cambrian Caledonian mountain chain, 
the inner part of the island and the east coast primarily consist of sedimentary rocks. 
                                                 
216 Jacobsen. A.R. Svend Foyn- Fangstpioner og nasjonsbygger. 2008. P: 277. 
217 «Dagbog D/S Skytten. 1899–1910”. National Library of Norway. Oslo. MS Fol 3905. See also: Johnsen, 
A.O. Finnmarksfangstens Historie 1864–1905. 1959. P: 554. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie-
Opprinnelse og Utvikkling, and Risting. S. Av Hvalfangstens Historie. 1922. P: 624f. 
218 Johnsen, A.O. Finnmarksfangstens Historie 1864–1905. 1959. Vol 1. P: 575. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst 
Historie-Opprinnelse og Utvikkling. 
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Bear Island, which is located approximately 400 km south of Spitsbergen, is a part of the 
same fold belt. Large parts of the fjords on the west coast are accessible throughout the 
summer due to the Gulf Stream, while fjords on the east side are more inaccessible due 
to sea ice. 
Fig 22 Map of the Svalbard archipelago. Map by 












During winter, most of the archipelago’s fjords are covered in ice, with drift ice along the 
coasts. By June, the fjords are accessible. Ice coverage has, like in most areas in the 
Arctic, changed substantially in the 20th century. 
 
The beginning of modern whaling in Svalbard 
Existing literature has explained that the move of modern whaling to Spitsbergen and 
Bear Island in 1903 was natural and logical. Firstly, the distance between northern 
Norway and the archipelago is relative short. Secondly, the whaling ban introduced in 
1904 forced the whaling industry to move north.219 Tønnesen has also depicted the 
                                                 
219 Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. No 10. October 1919. P: 170. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s 
Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord, Norway. See also: Tønnesen. J. N. Noen problemer i den moderne 
hvalfangst historie. P: 2f. Sandefjord Library. 
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industrial activities of the modern whaling industry in the Arctic as a precursor to the 
Antarctic whaling industry,220 as well as an intermezzo.221 In fact, the modern whaling 
industry had already established itself in the Arctic prior to the 1904 ban. This shift was 
motivated by competition for increasingly scarce living marine resources in northern 
Norway. It is true that the distance from northern Norway to Spitsbergen and Bear 
Island is relatively short (approximately 800 km). This, combined with the knowledge 
the whaling companies had collected, means that a move northward was perhaps logical. 
Furthermore, expansion of the modern whaling industry to the Arctic and Antarctic was 
a parallel event rather than two separate ones, therefore whaling in the Arctic cannot be 
regarded as a precursor to whaling in the Antarctic. In fact, the first whaling station in 
the Antarctic was established once year before the first whaling station in the High 
Arctic. 
Some whaling companies that initially operated in the Arctic moved their operations to 
the Antarctic when these hunting grounds became the largest in the world. The 
knowledge and experience these companies gained in Spitsbergen and Bear Island was 
probably useful, since they knew what it meant to operate in polar conditions. 

















Fig 23 Global development of the modern whaling industry 1900–1905.222 
 
                                                 
220 Tønnesen. J. N. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924. Del 1: 1883–1914. Vol 2. 1967. P: 84f. In: Den Moderne 
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221 Basberg. B.L. In the wake of Tønnesen and Johansen: Trends in Whaling History Research after 1970. 
Discussion paper. 2005. P: 8. 
222 Based on Johnsen, A.O and Tønnesen, J.N. 1959–1970. Vol 1–4. Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie-
Opprinnelse og Utvikkling. 
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The move to and permanent establishment of the modern whaling industry in the polar 
regions was not easy. The Arctic and the Antarctic have harsh climates and lack 
necessary components needed for industrial activities.223 Moreover, no state authority 
was present in these areas, and the legal status was often unclear if not unsettled and 
conflicted. Consequently, whaling companies needed big investments and contractors 
long before they started production and generated an income. Because of these 
circumstances, companies had to work out strategies to adapt to these local 
environmental and political circumstances. 
The first Norwegian whaling company to establish permanent whaling operations in 
Spitsbergen was Christen Christensen’s whaling company A/S Ørnen in 1903. The 
company based their operations on the 450 ton semi-pelagic factory ship Telegraf, 
which was stationed in the bays of Spitsbergen.224 M.A. Ingebrigtsen also hunted in 
Spitsbergen during this summer, but had not yet moved his base northwards. In its first 
whaling season in Spitsbergen, A/S Ørnen caught 57 whales and made a profit of 
Kr20 000.225 Compared with the combined catch of 42 whales for all companies 
operating in northern Norway in the same season, the expedition must have been 
regarded as a huge success. Perhaps more importantly, the expedition showed that it 
was not only technically and logistically possible to exploit and process fin whales in 
arctic waters, but also profitable, even though the company had to base all their 
industrial activities on an untested factory ship platform. 
Over the following years, another seven whaling companies moved their operations 
northwards and established themselves in Spitsbergen (Svalbard after 1926). This 
process has been well described by Risting and Tønnesen.226 Most companies 
established themselves in Bellsound on the west coast of Spitsbergen. Here, they could 
find deep and sheltered anchorages, plenty of freshwater, and be close to the main 
hunting grounds off the west coast. 
                                                 
223 Jackson, G. The British Whaling Trade. 1978. P: 153f. 
224 Risting, S. Av Hvalfangstens Historie. 1922. P: 245. 
225 Tønnesen. J. N. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924. Del 1: 1883–1914. Vol 2. 1967. P: 90. In: Den Moderne 
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After 1908, however, the number of whaling companies fell and a shift occurred from 
Bellsound to Icefjorden further north. One reason for this shift may be the easier access 
to coal, since several coal mines operated in the Isfjorden area. 
 
Factory ships and shore-based operations 
During the first decade of the 20th century, a total of eight Norwegian whaling companies 
established themselves in Spitsbergen and Bear Island. Most of these whaling companies 
chose to base their industrial operations on floating factory ships. Contemporary media 
argued that this technical solution made them “less dependent on the stand point taken by 
Norwegian authorities towards whaling as a whole, as well as taxes, medicinal costs, and 
so on. Whalers operating with a floating factory have yet an additional advantage since it 
allows them to operate and exploit larger hunting grounds compared with a stationary 
production unit”.227 Although this is a press statement, it probably reflects how the 
whaling entrepreneurs felt after the prolonged conflict in northern Norway, where they 
believed they had been sacrificed by the Norwegian authorities in favour of a political 
strategy.228 The same statement also had rhetorical and economic purposes since the 
Norwegian government compensated the whaling companies for not being able to carry 
on their activities in northern Norway. To maximise the compensation, the industry 
exaggerated the importance and economic value of northern Norway as a hunting 
ground. 
  
                                                 
227 Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1903. P: 588. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord, 
Norway. 
228 For further reading, please see chapter two. 
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Fig 24 and 25. Floating factories operating in Spitsbergen. Right: Young workers onboard the floating factory 
Hecla of the whaling company Alfa & Beta in Green Harbour. The photos have been published with the kind 
approval of the Norwegian Polar Institute. 
 
Contemporary media argued that using semi-pelagic platforms would eventually lead to 
a mass slaughter of whale stocks because the whaling companies could position 
themselves almost wherever they desired.229 At the turn of the century, however, the 
factory ships did not have these abilities and could not operate and process whales in a 
true pelagic sense – they were still dependent on land for shelter, access to freshwater, 
and for storing goods like barrels and coal. It is reasonable to ask why six whaling 
companies chose this approach for their operations despite the restricted capability and 
low utilisation it presented. One explanation may be that the companies had doubts 
about the whaling grounds in Spitsbergen and Bear Island. The choice could also have 
been influenced by contemporary perceptions of the Arctic as an environmentally 
difficult region to establish industrial operations in. Svend Foyn’s failed attempt of 1891 
demonstrated that operating in the Arctic was difficult, and it is not unlikely that other 
companies feared that they would suffer similar material and economic losses. 
In 1903, one company operated with two whale catchers. Two years later, eight 
companies operated 16 whale catchers in these waters.230 Consequently, competition for 
resources and freshwater harbours increased. Already in 1903, several whaling 
companies sent representatives to Spitsbergen to secure a harbour and a small piece of 
land on behalf of the whaling company they represented. 231 The archaeological field 
work I have conducted within the framework of the LASHIPA project shows that 
companies aimed to secure land that contained an abundant supply of freshwater, as 
well as being dry and protected enough to allow them to store barrels and coal supplies, 
which were vital for whale oil production. At these sites, the companies erected claim 
boards with information about the extent of their claim, and these boards were signed 
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by witnesses. Some also erected huts, which were practical but also marked their claim 
to the site. 
Out of the eight whaling companies that established themselves in Spitsbergen and Bear 
Island, two chose to establish whaling stations. These stations were established at 
Finneset on Spitsbergen and at Walrus Bay on Bear Island. Throughout their operational 
lifespan, these two whaling stations were owned by four different companies, all of 
which will be dealt with in the following chapters. The modern whaling industry in 
Spitsbergen and Bear Island developed rapidly. 
 
Activities and results 
As the number of companies increased, so did the whale catches and production of 
whale oil. In 1905, whale oil production peaked at approximately 17,500 barrels.232 In 
1906, the season was challenging for the whaling companies operating in Spitsbergen, 
and catches dropped significantly compared with the 1905 season.233 In 1906, the 
company with the best results in Spitsbergen was A/S Nimrod with a catch of 55 whales. 
On Bear Island, M.A Ingebrigtsen caught 60 whales and a large percentage of these were 
blue whales.234 The companies argued that whales were scarce in the western 
Spitsbergen and storms and fog hindered whale catchers from scouting and catching 
whales. This made it difficult for the whale catcher and tug boat crews to navigate the 
waters and catch the few whales they spotted. Although the companies and their 
employees had extensive experience operating in harsh conditions from northern 
Norway, the constant fear of ice was a new environmental hazard that the companies 
had to adapt to. 
 
In an attempt to adapt to these harsher conditions, several whaling companies sent 
small expeditions along the shores of Bellsound and Recherchefjorden on the west coast 
of Spitsbergen to collect whale bones that were scattered along the shores.235 According 
to Tønnesen, whaling companies cut these bones into smaller pieces and processed 
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them into whale oil and a few thousand bags of guano.236 These companies used floating 
factory ships and had no onboard capability to process bones, which needed to be 
cooked at a higher pressure than blubber. According to a contemporary coal mining 
company, the Arctic Coal Company, a land-based production facility was constructed in 
Recherchefjorden, which the companies used jointly to process collected whale bones.237 
Another source suggests that the Norwegian whaling company A/S Ørnen established a 
primitive shore-based cookery in 1905 for processing whale meat into 100 barrels of 
whale oil in an attempt to increase the utilisation of the whales.238 The level of utilisation 
among the companies that operated in Spitsbergen was generally low since the floating 
factories only had capability to process blubber. Consequently, a large part of the raw 
material was discarded after the whalers had flensed the whale. This resulted in a large 
number of whale carcasses on the beaches of Bellsound and Recherchefjorden. 
 
Fig 26. Land-based construction along the shores of Recherchefjorden on Spitsbergen. The photo was taken 
by an unknown employee of the Arctic Coal Company in 1913. The photo has been published with the kind 
permission of Michigan Technological University, USA. 
 
In 1907, the whaling fleet was obstructed from reaching their anchorages by a large belt 
of sea ice, which extended from north-western Spitsbergen to just south of Bear 
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Island.239 To avoid getting trapped in the ice, the whaling companies positioned their 
ships alongside the edge of the sea ice, where they hunted and processed whales 
alongside the ships. In mid-June, the sea ice broke up and the companies could use their 
whale catchers and tug boats to push the ice floes away from the factory ship, carving a 
path to access their claimed harbours and territories along the west coast of 
Spitsbergen. 240 
It is noteworthy that many whalers believed whale stocks were larger than the numbers 
indicated, despite the declining catches. They blamed the sea ice, fog, and irregular 
distribution of whales for their low number of catches.241 Three whaling companies 
chose to cease their operations in Spitsbergen, and either cancel or transfer their 
operations to new and potentially more prosperous hunting grounds elsewhere. Some 
moved their operations to the west coast of Africa, South Georgia, or to the South 
Shetland Islands. 
A similar situation, with many ice-blocked harbours and declining catches, occurred in 
1908.242 Because of declining catches, more whaling companies chose to withdraw from 
these hunting grounds in favour of other areas. In 1905, the whaling company A/S 
Ørnen left Spitsbergen for the South Shetland Islands in Antarctica.243 The motivation 
for this move probably came from articles in Norwegian newspapers that Cia Argentina 
De Pesca were hugely successful in South Georgia, with 51 whales caught in less than 
one month. It is difficult to estimate what effect the success of Antarctic whaling 
companies had on attracting investors and industrialists in Norway and elsewhere to 
whaling projects in the European High Arctic. It is, however, reasonable to assume that it 
became increasingly difficult to maintain the support of arctic projects by global 
networks as the future and profitability of these projects looked bleak. Nonetheless, two 
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whaling companies chose to maintain their operations.244 These will be discussed more 
in chapters 4 and 5. 
 
Modern whaling and geo-politics 
The archipelago’s legal status as a no man’s land and the process that ended with the 
Spitsbergen Treaty of 1920 were discussed in the previous chapter. This mostly dealt 
with the political arena in the states concerned; it gave little information on how natural 
resource interests, such as the modern whaling industry, acted in relation to this issue. 
The purpose here is to do just that. 
The whaling companies claimed land for their shore-based production activities using 
various  symbols, such as claim boards, huts, and fences. Their stations, coal stores, and 
barrels on the shores fulfilled similar functions, serving practical needs while at the 
same time indicating that the land was claimed. Theoretically, these objects were non-
human guards of these sites or actants.245 These actants were placed at prominent 
positions in the landscape to be visible from a long distance. Similar rituals of possession 
have been performed for centuries by governments and actors who sought to create 
what they regarded as a legitimised dominion and sovereignty over a certain territory. 
Depending on their cultural background, the different actors used different symbols to 
achieve their goals.246 
The whaling companies designed their strategies for claiming land as a way of adapting 
to the legal status of Spitsbergen and Bear Island as no man’s land. The implications of 
this status have been analysed and described by several researchers, including Berg 
(1995), Wråkberg (1999), Mathisen (1954), Singh (1980), Hoel (1966), and Arlov 
(2003). The legal status of no man’s land meant that the archipelago was open to anyone 
for exploration and exploitation. The whaling companies regarded these conditions as 
favourable, since they did not have to comply with any state regulations that might have 
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restricted their activities. Nor did they have to pay taxes.247 However, the no man’s land 
status also posed challenges. There was no state authority to give the whaling 
companies a concession for catching whales and building whaling stations. In other 
words, the companies did not have a state sanctioned legal title to their hunting grounds 
and stations and therefore had to protect them by other means. Marking land with non-
human actors was one way of doing this. An informal practice on what was regarded as a 
legitimate way of claiming land – and what was not – developed between the actors that 
operated there.248 
It appears that the whaling companies studied how other actors dealt with the issue, in 
particular actors within the emerging coal mining industry, such as the German Theodor 
Lerner (1898) and the Norwegian Søren Zachariassen (1899). These two actors 
demarked their territorial claims with steel wire and erected wooden claim boards, 
which stated the name and extent of the claim, including the date of the occupation and 
witnesses present. Together with a map, they reported these claims to their respective 
foreign ministries to validate them.249 The foreign ministries followed up by sending out 
notes to other nations about the claim. If no one opposed, it was regarded as valid. This 
was the informal practice that the companies had to adapt to. After performing these 
rituals of possession, the companies could establish and build their local networks. 
   
Fig 27, 28, and 29. Claim boards by three different whaling companies (A/S Spitsbergen, A/S Nimrod, and 
Thor Dahl), which were erected in  Spitsbergen. The photos (left and centre) have been published with the 
kind approval of the Norwegian Polar Institute. The photo on the right was taken by the author in the 
collections of the Svalbard Museum. 
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Avango (2005) and Arlov (2003) have shown that the states involved in negotiating the 
legal status of Spitsbergen used the mining industry on the archipelago to support their 
positions – including the land these companies had claimed using the aforementioned 
actants.250 
Although Spitsbergen and Bear Island both had a status of no man’s land, the 
competition over natural resources and territories there played out very differently. The 
first countries to show a political interest in Bear Island were Germany and Russia at the 
end of the 19th century. While Germany used a state supported company named 
Deutsche Seefischerei Vereins to claim the island, Russia used a man-of-war ship named 
Svetlana. In 1899, the German company established a large building at present day 
Hertwighamna to claim the land. Here, they brought ashore a steam-powered 
locomobile and fleischehackmaschine, which they used to cut up the seven whales they 
caught.251 The purpose of the project was a part of a covert German strategy initiated by 
Emperor Wilhelm II to claim the island for Germany and create a foothold for the nation 
in the north.252 Emperor Wilhelm II frequently visited Norway. In 1891 and 1892, he 
visited northern Norway, where he was invited to take part in whale hunting on board 
the whale catcher Nancy Grey of the Anglo-Norwegian Fishing Company.253 It is not 
unlikely that this visit contributed to the Emperor’s decision to occupy Bear Island by 
establishing a whaling base there. Despite this German state initiative, it was a private 
German entrepreneur named Theodor Lerner who first claimed the island, including 
some of the best harbours. Even though the project failed, the activities of the Deutsche 
Seefischerei Vereins at Hertwighamna represent the first modern attempt to exploit the 
whale populations around the island. 
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Fig 30 and 31. Remains of the fleischhakkemaschine of the Deutsche Seefischerei Vereins at Hertwighamna. 
Photo: Gustav Rossnes. LASHIPA 5/2008. Right: The Deutsche Seefisherei Verein processing a minke whale at 
their station in Hertwighamna on the northern coast of Bear Island.254 
 
The case of Emperor Wilhelm II at Bear Island shows that state actors tried to use the 
whaling industry as a tool to gain influence or even claim sovereignty in Spitsbergen. As 
Thor Bjørn Arlov has suggested, a few years later, the presence of Norwegian whaling 
companies in Spitsbergen provided the Norwegian government with a similar 
opportunity. 
The Norwegian government made its first moves to gain influence in Spitsbergen in 
1906. In January 1907, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry invited nationals who had 
economic interests in the archipelago for a meeting. The purpose of this meeting was to 
map and investigate the extent of Norwegian presence and economic activities in the 
archipelago. Prior to the meeting, the Ministry had sent out questionnaires to the 
whaling company managers to find out how many catching boats were used, the number 
of employees, the size of boat crews, and how many whales were caught. They also 
asked how many barrels of whale oil were produced and what the  profits were. The 
most significant question was whether whaling companies operating in Spitsbergen and 
Bear Island had experienced problems because of the no man’s land status of the 
archipelago.255 The meeting was held at the Foreign Ministry, and representatives of 
different enterprises participated, including Ingebrigtsen who represented the whaling 
industry. At this meeting, the answers to the questionnaires were discussed. The 
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managers of the whaling companies reported that they had not in any way experienced 
problems with the legal status of the archipelago.256 
The whaling companies and their managers had good reasons for reporting this, since 
they feared that new governmental regulations and concessions would be introduced, 
similar to the ones experienced in Norway, if the nation was granted sovereignty. By this 
time, whale catches had been declining for several years. Morten Andreas Ingebrigtsen 
downplayed the importance of the whaling industry in Spitsbergen and Bear Island, and 
argued that its economic activity hardly provided a basis for a Norwegian claim of the 
archipelago. Ingebrigtsen’s opinion was backed by the famous explorer and scientist 
Fridtjof Nansen. Nevertheless, the activities of the whaling industry in Spitsbergen and 
Bear Island were, from the Norwegian government’s point of view, not without 
significance. At the time, the Norwegians were engaged in exploiting the archipelago’s 
natural resources, which could have been used to promote geo-political ambitions. 
The main conclusion of the meeting was that the whaling industry could not form a basis 
for Norwegian sovereignty of the archipelago by itself.257 However, a need for regulating 
claims was acknowledged and it was agreed that the Foreign Ministry should work out 
international rules on use and property rights.258 From 1908, the Norwegian Foreign 
Ministry started supporting Norwegian mining companies and Norwegian scientific 
research at Spitsbergen. After 1910, as Foreign Minister Johannes Irgens came into 
office, the Norwegian government intensified this strategy.259 
In 1911, Irgens summoned two scientists to his office and assigned them with a secret 
strategy designed by the Foreign Ministry.260 This strategy involved a series of 
“scientific” expeditions to conduct research, but also to claim land and natural resources. 
The two scientists were told to form private companies to defend the territory and 
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exploit the resources. The Foreign Minister stressed that under no circumstances could 
this plan be linked to the Foreign Ministry.261 
 
Fig 32. There was intensive competition for good 
harbours located close to the primary hunting 










These expeditions became known as De Norske Statsunderstøttede Spitsbergen 
ekspedisjonene (NSIU). Norway’s interest in Spitsbergen, Bear Island, and other polar 
areas increased during the 1890s, as actors from other nations tried to establish 
colonies there. Norwegian historians argued that Norwegians had long traditions here, 
dating all the way back to 1194.262 Norwegian hunters did have long traditions in the 
archipelago, much like the Russians did, but the Norwegians lacked, as Drivenes points 
out, the scientific traditions that Sweden had.263 To counteract this, NSIU was 
established. While the official task of the expeditions was to map sea- and land areas and 
to do scientific work, their covert task was to claim natural resources on Spitsbergen 
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and to create companies that could uphold the rights to Norway’s claims, either by 
renewing claims or by exploiting resources. 
 
During the first decade of the 20th century, Norwegian whaling companies appeared to 
have little interest in supporting the geo-political agenda of their government in 
Spitsbergen. However, this appeared to change after 1911 when the two whaling 
companies that still operated in Spitsbergen were visited by the NSIU expedition. I have 
not been able to find any sources about what they discussed, but it is reasonable to 
assume that NSIU expedition members encouraged the whaling companies to increase 
their territorial claims. They had already done so with Norwegian mining entrepreneurs 
and the Norwegian whaling companies increased their territorial claims in Spitsbergen 
afterwards. Thus, these two Norwegian whaling companies may have actively supported 
the Norwegian government’s ambitions to claim Spitsbergen for a period of time. Their 
geo-political role was small, however, in comparison with the mining industry and 
scientific expeditions. 
The whaling companies used the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and NSIU as allies in their 
global networks. They used them in case of territorial disputes, since the Foreign 
Ministry had registered all their claims to land there. They could count on similar 
support from the scientific community, which was part of NSIU. Their primary task was 
to increase and secure control over large areas on behalf of the nation. It seems likely 
that they and the maps they produced supported and legitimized the claims of the 




Fig 33. De Norske Statsunderstøttede Spitsbergenekspedisjonene visiting Finneset whaling station in 1911. 
Photo courtesy of the Norwegian Polar Institute Archive. 
 
During the First World War, a large number of mining companies were established and  
claimed large territories. In addition to these, a telegraph station was built at Finneset in 
1911 by the Norwegian state. The combined effect of the scientific work, established 
mining companies, whaling industry, and the telegraph station strengthened Norway’s 
position on the archipelago during the first two decades of the 20th century. 
The legal status of Spitsbergen remained a no man’s land until 1920, when the issue was 
solved at the Versailles negotiations, which granted sovereignty to Norway through the 
treaty concerning the Spitsbergen archipelago including Bear Island. At the same time, 
actors from signatory nations were given equal rights to exploit resources on the 
archipelago. After the ratification of the treaty in 1925, Norway formally took over 





In addition to the legal status of Spitsbergen and Bear Island, the whaling companies had 
to adapt to the environmental conditions in this part of the Arctic, in particular the sea 
ice.264 On several occasions, the sea was frozen in the fjords, preventing access to the 
harbours until late summer. Whaling companies could not access their anchorages or 
whaling stations, and had to adapt their operational structure. While some companies 
anchored alongside the edge of the sea ice where they flensed and processed whales, 
other companies tried to cut their way through the ice. 
 
Fig 34. Summer sea ice extent in the European High Arctic in the spring and summer of 1907.265 
 
These environmental conditions, combined with recurring fog, made it difficult for the 
whale catchers to operate and hunt whales. Fog also made sailing hazardous, since they 
risked hitting an ice flow and damaging the ship. This shortened an already short arctic 
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hunting season. There were few hunting grounds where sea ice had such an influential 
and dictating role in the success of industrial projects as in Spitsbergen.266 
 
Renewed interest in arctic hunting grounds 
During the First World War, whaling grounds in the European High Arctic once again 
became a target of the modern whaling industry. In 1915, L.M. Christensen from 
Tønsberg attempted to re-open the whaling station at Finneset for three consecutive 
seasons.267 Christensen was one of the most important suppliers of buildings for whaling 
stations across the world. From 1908, he started investing and became more active 
within the whaling industry in the northern hemisphere.268 The motive for renting 
Finneset whaling station was to exploit the blue, fin, sei, minke, and humpback whale 
populations in the North Atlantic ocean. They believed that these populations had 
recovered since whaling had ceased in Iceland, the Hebrides, Ireland, and Norway. 
Christensen believed that exploiting these whale populations from a whaling station in 
Spitsbergen could be profitable.269 His business idea was to supply the domestic market 
with oil and fat, which was scarce due to the First World War. 
 
During the war, Great Britain declared whale oil as contraband and ceased control over 
the entire whale oil production because it could be used for war-time purposes. The 
needs on the domestic market could not be met, meaning projects like Christensen’s 
could potentially be profitable. The attempt was, however, a complete failure as the 
entire expedition, which consisted of 125 men, was caught in the ice.270 It eventually had 
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to return to Norway without catching a single whale.271A second attempt was planned 
for the following year, but that also failed since Christensen had not been able to obtain 
any whale catchers.272 
The dominance the whaling industry had during the first decade was never regained. 
From 1908 onwards, the mining industry became the dominant industrial activity in the 
archipelago. Unlike the modern whaling industry, the mining industry developed into an 
international activity. Despite this, whaling companies continued to exploit resources in 
the area until 1938. One of these companies was Spitsbergen Hval. This whaling 
company was owned and managed by the Norwegian Morten Andreas Ingebrigtsen and 
his son. They rented and re-opened Finneset whaling station from the mining company 
Store Norske Spitsbergen Kullkompani in 1920.273 This attempt was motivated by the 
belief that whale stocks in the arctic waters had recovered after almost a decade of no 
hunting, similar to what Christensen had believed. This project was also short-lived due 
to poor catches, and was the last time a whaling station was in operation at Finneset. 
Later attempts in 1926–1927 and in the 1930s were all pelagic projects based on 
floating factory ships that only visited Spitsbergen to buy coal from the mining 
companies and to resupply their fresh water tanks. Finneset whaling station was, 
however, not entirely abandoned. It was regularly used as storage for small boats. It is 
also likely that the station’s forge continued to play an important role for expeditions, 
trappers, mining companies, as well as for the telegraph station at Finneset. 
During the Second World War, the archipelago and its many coal mines became 
strategically important. The allied forces wanted to prevent German armed forces from 
gaining control over these, and sent up an expedition to evacuate the small population 
from the island and set fire to the coal deposits. The telegraph station at Finneset, which 
was of strategic importance, was bombarded by allied ships. These shells destroyed both 
the telegraph station and the whaling station. 
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Today, there are still cultural remains of the modern whaling industry in Svalbard, 
particularly at Finneset. These remains were surveyed and mapped by a LASHIPA team 
in the summer of 2007. The results of this fieldwork will be discussed thoroughly in the 































4. Finneset whaling station 
 
Introduction 
The remains of Finneset whaling station are located on a small, flat peninsula in Green 
Harbour. This is a southern fjord arm that extends from the larger Isfjorden on the west 
coast of Spitsbergen. The whaling station was established in 1905, and was operated by 
three different whaling companies until it was finally abandoned after the 1920 season. 
The whaling companies that operated the station are: 
• A/S Spitsbergen  (1905–1908) 
• A/S Nimrod  (1909–1912) 
• A/S Spitsbergen (1920–1921) 
 
A/S Spitsbergen whaling company 
A/S Spitsbergen whaling company was established in 1905 by the three Norwegians 
Severin Dahl, Lars Iversen, and Knut Raaum. A/S Spitsbergen succeeded the whaling 
company A/S Finmarken. Both Iversen and Raaum had worked for A/S Finmarken and 
initially claimed the peninsula Finneset for this company in 1904.274 Here, I will briefly 
discuss A/S Finmarken since it is relevant to the formation of A/S Spitsbergen later on 
and the company’s decision to move their whaling station from northern Norway to 
Spitsbergen. A/S Finmarken was established in 1880 by the Tønsberg-based 
entrepreneurs Johannes Bruu, Olaus Røed, and Otto Thoresen with a capital of Kr 
268,000.275 It is perhaps not surprising that the actors behind this whaling company 
came from Tønsberg, where the success of the local whaling entrepreneur Svend Foyn 
had not been unnoticed. 
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A/S Finmarken was one of five Tønsberg-based whaling companies that were 
established that same year.276 Apart from being eager to participate in the whaling boom 
at the time, the company was also established because new whaling companies were 
joint stock projects in which people could invest and buy shares. According to Johnsen, 
the whaling companies were commonly divided into 24–70 parts or shares and were the 
first joint stock ventures to be based on public support and interest in Norway.277 
Having secured the financial support of local shareholders, Bruu, Røed, and Thoresen 
hired Marcus Bull to manage the company and build its local network. Bull had extensive 
experience of shipping and whaling, having worked as the local manager of Svend Foyn’s 
whaling station at Vadsø in northern Norway. Under the leadership of Bull, a whaling 
station and whaling fleet were developed throughout the 1880s. A few years later, Bull 
was replaced as manager by Jacob Dessen, and Bull moved to Iceland where he and his 
brother established their own whaling station.278 During the period 1885 to 1904, the 
company was relatively successful, catching approximately 1,360 whales.279 In 1899, 
there was a turning point for the whaling company, as well as the entire whaling 
industry in northern Norway. Whales were becoming scarcer. A/S Finmarken went from 
an average annual catch of 109 whales to 60 whales in 1899, and this dropped even 
further to 34 whales in 1900. The trend was similar throughout northern Norway and 
was a sign that whale stocks had become depleted after decades of being hunted. In an 
attempt to counteract the situation, the management of A/S Finmarken decided to 
replace the manager Jacob Dessen with Lars Iversen.280 
 
Iversen managed to turn the trend by reorganising hunting. He had worked for the 
Greenland Shark fishing industry and the sealing industry in the northern seas before he 
was employed as the manager of A/S Finmarken.281 Instead of organising the hunting 
activities as the company traditionally had done, with whale catchers operating from the 
stations at Sørvær, Iversen convinced the company management to invest in a steam-
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powered tug boat. This increased the company’s operational range and allowed access 
to larger hunting grounds. Iversen decided to place the two whale catchers Fin and Frey 
at Bear Island, and to use the tug boat as a link between the whaling station in northern 
Norway and the whale catchers at Bear Island. By reorganising the hunting activities in 
this way, catches increased from 34 whales in 1900 to 49 in 1901, 66 in 1902, 79 in 
1903, and 95 in 1904.282 Although prices for whale oil dropped during the same period 
from £ 22 per ton in 1900 to £15 per ton in 1904,283 the number of catches indicated 
that whaling in the Arctic could be profitable. As a result, the management of A/S 
Finmarken decided to send Knut Raaum to Spitsbergen in 1903 to investigate the 
hunting grounds there and to locate and claim a piece of land on behalf of the company. 
Raaum was a ship owner from Tønsberg. His role in A/S Finmarken is unclear, but it is 
possible that he was a part of the company’s management. Although Raaum failed to 
locate a suitable site for establishing a whaling station, the attempt was repeated in the 
summer of 1904. 
 
This group consisted of Knut Raaum, Lars Iversen, and the manager of Tønsberg 
Brewery, who was probably one of A/S Finmarken’s main shareholders.284 After failing 
to claim an area in Bellsound, which had already been claimed by the Bergenske 
Kulkompanie of Bergen,285 the group sailed north to Isfjorden and Green Harbour. Here, 
they located a large and unclaimed peninsula, which they named Finnæs, or Fine Point, 
on behalf of A/S Finmarken.286 
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Fig 35. Finneset Peninsula, Green Harbour. The peninsula is flat and dry, with good, sheltered harbour 
conditions on the southern side. Photo: U.I. Gustafsson. LASHIPA 3/2006. 
 
Having claimed Finneset peninsula, the company started building their butchering and 
production facilities – their local network. It appears, however, that the local company 
management was unable to convince the shareholders of the idea. The shareholders 
favoured taking the compensation offered by the Norwegian government for the 1904 
whale ban in northern Norway. 287 This was because the company’s local network were 
unable to generate enough economic profits to maintain the shareholder’s support, and 
were not able to convince them of the hunting potential in the Arctic. The company’s 
negotiations with the Norwegian government resulted in a Kr 56,000 compensation 
deal, which was less than the Kr 75,000 requested for their whaling establishment at 
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Sørvær.288 As a result, Iversen and Raaum found themselves with a claim to a piece of 
land at Spitsbergen and a belief that the arctic whaling grounds could be profitable. In 
the spring of 1905, Iversen and Raaum managed to attract the interest of the Kristiania- 
(present day Oslo) based company, Firma Severin Dahl. 
 
Firma Severin Dahl was founded in Tønsberg, Norway in 1867 by the entrepreneur 
Severin Dahl. Initially, Dahl’s business focused on shipping insurance and supplying 
financial aid to Norwegian shipping firms. At the turn of the 20th century, Severin Dahl 
decided to move his operations from Tønsberg to Oslo, where they developed into a 
successful and profitable company, supplying insurance to several international 
companies.289 It is, however, uncertain when Severin Dahl left this position as director of 
the company. At the same time, it seems that the company changed its name to Noprivas. 
This company had two directors: Even Andersen and Bjarne Jørgensen, and Knut Raaum 
was chairman of the board.290 Raaum used his position as chairman to convince the 
board to invest in the project. According to Johnsen, Firma Severin Dahl/Noprivas 
decided to purchase the whaling station at Sørvær from A/S Finmarken, with all its 
buildings and technical installations, with the intention of moving it to Spitsbergen.291 
There are unfortunately no historical sources that give insight into the negotiations 
between the two parties. It is likely that their decision was inspired by the good results 
other whalers had in Spitsbergen between 1903 and 1904.292 There was a widespread 
notion that there would be large exploitable whale stocks in the Arctic. Another factor 
was the availability of new technology – such as the hydrogenation of whale oil. 
 
Activities and results 1905–1909 
Firma Severin Dahl supplied the necessary capital to establish the whaling station at 
Finneset, Spitsbergen, while Iversen and Raaum had the expertise to realize the project. 
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Raaum and Iversen were contracted as managers of the newly formed whaling company 
and with the task of moving the whaling station from Finnmark and rebuilding it at 
Spitsbergen.293 During the spring of 1905, Iversen and Raaum hired people to 
disassemble parts of the former whaling station A/S Finmarken at Sørvær in northern 
Norway and to move it part by part to Finneset where it was re-erected.294 The company 
spent a large part of the summer building the station at Finneset. As a result, production 
lagged behind. In spite of this, the company caught 81 whales and produced 2,700 
barrels of whale oil.295 Compared with other whaling companies in Spitsbergen, this was 
an average result. The total catch and production for the eight companies operating in 
Spitsbergen in 1905 was 553 whales and 17,460 barrels of whale oil.296 In comparison, 
the Argentinean whaling company Cia Argentina de Pesca, which operated from 
Grytviken whaling station in South Georgia, caught 183 whales and produced 5,302 
barrels of whale oil that same year.297  
Given that the average price for whale oil on the domestic market was Kr 48.23 and the 
production costs were Kr 46.19, A/S Spitsbergen made a surplus of Kr 5,400298 This was, 
however, before the company had paid any salaries to their workers. I have not 
uncovered any data on the number of employees or their individual salaries, which 
makes it difficult to estimate these costs. It is reasonable to assume that the company did 
not make any profit in their first season. Considering this was the company’s first 
hunting season, the management and shareholders probably regarded any profit as a 
good result. Prices for whale oil had declined since 1900. In 1905, they reached an all-
time low –  whale oil No 1 was sold at £ 15 per ton and whale oil No 4 was sold at £ 9.10 
per ton, including barrels.299 These declining prices might seem odd considering the 
export of whale oil to the European markets increased in the period 1903–1905. 
According to Johnsen (1959), the decline in prices was the result of strong competition 
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Vol 2. P: 587. In: Den moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
299 Johnsen. A.O. Finnmarksfangstens historie 1864–1905. 1959. Vol 1. P: 512. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst 
Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
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from animal, vegetable, and mineral oils, which entered the market in the core regions of 
Europe in huge quantities.300 
PRICES FOR WHALE OIL (Ton) 1900–1905 
 Year No 1 (£)  No 4 (£) 
    
1900 22.00 16.00 
1901 20.00 13.00 
1902 20.00 16.00 
 1903 19.00 13.10 
1904 16.00 11.00 
1905 15.00  9.10 
 
Fig 36 and 37. Tables indicating average prices for whale oil and average annual production per whaling 
company in northern Norway, Bear Island, and Spitsbergen.301 Although the two tables indicate that 
production increased as prices dropped, the number of companies was also reduced, which increased average 
production per company. Despite this, it is obvious that the whaling companies increased their annual 
production over the period. 
 
The 1906 season proved to be a difficult hunting season for all whaling companies 
operating in Spitsbergen. Overall, fewer whales were caught and it was not uncommon 
for whale catchers to lay stationed at sea for days without seeing any whales.302 The 
whalers believed this was because there was less food along the west coast of 
Spitsbergen. There were rumours that there had been plenty of whales at Bear Island 
and in the vicinity of Hopen Island further to the south-east.303 Catching statistics from 
Spitsbergen and Bear Island might support these rumours. The company with the best 
result in Spitsbergen was A/S Nimrod, which caught 55 whales. Morten Andreas 
Ingebrigtsen at Bear Island managed to catch 60 whales and a large percentage of these 
were blue whales.304 
 
                                                 
300 Johnsen. A.O. Finnmarksfangstens historie 1864–1905. 1959. Vol 1. P: 508. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst 
Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
301 The figures are based on data reported in Norsk Fiskeritidende 1890–1905, The Economist 1890–
1905, Grosser W. Hvistedahl & Co, Johnsen. A.O. (1959) and Risting. S. (1922). Please note, that for the 
period 1903–1904, the production for the two whaling companies operating in Bear Island and 
Spitsbergen have been included, while 1905 in entirely based on the latter. 
302 Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1906. P:72. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. 
Norway. 
303 Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1906. P:72f. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. 
Norway. 
304 ”Dagbog D/S Skytten. 1906”. National Library of Norway. Oslo. MS Fol 3905. See also: Risting. S. Av 
Hvalfangstens Historie. 1922. P: 262. 
AVERAGE  






1900 801.57 14 
1901 1,143.83 12 
1902 1,994.90 11 
1903 1,332.45 10+1 
1904 2,496.66 10+2 
1905 2,332.5 8 
 98 
 
For A/S Spitsbergen, the 1906 season ended with a catch of 37 whales, 1,492 barrels of 
whale oil, and a few tonnes of dried and packed baleen. According to Tønnesen, whale 
oil prices were Kr 61.00 per barrel at the time, while the estimated production costs 
were approximately Kr 49.00 per barrel.305 This suggests that the company made a net 
profit of Kr 17,904 (excluding baleen), despite the difficult environmental conditions. 
Another growing concern for the whaling companies in Spitsbergen was the rising 
whaling industry in the Antarctic, which was attracting much attention with its large 
catches. This in turn attracted investors and other actors, and also gunners who wanted 
employment there. All whaling companies were dependent on a good gunner to secure 
good catches. As a result, they often competed over the best ones, using salaries as a tool 
to achieve this. This gave the gunners a unique opportunity to earn well. Not only did 
they have a good base salary, they were also paid per whale they brought in for 
processing. This made it difficult for the whaling companies in Spitsbergen to compete 
for the best gunners. What effect this had on the catches is, however, difficult to say. 
 
In May 1907, when the whaling fleet approached Spitsbergen, they met a large belt of 
sea ice, which extended from north-western Spitsbergen to just south of Bear Island.306 
To avoid getting trapped in the ice, the whaling companies positioned their ships 
alongside the edge of the sea ice. Here, they started the hunting season and flensed and 
processed whales alongside the ships. Although the sea ice prevented them from 
accessing the shelter of Spitsbergen’s waters, the ice itself broke the large swells from 
the Barents Sea and provided enough shelter for the companies to process whales. By 
mid-June, the sea ice broke up and the companies could enter the fjords, using their 
whale catchers and tug boats to push the ice floes away from the factory ship. This 
carved a path that allowed the whaling companies to access their claimed harbours and 
territories along the west coast of Spitsbergen. Here, the companies operated until the 
end of August.307 Many companies that previously operated from Bellsound and 
Recherché Bay sought new anchorages because the harsh summer with ice and low 
temperatures had kept the fjord frozen for most of the season. Some companies took 
                                                 
305 Data have been extracted from Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924. Del 1: 1883–1914. 1967. 
Vol 2. P: 587. In: Den moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
306 See figure 35 in chapter 3. 




harbour in Isfjorden, while others established themselves at Prince Charles Foreland.308 
A/S Spitsbergen encountered similar problems further north and anchored with its fleet 
alongside the edge of the sea ice. In June, the company was able to sail into the Isfjorden. 
Green Harbour and the whaling station were, however, still blocked by sea ice. To access 
the station, Iversen ordered his workers to cut a canal through the ice. In spite of the 
initial problems, the season was better than the previous one, with a total catch of 68 
whales and 16 bottlenose whales, from which the company produced 2,200 barrels of 
whale oil and a few tonnes of baleen.309 According to Dole, A/S Spitsbergen also sold 200 
barrels of salted whale meat to the Russian army, which added to the revenues.310 Since 
prices for whale oil had dropped compared with last year to Kr 54.00 per barrel, the 
company made a net profit of Kr 24,200 (excluding baleen).311 For the third year in a 
row, the whaling station at Finneset, the company’s local network, managed to produce 
enough whale oil to generate a profit for its investors. In spite of the declining catches, 
the whalers believed that whale stocks were larger than the numbers indicated. 
According to them, sea ice, fog, and irregular distribution of stocks were preventing 
them from catching larger numbers.312 After the season, three whaling companies chose 
to abandon their hunting operations in Spitsbergen and either cancel or transfer their 
operations to new and potentially more prosperous hunting grounds elsewhere. 
 
It is worth noting that the increased whaling activities in Green Harbour had attracted 
other industrialists who wanted to profit from whaling activities. In 1907, the American 
Arctic Coal Company (ACC) established a coal mine in Green Harbour.313 The motive 
behind this project was to mine coal and sell it to the whaling industry. 314 Shortly after 
the ACC was established, they made a verbal agreement with A/S Spitsbergen to use 
                                                 
308 Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1920/21. P:15. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. 
Norway. See also: Risting. S. Av Hvalfangstens Historie. 1922. P: 253. 
309 Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1908. P:20. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. 
Norway. 
310 Dole. N.H. America in Spitsbergen: The Romance of an Arctic Coal-Mine. 1922. P: 331. 
311 Based on whale-oil prices and production cost for a competing Norwegian whaling company on the 
domestic market. The prices per barrel were Kr 54.00 while production costs were Kr 43.00. 
312 Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1908. P:23. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. 
Norway. 
313 Hoel. A. Svalbards Historie 1596–1965. 1966. Vol: 2. P: 608. 
314 ”Letter to the President and Directors of the Arctic Coal Company, and Messrs. Ayer and Longyear. 
November 24. 1911”. Archive of Michigan Technological University. Houghton. USA. Archive: The Arctic 
Coal Company. Scott Turner Collection. MS 031. 
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their harbour to transport goods  from their mine to Longyear City. Over the following 
years, the ACC became the main supplier of coal to the whaling companies in the area. 
 
At the start of the 1908 season, both Bellsound and Green Harbour were blocked by 
ice.315 Several whaling companies took harbour in Safe Harbour on the northern side of 
Isfjorden and operated from there until August. A/S Spitsbergen anchored alongside the 
edge of the ice as they had done the previous season and cut the ice as they had done the 
year before. Parallel to this, the two whale catchers were hunting and bringing in whales 
for processing. These whales were flensed alongside the ship. After a period of ice 
cutting, the ice in Green Harbour broke up by itself. Throughout the remainder of the 
hunting season, A/S Spitsbergen and the other whaling companies were not disturbed 
by environmental conditions. For this season, the company and Firma Severin Dahl 
decided to transfer the guano factory from the former whaling station in Sørvær to 
Spitsbergen. 316 It was only the guano building that was transferred, and the guano mill 
inside was left behind. It appears that the company had decided to invest in new vertical 
guano drying machines rather than using the old horizontal one.317 Inside the guano 
drier, there were several shelves for storing residues from whale oil production and the 
products were dried with hot air.318 The dried products were crushed into a fine meal 
and placed in bags. It is likely that the decision to equip Finneset whaling station with 
full utilisation capability was motivated by declining catches. It became important to 
utilise all parts of the whale and throw nothing away. However, for unknown reasons, 
the guano factory was not assembled during the 1908 season.  
 
Halfway through the season, A/S Spitsbergen got the opportunity to operate with 
another two whale catchers because the factory ship of A/S Nimrod, a competing 
Norwegian whaling company, had caught fire and sunk. The company lost 1,000 barrels 
                                                 
315 Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1909. P:16. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. 
Norway. 
316 Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1920/21. P:92. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. 
Norway. 
317 Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1911. P:23. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. 
Norway. 
318 Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924. Del II: 1914–1924. Den Pelagisk fangst 1924–1937. 1969. 
Vol: 3. P:33. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling”. 
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of whale oil in the fire.319 In an attempt to minimise losses, A/S Nimrod rented out their 
two whale catchers Nimrod and Fiskeren to A/S Spitsbergen. All in all, A/S Spitsbergen 
operated five catchers. In addition to the two from A/S Nimrod, the company rented a 
catcher from the Shetland Islands.320 This increased their catches substantially.321 In 
spite of this, the company only caught 50 whales, from which they produced 1400 
barrels of whale oil and some baleen. The barrels were sold at the market at Kr 45.00 
per barrel, resulting in an annual net profit of Kr 11,200 before paying rent to A/S 
Nimrod and wages.322 The result could perhaps be blamed on inexperienced gunners, 
but there are no sources to support this. It is more likely that the whale stocks were 
depleted after a few years of industrial exploitation. 
A consequence of the declining catches was that several whaling companies chose to 
withdraw from the hunting grounds in favour of other areas. Several managers had been 
complaining for years that the hunting grounds at Spitsbergen had become too crowded, 
and that competition over the increasingly scarce whales had become fierce.323 It is 
difficult to estimate the effect the profits of Antarctic whaling companies had on 
investment from Europe and elsewhere in whaling projects in the European high Arctic. 
It probably became increasingly difficult to maintain the support of global networks for 
arctic projects, since their future and profitability looked bleak. 
 
Over a period of a few months, A/S Spitsbergen constructed a local network in 
Spitsbergen that consisted of a functional and operational whaling station. Although the 
company failed to make a profit in their first season there, the prospects of improved 
catches and production in the coming season, combined with the recent success of the 
hydrogenation process, made the future seem bright. During the same period (1905–
1908), as prices for whale oil improved, the catches and production of A/S Spitsbergen 
decreased. In spite of reduced catches, the company was able to generate a profit largely 
                                                 
319 Holmsen. G. Spitsbergens natur og historie. 1911. P: 37. 
320 Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1909. P:16. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. 
Norway. 
321 Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1909. P:2. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. 
Norway. 
322 Based on whale-oil prices and production cost for a competing Norwegian whaling company on the 
domestic market. The prices per barrel were Kr 45.00 while production costs were Kr 37.00. 
323 The Diary of Alex Lange 1904– 1907/08, and Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. Nr 12, Dec 1919. P: 214. 
Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. 
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because the prices increased. These profits were apparently enough to maintain the 
support of the owners of Firma Severin Dahl. 
Sale and production costs per barrel   
for A/S Spitsbergen 1905 to 1908.    
       
Year Production Sales rate Production costs Profit  
1905 2,700 Kr48.00 Kr46.00 Kr5,400 
1906 1,492 Kr61,00 Kr49.00 Kr17,904 
1907 2,200 Kr54.00 Kr43.00 Kr24,200 
1908 1,400 Kr45.00 Kr37.00 Kr11,200 
Fig 38. Production of A/S Spitsbergen from 1905 to 1908, including estimated sales and production costs 
(based on accessible data for whaling companies that operated in the Antarctic). According to these figures, 
A/S Spitsbergen’s profit was relatively small. But it is reasonable to assume that the production costs in the 
Arctic were less compared with the Antarctic, since it is less remote and the company made few new technical 
investments when they transferred the whaling station from northern Norway.324 
 
The variable catches and production of A/S Spitsbergen during these years was due to 
competition over available resources, such as whales and fresh water, combined with 
environmental factors, such as sea ice and fog. According to Marcussen, the manager of 
A/S Nimrod, the reason behind the declining catches was a result of “an unfortunate 
combination of variables. In 1907, the sea ice had presented an obstacle, and was followed 
in 1908 by un-favourable weather and current conditions, which meant there were no 
schools of krill to be found in the waters off Spitsbergen. It is likely that Spitsbergen will 
become a good hunting ground when weather and current conditions improve”.325 From 
1905 to 1907, the average catch per whale catcher dropped significantly. This was likely 
the primary reason that several companies withdrew from the arctic hunting 
grounds.326 A growing concern for the whaling companies that operated in Spitsbergen 
was the developing situation in the Antarctic. The large catches made there meant that 
                                                 
324 The table is based on catch and production data reported in Norsk Fiskeritidende 1905–1909, Risting. 
S (1922) and Tønnesen. J.O.H. (1959). Sales and production costs for the several Antarctic based whaling 
companies, have been extracted from Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924. Del 1: 1883–1914. 
1967. Vol 2. P: 587. In: Den moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
325 Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. No 6. June 1920. P: 91. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. 
Sandefjord. Norway. 




companies in the Arctic had problems attracting competent gunners. The comparatively 
small catches made in the Arctic were a great disadvantage for arctic-based whaling.327 
 
Sale and closure of Finneset whaling station 
The deteriorating situation meant that the company’s local network in Spitsbergen 
found it increasingly difficult to maintain the support of their global network – the 
owners of Firma Severin Dahl – as they were becoming concerned for their investments. 
In 1908, A/S Spitsbergen lost the support of Firma Severin Dahl, who decided to 
withdraw from the project and sell the company’s assets. The decision can hardly have 
come as a surprise to Iversen and Raaum. The company had suffered from the declining 
trends mentioned above, and the decreasing whale oil prices (rather than their catches 
and production) had affected their profits. If prices for whale oil turned, then Firma 
Severin Dahl were at risk of suffering large financial losses. It is reasonable to assume, 
therefore, that the decision to withdraw from the project and to sell the whaling station 
at Finneset was motivated by the belief that it was easier to sell a station before whale 
oil prices fell further and the whale stocks collapsed. 
One party interested in purchasing the station and its installations and claims was the 
former manager Lars Iversen, who had plans to establish his own whaling company.328 
His plans failed, however, because he was unable to attract enough financial support to 
purchase the whaling station from Dahl – perhaps because of competition from the 
Antarctic whaling industry and because of declining catches in the European high Arctic. 
In addition, Iversen got involved in a conflict with Dahl after he had attempted to sell a 
part of Finneset peninsula, arguing that it was his private property.329 
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328 “Printed copy of letter, Dec 27, 1909 from the Arctic Coal Company and Frederick Ayer and John M. 
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and exhibits therein referred to”. In: Report on the matter of the coal properties in Spitsbergen of the Arctic 
Coal Company and Frederick Ayer and John M. Longyear. Archive of Michigan Technological University. 
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Fig 39 and 40. Lars Iversen’s claim hut at Finneset, stating “for sale”. The hut was placed upon the territorial 
claim he maintained that he had conducted on his own behalf in 1904, and which he attempted to sell to the 
Arctic Coal Company in the period after 1908. Both photos have been published with the kind approval of the 
Michigan Technological University’s archive. 
 
In 1909, Firma Severin Dahl initiated talks with Carl S. Sæther, the Norwegian 
representative for the American ACC. During these talks, Dahl informed Sæther that A/S 
Spitsbergen was going to be dissolved, and offered ACC the opportunity to purchase the 
company’s claims and installations at Finneset for Kr 30,000.330 Dahl also told Sæther 
that if the ACC rejected their offer, the whaling station would be rented out for the 
upcoming hunting season to another whaling company.331 
The ACC was a coal-mining company that had established a small mine in the mountains 
overlooking Finneset. Through an agreement with A/S Spitsbergen, the ACC had been 
allowed to use a small section of Finneset peninsula to transport coal and goods to and 
from the coal mine. This was not the first time the whaling company had approached the 
ACC with an offer to buy their station and claims. In 1908, the company had approached 
Mr. Burrall, the local manager of the ACC in Spitsbergen, with a similar offer. Burrall 
believed that Dahl made the offer to Sæther because he thought the ACC would be 
interested, as they operated in the area.332 It appears that Dahl neglected the fact that 
A/S Spitsbergen was one of the major customers of coal mined by the ACC in Green 
Harbour. It was indeed in the interest of ACC that the whaling stations remained 
                                                 
330 “Letter from Fredrik Burrall to The Arctic Coal Company. March 20, 1909”. Archive of Michigan 
Technological University. USA. MS 031. Box 4. Fldr 20. 
331 “Letter from Fredrik Burrall to The Arctic Coal Company. March 20, 1909”. Archive of Michigan 
Technological University. USA. MS 031. Box 4. Fldr 20. 
332 “Letter from Frederick Burrall to the Arctic Coal Company, August 30, 1908”. Archive of Michigan 
Technological University. USA. MS 031. Box 4. Fldr 19. 
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operational there, but it was not in their interest to operate it themselves, since whaling 
was poor business. This might explain why they chose to turn the offer down. 
The whaling company interested in renting the station at Finneset was A/S Nimrod from 
Larvik. They approached Firma Severin Dahl when it became apparent that Dahl was 
going to withdraw from the project and sell the company, including all its properties and 
claims.333 During the spring of 1909, the companies started their negotiations. In April, 
the representatives of the two whaling companies – Knut Raaum on behalf of A/S 
Spitsbergen and Christian Nielsen and Anders Marcussen on behalf of A/S Nimrod – 
came to an agreement. The agreement stated that Christian Nielsen & Co. would 
purchase A/S Spitsbergen’s two whale catchers, Fin and Frey, including all the rights, 
installations, and tools of the whaling station at Finneset at Spitsbergen, as well as the 
un-assembled guano factory and all remains and machinery of the former whaling 
station at Sørvær in northern Norway for Kr 41,500.334 
 
Discussion: Firma Severin Dahl and A/S Spitsbergen 
The establishment of the modern whaling industry in the Arctic was an integrated part 
of the globalisation of the whaling industry and was motivated by increasing demands 
for whale oil and whale-related products in Europe and elsewhere. This expansion was 
not restricted to the Arctic, but included other areas, like Africa, South America, and the 
Antarctic. 
Establishing a whaling industry in the Arctic meant the companies had to adapt to new 
geographical, environmental, and political circumstances. The geographical location 
meant increased distances and operational costs, and the companies’ organisation, 
machines, and social strategies had to adapt to new environmental and political 
circumstances. The ability to do so determined the success or failure of the companies, 
since it was directly related to the ability to catch whales and produce whale oil. 
 
                                                 
333 ”Sales-contract between A/S Spitsbergen and A/S Nimrod. April 1909”. The Norwegian National 
Archives. Archive of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. Series: P7. Vol: B5146. Fldr: Finneset. 
334 ”Sales-contract between A/S Spitsbergen and A/S Nimrod. April 1909”. The Norwegian National 
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To secure continuous support, a whaling project had to generate profit. If a whaling 
company failed to do so, it risked losing the support of the investors and their arctic 
whaling operations would fail. For A/S Finmarken, the declining catches and profits they 
made in northern Norway at the turn of the 20th century promoted the management to 
employ Lars Iversen as their new operational manager. It is likely that he, in turn, 
encouraged the management to send Knut Raaum to the Arctic to secure the future of 
the company. Having failed to convince the management to move their whaling activities 
to Spitsbergen, the company sold its assets to Firma Severin Dahl, a company with 
previous whaling experience. The archival sources show that Iversen and Raaum, who 
claimed Finneset in 1904, managed to attract Severin Dahl to invest in the project. 
Having secured the necessary support and funding to materialise the project, the two 
could proceed and construct the whaling station at Finneset. Under the management of 
these two actors, A/S Spitsbergen could construct the Finneset whaling station and 
develop it from 1905 to 1908. During this period, the company generated enough profit 
to uphold the support of Firma Severin Dahl, despite the environmental challenges they 
encountered at Spitsbergen. After three years, they decided to equip the whaling station 
to fully utilise the raw materials. This decision was motivated by a desire to increase 
economic profit as the company was catching fewer whales and because whale oil prices 
were increasing in core European markets. Although the whalers themselves firmly 
believed that whaling grounds in the region were rich enough to sustain large-scale 
industrial exploitation for many years to come, they failed to prove and convince their 
shareholders of this, since none of them managed to increase catches, production, or 
economic profits. 
 
A/S Spitsbergen, Iversen, and Raaum managed to produce enough whale oil and baleen 
to generate a satisfactory profit from 1905 to 1908, which enabled them to maintain the 
support of their global network. In spite of increased financial investments in processing 
technologies, machines, and hunting capacity, A/S Spitsbergen failed, in 1908, to supply 
the necessary output to maintain Firma Severin Dahl’s support. The main business 
interests of Firma Severin Dahl lay in shipping insurances and in supplying financial aid 
to Norwegian shipping firms, therefore investing in a large-scale industrial project in 
remote Spitsbergen was an adventurous project. The company had, up until the 1908 
 107 
 
season, not invested in any additional machines or buildings at Finneset. Instead, they 
used buildings and well-tested machines, which they moved there from the former 
station in northern Norway. This strategy was financially beneficial and it secured 
functionality. Furthermore, the workers were familiar with these machines and knew 
how to operate them. This meant that the company did not have to waste time during 
the short arctic hunting season training their workers. Consequently, A/S Spitsbergen 
was able to immediately start processing whales and producing oil and other products. 
 
The climatic circumstances of sea, fast ice, and fog meant the company had to adapt its 
operational strategies. This was done by hunting and processing alongside the sea ice 
during the early summer and by using tug boats to extend the range of the whale 
catchers. The company also focused exclusively on the production of whale oil. In 
addition to the company’s technical and organisational choices, the management also 
used other strategies to ensure maximum efficiency and output of the station. These 
included the design of accommodation, a part-based salary system, leisure activities, and 
claim boards and fencing to protect territories and prevent disruptions of whale oil 
production. These strategies will be discussed later. Firma Severin Dahl had approached 
the industrial project carefully. They let A/S Spitsbergen and the arctic hunting grounds 
prove themselves as profitable for a period of three years before they invested in new 
machinery, which allowed A/S Spitsbergen to fully utilise the whales they caught. By 
doing so, they kept costs and risks to a minimum. Within a few years, catches decreased, 
which meant that the fundament of their whaling project at Spitsbergen was gone. 
Therefore, Firma Severin Dahl chose to withdraw from the project and sell the company. 
Despite declining catches and profits, two whaling companies (A/S Nimrod and Alfa & 
Beta) remained in these arctic grounds, motivated by a belief that the area contained 
enough whales to sustain an industry and become profitable. In 1909, A/S Nimrod 
bought the whaling station at Finneset. The primary reason for buying the station was 





Christian Nielsen & Co. and A/S Nimrod 
The whaling company A/S Nimrod was established by Christian Nielsen & Co. in 1904. 
Christian Nielsen, who later became one of the biggest whaling entrepreneurs of the 20th 
century, had a background of shipping and managing wood pulp production in 
Newcastle.335 In addition to this, he also had a network within the shipping business. 
Upon his return to Larvik in Norway, he started a business together with Hesselberg. 
Together, these two actors managed Laurvigs Intressentskab for Hvalfangst until 
Hesselberg withdrew a few years later, leaving Nielsen to single handedly manage the 
activities of the company until Ole Johannesen joined as joint manager in 1901.336 In 
effect, Laurvigs Intressentskab for Hvalfangst was a dormant company from 1904, 
although it formally remained in the company records until 1909.337 From 1904 
onwards, the company operated under the new name: Christian Nielsen & Co. 
 
The predecessor of Christian Nielsen & Co. was the whaling company Laurvigs 
Intressentskab for Hvalfangst. This company was formed by Hesselberg, Semb, Berntsen, 
Christian Nielsen, and a smaller group of shareholders on December 29, 1881.338 
Christian Nielsen and Hesselberg were the managing directors of this company, and 
Anders Berntsen was the manager. The initiative to form a whaling company was to 
exploit whale stocks in northern Norway and had initially come from Berntsen. He had, 
for a number of years, been employed by Semb and was chartered by a whaling 
entrepreneur to master the factory ship Laura.339 These years had given Berntsen an 
opportunity to learn how the modern whaling industry was organised. The idea to form 
a whaling company was, in many ways, the result of years of network building and 
strategic manoeuvring, which secured the rights to build a whaling station in a suitable 
location in northern Norway.340 
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Norway. For further reading, please see: Sørensen. G, Hoff. J.O, Halvorsen. L & Salicath. C. Hvalfangsten- 




The stock capital of Laurvigs Intressentskab for Hvalfangst was Kr150,000, which was 
divided between fifteen shareholders.341 This capital was used by the company’s 
management to purchase technical equipment and installations for the whaling station 
and a whale catcher. After a successful season in 1883, the company increased its 
available stock capital by Kr24 000 and this allowed the company to buy a second whale 
catcher.342 The company operated from Svartnæs until 1900, after which they decided to 
disassemble the station and move it further west to Bøle on Sørøen in northern Norway. 
The company made substantial losses in the years leading up to the 1904 whaling ban in 
Norway.343 In an attempt to counteract the situation, Nielsen and Berntsen established 
Shetland Hvalfangerselskap with a whaling station at Ronas Voe in the Shetland 
Islands.344 Much like in Norway, the whalers were initially welcomed by the local fishing 
communities.345 But within one year of industrial operations, an anti-whaling movement 
developed. The primary goal of this movement was, according to Risting, to prevent the 
whalers from operating in the surrounding waters.346 The argument was “that if the 
whaling industry has been an obstacle for the Norwegian fishermen, the same must apply 
in the Shetlands. And if industries are banned from destroying the fishing industry in 
northern Norway, why should we allow foreign industrialists to do the same in the 
Shetlands?”347 The British authorities responded to the developing situation by 
demanding full utilisation of the raw materials, faster processing times, and introducing 
restricted hunting areas in the region. 
 
A/S Nimrod was, much like Shetland Hvalfangerselskap, a daughter company of 
Christian Nielsen & Co. The purpose of A/S Nimrod was to exploit the whale stocks in 
                                                 
341 Johnsen. A.O. Finnmarksfangstens Historie 1864–1905. Vol 1. 1959. P: 467. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst 
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342 Sørensen. G, Hoff. J.O, Halvorsen. L & Salicath. C. Hvalfangsten- Dens historie og mænd. 1912. P: 92. See 
also: Johnsen. A.O. Finnmarksfangstens Historie 1864–1905. Vol 1. 1959. P: 536. In: Den Moderne 
Hvalfangst Historie-Opprinnelse og utvikkling”. 
343 Johnsen. A.O. Finnmarksfangstens Historie 1864–1905. 1959. Vol: 1. P: 482. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst 
Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
344 Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924. Del 1: 1883–1914. 1967. Vol 2. P: 61. In: Den moderne 
Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
345 Risting. S. Av Hvalfangstens Historie. 1922. P: 218. 
346 Risting. S. Av Hvalfangstens Historie. 1922. P: 221. 
347 Risting. S. Av Hvalfangstens Historie. 1922. P: 224. 
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the waters off Spitsbergen and process them into whale oil and by-products.348 To 
achieve this, the company bought a wooden sail ship named Figaro, which was 
converted into a floating factory with a loading capacity of 3,000 barrels. The idea was 
that Figaro would operate in conjunction with the company’s two exiting whale catchers 
(Fiskeren and Nimrod) under the leadership of Anders Marcussen of Sandefjord.349 
Marcussen was the former operational manager of Bøle Trankokeri at Sørøya in 
northern Norway.350 
 
The company’s first arctic season was in 1905. According to Norsk Fiskeritidende, the 
company had initially planned to establish a base for their factory ship in Bellsound. All 
suitable harbours had, however, been occupied by competing whaling companies. The 
company went northward to Green Harbour, where Marcussen decided to anchor the 
ship at a harbour in Kokerineset on the west side of the fjord. Throughout the season, 
the company’s two whale catchers Fiskeren and Nimrod brought whales for processing 
from the primary hunting grounds 100–200 km west of the west coast of Spitsbergen.351 
The factory ship Figaro remained A/S Nimrod’s only production unit until 1908, when it 
caught fire and sank in Spitsbergen. 
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Fig 41. Catches and production for A/S Nimrod from 1905 to 1908. The company experienced a constant 
decline in catches and production, which peaked with the loss of a large percentage of the 1908 production 
and the company’s floating factory ship Figaro. 
 
Activities and results of A/S Nimrod 1905–1912 
During 1905–1908, prices for whale oil varied causing fluctuations in the company’s 
profits. It is difficult to estimate the exact profits or losses of the company since there are 
no data on the quality of whale oil produced or the companies operational and salary 
costs. 
One of the few reliable sources of the company’s economic success is a letter by one of 
A/S Nimrod’s employees, Tønder Bull. According to him, A/S Nimrod’s operational costs 
for the 1905 season were Kr109,000, which excluded the Kr30,000 that were subtracted 
for salaries and food.352 Based on these figures, the company made a net profit of 
Kr79,000 in 1905, assuming that the company sold their whale oil at Kr40.90 per barrel. 
This does not seem unreasonable compared with data of other contemporary whaling 
companies (who sold at Kr49.00 per barrel). If one assumes that the production costs 
per barrel correspond to that of other whaling companies (approximately Kr46.00 per 
                                                 
352 ”Letter from Tønder Bull to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, Kristiania July 2nd 1910”. Tromsø 
StatsArkiv. Archive of Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani. Private Archive No 73. Vol: 451. Fldr: 1909–
1923 Green Harbour, A/S Nimrod. 
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barrel) then the company made a loss of Kr5.10 per barrel and a total loss of 
Kr13,586.40 after their first arctic season. This would hardly have motivated the 
company’s board and shareholders to continue supporting the arctic whaling project. If 
one assumes that the company’s produce was sold at prices corresponding to those of 
other whaling companies (Kr49.00 per barrel), then the result for the season was 
Kr127,872, indicating a net profit of Kr18,872 during their first season in Spitsbergen.353 
Tønder Bull reported in his letter to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry that the company 
made a loss of Kr6,049 in 1906.354 If one adopts the same prices as for A/S Spitsbergen 
and other whaling companies at that time, the company made a profit of Kr17,892.355 
Whatever the economic result, it was good enough to encourage Christian Nielsen & Co. 
and its shareholders to maintain their support and equip an expedition the following 
season. 
 
The 1906 season was one of the toughest seasons recorded during the first decade of the 
20th century, with extensive and prolonged sea ice that prevented whaling companies 
from gaining access to their harbours and operating effectively. The result for A/S 
Nimrod after the 1907 season was, according to Tønder Bull, 2,218 barrels of whale 
oil,356 even though the company had caught a similar number of whales as the previous 
year. A simple explanation for this is that the whales caught were either larger or the 
percentage of bigger whales was different. The end result was a profit of Kr24,398.357 
 
                                                 
353 This estimate have been deducted from costs and production reported in ”Letter from Tønder Bull to 
the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, Kristiania July 2nd 1910”. Tromsø StatsArkiv. Archive of Store Norske 
Spitsbergen Kulkompani. Private Archive No 73. Vol: 451. Fldr: 1909–1923 Green Harbour, A/S Nimrod, 
and prices per barrel of whale-oil have been extracted from Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924. 
Del 1: 1883–1914. 1967. Vol 2. P: 587. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikling. 
354 Deducted from the data over production and expedition costs reported by T. Bull in a letter to the 
Norwegian Foreign Ministry of July 2nd 1910, and whale-oil prices reported by Tønnesen (1967). 
355 Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924. Del 1: 1883–1914. 1967. Vol 2. P: 587. In: Den Moderne 
Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
356 ”Letter from Tønder Bull to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, Kristiania July 2nd 1910”. Tromsø 
StatsArkiv. Archive of Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani. Private Archive No 73. Vol: 451. Fldr: 1909–
1923 Green Harbour, A/S Nimrod. 
357 This estimate have been deducted from costs and production reported in ”Letter from Tønder Bull to 
the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, Kristiania July 2nd 1910”. Tromsø StatsArkiv. Archive of Store Norske 
Spitsbergen Kulkompani. Private Archive No 73. Vol: 451. Fldr: 1909–1923 Green Harbour, A/S Nimrod, 
and prices per barrel of whale-oil have been extracted from Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924. 
Del 1: 1883–1914. 1967. Vol 2. P: 587. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
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After the 1908 season, only two out of the initial eight whaling companies remained in 
Spitsbergen and Bear Island.358 Despite a constant decline in catches and output, 
Christian Nielsen & Co. continued to support the local network in Spitsbergen. One can 
only speculate on the motives for this, but it is possible that they believed in better 
results with fewer competitors. The loss of the factory ship Figaro cost the company its 
production unit and a large percentage of its whale oil in 1908. It is reasonable to 
assume that the company had insured its ship for events like this. The crew did manage 
to salvage some of their produce, but the whale oil they lost meant that the company 
made a total loss of Kr49,300.359 
 
Christian Nielsen & Co. decided to purchase Finneset whaling station for the upcoming 
season.360 That same year, Christian Nielsen & Co. also invested in and established the 
whaling company A/S Ocean with a whaling station at New Fortuna Bay in South 
Georgia where they had been granted a concession by British authorities.361 This 
company was formed with a stock capital of Kr650,000. Christian Nielsen & Co. became, 
therefore, the first whaling company to simultaneously operate whaling stations in both 
polar areas. That same year, Laurvigs Intressentskab for Hvalfangst was formally 
dissolved in favour of Christian Nielsen & Co.362 In 1908–1909, Christian Nielsen & Co. 
began to expand. Over the following years, the company expanded its activities and 
engagements across the globe and established a number of whaling stations and 
companies, such as A/S Norge in 1910–11 and A/S Spermacet in 1911.363 By 1913, 
Christian Nielsen & Co. had become the world’s largest producer of whale oil, with a 
total production of 89,000 barrels. By 1914, the company ran six daughter companies, 
                                                 
358 Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1909. P: 16. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. 
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359 This estimate have been deducted from costs and production reported in ”Letter from Tønder Bull to 
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reading, please see Risting. S. (1922), and Tønnesen. J.O.H and Johnsen. A.O. (1959–1976). 
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which operated 21 whale catchers and cargo ships, five floating factories, and four 
whaling stations across the globe.364 The company had developed into a giant industry 
with access to global markets and vast financial resources. 
 
In this context, it is reasonable to question why the company wanted to invest in 
Spitsbergen, an area that was declining and was abandoned by contemporary whaling 
entrepreneurs. Although several whaling entrepreneurs and managers believed in the 
future prospects of arctic whaling grounds, others like Søren Berntsen, gunner for A/S 
Ørnen, argued that it was merely a matter of time until the whales were depleted due to 
the large numbers of companies competing for them.365 It seems, however, that many 
whalers continued to believe in Spitsbergen as a sustainable hunting ground with plenty 
of resources. This was perhaps a logical belief at a time when people’s perception of 
nature was intertwined with religious beliefs that everything in nature had been created 
by God for the greater benefit of mankind.366 Exploiting nature’s resources and 
benefiting from them was, in many ways, regarded as a divine quest.367In addition, the 
large catches and economic profit of the antarctic hunting grounds may have drawn the 
whaling companies away from Spitsbergen. Tønnesen (1967) suggests that one of the 
main reasons for the declining catches in Spitsbergen was that the whale catchers were 
small and had limited operational range, which made them unsuitable for arctic 
conditions.368 The companies overcame the limited range of the whale catching boats by 
employing tug boats to extend their operational range. Perhaps a more simple argument 
for the rapidly declining catches after 1905 was overexploitation of a limited non-
renewable resource combined with low utilisation, resulting in great waste. 
 
The purchase of A/S Spitsbergen included the whaling station, its technical installations, 
and territorial claims, as well as the company’s fleet. This meant that A/S Nimrod could 
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operate four whale catchers in the 1909 season (Fin, Frey, Fiskeren, and Nimrod) as well 
as a tug boat and one 1,300-ton cargo ship.369 A/S Nimrod was one of the two whaling 
companies that remained operational in Spitsbergen after the 1908 season. The other 
company was the Sandefjord-based company Alfa & Beta. This company operated the 
floating factory Hecla with a base at Kokerineset on the west side of Green Harbour.370 
The organisation of A/S Nimrod did not change, with Anders Marcussen as the local 
manager. Christian Nielsen & Co. decided to appoint their former employee, Tønder Bull, 
as the new managing director of A/S Nimrod.371 
 
When A/S Nimrod arrived at Green Harbour in the spring of 1909, the fjord was frozen 
and the company was unable to access the whaling station. The majority of workers 
were employed in cutting a canal through the ice to the station.372 Having operated in 
the archipelago for a number of years, Marcussen was aware of the shifting conditions 
during spring. Before their departure, Marcussen equipped the company’s steam-
powered tug boat with a few cookers. This enabled the company to start hunting and 
processing whales immediately. This method proved to be successful. By the time the 
company had accessed Finneset whaling station, they had already killed and processed 
25 whales and three bottlenose dolphins.373 Once they reached the whaling station, 
Marcussen divided the work into two teams, with one team prepared the whaling 
station for the upcoming season and the other erecting the guano factory. Building the 
guano factory meant that Finneset whaling station had full utilisation capacity.374 The 
company had problems getting the guano factory to function satisfactorily. They had big 
problems with the vertical driers they bought. Over the following three seasons, the 
company tried to solve these problems until they gave up in 1911. For the 1912 season, 
they disassembled the old horizontal guano drier from A/S Finmarken’s former whaling 
                                                 
369 Risting. S. Av Hvalfangstens Historie. 1922. P: 256. 
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station in northern Norway and moved it to Finneset.375 In 1909, the hunting grounds 
shifted and the whale catchers had to travel up to 400 km west of Spitsbergen to locate 
whales.376 During the season, A/S Nimrod extended their territorial claims to Linné 
River at the entrance of Isfjorden, where they erected a fishing hut.377 The purpose of 
this hut was twofold. Firstly, it meant that the company and its workers could get fresh 
fish. Secondly, it provided a leisure activity for the company’s workers. 
 
Fig 42. A/S Nimrod’s fishing 
hut at Linné River. This hut 
was frequented by the 
workers of the whaling 
station. It provided a leisure 
activity and supplied the 
station with supplementary 




The season ended with a catch of 68 whales, 2,990 barrels of whale oil, and an unknown 
amount of baleen. Considering the company operated four catchers and a tug boat, these 
figures were relatively small. According to Tønnesen (1967), the season’s price for 
whale oil was Kr57.00 per barrel,379 amounting to Kr170,430 total gain. Deducting the 
operational costs for the company (approximately Kr139,000)380 the end profit was 
Kr31,430. This was the first time in three years that the company increased both catches 
and production, therefore generating a substantial profit for Christian Nielsen & Co. The 
result must have been encouraging for the company management who had taken a risk 
investing in the whaling station and new machinery. It is interesting to note that this 
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379 Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924. Del 1: 1883–1914. 1967. Vol 2. In: Den moderne 
Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. P: 587 
380 ”Letter from Tønder Bull to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, Kristiania July 2nd 1910”. Tromsø 
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was the first season the traditional anchorages at Bellsound and Recherchefjorden laid 
empty. This may indicate that the primary hunting grounds had already shifted to the 
north in previous years. Another advantage of basing operations in the Isfjord area was 
the easier access to a constant supply of coal and other commodities, since the coal-
mining industry was well-established there and there were a few larger settlements. 
 
In 1910, A/S Nimrod invested in a new and larger tug boat named Banan. This boat had 
previously operated as a cargo ship.381 The investment was probably motivated by the 
increased towing distances to the primary hunting grounds west of Spitsbergen. Banan 
had a greater operational range and a more powerful engine, which meant that it 
reached the whale catchers faster and could tow a greater number of whales back to the 
whaling station. A/S Nimrod’s expedition arrived to an ice-free Isfjorden at the end of 
May.382 Like previous years, Green Harbour remained frozen and forced the company to 
take anchor alongside the sea ice where they remained until June 12. Once again, the 
company started the season here, killing and processing 12 whales into 200 barrels of 
whale oil.383 
Occasionally throughout the season, drifting sea ice from the east became a problem for 
the whaling companies. By mid-July, a massive belt of sea ice filled several fjords along 
the west coast of Spitsbergen. A positive consequence of the sea ice was that the 
companies could catch whales closer to the archipelago because the whales followed the 
ice. It is also possible that the quality of whale oil was higher since decomposition of the 
whale carcasses was minimised because time between killing and processing was 
reduced. Decomposition (or autolysis) sets in immediately after the whale is killed and 
has a great impact on the quality and quantity of oil rendered from the whale. A newly 
killed whale has a body temperature of 37–38ºC, which increases to 41ºC within 24 
hours and to 48º C after 48 hours.384 The body temperature increases because of 
internal decomposition of the intestines. The process accelerates when it reaches the 
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insulating blubber layer, because the increasing body heat is insulated. As a result, 
whales brought in for processing in Spitsbergen were often expanded like balloons. This 
meant that the companies could only use the top part of the blubber layer on the back of 
the whales,385 meaning much of the whale was wasted. 
 
Fig 43. The floating factory Hecla of Alfa & Beta anchored at Kokerineset processing whales alongside its hull. 
Note the bloated-up whale carcass on the left. Photo published with the kind permission of the Norwegian 
Polar Institute. 
 
The sea ice withdrew and the whales successively moved westward to Greenland. By the 
end of the season, the whale catchers were operating 500–600 km west of Spitsbergen. 
The manager of A/S Nimrod decided to investigate the hunting grounds further north at 
80º north, but found few whales there. The company focused on getting their guano 
factory operational, but without success. Being unable to adapt and make the technology 
functional to arctic conditions, the station stored hundreds of tonnes of whale bones 
beside the whaling station for later processing. The hunting season ended on September 
1 with a catch of 99 whales, three bottlenose whales, and 3,600 barrels of whale oil.386 
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These were sold on the domestic market at Kr0.37 per kg or Kr62.90 per barrel,387 
resulting in a profit of Kr222,000 before the company’s operational costs were deducted. 
It is reasonable to assume that the company made a profit large enough to convince 
Christian Nielsen & Co. to prolong their support. Competition with antarctic hunting 
grounds for competent gunners greatly affected the total catch of the company. These 
southern hunting grounds had, by 1910, developed into the largest whaling grounds in 
the world and a large number of international actors and industrialists were involved. 
In the 1911 hunting season, the companies had many problems caused by drift ice. For 
14 days at the start of the season, the whaling fleet could not sail northwards because of 
a drift ice belt that extended from Bear Island far into the Barents Sea. Not until June 19 
were the ships of A/S Nimrod and Alfa & Beta able to sail into Isfjorden having used 
their whale catchers to plough a way through the ice. A/S Nimrod used their tug boat 
Banan, which they fitted with a few cookers, to process the bones, meat, and intestines 
of 18 whales.388 After these initial challenges, operations ran smoothly until the end of 
August when the season was over.389 
 
Throughout the season, the whale catchers had to travel far west to reach the primary 
hunting grounds. This meant long towing distances for the tug boats. Again, Marcussen 
had sent a whale catcher to investigate the hunting grounds further north, hoping to 
discover more whales there. At 80º north, the company’s whale catcher, Fiskeren, caught 
a Greenland right whale, a species that was believed to be extinct after decades of 
exploitation by Dutch, German, and English whalers in the 17th and 18th centuries. The 
problems with the guano factory continued at Finneset.390 The company’s catch for the 
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Norway. 
390 Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1912. P: 6. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. 
Norway. However, Tønnesen (1967, p: 94) suggest that the company got the guano factory operational 
during the season, and reports that the company produced significant amounts of guano in addition to the 
whale-oil. Unfortunately, he fails to reference on what he bases his conclusion. 
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season was 90 whales, of which one-third were blue whales.391 The company was able to 
produce 4,080 barrels of whale oil in addition to a few tonnes of baleen. 
 
After 1905, whale oil prices generally increased, partly because of poor linseed 
harvests.392 As a result, Christian Nielsen & Co. were able to sell their products on the 
market for approximately £22 per ton,393 or Kr0.40 per kg.394 One barrel of whale oil 
weighed about 170 kg, or approximately six barrels per ton.395 For A/S Nimrod this 
meant a financial gain of £14,960 or Kr272,000 before deducting the operational costs. It 
is not unlikely that these profits were similar to those of the 1909 season (Kr139,000). 
The net profit for A/S Nimrod was more than Kr100,000, which was probably regarded 
a success by the company management and its shareholders and a testament that their 
persistency in the Spitsbergen hunting grounds had finally paid off. The result convinced 
Christian Nielsen & Co. and its shareholders to prolong their support for the project in 
Spitsbergen. 
 
At the start of the 1912 hunting season, A/S Nimrod stopped at the former whaling 
station of A/S Finmarken in northern Norway and disassembled a horizontal guano 
drier that had been used there. At Finneset, the workers made a concrete foundation for 
the drier outside the northern wall of the existing guano factory building. The reason for 
placing it here was probably that it was the simplest solution since it avoided re-
designing or moving the existing furnace from inside the building. The horizontal guano 
drier proved to be highly functional and produced 2,700 bags of guano.396 
 
                                                 
391 Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1912. P: 5. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. 
Norway. 
392 Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924. Del 1: 1883–1914. 1967. Vol: 2. P: 501. In: Den moderne 
Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
393 ”Chr. Nielsen & Co. AS. Larvik 25/2-1919. Oliepriser”. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. 
Sandefjord. Norway. Archive: Hvalfangerforeningen. Korrespondanse ang salg av hvalolje. Vol: 1. 1907–
1939. 
394 Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1912. P: 27. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. 
Norway. 
395 Deducted from the data supplied by Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924. Del II: 1914–1924. 
Den Pelagiska Fangst 1924–1937. 1969. Vol: 3. P: 7. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og 
Utvikkling. 
396 Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924. Del 1: 1883–1914. 1967. Vol: 2. P: 94. In: Den moderne 




Fig 44. The horizontal guano drier that A/S Nimrod brought up 
to Finneset whaling station for the 1912 season. This older type 
of machinery proved to be highly functional in arctic 
environmental conditions. Photo published with the kind 









Guano production increased the consumption of coal and freshwater. Water was difficult 
to get at Finneset. A/S Nimrod and A/S Spitsbergen had collected water and brought it 
to the whaling station through a metal pipe, which was connected to a large metal tank 
placed higher up in the landscape. There was often less water than the whaling station 
needed, and sometimes none because the little water available in the area was frozen. 
Therefore, both companies frequently collected freshwater from a larger river at 
Sandefjord Point on the south-west side of the fiord. The manager, Anders Marcussen, 
considered the freshwater issue so problematic that he planned to disassemble and 
move the entire station to Sandefjord Point. To make this possible, he claimed the entire 
peninsula at Sandefjord Point on behalf of A/S Nimrod and Christian Nielsen & Co.397 
                                                 
397 Isachsen. G. Green Harbour. 1913. In: L’expedition Norvegienne au Spitsberg 1909–1910 sous la 




Fig 45. Map of Green Harbour with Finneset, Kokerineset (Hecla Havn), and Sandefjord Point. Sandefjord 
point is encircled. The map has been published with the approval of the Norwegian National Library.398 
 
Over the following seasons, catches and production improved, but were still rather low 
compared with antarctic hunting grounds. Despite operating with four whale catchers in 
1912, A/S Nimrod only caught 38 whales and produced 1,570 barrels of whale oil.399 
These barrels were sold on the domestic market for Kr0.33 per kg,400 or Kr56.10 per 
barrel, giving a result of Kr88,077. Assuming that the annual production costs for the 
season were similar to those of previous years (Kr139,000), the company suffered a 
substantial loss of Kr50,923 at the end of the season. Although the 2,700 bags of guano 
                                                 
398 Oversiktskart over Spitsbergen – Sjøkarter optat av Ritmester Isachsens norske Spitsbergenekspedition 
med Marinen d/s Farm 1909–1910. The Norwegian National library. Reference no-kb_krt_00560. 
399 Risting. S. Av Hvalfangstens Historie. 1922. P: 262f. 
400 ”Chr. Nielsen & Co. AS. Larvik 25/2-1919. Oliepriser”. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. 




were sold at approximately Kr11.00 per bag,401 giving a profit of Kr29,700 before 
subtracting production costs, it contributed little to recovering the financial losses the 
company made.  
 
Christian Nielsen & Co.’s decision to sustain and support the industrial project in 
Spitsbergen had resulted in profits over the last few years. The 1912 result showed that 
the hunting grounds had become depleted, and that despite having the technical 
capability to fully utilise the available resources, there were simply not enough 
resources to continue the project. It is remarkable that a company like Christian Nielsen 
& Co. – which by 1912 was one of the largest whaling companies in the world, with 
whaling stations and floating factories in South Georgia, South Shetland Islands, Africa, 
Australia, and New Zealand –402 would support and sustain a small whaling station in 
Spitsbergen that barely generated a profit. Comparing the catches made by A/S Nimrod 
with other daughter companies of Christian Nielsen & Co., such as A/S Ocean (South 
Georgia) and A/S Norge (the South Shetland Islands), it is not clear what the economic 
motives were behind the project. Throughout 1909–1912, A/S Nimrod caught and 
processed 295 whales. During the same period, A/S Ocean caught 1,814 whales, and A/S 
Norge 1,532.403 Although these southern hunting grounds were more remote compared 
with Spitsbergen, the results show why so many whaling companies chose to abandon 
the Arctic. Nonetheless, from 1909 to 1912, A/S Nimrod generated (with the exception 
of the 1912 season) a profit large enough to cover the costs. Consequently, the local 
network at Finneset and Spitsbergen had maintained the support of Christian Nielsen & 
Co. and its shareholders until the catastrophic 1912 season, when they made a huge loss. 
 
                                                 
401 Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924. Del II: 1914–1924. Den Pelagiske Fangst 1924–1937. 1969. 
Vol: 3. P: 32. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og Utvikkling. 
402 Sørensen. G, Hoff. J.O, Halvorsen. L & Salicath. C. Hvalfangsten- Dens historie og mænd. 1912. P: 92. 
403 Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924. Del 1: 1883–1914. 1967. Vol: 2. P: 376 and 386f. In: Den 
moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. See also: Risting. S. Av Hvalfangstens Historie. 
1922. P: 366f. 
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Consolidation and sale 
After the results of 1912, the company management decided to sell A/S Nimrod’s 
properties, installations, and claims on Spitsbergen.404 One interested buyer was a 
German company called Mathias Rohde & Co. The aim of this company was to secure 
territories on Spitsbergen to exploit coal deposits. Mathias Rohde & Co. came in contact 
with Christian Anker and the Green Harbour Coal Company.405 In the summer of 1913, 
Rhode & Co. sent a geological expedition, under the leadership of Dr. Voit, to Green 
Harbour and Kings Bay to investigate the potential of the Green Harbour Coal 
Company’s claims. During negotiations between the parties, it became clear that the 
Germans were also interested in buying the whaling station and the properties of 
Christian Nielsen & Co. In the spring of 1914, Voit negotiated a potential purchase of 
Christian Nielsen & Co.’s properties in Spitsbergen with the company.406 Due to lack of 
archival data, it is unclear what was discussed and decided during these negotiations. 
Whatever these involved, the Germans withdrew from the deal. Having failed to sell the 
whaling station, Christian Nielsen & Co. left Finneset whaling station dormant during the 
1913 and 1914 seasons. Even though Christian Nielsen & Co. probably had no plans to 
re-open the station, they made contracts with Christian Anker and the Green Harbour 
Coal Company for coal deliveries to the station on several occasions between 1913 and 
1920.407 This was because they were negotiating renting out the station. In the summer 
of 1918, Christian Nielsen & Co. was contacted by Arthur S. Lewin. He was a coal-mining 
entrepreneur who had rented the claims of A/S De Russiske Kulfelter Green Harbour.408 
Lewin wanted Christian Nielsen & Co. to support a large scale coal-mining operation in 
Spitsbergen. Apparently, Christian Nielsen & Co. found his proposal interesting. On 
August 30 1918, Spitsbergen Trading Co. Ltd A/S was formed under the management of 
                                                 
404 ”Letter from Chr. Nielsen to Höiesteretsadvokat Kristen Nygaard. Larvik. March 9, 1914”. Tromsø 
StatsArkiv. Norway. Archive: Private archive No 73. Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani. Box. 452 
(1914–1916). See also: Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. No 7. July 1920. P: 104f. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s 
Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. 
405 Hoel. A. Svalbards Historie 1596–1965. 1966. Vol 2. P: 718. 
406 “Letter to Herr Advokat Carl Lundh”. Undated. Tromsø StatsArkiv. Norway. Archive: Private archive No 
73. Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani. Box. 452 (1914–1916). 
407 ”Letter to Messrs. Ayer and Longyear. October 25, 1912”. Archive of Michigan Technological University. 
Houghton, USA. Archive: Arctic Coal Company. Scott Turner Collection. MS 031. See also: “Letter from Chr. 
Nielsen & Co to Herr Høiesteretsadvokat Kristen Nygaard. Kristiania. October 21, 1916”, and in letter to 
“Herr Høiesteretsadvokat Kristen Nygaard. Larvik, May 18, 1917”. Tromsø StatsArkiv. Norway. Archive: 
Privat Arkiv nr. 73. Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani. Box 452. (1914–1916). 
408 Hoel. A. Svalbards Historie 1596–1965. 1966. Vol: 1. P: 259. 
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Johannesen, Nielsen, Bie, and Bull, the former manager of A/S Nimrod.409 On the same 
occasion, all the rights and properties of A/S Nimrod were transferred to Spitsbergen 
Trading Co. Ltd A/S.410 Shortly after, A/S Nimrod was formally dissolved and removed 
from the Norwegian company registers.411 The purpose of Spitsbergen Trading Co. Ltd 
A/S was to operate and develop the claims of A/S De Russiske Kulfelter Green Harbour 
together with Lewin. The project was formally managed by Christian Nielsen & Co., and 
Arthur S. Lewin managed the technical development of the coal mine in Spitsbergen. The 
active engagement of Christian Nielsen was short-lived. In the same year, the Norwegian 
coal-mining company, Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani (SNSK), announced that 
they wanted to buy the properties and installations of Christian Nielsen & Co. 
 
In November 1918, SNSKs attorney Kirsten Nygaard met with the management and 
shareholders of the former whaling company at their general assembly in Larvik to 
discuss the possibilities of purchasing its properties and installations.412 At this meeting, 
Mr Nygaard stated that SNSK could offer between Kr100,000 and Kr125,000 for the 
installations and claims of the whaling company. The shareholders thought the offer was 
too low to accept, wanting at least Kr132,127, which was the deficit A/S Nimrod had 
acquired from 1912 onwards.413 After discussions in December 1918, SNSK agreed to 
offer A/S Nimrod and its shareholders Kr140,000. The offer included the claim at 
Finneset, including the whaling station and all its buildings and machinery.414 SNSK’s 
offer was accepted by the former owners and shareholders of the whaling company. 
 
                                                 
409 ”Fuldmagt til Herr Tönder Bull from the directors of Chr. Nielsen & Co. Larvik. May 29, 1912.” Avskrift. 
Tromsø StatsArkiv. Norway. Archive: Privat Arkiv nr. 73. Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani. 
410 ”Letter to Advokat Sven Brun, Kristiania. November 22. 1919”, and ”Letter from Chr. Nielsen & Co to Herr 
Advokat Sven Brun, Kristiania. Larvik November 17, 1919”. Tromsø StatsArkiv. Norway. Archive: Privat 
Arkiv nr. 73. Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani. Box: 453. Fldr: 1919–1920, De Russiske Green 
Harbour feltene. 
411 Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. 1919. P: 39 Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. 
Norway. 
412 ”Letter from Kirsten Nygaard presented at Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani board-meeting on 
November 14, 1918”. Tromsø StatsArkiv. Norway. Archive: Privat Arkiv nr. 73. Store Norske Spitsbergen 
Kulkompani. Box: 451. Fldr: 1909–1923, Green Harbour. A/S Nimrod. 
413 ”Letter from Kirsten Nygaard presented at Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani board-meeting on 
November 14, 1918”. Tromsø StatsArkiv. Norway. Archive: Privat Arkiv nr. 73. Store Norske Spitsbergen 
Kulkompani. Box: 451. Fldr: 1909–1923, Green Harbour. A/S Nimrod. 
414 Hoel. A. Svalbards Historie 1596–1965. 1966. Vol 2. P: 808. See also: Gustafsson. U. Industrialising the 
Arctic: Settlement design and technical adaptations of modern whaling stations in Spitsbergen and Bear 
Island. 2009. P: 47–59. In: Whaling & History III. Editor: Ringstad. J.E. Publikasjon nr. 33. Kommendør Chr. 
Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. 
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The purchase was most likely motivated by SNSK’s desire to secure a good supply of 
potentially profitable coal resources and as much territory as possible for the nation. 
Today, Finneset and the area south are still owned by the Norwegian company. For a 
number of years, they rented it out to the Russian mining company Trust Arktikugol 
under the name “kontrakts-gruva” (contract mine). During the autumn of 1919, the 
contract between Lewin and A/S De Russiske Kulfelter Green Harbour expired. New 
negotiations were initiated between Spitsbergen Trading Co. Ltd A/S and the Russian 
industrialists and the contract was extended until May 1920. After that, the area went 
back to A/S De Russiske Kulfelter Green Harbour, an area the consortium had invested 
Kr850,000 in developing.415 In 1920, the Russian company sold the area to a group of 
Dutch entrepreneurs who continued to develop the mining settlement, which was 
named Barentsburg.416 
Unfortunately, I have not been able to find more data that shed light on the driving 
forces behind the activities of Spitsbergen Trading Co. Ltd A/S. It is probable that 
Christian Nielsen & Co. saw the investment in a coal mine as potentially profitable. In 
addition, the investment could have secured coal deliveries to their antarctic whaling 
expeditions. It is unclear whether any of the 10,200 tonnes of coal, which was mined at 
the site, was used by any of Christian Nielsen & Co.’s whaling companies.417 With the sale 
of A/S Nimrod to SNSK in 1918, and of Spitsbergen Trading Co. Ltd A/S in 1920, the 
activities of Christian Nielsen & Co. in Spitsbergen came to an end. 
 
Discussion: Christian Nielsen & Co. and A/S Nimrod 
Much like other contemporary whaling companies in northern Norway, Laurvigs 
Intressentskab for Hvalfangst and Christian Nielsen & Co. adapted to the highly 
competitive situation in northern Norway by extending the operational hunting range of 
their whale catchers. They also established Shetland Hvalfangerselskap and erected a 
whaling station at Ronas Voe. In 1904, the company’s management decided to move 
                                                 
415 ”Report by Struicken regarding the rights of the Nederlandsche Spitsbergen Compagnie in Spitsbergen”. 
Dutch National Archives. Archive: 2.05.21. Inventaris van het archief van het ministerie van Buitenlandse 
zaken: A-dossiers, 1919–1940. 1723. 
416 For further reading on the driving forces, motivations and activities of this company please see the 
dissertation of Dr. Hidde De Haas. 
417 ”Report by Struicken regarding the rights of the Nederlandsche Spitsbergen Compagnie in Spitsbergen”. 
Dutch National Archives. Archive: 2.05.21. Inventaris van het archief van het ministerie van Buitenlandse 
zaken: A-dossiers, 1919–1940. 1723. 
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their industrial operations to Spitsbergen, where activities were based on a floating 
factory rather than in a whaling station. This allowed them to operate in two areas that 
had not been exploited before. In addition, the factory ship gave them the flexibility to go 
elsewhere if the hunting grounds at Spitsbergen became unfavourable. 
The season of 1908 was an offensive re-organisation of Christian Nielsen & Co. The 
company bought Finneset whaling station and established A/S Ocean with a whaling 
station at South Georgia. Over the following years, Christian Nielsen & Co. continued to 
expand and established two whaling companies in 1910–1911: A/S Norge and A/S 
Spermacet. This made the company a giant in the modern whaling industry, with access 
to capital, competence, markets, and networks across the globe. A/S Nimrod could, 
however, not compete with its sister companies elsewhere in terms of catches and 
output. From 1909 to 1912, A/S Nimrod caught 295 whales and produced 12,240 
barrels of whale oil and 2,700 bags of guano. During the same period, A/S Ocean caught 
1,814 whales and produced 66,161 barrels of whale oil and 27,985 bags of guano.418 
This gave the shareholders of A/S Ocean a 30% dividend during the first season, and a 
100% dividend for the second.419 Despite comparably meagre results, A/S Nimrod was 
able to generate a profit that was apparently large enough to secure the prolonged 
support of Christian Nielsen & Co. 
 
The decision to cease their arctic project after the 1912 season was because the local 
network failed to generate a profit, although the global network had made several 
investments in the station over the last few years. Since there was little interest in 
buying the station, Christian Nielsen & Co. decided to keep it and to rent it out in 1915 
and 1916. However, the expedition (under the leadership of Siegwarth) that agreed to 
rent the station got stuck in the ice and never reached the station. The company 
maintained this strategy until Lewin managed to interest them in his coal-mining 
project. Since Christian Nielsen & Co. had failed to sell their properties at a price high 
enough to compensate the losses they made in 1912, they decided to participate in 
Lewin’s project. To achieve this, Christian Nielsen & Co. transferred the ownership of 
                                                 
418 Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924. Del 1: 1883–1914. 1967. Vol: 2. P: 376. In: Den moderne 
Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
419 Galteland. O. Hvalfangst på Syd-Georgia. A/S Sandefjords Hvalfangerselskab / A/S Vestfolds fangst fra 
landstasjonen Strømnes 1906–1931. P: 167. 2009 
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A/S Nimrod’s properties and claims to the consortium. In 1917, the company expanded 
their activities and built several new buildings at Heerodden.420 
 
The decision to get involved in the mining project was probably motivated by the belief 
that there would be a great need for coal after the First World War had ended. Secondly, 
investing in the project could secure the necessary coal supplies for Christian Nielsen & 
Co.’s entire whaling enterprise. Christian Nielsen & Co.’s negotiations and later sale of 
their claims and installations to SNSK was what the company had sought to achieve for 
several years. Having recovered the accumulated losses A/S Nimrod had made in their 
final year of operations, Christian Nielsen & Co. withdrew from Spitsbergen. 
 
Shortly after the First World War had ended, a new whaling company established itself 
at Finneset whaling station in Spitsbergen. Who was the actor behind this project, and 
what was the purpose of this company? How did this company operationalise their 
objective, and what were the consequences and results of their activities? 
 
Spitsbergen Hval 
As we have seen, Spitsbergen Hval was established by Morten Andreas Ingebrigtsen and 
his son Andreas Ingebrigtsen in 1920.421 Ingebrigtsen started his career hunting beluga 
whales in Spitsbergen in the 1860s. In 1892, he sold his boat, Hvidfisken, and invested in 
the steamboat D/S Skytten,422 which he converted into a whale catching boat. Operating 
with only one whale catcher, Ingebrigtsen caught and processed as many whales as his 
competitors did with two or more whale catchers each year. In 1905, Ingebrigtsen 
established a whaling station in Walrus Bay on Bear Island. Having abandoned the arctic 
whaling grounds in 1908, he went to Angola, Mexico, and later Alaska. In 1920, he 
returned with his son to Spitsbergen, motivated by a belief that these hunting grounds 
                                                 
420 Rossnes. G. Norsk overvintringsfangst på Svalbard 1895–1940. Norsk polarinstitutt, Meddelelser nr 127 
1993, side 69–70. 
421 ”Letter from Hvalfangerforeningen to Andr. Ingebrigtsen. Kristiania. May 19, 1920”. Kommendør Chr. 
Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. Archive: Hvalfangerforeningen. Diverse 
Pakkesaker. Vol: 3. (1912–1922). 
422 Ytreberg. N.A. Tromsø Bys Historie. 1962. Vol: 2. P: 207 & 217. The background of M.A. Ingebrigtsen will 
be discussed more thoroughly in chapter 4, which deals with Ingebrigtsens whaling station in Walrus Bay 
on Bear Island. 
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had recovered from the exploitation a few years earlier. Ingebrigtsen and his son 
purchased two whale catchers, Hobarth and Maquaria, which they renamed Sørkap and 
Viking III.423 These boats were larger and more powerful and had a larger operational 
radius compared with the whale catchers previously used in Spitsbergen. 
 
Risting (1922) states that he knew of no other hunting ground where sea ice had such an 
influential and dictating role on the success or failure of industrial projects as it had in 
Spitsbergen. He argued that a company of experienced whalers equipped with modern 
hunting capability could probably make arctic whaling profitable once again.424 It is 
remarkable how much faith the whalers appear to have had in these hunting grounds. 
A/S Nimrod and Alfa & Beta had been motivated by similar beliefs. Similar beliefs also 
encouraged Christensen and Siegwarth to make an attempt in 1915 and 1916. Although 
these failed to make a profit because of poor catches, Morten Andreas Ingebrigtsen and 
Andreas Ingebrigtsen still chose to make a new attempt. 
 
In May 1920, the company made a deal with SNSK to rent Finneset whaling station.425 
Spitsbergen Hval agreed to pay an annual rent of Kr5,000 in addition to Kr5 per barrel of 
whale oil and Kr0.50 per bag of guano they produced throughout the season. In return, 
SNSK would supply the station and the whaling company’s boats with 500–800 tonnes 
of coal annually.426 Even though Ingebrigtsen and his son only rented the whaling 
station for a single season, they negotiated an option in the contract that allowed them 
to re-new the contract for another five years, and a right to buy the whaling station if 
they wanted.427 Throughout the 1920 season, the company’s two whale catchers hunted 
off the west coast of Spitsbergen, where there were few whales. The company decided to 
try even further west in an area between Spitsbergen and Greenland. But the result was 
                                                 
423 Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. No 9, Sept 1920. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. 
Sandefjord. Norway. 
424 Risting. S. Av Hvalfangstens Historie. 1922. P: 266. 
425 ”Contract between Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani A/S and Whaler Andr. Ingebrigtsen. May 3, 
1920”. Tromsø StatsArkiv. Norway. Privatearchive no 73. Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani. Vol: 453. 
Fldr: 1917–1925, Green Harbour. Eiendomsforhold. 
426 ”Contract between Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani A/S and Whaler Andr. Ingebrigtsen. May 3, 
1920”. Tromsø StatsArkiv. Norway. Privatearchive no 73. Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani. Vol: 453. 
Fldr: 1917–1925, Green Harbour. Eiendomsforhold. 
427 ”Contract between Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani A/S and Whaler Andr. Ingebrigtsen. May 3, 
1920”. Tromsø StatsArkiv. Norway. Privatearchive no 73. Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani. Vol: 453. 
Fldr: 1917–1925, Green Harbour. Eiendomsforhold. 
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the same. The end result for 1920 was a catch of 18 whales and 549 barrels of whale 
oil.428 The prices for whale oil had been negotiated by the Norwegian Whaling Union to 
£90 per ton for No 1, £85 for No 2, £80 for No 3, and £72 for No 4.429 Spitsbergen Hval 
sold their oil for £7,813.08 before paying production costs and salaries430 and the 
required Kr2,745 plus Kr5,000 rent to SNSK. The season’s catches and production must 
have been a financial loss, and Ingebrigtsen withdrew from Spitsbergen. The results of 
Spitsbergen Hval are a testament to the devastating long-term effects that large-scale 
industrial exploitation had on whale stocks in the north, and highlighted that it would 
take more than a few years for whale populations to recover. Although whales do 
migrate over great distances to feed and breed, it is unlikely that changing migration 
patterns caused the declining catches. Uncontrolled exploitation that initially included 
eight competing whaling companies and an abundance of whale catchers simply 
diminished the whale stocks after a few years. This fact, together with difficult climatic 
circumstances, explains why later attempts to re-open and exploit these hunting 
grounds failed. 
In spite of the results of this project, a number of industrial projects took place later that 
targeted whale stocks in the north Atlantic using pelagic floating factory ships that could 
process whales at sea. This enabled actors to pursue whales wherever they were and 
was not bound to a land-based production unit for processing and supplies. 
 
Discussion: Spitsbergen Hval 
Ingebrigtsen and his son’s plan to re-open the whaling station at Finneset was motivated 
by the same belief and hope that encouraged the same industrial projects throughout 
the second decade of the 20th century. Despite renting a station with the capacity to fully 
utilise the resources and two modern whale catchers operated by very experienced 
whaling entrepreneurs, the project failed. The failure of this project marked the end of 
                                                 
428 Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. No 9, Sept 1920. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. 
Sandefjord. Norway. There is indeed a striking difference between the results of the two whale catchers; 
while Viking under the leadership of Andreas Ingebrigtsen managed to catch 13 whales, Sørkap under the 
management of M.A. Ingebrigtsen only managed to catch 5. Of the annual production of 549 barrels; 265 
barrels were No 1, and the remaining 284 No 4. 
429 Risting. S. Av Hvalfangstens Historie. 1922. P: 462f. 
430 The prices have been deducted from data supplied by Risting. S (1922), p: 462f, and by calculating the 
number of tonnes of oil Spitsbergen Hval produced throughout the season, by dividing the number of 
barrels with 5.88 (the number of barrels per ton). Please see price-discussion on page 20. 
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the shore-based whaling industry in Spitsbergen. It is curious that Ingebrigtsen later 
returned to Spitsbergen to hunt and exploit beluga whale stocks as he had done during 
the 1880s. 
 
Finneset as a base for pelagic whaling 
From 1915 onwards, a number of semi-pelagic attempts to exploit the whale stocks of 
Spitsbergen were conducted. I will only briefly discuss these and their results since they 
were semi-pelagic and not connected to Finneset whaling station. These expeditions 
were all primarily motivated by the relatively high whale oil prices.431An attempt by 
Christensen and Siegwarth failed in 1915. The first relatively successful attempt took 
place in 1918–1919 by the Norwegian brothers Sæbjørnsen, who operated in the waters 
of Spitsbergen with the boat Vikertangen. Although their boat was relatively small, they 
managed to kill and process 14 fin whales and four bottlenose whales.432 After this 
attempt, no one invested in whaling projects in the Arctic until the summer of 1926. 
Tønnesen and Johnsen (1969) argued that interest in whaling in the Arctic was reignited 
because many believed that the whale populations had recovered after six years of no 
hunting. A contributing factor was also the relative vicinity of the arctic hunting grounds 
compared with the Antarctic, which reduced operational costs and encouraged 
investment in smaller expeditions.433 One must not overlook the domestic market and 
the increasing need for oil and fat, especially during the First World War when whale oil 
from the Antarctic was classified as contraband by the British authorities.434 In 1926 and 
1927, a semi-pelagic whaling expedition was managed by Andreas Nilsen of Sandefjord. 
The expedition used one floating factory ship (Foldin 1) and two whale catchers (Maar 1 
and Ulv 1).435 
 
                                                 
431 Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924, Del 2: 1914-1924. Den Pelagiske Fangst 1924–1937. Vol: 3. 
P: 224. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse of Utvikkling. 1969. 
432 Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. Nr 11, November 1926. P: 173. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s 
Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. 
433 Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924, Del 2: 1914-1924. Den Pelagiske Fangst 1924–1937. Vol: 3. 
P: 228. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse of Utvikkling. 1969. 
434 ”Brev fra den Kgl. Utenriksdepartementet til den norske hvalfangerforeningen. 15. August 1914”. Archive: 
Hvalfangerforeningen. Div pakkesaker, Vol: 4. 1913-1920. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s 
Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. 
435 Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. No 11. November, 1927. P: 185. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s 
Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. 
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Fig 46. The floating 
factory ship Foldin 1 
anchored at the 
former Finneset 
Whaling station in 
Green Harbour on 
Spitsbergen in 1926. 
The photo has been 
published with the 





It would be wrong to refer to this expedition as a pelagic, since Foldin 1 was unable to 
operate and process whales at sea. The expedition used the harbours at Bellsound as 
well as Safe Harbour and Green Harbour in Isfjorden.436 The result of the expedition 
over two seasons was a catch of 77 whales and 3,008 barrels of whale oil.437 This result 
was too small to encourage further activities. 
 
The next attempt took place in 1928, by Leif Bryde and his company Ishavet A/S.438 
Bryde had previously operated in Spitsbergen and gained knowledge of good 
anchorages and where to find freshwater supplies. Bryde purchased the diesel powered 
ship M/S Haugar and two whale catchers in Haugesund in southern Norway. M/S 
Haugar had a capacity to store 18,000 barrels and could produce up to 400 barrels per 
day.439 Compared with the floating factories used in 1903–1912, this factory ship was 
                                                 
436 ”Skipsjournal. D/S Ulv 1. M. Torgersen (maskinmester), 1927”. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s 
Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. Archive: Skipsjournaler. F-skipsjournaler, D/S Ulv 1. Vol: 0230. 
Fldr: 1926–1927. 
437 Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. No 11. November, 1927. P: 185. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s 
Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway, and Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924, Del 2: 1914–
1924. Den Pelagiske Fangst 1924–1937. Vol: 3. P: 228. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse of 
Utvikkling. 1969. 
438 Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. No 11. November, 1926. P: 169, and Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. No 5. May 
1929. P: 124. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. See also: Tønnesen. 
J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924, Del 2: 1914–1924. Den Pelagiske Fangst 1924–1937. Vol: 3. P: 228f . In: 
Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse of Utvikkling. 1969. 




well equipped and modern. The first purpose-built factory ship that operated in these 
waters was A/S Ørnens Admiralen. This 1,500-ton ship could only process blubber and 
store 5,000 barrels of whale oil.440 In comparison, the 2,242-ton M/S Haugar was 
equipped with ten cookers for processing meat and bones, and one Hartmann cooker for 
processing blubber.441 Initially, Bryde planned to rent Finneset whaling station from 
SNSK,442 but for unknown reasons he chose to buy a floating factory instead. In the 1929 
season, the expedition operated in the waters of Bear Island and they made good catches 
over the three months they operated there, resulting in a profit of Kr74,000.443 Despite 
making a profit, the company did not return to these arctic hunting grounds until 1933. 
For that expedition, Bryde hired Andreas Ingebrigtsen to manage the expedition.444 
Unfortunately, I have been unable to uncover any results for the 1933 season, but the 
1934 results amounted to a catch of 150 whales and a production of 6,799 barrels of 
whale oil.445 It is remarkable that actors continued to invest in whaling expeditions in 
the Arctic even though most made poor catches compared with other hunting grounds. 
Most of these attempts were motivated by the domestic need for oil and fat combined 
with beliefs that arctic whale populations had recovered after a break from hunting. 
 
Finneset whaling station 
It was the Norwegian whaling company A/S Spitsbergen that built the whaling station at 
Finneset. They moved it from northern Norway and rebuilt it over a period of six weeks 
in the summer of 1905. The company established the station to process blubber, meat, 
and baleen. In August 2007, an international team of LASHIPA researchers surveyed and 
conducted a comprehensive archaeological documentation of all remains of human 
                                                 
440 Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. No 8. August 1929. P: 202f. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s 
Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. 
441 ”Dagbok Hvalfångstselskapet Haugar A/S. Bestyrer Andr Ingebrigtsen, dagbokförer Peder Näst 1ste 
styrman. 1934”. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. Archive: 
Hvalrådet. Fångstdagbøker 1931–1943. Vol: 15. Fldr: Hvalfangstselskapet Haugar A/S. 
442 Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. No 11. November, 1926. P: 169. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s 
Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. 
443 Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924, Del 2: 1914–1924. Den Pelagiske Fangst 1924–1937. Vol: 3. 
P: 229. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse of Utvikkling. 1969. 
444 ”Dagbok Hvalfångstselskapet Haugar A/S. Bestyrer Andr Ingebrigtsen, dagbokförer Peder Näst 1ste 
styrman. 1934”. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. Archive: 
Hvalrådet. Fångstdagbøker 1931–1943. Vol: 15. Fldr: Hvalfangstselskapet Haugar A/S. 
445 ”Dagbok Hvalfångstselskapet Haugar A/S. Bestyrer Andr Ingebrigtsen, dagbokförer Peder Näst 1ste 
styrman. 1934”. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. Archive: 
Hvalrådet. Fångstdagbøker 1931–1943. Vol: 15. Fldr: Hvalfangstselskapet Haugar A/S. 
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activity at Finneset, as well as other contemporary whaling sites in Green Harbour. The 
team used total station, highly accurate GPS units, photography, hand measurements, 
and text descriptions of the sites, and added this data to a database. The primary 
purpose of this work was to study how whaling companies a) organised their 
production system, b) arranged their settlement for employees, c) adapted technologies, 
machines, and settlement plans to local environmental and political circumstances, and 
d) claimed ownership to territories and freshwater resources. 
 
 
Fig 47. Total station map of Finneset peninsula and the whaling station by: Bolhuis.E, Gustafsson.U.I, 
Avango.D, De Haas.H, Hartnell.C and Depasqual.S. LASHIPA 5/ 2007. The remains of the whaling station are 
located within the demarcated box on the southern side of the peninsula. On the northern side of the 






Features of Finneset whaling station 
Please see LASHIPA 4 fieldwork report (2007) for more details. 
 
1 – Workers’ barracks   2 – Manager’s villa 
3 – Bakery    4 – Guano factory 
5 – Meat cookery   6 – Flensing platform 
7 – Bedding    8 – Steam engine house 
9 – Blubber cookery   10 – Blubber cutter 
11 – Forge         12 – House foundation 
13 – Shed foundation   14 – Shed foundation 
15 – Area for drying baleen  40 – Wooden construction 
41 – Wooden construction  45 - Grave 
 
 
The former whaling station of A/S Finmarken, which A/S Spitsbergen purchased in 
1905, was initially designed to process blubber and meat. Later, the station was 
equipped with a guano factory, which allowed full utilisation of the raw materials. The 
production process started as soon as whale catchers delivered the whales to the south-
side of the station at high tide. From here, the whales were pulled onto the flensing 
platform where the workers cut off the blubber layer into long strips. These were pulled 
off the carcass using powerful steam winches.446 The remainder of the carcass was 
towed onto an elevated wooden platform called the lemming platform. Here, the meat 
was separated from the body and processed. The meat was cooked into whale oil in 
cookers under the lemming platform. Initially, bones were collected in large piles on the 
shore east of the station. After the guano factory was assembled, the bones were crushed 
by a steam-powered hammer device into small pieces before being fed into the guano 
mill. Beside the local manager and the crew onboard the two whale catchers (Fin and 
Frey), the station employed 40 men in the production line.447 
 
In May 1905, A/S Spitsbergen dismantled the houses and installations at the whaling 
station in northern Norway. A few weeks later, the expedition arrived in Spitsbergen 
with the cargo. During June, the workers started to erect the whaling station. The 
buildings at Finneset whaling station were subdivided into accommodation, production, 
                                                 
446 Ohlin. A. Några anteckningar om den nutida hvalfångsten i norra ishafvet. 1894. P: 153. In: Ymer. 
Tidsskrift utgifven af Svenska Sällskapet för antropologi och geografi. 
447 Ohlin. A. Några anteckningar om den nutida hvalfångsten i norra ishafvet. 1894. P: 154. In: Ymer. 
Tidsskrift utgifven af Svenska Sällskapet för antropologi och geografi. 
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and ancillary functions.448 These were designed to process the raw material as 
effectively as possible and to generate economic profit. The company painted the name 
Firma Severin Dahl in large letters on the blubber cookery. Whether this was done to 
enforce their territorial claim or not remains uncertain, but if this was the purpose, it 
would have been more effective to paint it on the opposite side of the building, which 
faces the fiord opening where competitors would have come sailing in. In addition to 
this, the company erected several claim boards in the surrounding landscape that stated 
the company’s name. 
  
Fig 48 and 49. Firma Severin Dahl’s name painted visibly on the southern side of the blubber cookery at 
Finneset whaling station. Right: A/S Spitsbergen’s claim board, which the company erected in the 
surrounding landscape to establish their rights to the area. Both photos published with the kind approval of 
the private archive of Fred Tibbets (USA) and The Norwegian Polar Institute. 
 
                                                 
448 LASHIPA 4 fieldreport. 2007. P: 24–36. See also: Isachsen. G. Green Harbour. 1913. P: 41f. In: 
L’expedition Norvegienne au Spitsberg 1909–1910 sous la direction du Captaine Gunnar Isachsen. 
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The organisation of production 
 
Fig 50. Features recorded at Finneset Whaling Station survey area. The area contains remains of A/S 
Spitsbergen, A/S Nimrod, and other actors’ industrial activities in 1905–1927. Map by Ulf I. Gustafsson and 
Dag Avango. 
 
The production process at the whaling station started on the south-facing wooden 
flensing plan (Fig 50, No 6). The platform faced south so the company could use the 
sheltered and deep harbour on the southern side of the peninsula, instead of the north-
facing part of the peninsula, which is more exposed and less deep. The flensing plan was 
equipped with three steam winches on the northern end of the platform. These were 
used to haul the whale carcasses from the water onto the flensing platform for 
processing. The platform was also equipped with two manual winches on the west side 
of the plane, which rotated the carcass.449 On the flensing platform, flensers cut the 
blubber layer into long strips. These strips were pulled off by attaching wires from the 
                                                 
449 Gustafsson. U.I. Industrialising the Arctic: Settlement design and technical adaptations of modern whaling 
station in Spitsbergen and Bear Island. 2010. P: 51. In: Whaling & History III. Editor: Ringstad. J.E. 
Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. 
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steam winches to a small hole that was cut in the blubber. The strips of blubber were fed 
into a large box containing a steam-driven rotating blubber cutter.450 This device was an 
extension of the blubber cookery (Fig 50, No 9). The blubber cutter was equipped with a 
large metal wheel fitted with two large, sharp blades that rotated at high speed and cut 
the blubber strips into smaller pieces. This device was connected to an elevator, which 
transported the blubber pieces to the second floor of the blubber cookery. It was 
important to cut the blubber into smaller pieces since it made the cooking process more 
effective. Once on the upper floor, the blubber pieces were distributed into eight vertical 
open blubber cookers, which processed the blubber into oil. As soon as one cooker was 
filled, steam was turned on to start the cooking process and the blubber was cooked for 
approximately 10 to 12 hours.451 
  
Fig 51 and 52. Remains of the rotating blubber cutter at Finneset whaling station. Right: the upper floor of 
the blubber cookery. Note the elevator on the far right, which transported the pieces of blubber to the first 
floor, and which were distributed into the cookers via a wooden distribution system. Photos: Ben Bekooy. 
LASHIPA 5/2007. The photo on the right has been published with the kind approval of Michigan 
Technological University, USA. 
 
Finneset whaling station had circular open iron cookers with a steam pipe and tapping 
mechanism attached in the bottom of each cooker. Once the blubber was cooked, the 
cooker was tapped to remove the whale oil. The whale oil was transferred into open 
clearing tanks where it was left to cool before being tapped into wooden barrels and 
stored nearby the whaling station. At the end of the season, the barrels were loaded 
onboard the company’s ships and transported to the markets for sale. Wooden barrels 
                                                 
450 The LASHIPA 4 archaeological expedition on Svalbard. Fieldwork report, 2007. Pp: 24–35. 
451 Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883–1924, Del 2: 1914–1924. Den Pelagiske Fangst 1924–1937. Vol: 3. 
P: 10. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse of Utvikkling. 1969. 
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were often a nuisance for the companies. Not only were they expensive and took up 
precious storage space onboard the ships, they also had a tendency to leak. 
After the blubber layer was stripped, the whale carcass was rotated using two manual 
winches and positioned on the west side of the flensing plan. Here, the carcass was 
attached to a steam winch on the north side of the lemming plane and pulled onto an 
elevated wooden platform for further processing (Fig 50, No 5). Meanwhile, a new whale 
was pulled onto the flensing plan. It was important that all parts of the process went as 
planned otherwise the whole chain of production was halted. This had a direct effect on 
the output, the quality of the oil, and the salary of the workers. 
 
Fig 53. Flensing workers and general workers busy processing whales on the flensing platform. Note the two 
manual winches operated by two workers in the background. Photos published with the kind approval of 
Michigan Technological University, USA. 
 
The meat-cutting platform (lemming platform) and cookery (Fig 50, No5) was an 
elevated extension of the wooden plan. This platform was equipped with one steam 
winch, one boiler, and five open cookers beneath the platform itself.452 The lemming 
workers cut whale meat from the bones into smaller pieces to maximise the effect of the 
                                                 
452 Gustafsson. U.I. Industrialising the Arctic: Settlement design and technical adaptations of modern whaling 
station in Spitsbergen and Bear Island. 2010. P: 51. In: Whaling & History III. Editor: Ringstad. J.E. 
Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. 
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cooking process. It is likely that the meat took longer to cook than the blubber, since the 
cookers were more exposed. Cooking the meat was not as important since the oil 
produced from meat was lower quality (No 3 and No 4) and less valuable than the high-
quality blubber oil (No 1 or No 2). After the meat was cooked, residues such as grax and 
glue water were drained from the cookers and thrown into a small tide water lake 
immediately west of the station. The whale bones were collected in large piles beside the 
whaling station to be processed into guano and bone meal at the guano factory (Fig 50, 
No 4). This factory was built as an extension of the meat cutting platform. The guano 
factory made production more effective since the bones and residues were transferred 
directly to the next phase of production rather than being discarded. 
 
Although A/S Nimrod invested in new machines to process the whale, they were not 
able to process whale bones until 1912. Initially, the guano factory was equipped with 
two vertical driers placed inside the building. Over three years, A/S Nimrod failed to 
make the factory operational. This was because they could not get the new driers to 
work and had to disassemble an older horizontal drier from A/S Finmarken’s former 
whaling station in northern Norway. This drier was placed alongside the northern wall 
of the existing factory building and allowed the company to dry the whale bones without 
redesigning the building and changing the flow of production. At the opposite end of the 
drier, the company placed a small elevator, which transported the finished product 
(guano and bone meal) inside the building where it was packed into bags and stored 
until the end of the season. In addition to producing whale oil, whaling companies also 
utilised baleen. Baleen are the bone plates used by baleen whales to sieve food. These 
were cut from the whales’ mouths, cleaned, and washed in caustic soda before being 
dried in an open area immediately north east of the production area. Steam for the 
whole whaling station was produced and supplied by the steam boiler house (Fig 50, No 
8). This building was equipped with three boilers and one large water container.453 To 
produce enough steam, a constant flow of freshwater and supply of coal were needed. 
Coal could be purchased from local coal mines, but access to freshwater posed a bigger 
problem for whaling companies. 
                                                 
453 “Hvalstationen I Green Harbour”. Inventory report by SNSK. Tromsø StatsArkiv. Store Norske 





Fig 54. Primary activities at Finneset whaling station 1905–1921. 
 
The primary source of water was a small run-off stream that ran from the mountains 
east of the station area. To make the most effective use of this stream, A/S Spitsbergen 
constructed a small dam and placed a large metal tank beside it. From this tank, they led 
a pipe through the landscape to the whaling station. One of the disadvantages of this 
small stream was that it frequently froze. 
A/S Spitsbergen adapted and partly solved this problem by collecting water at a glacial 
river on the south-west side of Green Harbour, a procedure which A/S Nimrod adopted 
when they took over the station. Coal for producing steam was, during the first few 
years, primarily purchased in Norway and brought to the archipelago onboard the boats. 
Some whaling companies bought coal from the two mining settlements at Advent 
Bay,454Advent City operated by the British Spitsbergen Coal & Trading Co. Ltd, and 
Longyear City operated by the American ACC. In 1907, the ACC established a small coal 
mine in Green Harbour and became one of the largest local coal suppliers for the 
                                                 
454 ”Letter from Ernest D.Black (onsite manager for the Spitzbergen Coal & Trading Co. Ltd in Spitsbergen) to 
F. Davenport Esq. Advent Bay, July 30. 1907”. National Museum of Science and Technology. Stockholm, 
Sweden. Archive: William Olsson’s Archive 1899–1922. Vol: F2:20. Also in: “Letter from Johan Bryde to the 
Norwegian Foreign Ministry. 12/11–1908”. Archive of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. Vol: 5174, sak 8-9, 
Johan Bryde. Norwegian National Archives 
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whaling industry.455 The whaling companies could purchase coal at a local market, 
saving valuable space onboard their boats going to the hunting ground and during the 
season in Spitsbergen. 
The forge (Fig 50, No 11) and the repair shop (Fig 50, No14) at Finneset whaling station 
maintained the station’s technical elements and keep them functional. This house was 
located on the east side of the Finneset peninsula some distance from the blubber 
cookery. This was probably because the blacksmith worked with an open fire pit, which 
the company obviously wanted to keep away from flammable whale oil. The forge also 
assembled whale oil barrels and sharpened and repaired flensing knifes. By organising 
and structuring production this way, whaling companies could process whales into 
whale oil and other by-products effectively. 
 
                               
Fig 55 and 56. The flow of production at Finneset whaling station under A/S Spitsbergen 1905–1909 (left) 
and A/S Nimrod 1909–1912 (right). 
 
The south-facing position of the whaling station did not only offer protection. The 
deeper water on the southern side made it easier for whale catchers to deliver whales to 
the station, which made the on-shore work easier. The company management placed the 
accommodation buildings north of the main production area to separate the workers 
from the station manager. The workers were accommodated in a 10.5 x 7.5 m insulated 
                                                 
455 ”Letter from Tønder Bull to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. Kristiania. July 2, 1910”. Tromsø StatsArkiv. 
Archive: Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani. Private archive no: 73. Vol: 451. Fldr: 1909–1923 Green 
Harbour, A/S Nimrod. 
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wooden barracks containing four large rooms each with ten beds (Fig 50, No 1).456 The 
manager’s house (Fig 50, No 2) had a south-facing view. The status of the manager’s 
house was displayed with a flagpole at the front of the house flying the newly 
independent Norway’s national flag. It is possible that some of the workers, such as the 
blacksmith and the baker, were accommodated at their respective workplaces since 
these were large enough to accommodate beds. Unfortunately, there is no data to either 
support or disprove this. 
            
Fig 57 and 58. The workers barrack at Finneset whaling station during the first decade of the 20th century. 
Right: Remains of one of the workers barracks chimneys and stoves. The documentation and mapping of the 
remains at Finneset revealed information on spatial layout and the organisation of production, as well as 
architectural features of the stations features. Photo published with the kind approval of Norsk Folkemuseum 
photo collection. Right: Ben Bekooy. LASHIPA 5/2007. 
 
Wooden houses at the whaling station were double-walled and covered with tar paper 
to improve insulation and to protect from cold winds. The roofs had corrugated steel 
plates. Fieldwork shows that each building contained one or more heat sources (ovens) 
depending on the number of people living there. These ovens provided a hospitable 
temperature and allowed the workers to dry their clothes. 
The station’s ancillary functions included a kitchen and mess (Fig 50, No 2), a bakery 
(Fig 50, No 3), food storage (Fig 50, No 21), and a graveyard (Fig 50, No 45).457 These 
were located north of the station away from the odour and noise of the production area. 
The kitchen and mess were placed beside the manager’s house, while the bakery was 
located approximately 100 m to the east. This was probably for safety reasons, since the 
                                                 
456 “Hvalstationen I Green Harbour”. Inventory report by SNSK. Tromsø StatsArkiv. Store Norske 
Spitsbergen Kulkompani. Privatearchive no 73. Vol: 451. Fldr: Green Harbour. Topografiske kart, 
bygninger, tekninger. 
457 See appendix for a larger map over Finneset peninsula. 
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building had a brick furnace, and to keep food and bread away from the smell of the 
station. The company also built food storage inside an elevated earth embankment north 
of the kitchen building. This allowed food to be stored in a cold and dark place and kept 
it fresh for longer. On an elevated brink north-east of the peninsula, the whaling 
company established a graveyard. In the period 1905 to 1912, at least one whaler lost 
his life while working at the station. Today, his grave remains standing in the landscape 
as a part of the archipelagos cultural heritage. Operating and hunting whales in harsh 
arctic conditions was dangerous due to ice and low water  and air temperatures and this 
is reflected by the many graves of Dutch and German 18th century whalers. Falling into 
these waters rapidly reduced body temperatures and caused death within a few 
minutes. This was an ever present danger for the whale catcher crews. At whaling 
stations and on pelagic platforms, flensers were some of the most exposed workers 
because they worked on slippery, oil-drenched wooden platforms and handled long, 
sharp knives and powerful steam winches to remove different parts of the whale. On 
floating factories, flensers were even more exposed since they either balanced on top of 
the whale carcass alongside the ship, or worked in a small wooden boat alongside the 
whale. 
 
Ancillary stations were placed across Finneset peninsula to maintain the flow of 
production and everyday life in the whaling station, as well as to maintain hierarchical 
boundaries. These buildings enhanced the whaling companies’ physical control and 
claim to the peninsula since they occupied the whole peninsula and its harbours. 
Although the primary motive behind the design and spatial layout of the whaling station 
was to generate economic profit, it also aimed to create social control, hierarchical 
division, and boundaries for power relations, which was important for securing control 
of the entire peninsula, its freshwater supplies, and harbours. In his article A Ship 
Ashore, Basberg argues that the organisation and structure of a whaling station 
resembles that of a ship with all its hierarchical divisions and highly specialised working 
categories.458 While this is true, one could also argue that they were not dissimilar from 
                                                 
458 Basberg. B.L. A ship ashore? Organsation and living conditions at South Georgia whaling stations, 1904–
1960. 2002. In: International Journal of Maritime History. Vol: XIX, No 1. 
 145 
 
any other remote and isolated company town at the turn of the 20th century, which 
displayed similar divisions and functions.459 
 
Strategies for social control 
The whaling station at Finneset was designed for maximum efficiency. The company 
organised the production line efficiently and the settlement was also designed to 
promote control over the work force and achieve social control. This was by no means 
unique at the turn of the 20th century, most industries used the same strategy. However, 
the Arctic and Antarctic posed particular challenges that were less common elsewhere. 
To begin with, Spitsbergen was far away from population centres, which made it difficult 
for whaling companies to replace supplement workers they deemed undesirable, such as 
unionists. They had to stick with the employees they had recruited, and control them. 
Moreover, the legal status of the archipelago as a no man’s land meant that state support 
(i.e., police or army) was not available to break up strikes. And strikes were a particular 
concern. Whaling took place over a short summer season. During this time, companies 
had to produce an economic surplus to maintain the support of its shareholders. A strike 
during this short season could have potentially devastating effects on the company’s 
ability to make a profit. 
 
Modern whaling in the Arctic needed people, machines, organisations, and settlements 
to be adapted to these environmental and legal circumstances to function effectively. 
The legal status of Spitsbergen and Bear Island as terra nullius was both advantageous 
and challenging for the companies. From an economic point of view, the status was 
favourable since no national state could interfere and impose restrictions, taxes, or 
regulations on their activities. On the other hand, the lack of state authorities and laws 
meant that the companies had few tools to deal with strikes or territorial disputes. 
Although it remains uncertain when the strategies to achieve better social control were 
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first established, they were already in place during the 1880s.460 It is interesting that 
Johnsen (1959) and others have analysed these strategies as a means to create 
motivation.  
These strategies “laid the foundation for the team-work structure, which in many ways 
served as a model for the development of the modern whaling industry”.461 Nielsen (1921) 
argued that the part-based salary system was healthy and sensible as it made “the soil 
fruitless for Bolshevism”; everyone worked hard and energetically because they were 
part owners of the enterprise.462 According to Isachsen (1929), “there is no more 
brotherhood in whaling than in gambling”.463 Whatever one’s opinion may be about these 
social strategies, they were adopted by the whaling companies to create an economic 
incentive for the workers and to secure the company’s control over its workforce, 
territorial claims, and resources. The companies’ strategies to achieve social control 
included a part-based salary system, architectural design features, leisure activities, 
technological choices, and more. The social segregation and hierarchical division 
between the workers and the local management was an integrated part of this. When 
A/S Spitsbergen moved their whaling station to Spitsbergen, the management adapted 
their strategies to the no man’s land status using the environment and the landscape. 
This included spatial division of the workers and the management at Finneset whaling 
station to enhance the local management’s control and to increase the station’s output 
by preventing strikes or unrest that may compromise the flow of production and output. 
 
The workers were divided into shore- and boat workers. These two groups had little 
interaction with each other. While shore workers worked and slept at the station, boat 
workers (crew) stayed onboard the ships more or less during the entire season. The two 
groups had distinct accommodation, work titles, and part-based salary systems. This 
system was designed to differentiate skilled workers from unskilled workers and shore 
workers from boat workers/crews in a way which created a mutual dependence 
between the groups. While the sShip crews received a fixed salary and an additional 
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bonus based on the whale species and number of whales they delivered to the whaling 
station. The shore worker’s salary was based on the number of barrels of whale oil, 
tonnes of baleen, and bags of guano the station produced. This system encouraged the 
ship crews to catch larger whales (like blue whales and fin whales), which have more 
blubber than smaller whales (like minke whales). The shore workers were dependent 
on the ship crews delivering enough whales for processing into whale oil and by-
products. And if the shore workers were unable to keep up with the ship crew, the local 
manager could halt further hunting until processing had caught up, balancing the two 
out. Therefore, all workers remained dependent on one another and disturbance in any 
part of the production line affected everyone’s salary.  
 
The management of A/S Spitsbergen divided the shore workers’ accommodation away 
from the local manager to maintain hierarchy and emphasize who was in charge. In 
addition, the architectural design features, such as double-walled houses insulated with 
tar paper and iron stoves showed that the company management regarded the workers’ 
comfort as important. 
 
At contemporary workers accommodations in the mining settlements at Advent City and 
Longyear City, the companies distinguished between single-walled houses intended for 
the summer workers and insulated houses for the winter workers. The whaling 
company apparently wanted to avoid complaints about the accommodation from the 
workers, which could cause bad feelings. It is worth mentioning that these mining 
settlements experienced a number of strikes, which commonly started with complaints 
from summer workers about poor accommodation, salary, and food.464 Finneset whaling 
station may have had a shower with hot water from the steam production. 
Unfortunately, fieldwork provided no data to support this. It is probable that whaling 
station employees had access to some form of hygiene installation. 
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Work at the whaling station was intense and consisted of long hours with few 
opportunities for leisure activities.465 At Finneset whaling station, the workers were able 
to go hiking, fishing, and hunting during their spare time. Some workers got involved in 
mineral prospecting. At least two territorial claims were made by the station’s 
employees during the first decade of the 20th century.466 Although A/S Nimrod’s claim at 
Linneelva in 1909 was primarily motivated by getting supplementary food for the 
station’s employees, it was also used as a leisure hut for the workers. In addition to this, 
it was an actant in the arctic landscape that signalled ownership and ongoing activities 
to others. It might be coincidental that the hut was established after a series of 
devastating strikes in the mining settlements of Advent Bay.467 
 
It is questionable whether claiming the fishing area at Linneelva was a social strategy to 
provide another leisure activity or an attempt to secure supplementary food. When A/S 
Spitsbergen established their whaling station, they based it on the former buildings, 
installations, and machines of A/S Finmarken’s former whaling station in northern 
Norway.468 This made use of simple and well-tested machines that fulfilled several 
purposes. Firstly, they limited the company’s initial costs in setting up the whaling 
station. Secondly, the technologies and machines they transferred were proven 
functional in environmental circumstances not dissimilar to those encountered in the 
Arctic, and would probably work there also. Thirdly, the workers knew how these 
machines worked. By transferring well-known machines, the company and its 
shareholders secured themselves an immediate and constant flow of resources with 
limited financial risk. Furthermore, they cut costs and avoided the need to invest 
timetraining workers how to operate new machines and technologies. The advantages of 
this were demonstrated from 1909 to 1911 when A/S Nimrod frequently failed to adapt 
their new vertical guano driers to local conditions. This problem was eventually solved 
by transferring an old well-tested horizontal drier from northern Norway – a similar set 
up to what it had been in northern Norway during the last few decades. By sticking with 
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known methods, the station was re-erected easily and fully operational just six weeks 
after arriving at Green Harbour in the summer of 1905. 
 
Accessing the whaling station at the start of the season in spring was often problematic. 
From 1905 to1915, whaling expeditions had frequent problems with sea ice and fog, 
which prevented them from accessing the station and harbours and also prevented them 
from hunting. To adapt to these challenging conditions, A/S Spitsbergen and A/S Nimrod 
altered the organisation of production and the machines they used. On several 
occasions, these companies started their hunting season anchored alongside the ice 
edge, where they flensed and partly processed the whales they caught. To be able to do 
this, the companies re-built their tug boats and equipped them with cookers that could 
be removed later. The companies that operated with a floating factory had an advantage 
during this period since they could operate as normal. However, by adapting to the 
recurring ice problems, A/S Spitsbergen and A/S Nimrod could start hunting and 
processing immediately, therefore extended their production time and output. 
 
Who were the people that sought employment in the whaling industry, and what were 
their motives to do so? What is, in fact, a whaler? Tønnesen (1969) has remarked that 
the word whaler is often loosely used to describe those people employed by whaling 
companies. There are many glorified images of whalers. These are often dominated by a 
gunner or harpooner standing at the stern of a boat by his harpoon cannon, or with a 
firm grip on his hand-held harpoon. Most people’s understanding of a whaler has 
probably been influenced by Herman Melville’s famous book, Moby Dick. Although the 
hunt and kill were an essential part of whaling, the industry included diverse working 
positions, such as flensers, cookers, electricians, blacksmiths, carpenters, cooks, 
chemists, and many more. Each worker fulfilled tasks that enabled the whaling station to 
process whale carcasses smoothly and maintain the support of its management and 
shareholders. It is difficult to determine who these people were and where they came 
from because no data were collected on the birthplace and homestead of the workers 
until after 1930. There are also no preserved company records in national archives. 
Throughout the whaling period in northern Norway, the majority of workers were 
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recruited at home in Vestfold County, and some additional workers were recruited on 
site.469  
 
Even though the modern whaling industry had become an international business by the 
turn of the 20th century, it is not uncommon to come across statements suggesting that it 
was still a national affair. In existing whaling literature, one often comes across 
statements suggesting that it was an exclusive Norwegian activity: “Norwegian whaling 
in the Southern Ocean is certainly the toughest and most hazardous industry in the world. 
The Norwegians are alone in it, and will stay so since no other people in the world would 
endure the harshness and dog life down there”.470 It is correct that whaling was 
dominated by Norwegian workers and knowledge in the 19th and 20th centuries, but it 
also included workers, investors, machines, and markets from Great Britain, Argentina, 
Chile, South Africa, and many others. The whaling industry offered the men and boys 
who joined it the possibility to earn an income and have a career at a time when 
unemployment and societal transitions dominated at home. Others were undoubtedly 
driven by a sense of curiosity and a will to see parts of the world they otherwise could 
not have done. Economic factors were, nonetheless, primarily what attracted people to 
the well-paid whaling industry. Working for the whaling industry offered the 
opportunity to earn 5 to 10 times more than a farm worker, whose average annual 
salary was Kr300,00 in 1905.471,472 
 
Other possible motives for joining whaling expeditions to the polar regions was the 
opportunity for adventure and being part of a greater polar narrative that revolved 
around masculine ideals formed by national heroes such as Nansen, Nordenskiöld, and 
others. These scientists and explorers were often depicted as men who selflessly 
challenged nature’s elements, seeking to explore the unknown, and who were driven by 
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national pride and the quest for knowledge.473 The polar expeditions were also means to 
a career and funding. At the turn of the 20th century, the heroic image and rhetoric 
became incorporated into industrial projects. It was not only science that defined the 
greatness of a nation, but also industrial and technical progress as shown by the popular 
fairs and trades. During the last decades of the 19th century, Svend Foyn was a national 
hero together with his contemporary explorers.474 Associations with the Viking heritage 
were an integrated part of the Nordic legacy and heritage and, according to Wråkberg, 
became a vital part of Nordic identity in the late 19th century.475 The modern whaling 
industry fulfilled a role that polar expeditions did not: presence and economic profit. 
These were two important factors, which played an important role in industrialisation – 
and nationalisation in northern Scandinavia. Avango and Houltz (2008) have 
demonstrated that adventure was an important motivational factor for seeking 
employment in the arctic coal mines,476 and it is reasonable to assume that similar 
motives existed within the modern whaling industry. 
AVERAGE WHALING SALARIES FOR SPITSBERGEN, SHETLAND ISLANDS, AND 
THE FAROE ISLANDS.     
        
SHORE: Fixed Kr/Per barrel       
Foreman 1,200.00/season 1.20–2.00       
Blubber cooker 50–70.00/month 0.05–0.10       
Meat cooker 50–60.00/month 0.05–0.07       
Flenser 50–70.00/month 0.05–0.10       
Blacksmith 60–70.00/month 0.05–0.10       
General worker 35.00/month 0.02–0.03       
            
BOAT CREW: Fixed Kr/Blue whale Kr/Fin whale Kr/Sei whale Kr/Humpback 
Gunner/captain 100.00/month 80.00 30–50.00 20–30.00 20–30.00 
1st engineer 130–150.00/month 6.00–7.00 6.00–7.00 6.00–7.00 6.00–7.00 
2nd engineer 50–65,00/month 4.00–5.00 4.00–5.00 4.00–5.00 4.00–5.00 
Ships mates 45–50.00/month 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
Fig 59. Average seasonal salaries at a whaling station in 1903, including an estimate for the 1905 season of 
A/S Spitsbergen.477 
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The gunners onboard the whale catchers were crucial for the success or failure of the 
whaling company and its employees since the production of whale oil was directly 
linked to how many and which whales were caught. A bad or unfortunate gunner would 
immediately compromise the catches, production, profit, and part-based salaries of the 
workers. A competent gunner would have the opposite effect. It was, therefore, vital to 
secure and hire good gunners. This dependence was financially beneficial for the 
gunners, since competition between whaling companies for their skills drove up their 
salaries. 
Approximate salaries within whaling (1903)     
(Whale catcher crew)      
Title Fixed/month Per blue whale Per fin whale Per sei/humpback whale Income 1905 (A/S Spitsbergen) 
Gunner Kr100.00 Kr80.00 Kr30–50.00 Kr20–30.00 Kr4,350.00 
1st Engineer Kr130–150.00 Kr6–7.00 Kr6–7.00 Kr6–7.00 Kr876.00 
2nd Engineer Kr50–65.00 Kr4–5.00 Kr4–5.00 Kr4–5.00 Kr474.00 
Ships mates Kr45–50.00 Kr4.00 Kr4.00 Kr4.00 Kr459.00 
Fig 60. Average seasonal salaries of whale catcher crew members in 1903, including an approximate 
estimate for the 1905 season of A/S Spitsbergen. 
 
Salaries varied not only depending on the work position but also between companies 
and hunting grounds. In fact, the whaling industry did not have a collective salary 
agreement until 1920.478 Tønnesen argues that the whalers failed to organise 
themselves earlier mainly because they were an un-homogenous group, which made it 
difficult for them to fit into a workers union at the time.479 Un-homogenous or not, the 
formation of workers unions was something that company managements tried to 
prevent using social strategies and hierarchical segregation. The managements also used 
work contracts to prevent their employees from joining any unions: “I will not organise 
meetings to discuss and, by force, try to achieve things that violate the contract and the 
company’s interest, in that case I have forfeited my right to earned salary and part”.480 
Unfortunately, I have not been unable to uncover any contracts between the whaling 
companies that operated in Spitsbergen and their workers. However, it is reasonable to 
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assume that contracts between hunting grounds were not too dissimilar since many of 
the whaling companies, such as Christian Nielsen & Co., operated whaling stations and 
pelagic enterprises across the world and most likely tried to keep their contracts 
uniform so they could easily transfer employees and boats from one hunting ground to 
another. The motive behind these contracts was partly the fear that workers would 
place demands for better living conditions and higher salaries, and go on strike to get 
their demands. A strike in these remote areas, where the management had no possibility 
of replacing the workers with others, combined with the short season and high 
investments would have devastating effects on the future of the industrial project. The 
part-based salary system was invented to create a mutual dependence between 
company employees by linking their performances to everyone’s salaries. Despite this, 
whaling companies adopted additional strategies to enhance their control over 
production and output. 
 
One of the advantages of operating in the Arctic was the midnight sun, which allowed 
processing to continue long into the night since there were no fixed working hours. 
Consequently, the midnight sun had a direct effect on the organisation of production, 
together with environmental variables such as sea ice and fog. The sea ice caused 
problems, but could also be useful since it represented a source of freshwater as well as 
a temporary flensing platform. 
 
The decision to establish the whaling station at Finneset was based on many variables, 
such as space, access to freshwater, good harbour conditions, shelter from swell and 
strong winds, relative vicinity to the primary hunting grounds, and reduced competition 
with other whaling companies. The documentation and mapping of the peninsula in 
2007 made it clear how the company had designed and spatially planned their station to 
maximise output and profit, and to claim and control the territory. The survey also 
revealed how the company manoeuvred and used design features and leisure activities 
to achieve hierarchical division and social control. Although the companies that 
operated the whaling station experienced problems (primarily lack of freshwater and 
sea ice) Green Harbour was regarded by the whaling industry as one of the better areas 




The establishment of the modern whaling industry in Spitsbergen was motivated by the 
desire to make economic profit from whale oil and by-products on the international and 
domestic markets. Following the failure to catch enough whales to make a profit, all but 
two whaling companies abandoned Spitsbergen in favour of other hunting areas. Those 
that remained appear to have been motivated by beliefs that whale populations were 
large enough to generate a profitable result, and that their chances for doing so 
increased with less competition over the resources. Environmental problems such as fog 
and sea ice were constantly challenging for the companies and affected the their 
operations negatively. It is, however, unlikely that those environmental problems were 
the only reason for declining catches throughout 1905–1912. A more reasonable 
explanation is that whale populations could not sustain this sudden wave of exploitation, 
and that the whale population was not as large as the industry assumed. Although our 
knowledge of the migratory patterns of whales are scarce, it is not unlikely that the 
whales hunted at Spitsbergen belonged to the same populations as those exploited in 
northern Norway, which were already severely reduced after decades of exploitation. 
The transfer of whaling from northern Norway was partly promoted by the Norwegian 
authorities’ decision to introduce a ban. Although this ban effectively prevented the 
companies from hunting, killing, or processing whales in northern Norway for ten years, 
diffusion to the Arctic was part of the globalisation of whaling, which already started in 
the 1880s. By the turn of the 20th century, profitable hunting grounds included the Arctic 
and the Antarctic. 
 
The success of the hydrogenation process enabled cheap whale oil to be sold to the 
profitable margarine producing industry. Although hydrogenation was not properly 
industrialised until a few years later, it created an economic incentive for investors to 
invest in potentially profitable industrial projects in the polar regions. During the first 
decade of the 20th century, the markets for whale oil became more stable and 
increasingly lucrative. The diffusion from northern Norway to the Arctic (a no man’s 
land) was a geographical shift in environmental circumstances that forced whaling 
companies and their management to adapt and incorporate new strategies to maintain 
their projects. These included social strategies, such as the part-based salary system, 
hierarchic segregation, choices of technologies, machines, and settlement designs 
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features, as well as territorial strategies aimed at securing the company’s rights to 
resources and territories. A large percentage of the whaling companies that established 
themselves in Spitsbergen chose to use an early type of floating factory to base their 
operations in Spitsbergen. This decision might reflect their uncertainty towards 
operating under harsh arctic conditions. It may also reflect their belief in the whale 
population size in these hunting grounds. The choice may also have been motivated by 
fears of authorial interferences similar to those in northern Norway, despite the no 
man’s land status of the archipelago. Although this type of production platform provided 
manoeuvrability to pursue whale populations everywhere, it also had some drawbacks. 
For example, it could not process whales in a true pelagic sense on the open sea. They 
were dependent on calm weather to be able to flense whales alongside the hull and to 
process them into whale oil onboard the ship. Consequently, it was vital to secure 
control over a deep and sheltered harbour. They also had less storing space compared 
with a whaling station, which meant they needed land in the vicinity to store barrels and 
coal. This was also a safety precaution since whale oil is flammable. Therefore, 
processing was very weather dependent. Processing whales into whale oil was a reverse 
salient, or bottleneck, for this type of production unit. 
 
A/S Spitsbergen’s choice to move a whaling station might, from this perspective, be seen 
as a rational choice. However, establishing a whaling station meant less flexibility 
compared with competitors who could move with the whale populations. The whale 
catcher risked having to spend a long time and precious fuel towing whales back to the 
station for processing. This could, in turn, affect the quality of the whale oil, which was 
reduced as the whale decomposed. The company solved this problem by purchasing a 
tug boat, which transported food, coal, harpoons, and more to the whale catchers, and 
towed the whales back to the station for processing. This gave the gunners more hunting 
time as no time was wasted transporting the whales. Motivated by beliefs in the 
hydrogenation process and the untouched arctic hunting grounds, Iversen and Raaum 
were able to attract the investment of Severin Dahl and his company in their industrial 
project. With the support of Firma Severin Dahl, the company’s global network was 
secured and they were able to purchase the properties and claims of the former A/S 
Finmarken, allowing Lars Iversen and Knut Raaum to diffuse and establish the local 
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network at Spitsbergen. The experience and local knowledge of Raaum and Iversen were 
instrumental in securing the establishment at Finneset whaling station. They located 
and claimed a suitable site for the station, and negotiated the sale of A/S Finmarken 
properties. These two actors were the central network builders, while Firma Severin 
Dahl, together with other geo-politically motivated actors, represented the global 
network. From the perspective of Firma Severin Dahl, the actor network surrounding 
the whaling project in the Arctic could swing both ways. The careful approach used by 
Firma Severin Dahl, Raaum, and Iversen was, perhaps, characterised by a reluctance to 
invest, but was also way to secure immediate resources and output. It was advantageous 
to use functional and well-tested machines that workers could operate rather than 
investing in new costly machines. With this approach, A/S Spitsbergen could process 
resources and generate economic profit without too much interference. By maintaining 
this restrictive investment policy, the global network was able to exert pressure on the 
network builders to secure a local network that supplied a constant flow of resources 
and economic profit. This was necessary to sustained the support of Firma Severin Dahl 
and its shareholders. If the company failed to deliver, Firma Severin Dahl and its 
shareholders may choose to minimise risks and withdraw their investment. 
Consequently, Iversen and Raaum had to ensure that all related artefacts and technical 
installations in the local network functioned together as one unit, as well as taking care 
of the interrelated social, economic, and political factors required to maintain the 
support of the global network. 
 
Law and Callon have argued that “the stability and form of artefacts should be seen as a 
function of the interaction of heterogeneous elements as these are shaped and assimilated 
into a network”.481 From this follows that the conditions under which the network was 
built and stabilised are an intertwined part of the network that indirectly exercises 
pressure on the outcome of the success or failure of the actor network. Thus, the system 
builder must create a network of heterogeneous and sustainable elements, which they 
must dissociate from hostile forces and adapt them to their project. These elements 
cannot, however, be separated from one another since they interact and dictate the 
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outcome of an industrial project. Therefore, reducing the factors to only economic ones 
(as is often the case in historical research on the modern whaling industry) have often 
resulted in unsatisfactory analysis of the driving forces behind the establishment and 
sustainment of whaling in the polar regions. In the polar regions, the capability of the 
network builders to implement tactics and strategies to link related elements directly 
affected the stability and sustainability of the network, and thereby the project’s success. 
This is not an easy task since elements such as sea ice, fog, scarce resources, and 
freshwater supplies are difficult to control. When dealing with industrial projects, 
particularly in the Arctic and Antarctic, it is vital to adopt the same analytical approach 
or symmetrical principle towards the physical environment and all other elements that 
the network builder identifies as having an effect on the project. The environment was 
not only an opponent for the whaling companies to adapt to, but also a productional 
platform and a source of freshwater, transforming it to an allied rather than an 
opponent. 
A/S Spitsbergen and the actor network of Iversen and Raaum eventually collapsed in 
1908 because of different factors. Firstly, Raaum and Iversen failed to control all the 
interrelated elements. Consequently, they and the local network were unable to 
generate enough resources to maintain the support of the global network. Secondly, they 
were unable to convince the global network that whale populations were not depleted, 
and that they could generate enough resources even if the prices for whale oil dropped. 
Thirdly, they failed, much like other whaling companies, to attract experienced gunners, 
which were vital for securing a higher output from the local network. 
 
Christian Nielsen and Marcussen were better at bringing the elements together 
(resources, sea freshwater and knowledge) than many other whaling companies. They 
managed to maintain a higher degree of stability and control over the elements in their 
actor network. The tighter structure of their network with the owner Christian Nielsen 
(the global network) closely and directly connected with the local network (the manager 
and the workers, the whaling station, all technological artefacts, knowledge, etc.) in 
Spitsbergen. Christian Nielsen (the owner) and Marcussen (the manager of A/S Nimrod) 
were both builders and a part of the global network. They initiated the project in 1904 
when they outmanoeuvred Laurvigs Intressentskab for Hvalfangst and reorganised the 
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internal structure of the company to make decision-making quicker and more effective. 
Financial, market distribution, and political communications in the hands of Christian 
Nielsen, and operationalisation of the local network under Marcussen’s control enabled 
them to construct an actor network that functioned smoothly since both actors were 
experienced and knew how to run a sustainable whaling operation. Their ability to adapt 
organisational structures, machines, and strategies and to make the local network 
functional was vital for securing a constant flow of resources, which allowed them to 
maintain the support of the company’s shareholders. With the purchase of Finneset 
whaling station, which was a part of an expansionistic phase of the company Christian 
Nielsen & Co., the focus and the internal structure of the actor network was changed in 
that new elements were introduced in the organisation. Although all sister companies 
(A/S Nimrod, A/S Ocean, A/S Norge, A/S Spermacet aso) of Christian Nielsen & Co. each 
had their own defined roles and local networks, they shared a common global network 
with which they had to interact and supply resources to. For the local network of A/S 
Nimrod, restructuring of the global network resulted in a new internal structure. Tønder 
Bull was hired as the managing director of A/S Nimrod to work alongside the 
operational manager, Marcussen. Together, these two managed to maintain control, 
adapt the network, and supply the necessary resources. 
 
One might, however, question the motives and driving forces behind the continuous 
support of a whaling enterprise that was barely able to generate an economic profit. One 
explanation is perhaps that geo-political ambitions contributed to sustaining it. In 
chapter 1, I argued that not only economic, but also technical, social, and political factors 
dictated the evolution and sustainment of the modern whaling industry in the Arctic and 
Antarctic. The reasons for the failure of A/S Nimrod were much the same as for A/S 
Spitsbergen – they failed to maintain control over all the elements and successfully 
exploit resources from what appears to have been an ever more depleted reservoir. 
Consequently, they failed to generate the necessary output, which was vital to keeping 
the shareholders’ support. Secondly, they had difficulties adapting new machines to the 
local network and linking these to the existing production line. Finally, they failed to 
attract competent gunners even though Christian Nielsen & Co. had access to personnel, 
equipment, and networks across the globe that could potentially have been 
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redistributed within the multitude of local networks that belonged to Christian Nielsen 
& Co. 
Although beliefs in the capacity and regeneration of the north Atlantic whale population 
were strong enough to encourage new attempts to establish industrial projects, no one 
managed to develop a profitable and sustainable project. The primary reason was that 
the hunting grounds were depleted and that environmental conditions were difficult. 
Furthermore, none of these projects were able to attract and maintain the support of 
investors because the hunting grounds could not compete with the more profitable 

























5. Walrus Bay whaling station, Bear Island 
 
Introduction 
Bear Island is a small island in the Barents Sea, approximately halfway between 
Spitsbergen and Norway. The island is located where cold water from the Arctic basin 
meets the warmer waters of the North Atlantic Current and the Gulf Stream. As a result, 
the island is often covered in fog. Unlike Spitsbergen and other parts of the Svalbard 
archipelago, Bear Island lacks glaciers. The northern part of the island is relatively flat, 
while the southern part is more mountainous. 
 
During winter and spring, the island is often surrounded by sea ice, which drifts in with 
the East Spitsbergen Current. The coast is dominated by steep cliff and skerries that 
make access to the island difficult. At the beginning of the 20th century, the island was 
used as a base for whaling, with a whaling station in Walrus Bay. Today, the island is 
often used as a shelter by fishing vessels that operate in the area. 
 
The whaling company 
The company that established and operated the whaling station at Walrus Bay in 1905–
1908 was the only whaling company based on the island. Other companies that moved 
their activities from northern Norway to the Arctic operated from bases in Spitsbergen 
further north. 
 
M.A Ingebrigsten’s whaling company 
The whaling station at Walrus Bay on Bear Island was established by Morten Andreas 
Ingebrigtsen in 1905. The whaling company apparently had no formal company name 
besides the name of its owner. This perhaps illustrates the structure of the company, 
which was owned, controlled, and managed by M.A. Ingebrigtsen. 
 
In 1904, Ingebrigtsen had claimed parts of Bear Island to establish a whaling station. 482 
His claim was strategic and was a direct result of the whaling ban that was introduced in 
                                                 
482 «Logbook of D/S Skytten 1904» Nasjonalbiblioteket in Oslo, Norway. MS Fol 3905. 
 161 
 
northern Norway. His plan also reflected the developing interest in harbours and 
anchorages in the High Arctic, where whaling operations were increasing. 
 
Fig 61. Morten Andreas Ingebrigtsen. The photo has been 
















Morten Andreas Ingebrigtsen was born in 1848 in Malangen, northern Norway.483 From 
1866 until 1891, he hunted beluga whales in Spitsbergen, which, according to Ytreberg 
(1962), made him one of the wealthiest people in Tromsø.484 In 1891, the beluga 
population became severely depleted after decades of exploitation. According to 
Ingebrigtsen, only a small population of 400–500 whales remained in the waters of 
Spitsbergen.485 Ingebrigtsen chose, therefore, to withdraw from the beluga industry and 
to sell his boat, Hvidfisken, to Ingvald Svendsen.486 
 
During these years, he gained important knowledge of operating in the Arctic, local 
currents, and distribution and migration patterns of marine mammals like whales. In 
addition, he knew of good and sheltered harbours and anchorages in Spitsbergen and 
Bear Island. This knowledge was to be important for his later activities in the modern 
whaling industry.487 In 1892, Ingebrigtsen bought a steam-powered boat for Kr26,000, 
which he named Skytten and converted into a whale catching boat.488 By this time, the 
modern whaling industry had become well established and developed in northern 
                                                 
483 Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. No 10, October 1932. P: 217. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s 
Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. 
484 Ytreberg. N.A. Tromsø Bys Historie. Vol: 2. 1962. P: 217. 
485 Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. No 6, July 1918. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. 
Sandefjord. Norway. 
486 Ytreberg. N.A. Tromsø Bys Historie. Vol: 2. 1962. P: 207. 
487 Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. No 10, October 1932. P: 217. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s 
Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. 
488 Ytreberg. N.A. Tromsø Bys Historie. Vol: 1. 1962. P: 747. 
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Norway. Ingebrigtsten managed and financed his whaling company by himself. Whether 
this was his choice or because there were no investors in Tromsø remains unclear. It is 
noteworthy that Ingebrigtsen started his whaling career by immediately returning to 
Spitsbergen.489 He had seen for himself the potential of the arctic hunting grounds; he 
had noticed the abundance of large whales in Spitsbergen during his earlier career there, 
and decided to exploit them. Why he decided not to pursue this initiative in Spitsbergen 
remains unclear. During Ingebrigsten’s first two years in the industry, he operated from 
his home port at Tromsø and processed the whales he caught at the Anglo-Norwegian 
Fishing Company’s whaling station at Karlsø. This company was established in 1887 by 
the Norwegian Johannes H. Giæver and the Englishmen James Wilson and a Mr. 
Shephard.490 
 
In 1894, Ingebrigtsen established his own whaling station at Rolfsø in north-western 
Norway where he lived throughout the hunting season with his family.491 This whaling 
station was designed to utilise and process blubber into whale oil and baleen. 
Ingebrigtsen brought whales he had caught with D/S Skytten into his station for 
processing. The whales were attached to a buoy that was located in the water 
immediately outside the whaling station. From this buoy, the shore workers pulled the 
whales onto the beach for processing. This whaling station did not have a wooden 
flensing platform; instead the whales were winched up onto the beach at high tide. Once 
low tide set in, the flensers stripped the blubber into long strips. These strips were 
pulled to the blubber cookery building and fed into a rotating blubber cutter, after which 
the blubber pieces were transported to the upper floor via an elevator for cooking. After 
cooking, the whale oil was transferred into a large clearing tank then tapped into 
wooden barrels for storage.492 When high tide set in again, the whale carcass was 
rotated and the process repeated itself. Once the blubber had been stripped off, the 
carcass was pulled off the beach at high tide and towed to Tønsberg Kraftfoderfabrik 
where it was processed into guano.493 Ingebrigtsen operated his whaling station with 
                                                 
489 ”Journal holdt ombord i Hvalfangerdampbaaden Skytten tilhörende Skibsreder Morten. A. Ingebrigtsen. 
Fört av Capt. Lars Hansen, 1892”. National Library of Norway. Oslo. MS Fol 3905. 
490 Sørensen. G, Hoff. I.A, Hoff. J.O, Halvorsen.L, and Salicath.C. Hvalfangsten- Dens historie og mænd. 1912. 
P: 104. See also: Ytreberg. N.A. Tromsø Bys Historie. Vol: 2. 1962. P: 211. 
491 Sørensen. J. Nordland og Finnmarken- reiseindtryk. 1903. P: 37f. 
493 Kvalstasjonen på Rolvsøya. 1985. Pp: 35-39. In: Ultima Thule. Årgång 1. 
493 Kvalstasjonen på Rolvsøya. 1985. Pp: 35-39. In: Ultima Thule. Årgång 1. 
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the whale catcher D/S Skytten until the national ban on whaling was introduced in 1904. 
That Ingebrigtsen lived throughout the year in Tromsø meant that he was more flexible 
than his competitors and could initiate the hunting season as soon as possible. 
Ingebrigsten’s logbook revealed that he, unlike many other contemporary whaling 
companies, hired workers from northern Norway rather than from Sandefjord and 
Tønsberg. This gave him an advantage over other companies because he could start the 
season at short notice as soon as whales were recruited. His workers were most likely 
fishermen who were familiar with the hunting areas. As a result, Ingebrigsten’s whaling 
station was often operational from early February when he pursued humpback whales 
that migrated northward along the continental shelf.494 
 
Ingebrigtsen’s results were better than those of other whaling companies, although he 
only operated with one whale catcher.495 The choice to establish his whaling station at 
Rolfsø was strategic and the location contributed greatly to his success as it gave him an 
operational range that extended far into the north Atlantic. He frequently operated and 
kept his whale catcher stationed in the waters around Bear Island, and was also the first 
to use a steam-powered tug boat to link his whale catcher with the processing unit in 
northern Norway.496 From 1898 onwards, Ingebrigtsen frequently used the tug boats 
Haalogaland and Viken to tow whales back to his whaling station.497 Ingebrigsten often 
used the harbours at Bear Island to shelter during storms. He attached his catches to 
buoys in Southern Harbour/Sørhamna while waiting for the tug boat to arrive. The river 
at Russehamna was used to re-supply freshwater.498  
 
During these years, Ingebrigtsen gained important knowledge of the island’s natural 
environment, which became important later on when he moved his operations there. 
Throughout the period 1896 to 1904, Ingebrigtsen caught and processed 637 whales 
into 18,773 barrels of whale oil.499 
                                                 
494 Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. No 6, July 1918. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. 
Sandefjord. Norway. 
495 Risting. S. Av Hvalfangstens Historie. 1922. P: 611f. 
496 Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. No 6, July 1918. Also in issue No 10, October 1932. P: 217. Kommendør Chr. 
Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. 
497 ”Dagbog D/S Skytten. 1899-1910”. National Library of Norway. Oslo. MS Fol 3905. Also in: Risting. S. ”Av 
Hvalfangstens Historie”. 1922. P: 624f. 
498 ”Dagbog D/S Skytten. 1904-1908”. National Library of Norway. Oslo. MS Fol 3905. 




Fig 62. M.A. Ingebrigsten’s whaling station at Rolfsøya in northern Norway.500 
 
 
The 1904 whaling ban in Norway meant a shift of production units rather than a shift to 
new hunting grounds for Ingebrigtsen and his workers, since he already operated in this 
area and knew of anchorages, freshwater supplies, coal deposits, and potential sites for 
industrial facilities. In June 1904, Ingebrigtsen sailed to Bear Island and claimed a part of 
the island.501 The claim at Bear Island secured control over the harbours on the east 
side, as well as coal outcrops on the island, which was important since it would secure a 
sustainable fuel supply for the project. Having made the claim at Bear Island, 
Ingebrigtsen continued to Spitsbergen and Bellsound, where he also planned to claim 
land. However, all the suitable harbours in Bellsound were already claimed by 
competing whaling companies. Ingebrigtsen investigated a potential area at Aksel Island, 
which was deemed unsuitable for an industrial project. Ingebrigtsen spent some time 
catching whales along the coast of Spitsbergen with D/S Skytten and his tug boat Viken 
until they returned to Bear Island.502 
 
In the spring of 1905, Ingebrigtsen and his workers moved the whaling station from 
northern Norway to Walrus Bay. The whaling station here was designed to produce 
whale oil and baleen. This meant that a large part of the available oil was stored on land 
and the whale bones were discarded and dumped at sea. The lack of competition meant 
                                                 
500 Kvalstasjonen på Rolvsøya. 1985. P: 36. In: Ultima Thule. Årgång 1. 
501 ” Logbook of D/S Skytten 1904» Nasjonalbiblioteket in Oslo, Norway. MS Fol 3905. 
502 ”Dagbog D/S Skytten. 1904”. National Library of Norway. Oslo. MS Fol 3905. See also the «Diary of Alex 
lange 1904-1907/08» Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. 
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that the company made relatively good catches compared with competitors further 
north. The company successively increased its catches and production during 1905–
1907, which encouraged continued operations. Much like in Spitsbergen, the company 
dealt with severe sea ice conditions from time to time. Difficult environmental 
conditions combined with material losses and poor catches meant the project was 
cancelled after the 1908 season. 
 
In 1909, M.A. Ingebrigtsen returned to Bear Island to extend his territorial claim. 
Together with a group of investors that consisted of banker K.G Hvatum from Larvik, 
attorney S. Mayer from Tønsberg, and Captain J.O. Hoff, Ingebrigtsen secured control 
over lead and coal deposits, which they intended to exploit together.503 This territorial 
claim extended from Ingebrigsten’s initial claim at Walrus Bay along the entire east 
coast of the island. 504 It is probable that Ingebrigtsen had discovered other mineral 
deposits during his years operating the whaling station. In 1915, this claim was 
extended to include the whole territory east of a line from Sørhamna in the south to 
Nordhamna in the north.505 Later that same year, these claims were sold for Kr100,000 
to I/S Bjørnøen Kulkompani.506 One year later, this company established the coal mine 
Tunheim, which remained operational until 1925 when it was closed. 
 
The whaling industry and early Norwegian sovereignty ambitions 
The activities of the modern whaling industry were described by the Norwegian foreign 
minister Wilhelm Christophersen in 1908 as the predominant economic activities in 
Spitsbergen and Bear Island.507 The industry and its activities became the focal point of 
the Norwegian government from 1906 onwards.508 In January 1907, the former foreign 
minister Jørgen Løvland invited Norwegians with economic interest in the archipelago 
for a meeting. The purpose of the meeting was to investigate and map the extent of 
                                                 
503 «Letter to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry from M.A. Ingebrigtsen, K.G. Hvatum, S. Meyer and J.O. Hoff. 
June 8, 1908”. The Norwegian National Archives. Archive of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. Vol: 5174. 
504 Hoel. A. Svalbards Historie 1596-1965. 1967. Vol 3. P: 1360. 
505 «Letter to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry from M.A. Ingebrigtsen. May 12, 1915”. The Norwegian 
National Archives. Archive of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. Vol: 5174. See also Hoel. A Svalbards 
Historie 1596-1965. 1967. Vol 3. P: 1360. 
506 «Letter to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry from M.A. Ingebrigtsen. December 30, 1915». The Norwegian 
National Archives. Archive of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. Vol: 5174. See also Hoel. A Svalbards 
Historie 1596-1965. 1967. Vol 3. P: 1371. 
507 Berg. R. Norge på egen hånd 1905-1920. 1995. In: Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie. Vol 2. P: 163. 
508 Arlov. T.B. Svalbards historie 1596-1996. 1996. P: 283. 
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Norwegian presence and their respective economic activities for the upcoming 
international negotiations on the legal status of the archipelago. These negotiations 
were called the Kristiania conferences. They were held in 1910, 1912, and 1914, and 
included Norway, Sweden, and Russia. The purpose of these meetings was to establish 
an international legal regime on the archipelago.509 No progress was made, however, 
since all nations involved saw the proposals of others as attempts to claim sovereignty. 
As I mentioned previously, this increased interest in the Arctic was a direct result of 19th 
century colonialism. 
 
The Foreign Ministry under Løvland created a legal regime, arguing that strikes and 
conflicts in the mining settlements and tourism business called for such a system. Their 
initiative has been explained by researchers as a rhetorical tool to promote Norwegian 
control and management with the ultimate goal of gaining sovereignty. Before the 1907 
meeting took place, the Foreign Ministry sent out questionnaires to the managers of 
whaling companies. These contained questions on the number of whale catchers they 
used, the size of the crews, the number of employees, catch and production data, as well 
as economic profits. The questions were, however, not only about economic aspects but 
also asked whether the whaling companies experienced problems due to the legal status 
of the archipelago.510 Representatives from the different industrial projects in 
Spitsbergen and Bear Island participated in the meeting. M. A. Ingebrigtsen had been 
selected to represent the whaling industry. Several experts on the Arctic and politics 
participated in the meeting, such as Fridtjof Nansen, parliament representative Hans 
Horst, researcher and explorer Gunnar Isachsen, the head of the department for political 
issues Johan Wollbaek, and geology professor W.C Brøgger.511 The results of the 
questionnaires were discussed, but none of the respondents had reported problems 
with the legal status of the archipelago.512 Ingebrigtsen argued that there was no future 
                                                 
509 Berg. R. Norge på egen hånd1905-1920.. Bd 2 in Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie. 1995. P: 164ff. See 
also: Singh. E.C. The Spitsbergen (Svalbard) Question: United States Foreign Policy 1907-1935. 1980. P: 32f, 
and Mathisen. T. Svalbard in International Politics 1871-1925. The solution to a unique international 
problem. Skrifter No 101. Norsk Polarinstitutt. 1954. 
510 Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1909. P: 17-18. Kommendør Chr. Christensens Hvalfangstmuseum, Sandefjord, 
Norway. 
511 ”Beretning” Norsk Svalbard og Ishavsundersøkelser (NSIU) 1928. Vol: 0085. E-Korrespondanse og 
saksdokumenter. Tromsø Statsarkiv, Norway. This has also been described and analysed by Berg. R. Norge 
på egen hånd 1905-1920. 1995. In: Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie. Vol 2. P: 158. 




for the modern whaling industry, the sealing industry, or the coal mining industry. This 
conclusion was supported by Nansen.513 As the whaling industry’s representative, 
Ingebrigtsen had good reasons for saying this. The 1904 national whaling ban was the 
result of the last political involvement in the industry’s activities. It is reasonable to 
assume that the whaling industry regarded the no man’s land status as favourable since 
it meant that no one could impose restrictions or regulations on their activities that 
could potentially influence the economic output and profit of the industry. The main 
conclusion of the meeting was that the modern whaling industry alone was not a sound 
enough basis for a Norwegian claim to the archipelago.514 
 
In spite of this, it was decided that regulations and governance were needed to control 
the strikes that had occurred at some of the coal mines. The Foreign Ministry were 
assigned the task of designing international rules to regulate use and property rights on 
the archipelago.515 The Foreign Ministry later questioned this when they realised that 
both Ingebrigtsen and Nansen had additional agendas (see Berg 1995), and that the 
Norwegian economic interest on the archipelago was larger than what had been 
reported at the meeting. This is illustrated by a statement from foreign minister 
Christophersen in 1908. However, the sources do not state whether these economic 
interests were strong enough to make a claim for the archipelago. In 1909, Norway 
offered to establish a legal regime and take care of managing and enforcing the regime, if 
Sweden and Russia would consent. Their main argument was that it was primarily 
Norwegian citizens that were exploiting the archipelago’s natural resources, and that 
people from northern Norway regularly travelled in the Arctic. Another argument was 
that Norway was geographically the closest of the three interested countries. 
 
The role of the whaling industry subsided gradually as catches and profits reduced. After 
the 1908 season, only two whaling companies remained operational in Spitsbergen and 
this activity hardly supported the goal of the Foreign Ministry. From 1908, the coal 
                                                 
513 ”Beretning” Norsk Svalbard og Ishavsundersøkelser (NSIU) 1928. Vol: 0085. E-Korrespondanse og 
saksdokumenter. Tromsø Statsarkiv, Norway. This has also been described and analysed by Berg. R. Norge 
på egen hånd 1905-1920. 1995. In: Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie. Vol 2. P: 158. 
514 Arlov. T.B. Svalbards historie 1596-1996. 1996. P: 347. 
515 ”Beretning” Norsk Svalbard og Ishavsundersøkelser (NSIU) 1928. Vol: 0085. E-Korrespondanse og 
saksdokumenter. Tromsø Statsarkiv, Norway. This has also been described and analysed by Berg. R. Norge 
på egen hånd 1905-1920. 1995. In: Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie. Vol 2. P: 158. 
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mining industry was increasingly used as a geo-political tool by the Foreign Ministry. 
From 1910, the new foreign minister, Irgens implemented a covert strategy that 
involved scientific expeditions to coordinate Norwegian industrial activities on the 
archipelago and to secure large territorial claims.516 
 
 
Fig 63. View over Walrus Bay, Bear Island. Photo: Gustav Rossnes. LASHIPA 5/2008. 
 
Activities and results 1905–1908 
The spring of 1905 was the first season, since the whaling industry was established in 
northern Norway in the 1860s, that there was no hunting there. Some whaling 
companies had chosen to simply abandon their former whaling stations and leave the 
industry after receiving compensation from the Norwegian government. Others adapted 
to the situation, for example by equipping their ships with cookers so whales could be 
processed at sea. Or by disassembling their stations and rebuilding then in new 
locations. M.A. Ingebrigtsen was one of these. A possible motive for doing so was that, 
unlike other whaling companies, he had been operating for decades prior to the ban and 
                                                 
516  ”Beretning” Norsk Svalbard og Ishavsundersøkelser (NSIU) 1928. Vol: 0085. E-Korrespondanse og 
saksdokumenter. Tromsø Statsarkiv, Norway. 
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his whaling station (established in 1894) was relatively new.517 Moving relatively simple 
and well-tested technologies to Walrus Bay was an economic decision that reduced costs 
and guaranteed functionality. Fieldwork also revealed that, with the exception of 
Sørhamna, Bear Island was the only suitable location for a whaling station. Using a 
floating factory here would have been difficult since most anchorages were exposed to 
winds and drift ice and skerries were common along the entire coastline. 
 
In April 1905, Ingebrigtsen hired 40 men in Tromsø to disassemble the whaling station’s 
buildings and installations at Rolfsø.518 The whale catcher D/S Skytten and the cargo 
ship Maiston sailed back and forth between the station at Rolfsø and Walrus Bay at Bear 
Island with materials, workers, and equipment. Despite a few disturbances caused by 
sea ice, the company managed to assemble the whaling station at Walrus Bay and make 
it operational by mid-July.519 Establishing a whaling station on Bear Island was, 
according to Tønnesen (1967), a foolhardy experiment for a dignified man of 
Ingebrigsten’s statue.520 Tønnesen’s scepticism was not unfounded. The location of the 
whaling station on the east coast of the island meant that it was exposed to both drift ice 
and swells coming from the Barents Sea. Accessing the harbour by boat was difficult due 
to the large number of skerries in the area and the lack of sea charts. The exposed 
position of Walrus Bay also caused problems during the construction of the whaling 
station. Repeatedly, boats transporting building materials and installations were forced 
to take shelter in the nearby harbour at Sørhamna, meaning most materials had to be 
transported to Walrus Bay by land.521 Even though the distance was short, the workers 
had to haul the materials over the steep cliffs that circumvene Sørhamna and make it the 





                                                 
517 Sørensen. J. Nordland og Finnmarken- reiseindtryk. 1903. P: 37f. 
518 ”Dagbog D/S Skytten. 1905”. National Library of Norway. Oslo. MS Fol 3905. 
519 ”Dagbog D/S Skytten. 1905”. National Library of Norway. Oslo. MS Fol 3905. 
520 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. 1967. Vol: 2. P: 95. In: Den Moderne 
Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
521 Dagbog D/S Skytten. 1905-1908”. National Library of Norway. Oslo. MS Fol 3905. 
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Fig 64. The harbour at Sørhamna on the south-
eastern part of Bear Island. This harbour was an 
important part of Ingebrigsten’s local network at 
Bear Island. Here, Ingebrigtsen deployed a second 
buoy for whales. The harbour was also used as 
shelter and for Ingebrigtsen’s boats. Photo: U. I. 





Ingebrigtsen’s logbooks provide insight into how they dealt with dangerous sailing 
conditions at Bear Island during the spring when the coastline and its harbours quickly 
became filled with drift ice. “Wednesday, May 31, 1905. At dinnertime the large swell 
made the ice become more packed. We worked on board both ships so that they would not 
get severely damaged, but an accident seemed imminent. All men assembled their clothes 
on deck. The strong ice movement and large swell continued the whole day, and the men 
worked full time with the fenders and planks to reduce the pressing of the ice. The chances 
for salvaging the ships, and Skytten especially, seem small. God be with us.”522 
 
The first building to be re-erected at Walrus Bay was the forge. Soon after followed the 
accommodation building overlooking what was to become the production area. By mid-
May, the workers had completed these buildings and started working on erecting the 
blubber cookery.523 Ingebrigtsen used four boats for his hunting activities – the whale 
catcher D/S Skytten, the two steam-powered tug boats Bjølfen and Dovre, and the cargo 
ship Maiston. The task of D/S Skytten and Bjølfen was to hunt for whales and to tow 
carcasses to the whaling station for processing. Dovre was used to mine coal at 
Kolbugten and Nordhamna for the ships and whaling station. Maiston was primarily 
used as a cargo vessel during the initial phase of the season, carrying installations and 
buildings from the former whaling station. It was also used to transport workers and 
empty barrels to the new site at Walrus Bay.  
 
                                                 
522 ”Dagbog D/S Skytten. 1905”. National Library of Norway. Oslo. MS Fol 3905. 
523 ”Dagbog D/S Skytten. 1905”. National Library of Norway. Oslo. MS Fol 3905. 
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Throughout the remainder of the season, Maiston laid anchored at Sydhamna when she 
was loaded with the barrels of whale oil that had been produced.524 During a large part 
of the season, Bjølfen towed most of the whales to the whaling station.525 
 







Fig 65 and 66. Species distribution of whale catches for the 1905 season. Note the exceptionally large 
percentage of humpback whales.526 Right: Workers processing whales at Walrus Bay whaling station. The 
building in the background is the forge. The photo has been published with the kind approval of 
Forschungsinstitut und Naturmuseum Senckenberg, Germany. 
 
 
Apart from the start of the season, operations went well and were not disturbed by drift 
ice. The company managed to catch 46 whales. As shown in Fig 65, most of the catch 
consisted of humpback whales, fin whales, and blue whales. These 46 whales were, 
according to Ingebrigsten’s logbook, processed into 1,301 barrels of whale oil, of which 
1,255 barrels and 43 kg of baleen were transported to Kristiania (present day Oslo) on 
board Dovre to be sold there.527 Norsk Fiskeritidende (1906) and Risting (1922) stated 
that the total production for 1905 was 1,200 barrels.528 Assuming that the whale oil was 
sold at the market in Kristiania for approximately Kr48.00 per barrel, and that 
production costs amounted to Kr46.00 per barrel,529 Ingebrigtsen made a small profit of 
Kr2,561. Considering that the company had transferred materials and assembled the 
whaling station at Walrus Bay for almost half the hunting season, Ingebrigtsen must 
have regarded this as a good result. The organisation of production with only one 
designated whale catcher may partly explain the result. The initial plan was that Bjølfen 
                                                 
524 ”Dagbog D/S Skytten. 1906”. National Library of Norway. Oslo. MS Fol 3905. 
525 ”Dagbog D/S Skytten. 1905”. National Library of Norway. Oslo. MS Fol 3905. 
526 ”Dagbog D/S Skytten. 1905”. National Library of Norway. Oslo. MS Fol 3905. 
527 ”Dagbog D/S Skytten. 1905”. National Library of Norway. Oslo. MS Fol 3905. 
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Norway, and Risting. S. Av Hvalfangstens Historie. 1922. P: 262. 
529 Data have been extracted from Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. 1967. 
Vol 2. P: 587. In: Den moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
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would also hunt, but to avoid D/S Skytten wasting time towing whales to the station, 
Bjølfen was used as a tug boat. This indicates that most of the hunting was done at a 
distance from Bear Island. This adaptive measure reduced the company’s catching 
capacity. Therefore, only a small part of the available workforce and boats brought in 
raw materials. To increase the company’s hunting capacity for the coming season, 
Ingebrigtsen bought a second whale catcher, D/S Bjørn. In addition to this, he chartered 
the cargo ship Stabil, which was used to transport workers, barrels, provisions, and 
produce between the whaling station and the market in Norway.530 
 
In mid-May, Ingebrigtsen hired the season’s workers in Tromsø and they departed for 
Bear Island three days later.531 The arrival at Bear Island was anything but simple. D/S 
Bjørn started taking in water having struck ice outside of Bear Island. The ice belt 
prevented the expedition from accessing any harbour along the east coast for several 
days. Eventually, they managed to navigate through the ice and reach the harbour at 
Russehamna, north of Walrus Bay. Here, the workers, supplies, and some equipment 
were placed on land while the boats returned to Norway to fix the damages they had 
sustained in the ice. Meanwhile, the workers were ordered to carry supplies and 
equipment to the whaling station a few kilometres south. At Russehamna, there were a 
few houses from earlier expeditions that the workers used as accommodation. This 
delayed the start of the hunting season until June 8.532 
 
Throughout the season, the cargo ship Stabil and its crew mined coal along the coast of 
the island. Coal was essential for all operations.533 Environmental conditions had 
generally made the 1906 hunting season difficult for the whaling companies that 
operated in this part of the Arctic. Those that operated in Spitsbergen made relatively 
poor catches compared with Ingebrigtsen, who was less affected by drift ice. The 
whalers themselves argued that the poor catches were caused by lack of food for the 
whales around Spitsbergen.534 On several occasions, storms and fog prevented the 
                                                 
530 ”Dagbog D/S Skytten. 1906”. National Library of Norway. Oslo. MS Fol 3905. 
531 ”Dagbog D/S Skytten. 1906”. National Library of Norway. Oslo. MS Fol 3905. 
532 ”Dagbog D/S Skytten. 1906”. National Library of Norway. Oslo. MS Fol 3905. 
533 ”Dagbog D/S Skytten. 1906”. National Library of Norway. Oslo. MS Fol 3905. 
534 Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1907: P: 72, and Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1909, P: 18. Kommendør Chr. 




companies in Spitsbergen from hunting and processing. At Bear Island, the situation was 
better. The swell did not often push drift ice into the islands eastern coastline. Because 
of the structural changes Ingebrigtsen made to his organisation, the company increased 
its catches to 60 whales, and its production to 2,015 barrels of whale oil and 121 kg of 
baleen.535 Almost 48% of the whales caught were blue whales, which gave a higher yield 
of oil than other species. 
      
Specie distribution of catches 1906 (D/S 







Fig 67 and 68. M.A. Ingebrigtsen posing by the harpoon cannon on board D/S Skytten. The photo has been 
published with the kind approval of the Hay-Ingebrigtsen family.536 Right: Distribution of whale catches for 
the 1906 season, which was dominated by blue and fin whales. 
 
 
Assuming that Ingebrigtsen sold his whale oil for the same prices as whaling companies 
in the Antarctic did ( Kr61.00 per barrel) and met the same production costs per barrel 
(Kr49.00),537 he made a profit of Kr24.180 (excluding baleen). However, the estimated 
profit was likely higher since the company produced its own coal, and therefore had 
lower operational costs than the companies that Tønnesen based his calculations on. 
 
In April 1907, whalers in Tromsø began preparing for the coming season by testing the 
boats and compasses. Eight crew members were also hired for D/S Skytten.538 In 
addition, Ingebrigtsen chartered the cargo ship Stabil and the schooner Herold, which 
was going to be used as a semi-pelagic platform during the season.539 Herold was large 
enough to haul a whale on deck, and blubber could be flensed without being disturbed 
                                                 
535 ”Dagbog D/S Skytten. 1906”. National Library of Norway. Oslo. MS Fol 3905. 
536 The photo is a part of a private collection belonging to the Hay-Ingebrigtsen family. 
537 Data have been extracted from Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. 1967. 
Vol 2. P: 587. In: Den moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. These figures are based on 
data available from contemporary whaling companies operating in the Antarctic, and it is likely that the 
production costs for those operating in the Arctic were substantially less due to the relative proximity to 
the market. 
538 ”Dagbog D/S Skytten. 1907”. National Library of Norway. Oslo. MS Fol 3905. 
539 Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. No 6, July 1918. Also in: No 7, July 1928. P: 139 and No 10, October 1932. P: 
218. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. 
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by waves. This approach proved to be successful. Once the whales had been flensed, the 
remaining carcass was dumped overboard.540 Using this additional platform, the 
company flensed 16 whales in the open sea.541 This was an adaptation to problems 
caused by drift ice in earlier seasons.  
 
Changing the organisation of his production in this way allowed Ingebrigtsen to operate 
with two whale catchers and two processing units simultaneously. This made the local 
network more flexible and increased the project’s overall catching and processing 
capacity. It is interesting to note that later in the season the company attempted to haul 
northern bottlenose whales on board the whale catcher Bjørn for flensing. The ship 
Stabil was used to transport the workers, barrels, and provisions to Bear Island. Once 
the hunting started, the ship was used to tow whales from the two whale catchers to the 
whaling station for processing. 
 
The fleet reached Bear Island on May 20 after two days sailing. A large belt of sea ice 
prevented the company from getting closer than 10 km to the whaling station at Walrus 
Bay. This massive belt was a part of an ice belt that extended from south of Bear Island 
to the northernmost point of Spitsbergen, and which effectively prevented all whaling 
companies from reaching their harbours and stations.542 Ingebrigtsen chose to move his 
fleet further east where the ice was less dense. Here, the company started its hunting 
season by catching a few fin whales and a few bottlenose whales.543 After three weeks of 
hunting in this area and the open sea, the company were able to access the harbours at 
Walrus Bay and Sørhamna. 
 
                                                 
540 ”Dagbog D/S Skytten. 1907”. National Library of Norway. Oslo. MS Fol 3905. 
541 Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1908. P: 23. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. 
Norway. 
542 Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1908. P:22. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. 
Norway. 
543 ”Dagbog D/S Skytten. 1907”. National Library of Norway. Oslo. MS Fol 3905. 
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Fig 69 and 70. The extension of sea ice during summer 1907 in the European High Arctic.544 Right: Workers 
processing whales at Walrus Bay whaling station. The photo has been published with the kind approval of 
Forschungsinstitut und Naturmuseum Senckenberg. Germany. 
 
 
Hunting was often disrupted by fog, which made it difficult for the whale catchers to 
navigate the sea and spot whales. In an attempt to escape the fog and catch whales, 
Ingebrigtsen travelled northeast to Hopen Island where he caught a few whales. Despite 
difficult ice and fog conditions, Ingebrigtsen’s company managed to catch and process 
81 whales into 1,700 barrels of whale oil. This result was substantially higher than in 
Spitsbergen, where the average catch was 42 whales per company.545 The prices for 
whale oil had, as previously mentioned, dropped compared with the previous year to 
Kr54.00 per barrel.546 Based on the prices reported by other whaling companies, 
Ingebrigtsen probably made a profit of Kr18.598 that year. For the third year in a row, 
Ingebrigtsen and his employees made a profit despite difficult operational conditions 
that prevented them from operating at full capacity. 
 
                                                 
544 Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1908. P: 22. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. 
Norway. 
545 Risting. S. Av Hvalfangstens Historie. 1922. P: 262. 
546 Data have been extracted from Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. 1967. 
Vol 2. P: 587. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. The data supplied by 
Tønnesen did not only apply for whaling companies which operated in the southern seas, which suggest 
that the production costs would have been reduced to  Kr43.06 per barrel compared to  Kr46.00 for 1906. 
It is reasonable to assume that Ingebrigtsen, who was self supportive of fuels and operated close to the 
main market, had somewhat lower production costs. 
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Fig 71 and 72. Distribution of whale catches for the 1907 and 1908 season (D/S Skytten). Note the lack of 
blue whales and the predominant catch of fin whales in the 1907 season.547 In 1908, fin whales were 
predominant and blue whales were completely absent, compared with 1906 when almost 50% of the total 
catch were blue whales.548 
 
 
Similar to the previous year, Ingebrigtsen hired workers for the 1908 season in Tromsø. 
In mid-May, the expedition steamed northward to Bear Island, towing Herold behind 
them. The journey northward across the Barents Sea was rough and filled with ice. On 
the morning of May 20, Herold hit the ice so hard that it began leaking and the crew was 
unable to repair it. After only a few hours, the boat sank without casualties. The loss of 
Herold meant that a large part of the season’s supplies were lost.549 The expedition 
returned to Norway to report the loss. Even though the ship was insured, the loss was a 
severe setback for Ingebrigsten’s whaling operations, since he had lost one of his 
production platforms. By early June, the expedition headed northwards again. After one 
day at sea, the company hit a large belt of drift ice that forced them to change their 
course and head east where the ice conditions were less difficult. 
 
The company spent three weeks sailing along the edge of the drift ice in a north-
eastwards direction, until they were able to sail through safely to the whaling station at 
Walrus Bay. The difficult ice conditions combined with the loss of Herold meant the 
company could not start the hunting season until late June.550 Although there was little 
drift ice throughout the remainder of the season, there was plenty of fog, which 
disrupted hunting. Ingebrigtsen decided to end the hunting season on August 14 having 
caught only 44 whales. The expedition returned to Norway a few days later with 830 
                                                 
547 ”Dagbog D/S Skytten. 1907”. National Library of Norway. Oslo. MS Fol 3905. 
548 ”Dagbog D/S Skytten. 1908”. National Library of Norway. Oslo. MS Fol 3905. 
549 ”Dagbog D/S Skytten. 1908”. National Library of Norway. Oslo. MS Fol 3905. 
550 ”Dagbog D/S Skytten. 1908”. National Library of Norway. Oslo. MS Fol 3905. 
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barrels of whale oil and some baleen.551 In spite of these setbacks, the company made a 
small profit of Kr6.640.552 The figures showing the whales caught during the 1905 and 
1908 seasons illustrate how whale distribution differed from season to season. 
Humpback whales dominated the 1905 catches but were completely absent in 1908. The 
number of blue whales caught also changed over time. This is probably explained by 
overexploitation combined with seasonal variations, changing migration patterns, and 
changes in the whales’ food supply. 
 
Closure of Walrus Bay whaling station 
Ingebrigtsen appeared to abandon the industrial project at Bear Island and the Arctic 
during the 1908 season. By mid-August 1908, all operations at the station were halted, 
and the shore workers were ordered to disassemble parts of the technical installations 
at the whaling station. Together with the remaining 1,400 empty barrels they had hoped 
to fill with whale oil during the season, all equipment was loaded for transportation 
south.553 The industrial project at Bear Island had constantly improved its catches and 
output by reorganising its production to adapt to local circumstances. The difficult 
conditions the company experienced during the 1907 and 1908 seasons reduced their 
catches and production, but they also suffered material losses. With whaling companies 
in the south making huge profits, it was perhaps difficult to motivate continued 
investments in hunting grounds that were difficult and hazardous to operate in, and 
which were becoming depleted. 
 
                                                 
551 ”Dagbog D/S Skytten. 1908”. National Library of Norway. Oslo. MS Fol 3905. See also: Risting. S. “Av 
Hvalfangstens Historie”. 1922. P: 263. 
552 Data have been extracted from Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. 1967. 
Vol 2. P: 587. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 













Fig 73. Catches and production at Bear Island from 1905 to 1908. Production peaked in 1906 with a 
production of 2,015 barrels of whale oil, but catches reached a maximum the year after. The greater yield in 
1906 was due to the larger percentage of blue and fin whales.554 
 
 
In the autumn of 1908, soon after his return from Bear Island, M.A. Ingebrigtsen went 
into partnership with the Norwegian entrepreneur Peder Bogen from Sandefjord. 
Together, they established a new whaling company named A/S Viking.555 The purpose of 
this company was to explore and exploit new hunting grounds. To materialise this 
vision, they purchased a 2,900 ton steam ship in England and converted it into a factory 
ship (named Ambra). This was the first ship in England to be converted and equipped as 
a pelagic production unit.556 The idea was to build on the concept Ingebrigtsen 
developed with Herold at Bear Island; hauling the whole whale onboard to be flensed on 
deck. Unlike Herold, Ambra was equipped with cookers that allowed them to process the 
blubber onboard. Although Ambra had a larger platform than Herold, the new company 
                                                 
554 Based on data supplied in M.A. Ingebrigtsen’s logbooks (1905-1908) and Risting. S. 1922. 
555 Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. 1967. Vol 2. P: 440. In: Den Moderne 
Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. Also in: Risting. S. Av Hvalfangstens Historie. 1922. P: 472. 
556 Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. 1967. Vol 2. P: 440. In: Den Moderne 
Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
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failed to process whales onboard.557 Instead, the whales they caught were flensed 
traditionally alongside the ship. 
   
Fig 74, 75, and 76. Left: The floating factory ship, Ambra. Right (1): A whale shark being hauled onboard 
Ambra for processing. Right (2): Flensing on a floating dock at the stern and hauling blubber onboard for 
processing. The photos have been published with the kind approval of the Hay-Ingebrigtsen family.558 
 
 
Ambra operated in conjunction with Ingebrigtsen’s two whale catchers D/S Skytten and 
D/S Bjørn along the coast of Africa in the season of 1909, a season which ended with a 
profit of Kr64.374 559 For 1910, the company’s profit increased to Kr400.000 giving the 
company’s shareholders a dividend of 100% after just two seasons. For Ingebrigtsen, 
whose contract gave him 5% of the profit in addition to Kr2.00 per barrel and stocks for 
Kr150.000, the project’s success gave him an annual income of Kr22.427 for 1909, 
Kr26.600 for 1910, and Kr150.000 for 1911.560 That same year, Ingebrigtsen and Bogen 
expanded their collaboration and established a new company – A/S Capella – together 
with Olaf Støkken and his father A. Støkken . This company aimed to exploit the hunting 
grounds in Australia using the floating factory ship, Capella I.561 Instead of operating in 
Australia as planned, the company ended up operating along the African coast during 
the first year. With a production of only 5,700 barrels of whale oil, the company made a 
loss of Kr190.500 562 Unfortunately, there is no data to explain why the company 
                                                 
557 Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. 1967. Vol 2. P: 422. In: Den Moderne 
Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
558 The photo is a part of a private collection belonging to the Hay-Ingebrigtsen family. 
559 Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. 1967. Vol 2. P: 441. In: Den Moderne 
Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
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561 Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. 1967. Vol 2. P: 423. In: Den Moderne 
Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
562 Risting. S. Av Hvalfangstens Historie. 1922. P: 494. See also: Tønnesen. J.O.H. Verdensfangsten 1883-




management chose not to operate in Australia as originally planned. Whaling in 
Australia was relatively undeveloped until 1912, when Christen Nielsen & Co got a 
licence to establish a whaling station at a place they named Norwegian Bay. One reason 
why A/S Capella never materialised their plans to hunt in Australian waters could be 
because they failed to secure a licence for their project from the Australian authorities. 
As a result of these losses, the management of A/S Capella decided to transfer their 
operations to the coast of Mexico. Andreas Ingebrigtsen, the son of M.A. Ingebrigtsen, 
had reported an abundance of whales there. Under the leadership of the now 65-year-
old M.A. Ingebrigtsen, the company caught and processed 565 whales into 14,670 
barrels of whale oil. Despite the company’s good catches, the project was financial 
failure, resulting in a loss of Kr284.444 563 The reasons for this loss and the project’s 
subsequent closure were long distances to and from the hunting grounds, high fuel 
costs, lack of freshwater, labour problems, and political instability in Mexico.564 It is not 
unlikely that Ingebrigtsen and his partners were interested in establishing themselves in 
the Antarctic hunting grounds, where the whaling industry was producing promising 
results. The numbers of concessions for these hunting grounds were, however, strictly 
regulated by the British authorities, partly as an attempt to limit the expansion of the 
industry in South Georgia and the South Shetland Islands.565 
 
After this project failed, Ingebrigtsen withdrew from the modern whaling industry until 
1920 when he, together with his son Andreas, rented Finneset whaling station in 
Spitsbergen from Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani (SNSK). This project was 
motivated by a belief that the environmental conditions had improved and that whale 
stocks in the Arctic had recovered enough to withstand further industrial 
exploitation.566 
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Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 




Ingebrigsten’s whaling project at Bear Island differed in several ways from the other 
projects discussed in this thesis. While Ingebrigtsen financed the project himself, the 
others were financed through a share stock system. Unlike these other projects, 
Ingebrigsten had a central part in establishing, developing, and adapting the local 
network at Bear Island to arctic conditions, rather than having only a managerial role. 
Taking all the financial risk himself meant that Ingebrigsten’s project did not have to 
generate a profit to convince potential shareholders or other investors to maintain their 
support for the project. But he needed to make enough profit to generate a surplus after 
all costs had been deducted. Similar to the Finneset project in Spitsbergen, Ingebrigtsen 
chose to transfer his former whaling station to Bear Island, including buildings and 
installations, rather than invest in new buildings, technological installations, or a floating 
factory unit. Therefore, both arctic projects used well-tested and functional technologies 
to minimise costs. 
 
Throughout the project, the local network at Bear Island developed and adapted to local 
circumstances to maximise whale catches and the production of whale oil. This was 
achieved by incorporating new ships, which allowed Ingebrigtsen to alter the 
organisation of production. These adaptations increased catches, production, and 
profits. It was probably the combined success of these strategies that motivated 
Ingebrigtsen to sustain the project. Constant problems with drift ice, large swell, and fog 
did, however, frequently obstruct the industrial operations. In an attempt to adapt to 
these conditions, Ingebrigtsen purchased and converted the schooner Herold into a 
floating flensing platform, allowing the whale catchers to deliver their catch to Herold, 
rather than transporting it to the whaling station. Ingebrigtsen could use Herold to 
flense whales, but it is unlikely that blubber could be cooked onboard. Herold 
complemented the whaling station by increasing the production capacity of the 
company. Flensing in the open sea was challenging, which is why Ingebrigtsen 
experimented with hauling the whales onboard the ship. Even though they managed to 
do so, most flensing was probably done alongside the ship when the weather allowed. 
Drift ice was another constant challenge for whalers. Ice provided stability and shelter 
from the large waves at sea, but was also dangerous since it could crush the ships. The 
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sinking of Herold in 1908 was probably a result of being trapped in the drift ice while 
using it as a shelter. 
 
Ingebrigsten’s adaptive measures were exclusively aimed at improving whale catching 
and processing blubber, rather than on increasing the whaling station’s utilisation 
capability. Throughout its operational years, the whaling station at Walrus Bay only 
processed blubber into whale oil and cleaned and dried baleen. The remainder of the 
whale was dumped at sea. This is a similar situation to the first years of operation in 
South Georgia. From an economic point of view, this was bad business since a large part 
of the available raw materials were wasted. Rather than investing in additional 
technologies, which would have increased utilisation and output at the whaling station, 
Ingebrigtsen chose to keep investments to a minimum and only use what had been 
transferred from his former whaling station. Both his whaling stations were, therefore, 
similar in design. There are no data that suggest Ingebrigtsen ever considered investing 
in new technologies at Walrus Bay to increase the level of utilisation and production 
there. The reluctance to do may indicate that Ingebrigtsen did not realise how much 
whale oil could be yielded from the whales’ meat and bones, or that he calculated that 
costs for the new investments outweighed any potential profits that could be made from 
them. It is also possible that the location of the station, with difficult access and exposed 
position to swells and sea ice, played a role in this decision. There is no evidence to 
suggest that Ingebrigtsen reflected on the depletion of whale stocks after intensive 
exploitation. Instead, he argued that the poor catches were caused by un-natural ice and 
fog conditions, which prevented the whalers from finding and catching whales. 
Ingebrigsten’s belief in the capacity and profitability of these whale stocks is further 
supported by his later attempt to exploit whales in the area in 1920/21. From this 
perspective, it is perhaps even more remarkable that Ingebrigtsen did not invest in 
increasing the station’s utilisation capability. 
 
The information presented here provides insight into Ingebrigsten’s activities, and how 
and why the project adapted the way it did and what the result of these adaptations 
were for the company. But how was production organised at the whaling station in 
Walrus Bay? Below, I will present the outcome of archival research and fieldwork done 
at Walrus Bay during the LASHIPA 5 expedition to Bear Island in 2008. 
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Walrus Bay whaling station 
The whaling station at Walrus Bay was designed and equipped to process blubber into 
whale oil, and to clean and dry baleen. In 2008, a LASHIPA team surveyed large parts of 
Bear Island. During this expedition, a number of sites related to the activities of the 
modern whaling industry were documented and mapped by high accuracy GPS units, 
drawings, descriptions, and photography.567 The primary purpose of this work was to 
determine how the whaling company organised its production, and how it manifested 
hierarchy and ownership over the territory. The findings also revealed how the 
company adapted their production to the local circumstances and how it used the 
landscape to create hierarchical boundaries and promote social control. 
 
The area at Walrus Bay was subdivided into three areas (see Fig 77 below). Area 1 
represents the whaling station, while areas 2 and 3 represent cultural remains from 
trapping and the Second World War. The collected data were later post processed and 
transferred into a database. This data has, together with written sources, provided new 
information about how and why the local network at Bear Island was designed and 
organised the way it was. 
 
 
Fig 77. GPS map of the three survey areas at Walrus Bay. Map by U.I. Gustafsson and G. Rossnes. LASHIPA 5/ 
2008. 
                                                 
567 The LASHIPA 5 Expedition Report. 2008. Pp: 125-132. 
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Features of Walrus Bay whaling station 
Please see LASHIPA 5 fieldwork report (2008) for more detailed descriptions. 
 
1 – Accommodation house  2 – Pathway to Sørhamna 
3 – Steam boiler   4 – Wooden floor 
5 – Foundation   6 – Foundation of hut/shed 
7 – Elevator system   8 – Blubber cookery 
9 – Wooden poles   10 – Anchor points 
11 – Forge                          12 – Foundation for winches 
13 – Winch    14 – Propeller 
15 – Winch    16 – Buoy 
17 – Metal artefact   18 – Harpoon grenade 
19 – Remains of barrels   20 – Wooden poles 
21 – Flensing platform   22 – Wooden pole 
23 – Area with iron wire 
 
Organisation of production 
M.A. Ingebrigsten’s whaling stations at Rolfsø and later at Walrus Bay were designed 
and organised similarly. The largest difference between the two stations was that the 
whaling station at Walrus Bay had a wooden flensing platform, which the station at 
Rolfsø did not. This is probably due to the differences in tide between the two sites. The 
similarity between the two stations is not surprising since the whaling station at Rolfsø 
was disassembled and re-erected at Walrus Bay during the spring and summer of 1905. 
This station was, much like Finneset whaling station, divided into production, 
accommodation, and ancillary functions. 
 
The whale catcher(s) supplied the whaling station with raw materials, which were 
transported by a tug boat to one of the two buoys located in Walrus Bay and in 
Sørhamna.568 Using a small boat, the shore workers brought one whale at a time from 
these buoys to the whaling stations flensing platform. At the wooden flensing platform 
(today non-existent), the flensers separated the blubber from the whales body using 
flensing knifes and steam winches. The two steam-powered winches were located at the 
west side of the flensing platform (Fig 78, 12 and 13). These winches were used to tow 
the whales from the shoreline onto the flensing platform and to pull the strips of blubber 
from the whale’s body. 
 
                                                 




Fig 78. GPS map of Walrus Bay whaling station. Map by U.I. Gustafsson and G. Rossnes. LASHIPA 5/ 2008. 
 
 
The blubber was cut into long strips that were fed into a steam-powered rotating 
blubber cutter in the blubber cookery building (Fig 78, 8). This machine cut the blubber 
into smaller pieces, which were transported to the top of the cookery building via an 
elevator (Fig 78, 7). On the top of the cookery building, these pieces were fed into six 
vertical cookers.569 
 
Figure 79. Feature 13. The two steam winches that were 
used to pull whales up for processing. The winches were 
produced by Pusnæs ST & MEK VERKSTED. ARENDAL. 
NORGE. Type No 358. Today, only the foundation for the 
winches remain in situ, while the winches are lying on 
the beach. Photo by U.I. Gustafsson. LASHIPA 5 August 
2008. 
 
                                                 
569 Svendsen. A. Forliset på Bjørnøya I 1916. 1976. In: Polarårboken 1975/76. The Norwegian Polar Club. 
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Ingebrigtsen probably used open cookers, similar to those used at Finneset, since these 
came from his former whaling station, which was built in the 1890s when these cookers 
were common. Once the blubber was cooked, the resulting whale oil was transferred 
into a clearing tank where it settled before being tapped into wooden barrels and stored 
away beside the production area (Fig 78, 20) awaiting transport to the markets further 
south. Today, there are few remains of the whaling station. Parts of the station were 
disassembled when operations ceased, and what was left has probably been used as 
building materials for later industrial projects on the island. This made it difficult to 
determine whether the station was equipped with a hand winch to rotate the whale, 
similar to Finneset whaling station. This is likely to be the case, but there is no data to 
support this hypothesis. Once the flensers had stripped all the blubber from the whale’s 
body, the carcass was attached to the whale catcher through a line and pulled off from 
the flensing platform out to sea where it was dumped. 
 
Steam production was essential for the whaling station’s production and function. Steam 
was produced in a steam boiler house equipped with a single boiler (Fig 78, 3). 
Freshwater for the boiler house and for drinking was supplied by a small runoff stream 
close to the station.570 Coal used by the station and ships was mined by Ingebrigsten’s 
employees at outcrops along the east coast of the island, which were later commercially 
exploited by Bjørnøen AS. In addition to the primary production area, the station was 
equipped with a forge (Fig 78, 11). The blacksmith was responsible for repairing and 
maintaining the boiler, pipes, and cookers, as well as sharpened flensing knifes and 
                                                 
570 Gustafsson.U.I. Industrialising the Arctic: Settlement design and technical adaptations of modern whaling 
stations in Spitsbergen and Bear Island. P: 52f. In: Whaling and History III. Papers presented at a 
symposium in Sandefjord on the 18th and 19th of June 2009. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s 
Hvalfangstmuseum, Sandefjord. Vestfoldmuseene. Norway.2010. See also: The LASHIPA 5 Expedition 
Report. 2008. Pp: 125-132. 
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assembling barrels for storing whale oil. 
 
Fig 80. A steam boiler that still stands in situ at Walrus Bay. This boiler was used to generate the heat and 
pressurised steam that was necessary to run winches and cookers for processing raw material into liquid oil. 
Photo: G. Rossnes. LASHIPA 5/2008. 
 
 
The whaling station was located in a small natural dip in the landscape. This dip 
provided shelter from winds coming from the west and from the north. However, 
Ingebrigtsen probably chose the location because of dry land with accessible freshwater 
and a good harbour. During the 2008 LASHIPA 5 expedition, large parts of the island’s 
east coast were surveyed. These surveys showed that, beside Walrus Bay, there are no 
other areas along the east coast with a flat and dry piece of land where it is possible to 
erect several large buildings close to the sea, and which have a relatively deep and 
accessible harbour. At the former Tunheim coal mine, which is located further north on 
the east coast, the harbour is deep but very exposed. Furthermore, the coastline here 
consists of steep cliffs, which would have made it impossible to establish a whaling 
station, let alone deliver whales to it. Unlike most other whaling stations in the polar 
areas, which separated the production area from the accommodation area to create 
hierarchical divisions and to avoid smells from the production area, Ingebrigtsen put the 
production and accommodation buildings in immediate vicinity of each other, in the 
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same natural dip. Therefore, all the buildings at the whaling station were partly 
sheltered from the winds. 
 
 
Fig 81. Walrus Bay whaling station was situated in a natural dip, which provided shelter from winds. The 
station was completely exposed to easterly winds. Photo. G. Rossnes. LASHIPA 5/2008. 
 
Another explanation for why he chose this solution was that Ingebrigtsen adopted a 
different hierarchical structure to other whaling companies. Unlike most managers, who 
commonly had an administrative role overseeing and managing hunting and production, 
Ingebrigtsen took an active part in the hunting as well as managing the company’s 
activities. Throughout his whaling career, Ingebrigtsen acted as gunner and captain of 
D/S Skytten. During the hunting seasons at Bear Island, he visited the station at Walrus 
Bay to deliver his catch, or to maintain the boat. Consequently, he had less of a 
controlling role at the whaling station than was common within the industry. The 
hierarchical structure of the local network also reflects this. It seems that Ingebrigtsen 
had no need to use the design or the spatial layout of the station to create hierarchical 
boundaries, since only the workers lived there. It is possible that Ingebrigtsen had a 
person at the whaling station who was responsible for overseeing the work, but there is 
no evidence to support this. It is also possible that Ingebrigtsen used a different salary 
system to compensate for this and to secure and maintain control of his workers at the 
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station. His strategy to hire workers in his hometown Tromsø was probably a part of 
this strategy, since he knew the people and had a network there; he knew who he could 
count on to be a reliable worker. The LASHIPA fieldwork at the site revealed one 
accommodation house where all the workers, and possibly a foreman, lived during the 
season. This house was a two storey building built from wood with a corrugated steel 
roof and at least two brick chimneys. 
 
 
Fig 82. The accommodation house at Walrus Bay whaling station. The station only had one house that was 
used to accommodate all workers, which meant that skilled and un-skilled workers were not separated as 
was the custom in many whaling stations in the Antarctic. Behind it is the production area with the blubber 
cookery and the forge on the ridge beyond.571 
 
 
The house had a small extension on its southern end, which was probably used for 
storing coal. Water for cleaning, hygiene, and drinking was collected from a small river 
running down from the mountains and led through to the production area. Throughout 
the operational period 1905–1908, the fleet changed several times. These changes were 
motivated by a desire to maximise the company’s overall catching capability and to 
secure a flow of resources within the local network to maximise the project’s output and 
                                                 




economic profit. The main task of D/S Skytten and D/S Bjørn (from 1906) was to hunt 
and catch whales. A secondary task was to supply the local network with enough coal for 
hunting and processing. During the first season, Ingebrigtsen used tug boats as a link 
between the whale catchers and the whaling station. The fact that Ingebrigtsen chose 
not to use the tug boats Bjølfen and Dovre for more than one season could indicate that 
an increasing number of whales were caught within the catcher’s operational range, and 
it was not necessary to extend the hunting area further. 
 
Drift ice and fog were occasionally problematic. These, combined with underwater 
skerries and difficult access to the harbour at Walrus Bay, meant that delivering catches 
could be challenging. In an attempt to overcome this problem and to increase the overall 
production rate of the company, Ingebrigtsen replaced his tug boats with the schooner 
Herold for the 1907 season. It is also likely that he placed buoys in Walrus Bay and 
Sørhamna harbour during this season. This allowed the whale catchers to either deliver 
their catch to one of the two buoys or Herold, which was large enough to hold whales 
onboard. This organisation increased the processing rate of the local network since 
blubber flensed on Herold could immediately be processed into whale oil once it was 
delivered to the whaling station. The loss of Herold to the ice in 1908 affected the 
flexibility and capability of the local network to process whales and generate profit. 
Herold’s crew could flense whales on the deck rather than alongside the hull. It is, 
however, unlikely that Herold was used to process the blubber into whale oil. As 
mentioned earlier, this is because early floating factory ships needed sheltered waters to 
flense and to cook the blubber since they used open cookers, which were not easy to 
operate in large swells. 
 
Having enough coal for the whaling station and for the fleet was important. Coal supply 
was important enough to be included in Ingebrigsten’s 1904 claim. The claim reveals 
that Ingebrigtsen was able to use these resources in the past thanks to his local 
knowledge. From 1906, the task of the cargo ship Stabil and its crew was to mine coal for 
the whaling station and the fleet. The crew probably mined coal at the north-eastern 
part of the island where outcrops of coal were relatively easy to access. In 1909, 
Ingebrigtsen extended his territorial claim. This was probably motivated by 





Fig 83. M.A. Ingebrigsten’s whale catches 1898 –1908 in the European High Arctic. The relative fluctuation of 
barrels produced was highly influenced by sea ice and fog, which prevented hunting and processing. The 
figure show how the number of humpback whales caught dropped in the period 1900 –1903 and how the 
catches of blue whales increased.572 
 
Ingebrigsten managed to catch more whales than the whaling companies operating in 
Spitsbergen. This might simply be because he operated in an area that was more 
frequented by whales. The lack of competition over the resources probably also played a 
role. It is also likely that Ingebrigsten’s background and local knowledge of Spitsbergen 
and Bear Island had an influence. The more southern geographic location of Bear Island 
meant that Ingebrigsten’s industrial project was exposed to less drift ice compared with 
Spitsbergen. Less ice meant that more days could be spent on industrial activities. This 
meant that Ingebrigtsen’s hunting season was longer than in Spitsbergen, where the 
whale catchers were often forced to wait for the ice or the fog to disappear before they 
could hunt. 
 
                                                 
572 The figure is based on data collected from M.A. Ingebrigsten’s ships-logbook 1898-1908, Risting. S. Av 
Hvalfangstens Historie.1922. Pp: 242-267, and Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924, Del 1 1883-1914. 




Fig 84. Primary activities at Walrus Bay whaling station. 
 
Strategies for social control 
Social strategies to create control and hierarchical boundaries were common within 
industrial projects during the 19th and early 20th centuries. It seems that social strategies 
were more important in the polar regions due to the lack of a legal framework to resolve 
strikes or conflicts. To achieve social control, company management separated workers 
from the management. Natural boundaries, such as rivers and hills, were often used to 
do this. If natural barriers were not available, buildings with supportive functions, like a 
hospital, were erected. Architecture was frequently used to differentiate between 
management and workers; the manager’s villa was often an expression of this. It was 
often grandiose in its design and overlooked all parts of the production, suggesting the 
manager had full control of the station’s functions and workers. The design and location 
of the manager’s house served several purposes. In addition to being a hierarchical 
symbol of power and control, it was also the face of the company to visiting investors or 
other prominent guests. Basberg (2002 and 2004) has shown that the design and layout 
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of whaling stations in South Georgia clearly separated management and workers.573 At 
all of these whaling stations, the management lived at the station and did not take an 
active take part in the production. Avango (2005) has shown that other strategies, such 
as leisure activities and housing standards, were important to industrial projects in 
Spitsbergen.574 
 
M.A. Ingebrigtsen was the sole owner of the local network at Bear Island, including the 
station and boats. He worked onboard the whale catcher D/S Skytten throughout each 
season. This broke with the traditions mentioned above, since he did not use the spatial 
layout of the whaling station or the surrounding landscape to create a hierarchical 
division and separate himself from the workers. Nonetheless, Ingebrigsten’s logbooks 
show that he frequented the whaling station regularly, although he had boats to bring 
his catch to the station for processing. During these visits, he made sure that operations 
were working as they should. The whaling station had one building where the workers 
slept and ate (Fig 78, 1).575 Even though Ingebrigtsen probably had a manager at the 
station, that person lived together with the other workers in the accommodation house 
and there was no hierarchical design. This may be because Ingebrigtsen always used the 
same workers from Tromsø and his system was based on trust. The salary system, 
which was part-based and paid out once they had arrived in Tromsø, acted as a 
motivation for the workers to maximise production because the shore workers salary 
was directly linked to the production of whale oil and baleen. In addition, the workers 
were paid upon return to Tromsø when the season was finished and were dependent on 
Ingebrigtsen and his boat to return home. These factors contributed greatly to 
maintaining social control at the station, as it was in the workers’ own interests that 
operations at the station ran smoothly and without interruption. Any laziness and 
attempts to disrupt production were likely dealt with by the workers themselves. It is 
interesting to note that the different workers were not separated as in many other 
                                                 
573 A Ship Ashore? Organisation and living conditions at South Georgia whaling stations, 1904-1960. In: 
International Journal of Maritime History. Vol: XIV, No: 1, 2002, and The Shore Whaling Stations at South 
Georgia; A Study in Antarctic Industrial Archaeology. 2004. 
574 Sveagruvan: Svensk Gruvhantering Mellan Industri, Diplomati och Geovetenskap. Stockholm: 
Jernkontoret. 2005. 
575 Gustafsson.U. I. Industrialising the Arctic: Settlement design and technical adaptations of modern whaling 
stations in Spitsbergen and Bear Island. In: Whaling and History III. Papers presented at a symposium in 
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stations; skilled and un-skilled workers lived in the same building. There are, 
unfortunately, no sources to provide insight into the internal design of the house or how 
the different workers were organised. A similar system was used for the boat crews. 
They were paid depending on the number of whales they caught and received their pay 
upon return to Tromsø. As such, their salary was dependent on the skill of the gunner. 
Unlike the shore workers, the boat crew lived onboard the boats for the entire season. 
 
 
Fig 85. The accommodation house was located on a small ridge overlooking the blubber cookery and the 
forge. The house had two pipes, and it is reasonable to assume that one was used for heating while the other 
was located in the kitchen.576 
 
 
Leisure activities, together with good accommodations and the part-based salary 
system, were an important tool for maximising production and creating good, healthy, 
and stable working conditions. How much access the workers had to leisure activities 
other than games is unclear due to lack of sources. It is possible that they had the 
opportunity to go hiking in the surrounding landscape on Sundays, when Ingebrigtsen 
often gave the workers a day off. There are several small freshwater lakes at Bear Island 
so fishing was also a possibility. The workers may have gone fishing, both as a leisure 
activity and to vary their diet at the whaling station. It appears that Ingebrigtsen was 
                                                 
576 The photo has been scanned from «Bjørnøya». By: A. Hoel, A. Kvalheim, C. Schive & G. Smith. 1918. 




successful in creating a stable local network and a good environment since there are no 
indications that strikes occurred at Walrus Bay whaling station. 
 
Conclusions 
There were several factors that affected how Ingebrigtsen constructed and designed his 
industrial project at Bear Island, including his knowledge and experience of the physical 
environment, the local environment, and the legal status of Bear Island. Ingebrigtsen had 
to weave all of these factors together to succeed. 
 
During his operational years in northern Norway, Ingebrigtsen hunted with his whale 
catcher in the proximity of Bear Island. During this time, he incorporated the harbours at 
South Harbour (Sørhamna), Walrus Bay, and Russehamna into his local network. The 
introduction of the 1904 whaling ban in northern Norway forced Ingebrigtsen to move 
his production unit, but he did not have to adapt to new hunting grounds. Unlike many 
other whaling companies, Ingebrigtsen did not have to negotiate his plans with any 
shareholders since he was the sole owner and investor of his project. 
 
Ingebrigsten’s decision to establish a whaling project in the Arctic was motivated by a 
belief that whale populations there were large enough to sustain a high level of 
exploitation, and that an industrial project here would be financially profitable. He may 
also have been motivated by the recent success of the hydrogenation process. 
 
The activity and exploitation that occurred in this part of the Arctic during the first 
decade of the 20th century caused whale populations to decline rapidly. This illustrates 
the typical activities of the modern whaling industry. Moving the rather small and 
simple whaling station from Rolfsø in northern Norway to Walrus Bay was not an easy 
task due to drift ice that filled the harbours on the east coast of Bear Island. In the 
summer of 1904, Ingebrigtsen claimed an area at Bear Island and investigated the 
possibilities of establishing his station at Bellsound. He may have wanted to operate 
from Bellsound because of his earlier hunting activities in the area. It is also possible 
that he was, like many others, attracted to the area because of the success A/S Ørnen 




To get the support and protection of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, Ingebrigtsen 
reported all his claims at Bear Island to the Ministry. This was in line with contemporary 
practices. This meant that Ingebrigtsen enlisted the Foreign Ministry in his global 
network, which was important due to the large interest in the island. Enlisting the 
Foreign Ministry was important because their support would be needed in case of 
conflict or dispute over the areas he had claimed. Ingebrigtsen’s claims were never 
challenged and he did not need to activate this support. 
 
Even though Ingebrigtsen needed the support of the Foreign Ministry, he did not want 
the authorities to interfere with his project as this could result in similar restrictions the 
industry had experienced in northern Norway. Ingebrigsten’s views became apparent 
during the meeting at the Foreign Ministry to discuss Bear Island and Spitsbergen. 
Ingebrigtsen represented the whaling industry at this meeting and downplayed the role 
and extent of the industry from an economic point of view. The Norwegian government’s 
geo-political interest in these arctic areas was growing and the whaling industry 
probably realised that they already had the support of the Ministry, since the 
government’s primary interest lay in maintaining the presence of the industry and 
nationals. 
 
Ingebrigtsen’s productivity encouraged him to continue his project from 1905 to 1907, 
and he continued to make economic profit. Although catches declined constantly 
throughout the period, probably because of overexploitation, Ingebrigtsen managed to 
adapt his local network to maximise catches and production, and to maintain a high 
output compared with other whaling companies that operated in this part of the Arctic. 
The combination of large material losses, difficult ice conditions, and poor catches in the 
1908 season, convinced Ingebrigsten to abandon his whaling project in the Arctic. His 
partnership with Peder Bogen probably also played a role in this decision. Ingebrigtsen 








6. The modern whaling industry in the Subantarctic and the 
Antarctic in 1904–1931 
 
Introduction 
The potential for economic profit in the Antarctic region was discovered in the mid-18th 
century when the first explorers returned home and reported the abundance of marine 
resources there. Bouvet (1739), Cook (1772–1775), Weddell (1822–1823), and Ross 
(1839–1843) reported large numbers of whales and seals, and the first American sealers 
landed on South Georgia in 1780. 
 
The first expedition to investigate whaling potential in the Antarctic was in the 1890s, 
and was initiated by the Norwegian whaling entrepreneur Svend Foyn.577 There were no 
earlier expeditions because European whaling companies were more interested in 
exploiting whale populations in the nearby seas in the northern hemisphere – along the 
coast of Norway, Scotland, and Iceland. At the time, these activities generated enough 
profits to fulfil the whaling companies’ ambitions. The Antarctic was a remote and harsh 
area compared with other whaling grounds in the world – including the Arctic. The 
Antarctic was not well mapped at the time and lacked nearby populations and resources, 
such as building materials and fuels, that were important for sustaining whaling 
operations. For the whaling industry to be established there, expensive and risky 
expeditions were needed to ship all the materials there. Once the materials did arrive, 
the installations would need to be adapted to the harsh environment. 
 
This changed in the first decade of the 20th century when whaling became a global 
industry. The modern whaling industry had exhausted the resources in its established 
hunting grounds, which did not bode well for whale populations in the antarctic hunting 
grounds.578 
 
                                                 
577 In 1890, the Norwegian Svend Foyn despatched a survey-expedition to the Antarctic to investigate the 
possibilities of exploiting the stocks. This was followed by an expedition from Dundee in 1892, which had 
similar purposes. Se: Headland. R.K. The Island of Sough Georgia. 2009. P: 110. 
578 Basberg. B.L. The Shore Whaling Stations in South Georgia; A Study in Antarctic Industrial Archaeology. 
2004. P: 31. 
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The movement of whaling companies to the Antarctic was part of resource colonialism 
in the Atlantic at the time. Industrialists and scientists, together with their corporate 
and/or state supporters, constantly pushed the boundaries of natural resource 
exploitation and knowledge accumulation. This was fuelled by the increasing demand 
for raw materials in the growing industrial economies of the western world, as well as a 
fascination for the Antarctic, which was one of the last frontiers of the world. 
 
Whaling in the Antarctic was established by actors who were willing to take high risks. 
Three whaling companies established operations in the Antarctic in 1904–1905; the 
Chilean Sociedad Ballenera de Magellanes, the Argentinean Compañia Argentina de 
Pesca Sociedad Anónima, and the Norwegian A/S Ørnen.579 These companies showed 
that whaling was possible and profitable in the Antarctic. The success of these 
companies attracted other contemporary whaling actors to invest in similar projects. 
 
In the following chapters, I will explain how and why the Antarctic whaling industry 
developed from 1904 to 1931, focusing on two whaling stations and the companies that 
operated them: Prince Olav Harbour at South Georgia, and Borge Bay whaling station at 
Signy Island in the South Orkney Islands. In this chapter, I will discuss the whaling 
industry in the Antarctic from a broader perspective and present two types of local 
networks – or technological systems – for whaling. I will also introduce the early 
development of the modern whaling industry in the Antarctic as a technological system, 
as well as the geo-political context in which it operated. The aim of this chapter is to 
provide a background for the following two chapters, which focus on individual whaling 
stations, and a point of departure for my comparative analysis of whaling in the Arctic 
and the Antarctic. 
 
Shore-based and pelagic whaling in the Antarctic region 
The Antarctic whaling industry used two local networks for production: whaling 
stations and factory ships. Both functioned as processing units and each had its 
advantages and disadvantages. The whaling stations, or shore-based whaling stations as 
                                                 
579 For further reading on these companies, please see Hart. I. B. PESCA; The History of Compañia Argentina 
de Pesca Sociedad Anónima of Buenos Aires. An account of the Pioneer modern whaling and sealing company 
in the Antarctic. 2001. Johnsen A.O, and Tønnesen. J.N. Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie. Opprinnelse og 
Utvikkling. 1959-1976. Vol 1-4. 
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Basberg have called them,580 were land-based installations. These stations had plenty of 
space and the companies that operated them used the surrounding landscape to 
construct their local networks. This space allowed a larger, more diversified processing 
technology and a higher level of utilisation compared with the floating factories. These 
whaling companies often processed more whales compared with semi-pelagic factory 
ships since processing at the stations was not affected by environmental circumstances. 
On the other hand, shore-based stations lacked the manoeuvrability of floating factories. 
As pelagic whaling developed in the late 1920s, the pelagic factory ships became just as 
efficient as land-based stations at processing whales. 
 
Factory ships were either semi-pelagic or pelagic. As I mentioned earlier, several 
companies chose to use this type of platform since it gave them manoeuvrability and the 
possibility to place their ship in the immediate vicinity of migrating whale populations. 
On the other hand, they had less space, which limited their utilisation of whale carcasses. 
Pelagic whaling in its true sense did not begin until after the late 1920s, since the early 
factory ships were dependent on sheltered waters to flense the whales alongside the 
ship. A more correct term for these ships is semi-pelagic. The first true pelagic factory 
ship was introduced by Lancing in 1925. During the 1920s, the whaling companies and 
ship builders developed new designs and materials, which enabled them to increase the 
size of the factory ships. 
 
One of the largest challenges for whaling companies was finding access to a constant 
supply of freshwater. This was essential for the production of whale oil, since steam was 
essential for cooking and operating the machinery. In the 1930s, several important 
technologies were developed that allowed freshwater to be produced from saltwater 
onboard the factory ships. This made the whaling operations independent of land and 
they became truly pelagic. This allowed the whaling companies to operate in 
international waters where there were no concessions and restrictions on catches and 
utilisation. This increased the overall catch and output of the Antarctic whaling industry. 
As prices for whale oil dropped throughout the 1920s, the industry compensated by 
increasing catches and production to generate enough profits for its shareholders and to 
secure the survival of their whaling operations. This coincided with the global economic 
                                                 
580 Basberg B.L. The Shore Whaling Stations at South Georgia. 2004. 
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recession and market collapse in the late 1920s, during which several companies had 
difficulties selling their produce. Companies like Lever Bros were able to secure large 
quantities of raw materials at low cost and this dictated the development of the whaling 
industry in the early 1930s.  
 
The whaling industry’s choice of technology was the result of a complex interaction 
between British policy making and regulatory decisions, environmental circumstances, 
and the individual business strategies of the whaling companies. 
 
 
The geo-political context of the modern whaling industry in the Antarctic 
The development of the modern whaling industry in the Antarctic was related to the 
broader geo-political situation in this region at the turn of the 20th century, particularly 
the ambitions of the British Empire. At this time, the legal status of the Antarctic was 
uncertain. No states had any good reason to claim it. The only exception was the British 
explorer James Cook, who had claimed South Georgia on behalf of Britain back in 1775. 
However, when Compañia Argentina de Pesca Sociedad Anónima established itself in 
South Georgia in the summer of 1904–1905, the company and the governor of the 
Falkland Islands were unaware of James Cook’s claim.581 It seems, according to Hart, that 
the British authorities were equally unaware of this at the time.582 Once the British 
Foreign Office realised James Cook’s earlier claim, Great Britain soon reaffirmed its 
sovereignty over South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands, the South Orkney Islands, 
and the South Shetland Islands. In 1906, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry asked its 
British counterpart about the legal status of the South Shetland Islands, as the governor 
of the Falkland Islands appeared to have no knowledge of the legal status of the areas in 
question.583 On May 16, 1906, the British foreign minister, Sir Edward Grey, informed 
the Norwegian minister in London, Fridtjof Nansen, that South Georgia, the South 
Shetland Islands, the South Orkneys, and the northern part of Graham Land on the 
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Antarctic Peninsula were British.584 Grey told Nansen that the Norwegian whaling 
industry should apply to the governor of the Falkland Islands for any facilities the 
industry might need.585 This was one of the first steps made by the British authorities to 
assert British claims to an area primarily populated by non-British whaling companies. 
In October that same year, the British authorities issued the Whale Fishery Ordinance of 
1906, which stated that it was illegal for whaling companies to catch whales in these 
areas without concession from Great Britain.586 
 
In other words, Britain ordered the whaling companies to apply to the British Colonial 
Office and to the governor of the Falkland Islands for permission to conduct whaling 
operations and establish a whaling station. These licences determined the geographical 
boundaries the company could operate within, as well as the number of whale catchers 
they could use. Two years later, the British authorities issued the Letters Patent of July 
21, 1908. With this document, Great Britain claimed the territorial rights in these parts 
of the Antarctic: “the groups of islands known as South Georgia, the South Orkneys, the 
South Shetlands, and the South Sandwich Islands, and the territory known as Grahams 
Land, situated in the South Atlantic Ocean to the south of the fiftieth parallel of south 
latitude, and lying between the twentieth and the eightieth degrees of west longitude, 
which are part of our dominions are to be administered as Dependencies of our colony of 
the Falkland Islands.”587 With this statement, Great Britain reasserted historical claims to 
the areas in question. According to Dodds, the Antarctic Peninsula and many other areas 
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in the Antarctic were demarcated into the Falkland Islands Dependencies at the stroke 
of a pen, with the result that thousands of square miles of ocean, islands, and continental 
landscapes were incorporated into their imperial state.588 They did, however, have to 
adjust the extent of the continental landscapes because they included parts of other 
sovereign states such as Argentina. Great Britain supported their claims by saying the 
whale industry needed to be controlled to sustain the whale populations and to avoid 
the overexploitation that had taken place elsewhere.589  
However, as Klaus Dodds and Peder Roberts have shown, the whaling regulations were 
means to achieve other ends. Firstly, the British government wanted to establish and 
maintain its rule over the area because it considered it to be strategically important. The 
concession system supported this end – when whaling companies from various nations 
applied to the British authorities for concessions and leases, Britain argued that this 
constituted recognition of British sovereignty in the region. Secondly, the British 
colonial authorities profited from annual licences and fees and taxes from whale oil 
production. The British regulations for the whaling industry were means to achieve 
these ends.590 
 
Prince Olav Harbour and British geo-politics in South Georgia 
At the turn of the 20th century, the whaling industry’s favourite spot in the Antarctic was 
South Georgia. Between 1904 and 1908, no less than seven whaling companies 
established whaling stations there. In 1908, the British Colonial Office decided not to 
issue any further leases for South Georgia.591 Three years later, in 1911, the Colonial 
Office decided to issue a final concession and lease at the island. Several applicants 
contacted the British Foreign Ministry after hearing the news. The first whaling actors to 
react were the Norwegians Carl Anton Larsen and Alex Lange.592 They were both 
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experienced whaling entrepreneurs and had participated in the industry in the Antarctic 
at the turn of the century. Chr. Salvesen & Co, and a group consisting of the Irvin family 
and C.O. Johnson also contacted the British Foreign Ministry and applied to the Colonial 
Office. The Colonial Office favoured the application of the two Norwegians over the two 
British applicants.593 Both applicants intended to establish a whaling station at Prince 
Olav Harbour and to operate in the waters of South Georgia.594 
 
Interestingly enough, the magistrate of South Georgia had forwarded C.A. Larsen’s 
application to the British Colonial Office in London with a recommendation to consider 
Larsen’s application as he was a “naturalized British subject of the colony”.595 The 
interest in the eight concessions stimulated much discussion within the Colonial Office 
about British policy in the region. The Secretary of State for the colonies, Mr Harcourt, 
argued that nine rather than eight concessions should be offered in South Georgia. 596 He 
also argued that it would be wise to postpone any decision on the ninth concession until 
the application could be granted to a British firm.597 The magistrate of South Georgia 
argued that Mr. Lange’s application was the strongest.598 In spite of Mr Harcourt’s 
opinion, the Colonial Office turned down both applications from the British companies. 
The Colonial Office wrote to the Irvin and Johnson group that the prospects of getting a 
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licence in South Georgia were slim,599 but that they could offer them a concession to 
operate in the South Orkney Islands instead, where six other whaling companies had 
already been given concessions.600 Having little whaling experience, it is likely that the 
Irvin and Johnson group realised that operating in the South Orkney Islands, where 
many others had failed, would place them in a precarious financial situation. 
 
Mr. Irvin appealed to the Secretary of State, Mr. Harcourt, requesting a meeting with him 
to discuss the matter. He argued that  “it is a matter of life and death to us financially”.601 
Mr. Irvin explained  the national importance of their fishing and trawling business, 
which incorporated more than 140 steam vessels, 1,300 fishermen, and an additional 
1,200 employees in subsidiary companies. Mr. Irvin ended his letter by stating that “the 
British know very little about it, and the government had an opportunity here, I think, of 
giving the British a chance to lend a hand in developing the industry in His Majesty’s 
territories…our scheme is one involving great risk and difficulty, but we hope, with 
perseverance and with all-important backing from our government, to make it a 
success”.602 
 
In early July, the Colonial Office decided to award the ninth concession and lease for 
South Georgia to the British company,603 effectively excluding the two Norwegian 
companies. Whether or not this was a result of Mr. Irvin’s letter is uncertain. As 
compensation for losing the concession at Prince Olav Harbour, the Colonial Office 
offered Mr. Lange a concession and lease to build a whaling station on Deception 
Island.604 These moves by the British authorities could be interpreted as a strategy to 
strengthen British occupation of South Georgia by increasing the presence of British 
business activities there. Establishing a second British whaling station at South Georgia 
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could have been an important step towards achieving this; especially at a symbolic 
location like Possession Bay – where James Cook had claimed South Georgia for Britain 
in 1775. 
 
On June 1, Chr. Salvesen & Co decided to withdraw their application605 and the Colonial 
Office granted the concession to the Irvin and Johnson group, replacing the concession 
the company had received, rather unwillingly, for the South Orkney Islands earlier.606 In 
1911, the Colonial Office granted a concession and lease for a period of 21 years at 
Prince Olav Harbour to the Irvin and Johnson group and their company the Southern 
Whaling & Sealing Company. 
 
Why did the British authorities act the way they did? Was the primary motive for their 
change in whaling policy at South Georgia a desire to increase British economic presence 
in a region, which up to this point had been dominated by Norwegian citizens and 
capital? This contradicts the arguments of Gordon Jackson in 1978, who claimed that the 
British Colonial Office had conducted an anti-British policy that favoured non-British 
industrial enterprises.607 Jackson’s argument appears to be based on the fact that the 
British authorities turned down several applications from Chr. Salvesen & Co. Here, I 
argue that the British authorities’ goal in granting the concession and lease at Prince 
Olav Harbour to the Irvin and Johnson group and the Southern Whaling & Sealing 
Company in 1911 was to increase British economic interests in South Georgia. This 
policy grew stronger during the First World War and later during the post-war years. 
During this period, the British colonial authorities granted extraordinary liberties to 
British companies, which gave them operational and economic advantages over their 
non-British competitors. 
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Signy Island in British geo-politics at the South Orkney Islands 
In the spring of 1920, the management of A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri, which consisted of 
K. Ludv Henriksen, Joh Gmeiner, and Hans Borge,608 contacted the Colonial Office to 
negotiate a whaling concession and lease of land in the South Orkney Islands. At the 
time, A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri already operated a whaling station in South Georgia. 
Hans Borge was assigned the task of negotiating and handling discussions with the 
Colonial Office. The choice to assign Borge was probably strategic since he managed the 
whaling companies A/S Kastor,609 and A/S Rethval from 1911 to 1915.610 He also took 
part in whaling activities in the South Orkney Islands for A/S Rethval. During this time, 
Borge accumulated knowledge of local conditions, such as good anchorages and 
available freshwater. He also produced several maps of the South Orkneys, which meant 
that he was in a unique position to suggest a suitable location for the intended 
company’s whaling operations. It seems likely, therefore, that the management’s 
decision to expand their local network in the Antarctic by applying for a concession to 
operate in the South Orkney Islands, was highly influenced by Borge. It is also likely that 
Borge’s maps and local knowledge were useful resources in persuading the company’s 
shareholders to support a new whaling project in one of the harshest areas in the 
Antarctic. 
 
During his negotiations with the British authorities, Borge applied on behalf of the 
company for a concession and lease for five years to establish a whaling station. The 
company intended to operate with two whale catchers.611 The application was discussed 
at the Colonial Office, where they realised that no whaling operations had taken place in 
the South Orkneys since the 1914–1915 season, when a whaling company called A/S 
Rethval had operated there. According to Roberts, the Colonial Office could not deny the 
application based on concerns of overharvesting the whale populations. 612 The 
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magistrate for South Georgia supported A/S Tønsberg’s application – they had already 
seen the company transport equipment for the intended whaling station and store it at 
their station at Husvik harbour in South Georgia. This equipment included all the 
buildings and technical installations for their Signy Island station, and they intended to 
transport these materials there as soon as their application was approved.613 Before the 
British authorities made any decision, they investigated whether any British whaling 
companies were interested in the concession and lease.614 Chr. Salvesen & Co and the 
Southern Whaling & Sealing Company both declined the offer, and the Colonial Office 
granted approval to A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri. It is interesting that Chr. Salvesen & Co 
declined the offer, since this company had applied for and been denied a concession for 
the same area only five years earlier.615 I believe that, just like in South Georgia, the 
Colonial Office and the government of the Falkland Islands’ primary motive was to 
attract British whaling companies to an area that had been dominated by Norwegian 
companies. Increasing British presence through economic activities established British 
occupation of the British Falkland Island Dependencies (which were recently founded 
through the declaration of the 1908 Letters Patent).616 
 
There were no objections to Britain’s 1908 proclamation.617 However, Argentina 
claimed some of the same areas in the Antarctic as Britain did. In early 1910, a British 
diplomat named Walter Townly reported to the Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey that 
Argentinean newspapers questioned the validity of the British territorial claims.618 
According to him, the newspapers had reported on a ceremony that took place at Laurie 
Island in South Orkney in connection to the takeover from William Speirs Bruce. During 
the ceremony, an Argentinean delegation took possession of a meteorological station 
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originally built by the Scots, hoisted the Argentinean flag, and took down the Scottish 
flag to symbolise their claim of the area.619 
 
The governor of the Falkland Islands and the British Foreign Office had already 
discussed the legal status of South Orkney in 1906. During these discussions, the 
governor of the Falkland Islands, Allardyce, suggested that Britain should not send an 
expedition to hoist the British flag in the South Orkney Islands, but should rather 
approach carefully: “I need hardly point out the undesirability of attracting the attention 
of foreign powers to the groups in question. For the present it is more important to 
establish the British title to them and preserve the right of British subjects to resort to 
them than to treat them as a source of revenue. You will therefore be careful not to impose 
onerous conditions on foreigners resorting to them for whaling and sealing”.620 
 
To commercial actors interested in whaling in the South Orkney Islands, the legal status 
of the archipelago seemed uncertain. The Norwegian government, acting on behalf of 
Norwegian whaling companies, inquired with various scientists on the matter since they 
had the impression that Britain had only claimed the Falkland Islands and South Georgia 
as British dominions.621 Mr Nansen contacted the British government and asked them to 
answer three questions: “1) Since when have the South Orkney, South Shetlands, and 
Graham Land been considered to belong to the British Crown?; 2) Have any special action 
been taken upon which the British sovereignty over these regions is based, and which, 
according to generally recognised principles of International Customs and Usages, is 
relevant in this case? 3) Has there been any notification from His Britannic Majesty’s 
government to Foreign Governments of the occupation of these countries under British 
Crown?” The Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey responded that British sovereignty of 
the areas in question were based on historical discoveries and acts of possession made 
by Captain Powell, Captain Foster, and Captain Biscoe.622 Furthermore, Mr Grey pointed 
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out that it was “not the policy of His Majesty’s government to notify to foreign governments 
additions to British territory made by annexation, occupation, or otherwise”.623 
 
The British interest in the South Orkney Islands appears to have been modest only a few 
years earlier. The leader of the Scottish National Antarctic Expedition in 1902–1904, 
William Speirs Bruce, requested authority from the British representative in Argentina 
and the governor of the Falkland Islands to claim the South Orkney Islands on behalf of 
Great Britain and was turned down.624 The reason was that neither of the two regarded 
the archipelago as important and argued that if the Argentineans wanted the South 
Orkneys for a meteorological station, then they should be allowed to have them.625 On 
February 22, 1904, Bruce formally handed over the station to the Oficina Meteorologica 
Argentina,626 and the Argentinean flag was hoisted. 
  
Fig 86 and 87. The remains of Omond House erected by the Scottish National Antarctic Expedition at Laurie 
Island, South Orkney Islands, Antarctica. Right: Photo taken with permission for this thesis at Orcada 
Research Station at Laurie Island showing the formal hand over of the observatory of the Scottish National 
Antarctic Expedition to the Oficina Meteorologica Argentina in February 1904. Photo: G. Rossnes. LASHIPA 
8/2010. 
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In 1909, the British Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, and the governor of the Falkland 
Islands discussed whether to officially cede the South Orkney Islands to Argentina627 
because the islands were considered to have no strategic value for Britain, except for 
meteorological uses, since they lacked good harbours and were ice-bound for long 
periods of the year.628 It is interesting that Britain only three years earlier, on 23 August 
1906, and again in January 1907, notified the Argentinean government that the South 
Orkney Islands were British possessions.629 The Foreign Office believed that Great 
Britain should not cede the South Orkneys to Argentina for several reasons. Although 
the revenues gained from whaling concessions were minor, Sir Edward Grey believed 
that British firms might establish themselves in the area. He also argued that the islands 
should not be surrendered unless Argentina provided Britain with adequate 
compensation.630 Based on Grey’s arguments, the Foreign Office suggested that Great 
Britain should reaffirm her claim to the archipelago by despatching one of His Majesty’s 
ships to perform acts of ownership.631 The British admiralty were not keen to endanger 
one of their modern warships in the Antarctic ice for such an expedition.632 
 
The whaling concessions should be understood in this context. Rather than just being a 
tool to control overexploitation of the whale populations, they were a political tool to 
support and reinforce British claims to the area and the Antarctic as a whole. In 1912, 
the British governor of the Falkland Islands called it “third party recognition”.633 This 
was not only a support for the British claims. The mere presence of the Norwegian 
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whaling industry in the South Orkney Islands also represented a form for an indirect 
effective occupation since it consisted of Norwegians rather than British citizens. In this 
context, it is surprising that Magnus Konow’s ambitious project to establish a whaling 
station at Scotia Bay on Laurie Island was not supported by the British authorities. They 
refused his application for exclusive whaling rights for 21 years, instead granting him 
rights for one year.634 Perhaps the British authorities feared that Konow’s project was a 
covert Argentinean attempt to strengthen their presence in the archipelago, since 
Konow frequently corresponded with the British authorities using a listed Argentinean 
address. Whether this was true or not, a project that may have established an 
Argentinean whaling station, which could be used by the Argentinean government to 
bolster their influence in the South Orkneys, was not strategically wise for the British as 
it could draw unwanted attention to the uncertain legal status of the archipelago. 
 
According to Palmer, the governor of the Falkland Islands, Allardyce, appeared to change 
his mind about ceding the South Orkney Islands to Argentina in 1910.635 Allardyce 
probably realised the positive effects the revenues of the modern whaling industry had 
on the Falkland Islands’ parlous economy.636 In an attempt to establish British whaling 
in the South Orkneys, and thus secure effective British occupation, the government of 
the Falkland Island Dependencies offered a whaling concession to the Irvin and Johnson 
group and their whaling company the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company.637 This 
group had, as mentioned above, applied for a concession and lease at South Georgia but 
were instead offered one for the South Orkney Islands. Although the company declined 
the offer, it indicates that the government of the Falkland Island Dependencies wanted 
to establish British whaling in the region. Parallel to this, six other whaling companies 
were granted concessions to operate in the same area.638 The following year, in 1912, 
the Foreign Office approached the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company again and 
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offered them a sealing licence in the South Orkneys.639 In an attempt to establish 
territorial control and exercise sovereignty, the government of the Falkland Island 
Dependencies also tried to hire a customs officer in the South Orkney Islands. The offer 
was initially made to Moyes,640 who had acted as the government representative and 
customs officer onboard factory ships in the South Orkneys.641 Moyes turned down the 
offer, and the position was offered to William Speirs Bruce, who had operated a 
meteorological observatory at Laurie Island between 1902 and 1904. Bruce also 
declined the offer because the salary was too low and because he had scientific 
commitments elsewhere.642 Despite the increasing interest and revenues from whaling 
operations in the South Orkney Islands, the decision to cede the archipelago to 
Argentina appeared to be unresolved. In 1914, the discussion came to a close after 
Argentina declined an offer from Great Britain.643 There was nothing the British 
authorities in the Falkland Islands could do to exercise sovereignty over the South 
Orkney Islands, until A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri showed interest in operating in the area. 
Their application for a concession to conduct whaling there supported the British 
authorities’ claim to sovereignty there and provided a support base for British activities 
in the South Orkneys. 
 
Antarctic geo-politics and the modern whaling industry during the First 
Word War 
During the First World War, Britain changed its whaling regulations in several ways to 
support the political interests of the British Empire. British authorities became 
increasingly aware of the strategic importance of whale oil, and therefore of the entire 
                                                 
639 ”Confidential letter from L. Harcourt, to The Governor W.L. Allardyce. November 11, 1912”. Vol: D5-1-4-4. 
The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of the estate of David Wynn-
Williams. 
640 “Letter from the Colonial Secretary, to Mr. Moyes. July 31, 1912”. Vol: D5-1-4-5. The Archive of the British 
Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of the estate of David Wynn-Williams. 
641 “Letter from the Governor of the Falkland Islands, to the Honble. Lewis Harcourt. Secretary of State for the 
Colonies. April 11, 1913”. Vol: D5-1-5-5. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind 
permission of the estate of David Wynn-Williams. 
642 ”Letter from WM. S. Bruce of the Scottish Geographical Laboratory in Edinburgh, to The Secretary of State 
for the Colonies in London. August 13, 1913”. Vol: D5-1-4-4. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. 
Reproduced by kind permission of the estate of David Wynn-Williams. It is not unlikely that Mr. Bruce 
negative response was also a result of the previous lack of support from the British authorities for his 
earlier initiative to claim South Orkney for Britain. When Bruce launched the Scottish National Antarctic 
Expedition in 1902, he received no financial support from the British authorities, and had to rely almost 
entirely on the private support of the Coats family. Furthermore, his attempt to gain the support from the 
Royal Geographical Society in London was met with similar response 
643 Dodds. K. Pink Ice: Britain and the South Atlantic Empire. 2002. P: 17. 
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Antarctic region. In February 1916, the Minister of Munitions stated, “it is of urgent 
national importance to increase output of best qualities whale-oil suitable for manufacture 
of glycerine. Propose therefore to grant additional licences to British firms for next season. 
Request you will relax regulations as to the utilisation of whole carcass, towing, and 
buoying as far as you may judge necessary to increase output during current season”.644 
 
Due to the importance of whale oil to the British war effort, Britain reaffirmed her claim 
to sovereignty over the area through the Letters Patent of 1917.645 Darnley at the 
Colonial Office argued that it was urgent to establish an interdepartmental committee 
with the explicit purpose of increasing Great Britain’s control over the whaling industry 
and whale oil production in the Antarctic.646 In the report, the committee pointed out 
that the whaling industry had collapsed in Greenland and Spitsbergen because of 
excessive hunting, and expressed fear that a similar collapse might occur in the Falkland 
Island Dependencies. Therefore, Britain made it a national security issue to strengthen 
its control over the whaling industry in the Antarctic. Doing so served several goals. 
Firstly, it secured control and access to whale oil. Secondly, by reaffirming British 
territorial claims and increasing the number of British actors within the whaling 
industry there, they secured effective occupation.647 After the end of the First World 
War, the importance of the whaling industry and its products were summarised in the 
Interdepartmental Report of 1920. This report concluded that “without whale oil. the 
government would have been unable to carry out both its food and munition campaigns, 
since the use of this oil in the production of glycerine had freed other fats for edible 
purposes”.648 An additional and closely related motive was the attack by the German 
navy on the Falkland Islands during the war. 
 
                                                 
644 ”Telegram from the Secretary of State, to Governor. February 9, 1916”. The Falkland Islands Archive. Vol: 
SGD/WAH/1. SG&DEP, Whaling – General (1), 1915-1921. 
645 “British Letters Patent of 1908, and 1917 constituting the Falkland Islands Dependencies”. 1948. In: Polar 
Record. Vol 5, January-July 1948. 
646 “Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Research and Development in the Dependencies of the 
Falkland Islands. April, 1920”. The Norwegian Polar Institutes Library, Tromsø. Norway. See also: Dodds. K. 
J. “Antarctica and the modern geographical imagination (1918-1960)”. 1997. P: 50. In: Polar Record. 33 
(184). Pp: 47-62. 
647 “Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Research and Development in the Dependencies of the 
Falkland Islands. April, 1920”. The Norwegian Polar Institutes Library, Tromsø. Norway. 
648 “Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Research and Development in the Dependencies of the 
Falkland Islands. April, 1920. P: 67”. The Norwegian Polar Institutes Library, Tromsø. Norway. 
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To maximise whale oil production, the British authorities awarded extraordinary 
operational freedom to whaling companies in the Antarctic. They eased previous 
demands on full utilisation of the whales, as well as limitations on the number of whale 
catchers companies could use.649 Throughout the war, the market and prices for oils 
from the Antarctic were not determined by conventional supply and demand of the open 
market, but by Great Britain.650 
 
When the British authorities abandoned their war-time whaling policy and returned to 
normal conditions in 1920, the market changed rapidly.651 Buyers of whale oil were 
expecting a booming demand for oils and fats, which led to a dramatic increase in prices 
from £57 per ton in 1918, to £67 per ton in 1919, and £88 per ton in 1920. To ensure 
survival of the whale populations and the whaling industry, the British authorities 
introduced closed and open hunting seasons. Whaling companies were only allowed to 
operate during the open season, which lasted from September 15 to May 31.652 In this 
way, Britain used the Antarctic whaling industry as a tool to govern and maintain 
control over its claims to the Antarctic in the opening decades of the 20th century, up 




I have discussed the two local networks used by the modern whaling industry in the 
Antarctic, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of these. During the early phase 
of the industry, most companies operated shore-based whaling station in South Georgia, 
where there were plenty of whales in the surrounding ocean. South Georgia was, 
perhaps, also less affected by ice than other areas, such as the South Orkney Islands, the 
South Shetland Islands, and the Ross Sea area. The industry’s catches and production 
peaked during the First World War when demands for whale oil increased for glycerine 
production. Catches and production also peaked during the 1920s until prices for oils 
and fats dropped on the market. To counteract this and to continue to generate profits 
                                                 
649 “Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Governor. 9 February 1916”, The Falkland Islands Archive. 
Vol: SGD/WAH/1. SG&DEP, Whaling – General (1), 1915-1921. 
650 Jackson. G. The British Whaling Trade. 1978. P: 190. 
651 Jackson. G. The British Whaling Trade. 1978. P: 190. 
652 ”Report on the whaling industry in South Georgia for 1920/21. W. Barlas Stipendiary Magistrate, to the 
Honourable Colonial Secretary in Stanley. June 20, 1921”. The Falkland Islands Archive. Vol: STACK. 
Dependencies. Whaling (3). 1923-1929. 
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and pay out dividends to their shareholders, the whaling companies sought new ways to 
move from controlled areas. New technologies within shipbuilding, evaporation, stern 
slipway, and the whale-claw made the transition from land to the open sea, and the shift 
from controlled to unrestricted areas, possible. 
 
The development of pelagic whaling was in many ways the beginning of the end for the 
industry. Whaling returned to its old habits of rapid overexploitation of limited 
resources over a short period of time. As a consequence, the whaling companies’ local 
networks could no longer generate the necessary profits to maintain the support of their 
global networks. They essentially removed the foundation of their activities in their 
ambition to become ever more profitable. 
 
The British ambitions, and the strategies they used, fulfilled the nation’s geo-political 
goals and colonial ambitions of using the modern whaling industry to manifest and 
consolidate British ownership of large parts of the Antarctic. The British concession and 
lease system safeguarded controlled exploitation of the whale populations by limiting 
the companies’ hunting capabilities and by enforcing demands on utilisation of the raw 
materials. Taxation of the oil produced was also important for sustaining the Falkland 
Islands’ government and their work. Finally, by applying to the British Colonial Office 
and the governor of the Falkland Islands, the whaling companies recognised British 
ownership and dominion over this part of the Antarctic, which reinforced the British 
claim. The British claims were not challenged. It is within this context that the following 













7. Prince Olav Harbour whaling station, South Georgia 
 
Introduction 
South Georgia is an island located south of the Antarctic convergence, north of 60⁰S, in 
an area known as the Subantarctic or peri-Antarctic. The island is mountainous with 
several peaks exceeding 2,000 metres above sea level. 
 
Fig 88. Map of South Georgia. Six whaling stations and one semi-pelagic site (Godthul) have operated at 
South Georgia: Grytviken (1904–1966 with some interruptions), Stromness (1907–1961 with some 
interruptions), Husvik (1907–1960 with some interruptions), Prince Olav Harbour (1911–1931), Ocean 
Harbour (1909–1920), Leith Harbour (1909–1965 with some interruptions), and Godthul (1908–1929). Map 
data have kindly been provided by the British Antarctic Surveys. 
 
The companies 
The whaling companies that operated the station were: 
• Irvin and Johnson  (1916–1919) 
• Lever Bros/Unilever (1920–1931) 
 
During the first decade of the 20th century, both of these companies were international 










difficult to summarise their complete business activities. This chapter is therefore 
restricted to the company histories that are directly related to the whaling industry, in 
particular at South Georgia. 
 
To operationalise the whaling project at South Georgia, Irvin and Johnson created the 
Southern Whaling & Sealing Company in 1911. Lever Bros took the company’s name 
when they bought the station in 1919; therefore, the Southern Whaling & Sealing 
Company was operational for as long as Prince Olav Harbour was active. To avoid any 
confusion, I have clarified the ownership where necessary in this chapter. 
 
Irvin and Johnson and the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company 
The Southern Whaling & Sealing Company was formed in 1911 by a small group of 
entrepreneurs that consisted of the British company Richard Irvin & Sons Ltd and the 
Swede Carl Ossian Johnson. At the time, Richard Irvin & Sons Ltd was a fishing and 
trawling company based in North Shields in Great Britain.653 At the turn of the 20th 
century, the company decided to expand to South Africa where they established a 
daughter company, the African Fishing & Trading Company, in 1903. The company 
carried out its first fishery surveys off the South African coast using the survey ship 
Pieter Faure. At the turn of the century, they conducted several surveys and trawling 
operations in the Agulhas Bank.654 It is probable that Richard Irvin & Sons Ltd were 
motivated to expand their activities to South Africa to exploit these fishing grounds. The 
Irvin family had total control over The African Fishing & Trading Company, which was 
managed by Georgia D. Irvin.655 The Irvin family commissioned two fish-trawlers (Star 
of Peace and Star of the South), which formed the basis of the company’s activities. 
According to Greenwood-Johnson et al., the company made good catches but lacked 
direct access to the South African market. Consequently, the company had difficulties 
selling its catches and resorted to selling them for low rates at an auction in Cape Town. 
 
                                                 
653 For further reading on this company, please see Jackson. G. The British Whaling Trade. 1979. P: 174f. 
654 ”The History of the Irvin and Johnson Limited, Part 1 & 2. By Greenwood-Johnson.E, Abao.H,Rosenthal. E ”. 
Unpublished confidential file. P: 6. The Private Collection of Glenn McIntosh. Australia. 
655 ”The History of the Irvin and Johnson Limited, Part 1 & 2. By Greenwood-Johnson.E, Abao.H,Rosenthal. E”. 
Unpublished confidential file. P: 6f. The Private Collection of Glenn McIntosh. Australia. 
 218 
 
Fig 89. The fish-trawler Star of the South of the 
African Fishing & Trawling Company. The photo 











Carl Ossian Johnson experienced a similar situation. Johnson moved to South Africa from 
Sweden and decided to stay there and make a living. After running several relatively 
successful smaller businesses, which included a bicycle factory and a rickshaw service, 
Johnson invested in the growing fishing industry.656 In 1903, he formed his own fishing 
company and went back to Sweden to buy a fish-trawler. This ship (the Berea) arrived in 
South Africa at the same time as the Star of Peace and the Star of the South. It appears 
that Johnson and Irvin first met at an auction in Cape Town and decided to collaborate. 
Shortly after the auction, they negotiated a contract with the Imperial Cold Storage 
Company Ltd to store their catches. While George Irvin based his activities in Cape Town 
and Johannesburg, Johnson conducted his business in Durban and Natal. In 1909, Irvin 
and Johnson merged their two businesses under the new company name Irvin and 
Johnson.657 Their main motive for doing so was probably to reduce operational costs and 
to maximise profits. Their new company proved to be a successful merger. Irvin and 
Johnson quickly secured themselves large market shares and a dominant position within 
the fishing business in South Africa.658 
 
                                                 
656 ”The History of the Irvin and Johnson Limited, Part 1 & 2. By Greenwood-Johnson.E, Abao.H,Rosenthal. E”. 
Unpublished confidential file. P: 6. The Private Collection of Glenn McIntosh. Australia. 
657 ”The History of the Irvin and Johnson Limited, Part 1 & 2. By Greenwood-Johnson.E, Abao.H,Rosenthal. E”. 
Unpublished confidential file. P: 10. The Private Collection of Glenn McIntosh. Australia. 
658 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. Vol: 2. P: 378. In: Den Modern Hvalfangst 
Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 1967. 
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The marine resources off the African coast also attracted actors from the modern 
whaling industry. In 1908, the Norwegian whalers Johan Bryde and Jacob J. Egeland 
formed the South African Whaling Company, and established a whaling station at Bluff in 
Durban where they had secured a concession.659 The following year, Bryde and Egeland 
divided their business. Bryde continued to operate the station at Bluff and Egeland 
formed the Union Whaling & Fishing Co. Ltd. The success of these whaling operations 
attracted other Norwegian whaling industrialists such as M.A. Ingebrigtsen. Johnson was 
operating in the same area and must have noticed the whaling activities and the number 
of whales along the coast. The developments within the modern whaling industry, and 
the potential economic opportunities it represented probably interested Johnson and 
Irvin. However, they decided to invest in sealing. 
 
In 1909, they formed The Southern Sealing Company Ltd, having managed to secure a 
19-year licence to exploit the seal populations at Marion Island and Edward Island 
south-east of South Africa.660 Irvin and Johnson equipped an expedition (led by Johnson) 
that consisted of 100 workers. Due to a lack of archival sources, the results of the 
expedition are unknown. In 1910, they managed to convince Richard Irvin & Sons Ltd to 
establish a whaling station. This gave them access to additional capital and a distribution 
network in Great Britain to supplement their South African network. The group appears 
to have kept the whaling project a closed affair, with the Irvin family and Johnson being 
the only investors. Neither Irvin and Johnson nor Richard Irvin & Sons Ltd anchored the 
project in their individual businesses. The group generated a capital of £80,000 to 
materialise their project; £50,000 was paid in cash and the remaining £30,000 was 
generated by taking mortgages on their private properties and by borrowing on their 
own personal security.661 The group set up a plan that allowed them to operate in two 
different hunting grounds throughout the year. 
                                                 
659 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. Vol: 2. P: 436. In: Den Modern Hvalfangst 
Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 1967. 
660 ”Letter from John Irvin, to the Rt. Hon. Lewis V. Harcourt, M.P. Secretary of State for the Colonies. June 10, 
1911”. The Falkland Islands Archive. Vol: F. Confidential despatch book Jan 1909 – Aug 1911. Inward , No 
40. See also: ”The History of the Irvin and Johnson Limited, Part 1 & 2. By Greenwood-Johnson.E, Abao. 
H,Rosenthal. E”. Unpublished confidential file. P: 9f. The Private Collection of Glenn McIntosh. Australia, 
and Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914.. Vol: 2. P: 378. In: Den Modern 
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661 ”The History of the Irvin and Johnson Limited, Part 1 & 2. By Greenwood-Johnson.E, Abao. H,Rosenthal. E”. 
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 220 
 
Operating in two areas was strategic because they could transfer their operations 
depending on catches. The company already wanted to operate in South Georgia and in 
Angola. In 1911, they formally applied to the British Colonial Office for a whaling 
concession in South Georgia, the South Orkney Islands, and the South Shetland 
Islands.662 They argued that their application should be granted because it was a British 
enterprise.663 The same year, the group applied for and was granted a whaling 
concession at Porto Alexandre in Angola.664 Irvin and Johnson’s decision to start whaling 
generated great public interest in Great Britain where it was seen as a national 
endeavour to compete with Norwegian companies over the resources in South 
Georgia.665 
 
The investments the group had made in its fleet and local network were premature since 
the British Colonial Office had not yet granted their application. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the Colonial Office had decided to issue a final whaling concession and 
lease at South Georgia, which generated great interest. Irvin and Johnson’s application 
was denied at first, even though British companies were favoured. In July 1911, the 
Colonial Office decided that the ninth concession and lease for South Georgia should be 
granted to a British company,666 which opened the door for Irvin and Johnson after Chr. 
Salvesen & Co. decided to withdraw their application.667 
 
Shortly after, Irvin and Johnson received the new decision from the Colonial Office, the 
company replied and requested that the concession and lease should be issued in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Jackson. G (1979) have incorrectly argued that the whaling project was exclusively restricted to Irvin & 
Johnson, and that they only were able to generate £60 000 by issuing shares. 
662 ”Letter from John H. Irvin, to the Under Secretary, Colonial Office in London. March 14, 1911”. Also in: 
“Letter from Harcourt, to the Governor W.L. Allardyce. March 22, 1911”. The Falkland Islands Archives. Vol: 
F. Confidential despatch book. Jan 1909 – Aug 1911, Inward. No 40. 
663 ”Letter from Richard Irvin & Sons Ltd, to the Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office in London. March 23, 
1911”. The Falkland Islands Archives. Vol: F. Confidential despatch book. Jan 1909 – Aug 1911, Inward. No 
40 
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Unpublished confidential file. The Private Collection of Glenn McIntosh. Australia. 
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Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 1967. 
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G. Confidential despatch book. Jan 1907 – Dec 1911. Outward. No 8. 
667 “Letter from L. Harcourt, to the Governor W.L. Allardyce. July 1, 1911”. The Falkland Islands Archives. 
Vol: F. Despatch book. Aug 1911 – June 1912. Inward, No 45. 
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name of the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company, which they officially registered.668 
Shortly after the British authorities proclaimed, as they had done in 1908, 669 not to issue 
or to grant any further applications for concessions and leases in South Georgia.670 The 
Southern Whaling & Sealing Company was consequently not a daughter company of the 
Irvin and Johnson Company in South Africa, as Tønnesen (1967), Jackson (1978), and 
Hart (2006) have argued,671 but one that resulted from the economic partnership of the 
Irvin family and C.O. Johnson. Securing the necessary licenses was a key task in the 
company management’s construction of a global network for their whaling project. 
Having accomplished this, the management continued the construction of their local 
network, which included recruiting knowledgeable and experienced workers for their 
whaling fleet. 
 
In the winter of 1911, a whaling station owned by the South Georgia Company and Chr. 
Salvesen & Co was partly destroyed by an avalanche at Leith Harbour, so they moved 
their station to a new location. The company asked the Colonial Office and the Governor 
of the Falkland Islands for permission to move their station to Prince Olav Harbour.672 
When the management of the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company heard about this, 
they contacted the Colonial Office to confirm that they had first priority to Prince Olav 
Harbour, and to investigate the validity of Salvesen & Co’s request. Irvin and Johnson 
suspected that Salvesen was not really interested in the site or in moving the station, but 
rather in obstructing competition over resources.673 A similar situation had occurred 
between Compañia Argentina de Pesca Sociedad Anónima and Tønsberg Hvalfangeri 
                                                 
668 ”Letter from Richard Irvin & Sons Ltd, to The Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office in London. June 28, 
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A/S in 1908.674 In this case, priority was given to the whaling company that had applied 
first for the area in question and had operated at South Georgia the longest.675 Under 
these conditions, Chr. Salvesen & Co’s application had the rights to Prince Olav Harbour 
as it was made earlier. However, C. A. Larsen and A. Lange had operated in the Antarctic 
even longer than Salvesen, giving them the rights. In the end, however, the Colonial 
Office and the Governor of the Falkland Islands excluded non-British whaling companies 
from the competition. 
 
In a letter to the Colonial Office, Irvin and Johnson argued that when a concession and 
lease is granted, it should apply to a specific harbour – Prince Olav Harbour in this 
case.676 However, Chr. Salvesen & Co’s application had priority over Irvin and Johnson’s, 
and the Colonial Office encouraged them to apply for a new site.677 In January, Irvin and 
Johnson sent in a new application for a site at Prince Olav Harbour.678 A condition of the 
concession and lease meant that Chr. Salvesen & Co had to surrender their licence at 
either Leith Harbour or Allardyce Harbour before they established a new station at 
Prince Olav Harbour. The Colonial Office demanded that this condition be met by the end 
of September 1913.679 Chr. Salvesen & Co rejected these demands and the offer for 
Prince Olav Harbour and decided to move their station to a new location in the 
vicinity.680 
 
It appears, therefore, that the Colonial Office favoured British economic activities rather 
than being anti-British, as Jackson has argued.681 This strategy may have been politically 
motivated. The legal status of South Georgia, the South Orkney Islands, the South 
Sandwich Islands, and the South Shetlands was uncertain at the turn of the 20th century. 
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The Colonial Office probably wanted to give the last concession to a British company to 
strengthen British presence in the area, especially at the symbolically important Prince 
Olav Harbour where James Cook had declared South Georgia as British in 1775. The 
Southern Whaling & Sealing Company had no experience of whaling, whereas Chr. 
Salvesen & Co had extensive whaling experience; therefore, it may have been considered 
strategic to favour the latter. Contrary to Jackson (1978), I argue that the Colonial 
Office’s decision was deliberately aimed at strengthening the presence of British whaling 
companies in the area. During the First World War, British companies were given other 
advantages, which favoured both the economic interests of the companies and the 
political motives of the British authorities. This pro-British strategy also included 
changing the Norwegian sounding name Prince Olav Harbour to Port Gladstone in 
1913.682 
 
Lever Bros and the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company 
Lever Bros (Unilever from January 1, 1930) was a British company founded in 1894 by 
William Hasketh Lever and his brother with a stock capital of £1.5 million.683 The two 
brothers started out as partners in their father’s grocery business in the early 1880s. 
During these years, the two brothers started to manufacture and sell soap under the 
brand   name Sunlight, which became a successful business. After one year, William 
Hasketh Lever bought his first soap factory, which allowed him to increase production 
from 20 tons per week to 450 tons per week by 1887.684 One of the reasons behind 
Lever’s success was that he realised the buying potential of the working class early on, 
especially women who were the prime purchasers in the household. The Lever brothers 
invested the profits they made from selling their shares in the grocery business into the 
settlement Port Sunlight. They designed Post Sunlight to maximise efficiency, output, 
and profit in several ways, including the settlement plan, the architecture, and their 
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contracts with employees.685 By 1890, Lever Bros had expanded into a multinational 
company, with agencies and plantations across Europe, North America, Africa, and 
Australia. By 1913, Lever Bros had 64 associated companies, and by 1920 this had 
grown to 158 associated companies with a total capital of £130 million. The rapid 
expansion and multinational structure of Lever Bros makes it difficult to give an 
overview of the entire company and its activities.686 
 
I will focus on the company’s involvement in the modern whaling industry. One of Lever 
Bros’ primary motives for investing in the whaling industry was their need for cheap 
raw materials to produce margarine and soaps. The British government asked Lever 
Bros to establish a margarine factory prior to the outbreak of the First World War, so 
they set up the Planters Margarine Company together with Joseph Watson & Sons Ltd.687 
 
The number of margarine factories was increasing across Europe and analysts expected 
that oil prices would increase rapidly as the competition for raw materials increased. 
During the first two decades of the 20th century, Lever Bros expanded their activities. 
They strategically secured control over raw materials for margarine production.688 
During the same period, Lever Bros controlled an increasing part of the market in 
Europe and Africa, which culminated in their purchase of 50% of the shares in De 
Nordiske Fabrikker (De-No-Fa) and the South African Soap Makers Association in 1915. 
                                                 
685 The worker houses at Port Sunlight were designed in a variety of styles, and where Lever employees 
could live in accordance to Levers Rulebook which applied throughout the area. Here the workers could 
stay and work as long as they were able to maintain their jobs- if they lost it for whatever reason, that also 
lost their accommodation rights. In 1909, Lever introduced a new strategy he called “co-partnership” in 
which those that qualified for it held no monetary value; instead they were given to share a small part of 
any eventual economical dividend the company made. This system, which was liable for cancellation if the 
worker displayed negligence of duty, dishonesty or immoral behaviour, was aimed at increasing 
production as it gave the workers the feeling of being a part of the business- much like the salary system 
within the modern whaling industry. For further reading see: Unilevers World. CIS. Anti-Report. No 11. 
1975. 
686 For more information on Lever Bros/ Unilever, please see the works by: C. Wilson. The History of 
Unilever: A Study of Economic Growth and Social Change. Vol 1 & 2. 1954. Fieldhouse. D.K. Unilever 
Overseas: The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895-1965. 1978. 
687 Jackson. G. The British Whaling Trade. P: 184. 1978. 
688 In 1911, they established the Premier Whaling Company. In 1912, they established the Eastern 
Whaling Company and erected whaling stations at Bluff Cove in Durban and at Delgoa Bay, both in South 
Africa. See: Fieldhouse. D.K. Unilever Overseas: The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895-1965. 1978. P: 104. 
And Jackson. G. The British Whaling Trade. P: 210. 1978. 
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689 According to Fieldhouse and Jackson, the motive behind this acquisition was to 
regulate minimum prices and selling terms to maintain a profitable market.690 
 
The competition between European soap and margarine producers such as Lever Bros, 
Crosfield’s, Jurgens’, Van den Bergh, and Schicht’s increased the prices of raw materials. 
This created an economic incentive for industrialists to either establish whaling 
companies or find ways to increase production at existing stations. Several whaling 
companies joined forces and established the Whalers’ Assurance Union in 1911 and the 
Whalers’ Union in 1912.691 The soap and margarine producing companies reacted by 
doing the same. Anton Jurgens initiated the Whale Oil Pool in an attempt to counteract 
the situation. The Whale Oil Pool was not only created to prevent soap and margarine 
producers from dealing directly with the suppliers; it also aimed to secure and distribute 
the world’s supply of whale oil within the parties of the Pool itself.692 By removing 
expensive middle hands, the soap and margarine producers hoped to reduce the prices 
of raw materials,693 while the whaling companies wanted to hold on to their produce 
and get better prices. The cooperation between the buyers in the Whale Oil Pool 
encouraged whaling companies to increase their cooperation to prevent the market 
collapsing, and whale oil prices dropped.694 
 
The threat of war and slow developments at Lever Bros factories in the Belgian and 
French Congo combined with declining trade in Japan, China, South Africa, Sweden, 
Austria, and the USA made Lever Bros anxious to try and secure a sustainable supply of 
raw materials for their production.695 The First World War broke out, however, before 
the soap and margarine producers managed to secure long-term contracts with the 
whaling industry. This meant that Lever Bros were cut off from the lucrative markets in 
Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, and France. William Hesketh Lever tried to 
                                                 
689 Jackson. G. The British Whaling Trade. P: 180. 1978. 
690 Fieldhouse. D.K. Unilever Overseas: The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895-1965. P: 104. 1978. See also: 
Jackson. G. The British Whaling Trade. P: 107. 1978. 
691 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. Vol: 2. P: 519f. In: Den Modern Hvalfangst 
Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 1967. 
692 Wilson. C. The History of Unilever: A Study in Economic Growth and Social Change. Vol: 1. P: 138. 1954. 
693 Wilson. C. The History of Unilever: A Study in Economic Growth and Social Change. Vol: 2. P: 119. 1954. 
Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. Vol: 2. P: 510. In: Den Modern Hvalfangst 
Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 1967. 
694 Jackson. G. The British Whaling Trade. P: 176f. 1978. 
695 Wilson. C. The History of Unilever: A Study in Economic Growth and Social Change. Vol:1. P: 209f. 1954. 
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persuade the British government to allow him to export to these markets despite the 
situation, but the British government refused because they wanted to keep all available 
glycerine for the war effort.696 The government argued that glycerine produced by soap 
manufacturers was of national importance and that the soap industry needed to be 
strictly controlled by the state rather than private individuals with purely economic 
motives. Shortly after the British government ceased control of production, the supply of 
raw materials began to decline, especially after Dutch margarine manufacturers stored 
large amounts of oil in anticipation of a shortage of oil and fats on the market.697 
 
In early 1916, the British authorities asked the soap producers to significantly increase 
glycerine production. The demand for raw materials exceeded supply, but the prices for 
raw materials did not increase because the British government classified whale oil as 
contraband, and in 1916 restricted the export of whale oil produced in the British 
Dependencies in the Antarctic to Great Britain.698 For whaling companies operating 
under the British concession and lease system in the Antarctic, the open market was 
transformed into a controlled market where the buyer determined prices. On February 
25 1916, three soap makers in Great Britain made an agreement with the Minister of 
Munitions on the purchase, distribution, and production of glycerine from whale oil in 
Great Britain. 699 
 
Towards the end of the war, Lever Bros sought ways to increase the use of whale oil in 
their production. They stored as much whale oil as possible, motivated by a belief that 
there would be a shortage of oil and increasing prices once the market opened. To 
                                                 
696 Wilson. C. The History of Unilever: A Study in Economic Growth and Social Change . Vol: 1. P: 217. 1954. 
697 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del II: 1914-1924. Den Pelagiske Fangst 1924-1937. Vol: 3. P: 
140f. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 1969. 
698 ”Ordinance No 1, January 27, 1915. An Ordinance to amend the Whale Fishery Ordinance, 1908, with 
regard to the export of whale-oil”, and ”Ordinance No 10, December 2, 1915. Falkland Islands. An Ordinance 
to prohibit by regulations the export of whale-oil, except to the United Kingdom”. The Falkland Islands 
Archive. Vol: SG & DEP. Whaling – General. Vol 1. (1915 – 1921). “Letter to The Norwegian Whaling Union, 
from The Royal ForeignMinistry in Kristiania. August 25, 1914”, and “Letter to the Norwegian Whaling 
Union, from The Royal ForeignMinistry in Kristiania. December 10, 1914” Archive: Hvalfangerforeningen. 
Diverse Pakkesaker. Vol 4. 1913-1920. Kommendør Chr. Christensens Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. 
Norway. 
699 ”An agreement made the Twenty-fifth day of February 1916 between His Majesty’s Minister of Munitions 
of War, and Lever Brothers Limited, Joseph Crosfields & Sons Limited and Joseph Watsons & Sons Limited”. 
Archive: Hvalfangerforeningen. Diverse Pakkesaker. Vol: 3. 1912-1922. Kommendør Chr. Christensens 
Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. Whale-oil were controlled and distributed by Messrs. Meade 
King & Robinson of Liverpool, Lever Bros received 47.4%, while Joseph Crosfield & Sons Limited received 
31.6%, and Joseph Watson & Sons Limited 21% 
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increase their hydrogenation capability, the company invested more in oil shares to 
prevent post-war competition over oil. According to Jackson, the company had become 
dependent on whale oil by 1918.700 
 
Lever Bros was not the only actor on the market that regarded the post-war situation as 
a bright one for whaling. The Norwegian Whaling Union held a similar view, proclaiming 
that they “saw a bright future for the whaling industry which spoke of a new era”.701 This 
belief was founded on the assumption that the large demand for whale oil would 
continue after the war, and that new markets would open up in mid- and eastern 
Europe. The reopening of traditional markets in Germany and elsewhere was expected 
to increase the demand and competition for whale oil and rising prices were expected. 
Lever Bros tried to safeguard their dominant position in the market by incorporating 
additional whale oil producing companies into their supply network to secure a constant 
flow of whale oil without having to pay excessive prices. 
 
At a meeting with John Irvin in the summer of 1919, Lever Bros initiated negotiations to 
purchase the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company. Jackson (1978) suggested that one 
motive for purchasing this whaling company was its economic success during the war; it 
was economically more successful at whaling than Salvesen in the post-war seasons.702 
There are no sources to support that this was true, or that it was one of the arguments 
for buying the company. The available sources indicate that the Southern Whaling & 
Sealing Company had suffered substantial financial losses in South Georgia partly due to 
bad investments, poor organisation, and lack of social control. I will analyse the local 
network to show how and why production at Prince Olav Harbour suffered. Our 
knowledge of the rationale and negotiations between Irvin and Johnson and Lever Bros 
are limited due to lack of sources. 
 
The value of the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company, including the whaling station at 
Prince Olav Harbour and the fleet was, according to Jackson (1978), estimated by Lever 
                                                 
700 Jackson. G. The British Whaling Trade. P: 183. 1978. 
701 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del II: 1914-1924. Den Pelagiske Fangst 1924-1937. Vol: 3. P: 
179. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 1969. 
702 Jackson. G. The British Whaling Trade. P: 193. 1978. 
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Bros to be £440,000.703 Lever Bros offered the management of Irvin and Johnson 
£360,000 for the entire company and all its assets, and this offer was accepted.704 
Tønnesen (1967) argued that the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company was not sold 
until Lever Bros offered to buy 550,000 shares valued at £1 for £4 per share 
(£2,200,000).705 Unfortunately, Tønnesen does not support his claim with any 
references other than Bystrøm, who does not mention a price in his book.706 A number 
of sources indicate that the negotiations between the two companies likely went on for 
at least one year, and Johnson worked for one year at Lever Bros in England. In 1920, the 
year after Lever Bros had purchased the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company, Irvin 
and Johnson were involved in a workers conflict at Prince Olav Harbour.707 There are 
strong indications that Irvin and Johnson and Lever Bros continued their business 
relations after the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company was sold in 1919. 
 
 
Fig 90. Prince Olav Harbour whaling station as it looked when Lever Bros took over ownership. The photo has 
been published with the kind approval of Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum in Norway. 
                                                 
703 Jackson. G. The British Whaling Trade. 2nd edition. P: 174. 2005. This estimate included the whaling 
station at Prince Olav Harbour, including three whale catchers, the S/S Woodville, and the Sound of Jura. 
704 Jackson. G. The British Whaling Trade. 2nd edition. P: 174. 2005. 
705 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. Vol: 2. P: 451. In: Den Modern Hvalfangst 
Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 1967. 
706 Bystrøm. E. Et år på Syd-Georgia. 1944. The author worked for Chr. Salvesen & Co, and took part in the 
deconstruction of installations at the former whaling station at Prince Olav Harbour; an event which he 
vividly describes in the book. 
707 Børresen. D.I. The boys will die like flies; Afrikanere på hvalfangst I Antarktis 1908-1920. P: 91. In: 




Constructing the local networks 
In the first section of this chapter, I have shown how and why the industrialists Irvin and 
Johnson and Lever Bros/Unilever built the global networks that enabled them to build 
their local network. Based on fieldwork data and archival sources, I will explain how and 
why the local network was constructed, designed, and adapted to the environmental and 
contextual circumstances at South Georgia, and the consequences of these choices. I will 
also discuss how production at the whaling station was organised and how the 
companies used social strategies to maintain control. More importantly, I will discuss 
whether their whaling projects failed because of problems in the global network or the 
local network. 
 
The construction of the local network at Prince Olav Harbour and South Georgia can be 
divided into three phases: 
 
• Phase one (Irvin and Johnson 1911–1916) 
During this period, Irvin and Johnson operated with a semi-pelagic factory ship 
and built some installations on shore. 
 
• Phase two (Irvin and Johnson 1916–1919) 
A whaling station was constructed at Prince Olav Harbour and whaling 
operations began. 
 
• Phase three (Lever Bros/Unilever 1920–1931) 
Completion of the whaling station, operation, and closure in 1931. 
 
Phase one (Irvin and Johnson 1911–1916) 
Irvin and Johnson appeared to be confident that their application for South Georgia 
would be approved, since they started investing their capital in the project before 
getting permission from the Colonial Office and the Governor of the Falkland Islands. 
Within a few months they had invested in a fleet that would form the basis of their 
whaling operations. In February 1911, the company bought the sailing ship Sound of 
Jura for £2,750, and in April they bought the S/S Restitution in Great Britain for 
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£21,000.708 In addition, the company ordered three whale catchers from the Smiths 
Dock Company in Middlesborough, which were delivered in April. Together with the 
schooner Seabird, which Irvin and Johnson already owned, these ships represented their 
whaling fleet – and what was intended to be the basis of their local network. After the 
purchase of the S/S Restitution, the company sent the ship to Norway to be re-built into 
a factory ship at Framnæs Mek. Verksted.709 Here, the ship was fitted with ten pressure 
cookers and four open cookers, three cooling tanks, three steam winches, and internal 
tanks for storing the whale oil it produced.710 To comply with the British authorities’ 
demands on full utilisation of the whales, the company equipped the ship with a guano 
plant capable of processing 100 tonnes of residue per day, as well as electrical lighting 
and a wireless telegraph that allowed the ship to communicate with the fleet.711 The 
Sound of Jura and Seabird were re-built and fitted with internal engines and fixed tanks, 
which enabled them to transport whale oil.712 The decision to fit two of their three whale 
catchers with diesel engines was unconventional since other whaling companies used 
steam-powered whale catchers. Despite this, the two whale catchers (C.O.J and G.D.I) 
were fitted with diesel engines. The third catcher (T.W.I) was fitted with a conventional 
steam engine. Diesel has more energy per unit than coal, which in theory gave higher 
speed and range without having to refuel. It also meant that fuel took up less space and 
transport volume per energy unit than coal did. Diesel engines were, however, relatively 
untested on ships, but many saw the advantages of diesel and it became the main form 
for propulsion on ships. The decision to equip one of the catchers with a conventional 
                                                 
708 ”Letter from John Irvin, to the Rt. Hon. Lewis V. Harcourt, M.P. Secretary of State for the Colonies. June 10, 
1911”. and in “Letter from Richard Irvin & Sons Ltd, to the Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office in 
London. March 23, 1911”. The Falkland Islands Archive. Vol: F. Confidential despatch book. Jan 1909 – Aug 
1911, Inward. No 40 
709 Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1912. P: 11. Kommendør Chr. Christensens Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. 
Norway. 
710 ”The History of the Irvin and Johnson Limited, Part 1 & 2. By Greenwood-Johnson.E, Abao.H,Rosenthal. E”. 
Unpublished confidential file. P: 12. The Private Collection of Glenn McIntosh. Australia. 
711 ”Letter from John Irvin, to the Rt. Hon. Lewis V. Harcourt, M.P. Secretary of State for the Colonies. June 10, 
1911”. The Falkland Islands Archive. Vol: F. Confidential despatch book. Jan 1909 – Aug 1911, Inward. No 
40. 
712 The purchase and rebuild of these ships consumed a substantial amount of the available capital. The 
S/S Restitution cost £21 000, and its rebuilding at Framnæs Mek Verksted cost another £7000, while the 
commission and build of the three whale catchers (C.O.J, T.W.I and G.D.I) cost £20 400. The Sound of Jura 
including fitting it with internal tanks and en engine cost £8850, and similar rebuilt of the SeaBird cost 
£3600. Adding up to a total initial expenditure of £60 850. This amount excluded additional small 
investments in small motor boats, 1000 wooden barrels, 30 000 bags for guano and insurances which the 
company purchased. In: “Letter from John H. Irvin, to the Rt. Hon. Lewis V. Harcourt. Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, London. June 10, 1911”. The Falkland Islands Archives. Vol: Confidential despatch book. Jan 
1909 – Aug 1911, Inward. No 40. 
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steam engine was perhaps motivated by the fact that diesel engines were untested and 
that they did not want all catchers to be grounded by technical problems in the Antarctic 
waters. 
 
The company probably chose to base their whale oil production on a floating factory 
because they planned to conduct whaling operations in two regions: South Africa and 
South Georgia. Using a floating factory meant they could move between the two areas 
and maintain full utilisation in compliance with British demands. 
 
Fig 91. The S/S Restitution being converted into a factory ship at Framnæs Merk Verksted in Norway during 
the spring of 1911.713 
 
Although the global networks of the whaling companies were multinational, funded, and 
managed by industrialists and capitalists from Great Britain, Argentina, Chile, and 
Norway, the workers and managers of the whaling stations were largely Norwegian. 
Hiring experienced workers and managers achieved a high output with minimum risks, 
and avoided the need for training and educating personnel. In Vestfold and other places 
in Norway they had vast whaling experience. The Southern Whaling & Sealing Company 
set up a hiring office in Sandefjord in Vestfold in Norway and hired Consul Olsen as their 
agent to secure experienced, reliable workers and a manager.714 Olsen hired Nils A. 
Andersen as manager and captain of the S/S Restitution.715 Andersen had experience of 
                                                 
713 The photo has been scanned from Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. Vol: 2. 
P: 379. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 1967. 
714 ”The History of the Irvin and Johnson Limited, Part 1 & 2. By Greenwood-Johnson.E, Abao.H,Rosenthal. E”. 
Unpublished confidential file. P: 12. The Private Collection of Glenn McIntosh. Australia. 
715 ”The History of the Irvin and Johnson Limited, Part 1 & 2. By Greenwood-Johnson.E, Abao.H,Rosenthal. E”. 
Unpublished confidential file. P: 12. The Private Collection of Glenn McIntosh. Australia. 
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the whaling industry, having started his career in northern Norway at the turn of the 
century.716 
 
The Southern Whaling & Sealing Company initiated their whaling operations at South 
Georgia during the spring of 1912, which was late in the season. Irvin and Johnson had 
designed their company to be flexible to meet the demands of operating in two different 
regions. Their factory ship also had to be designed and equipped to have full utilisation 
capability, in compliance with British ambitions to control the west Antarctic. In 
addition, the whole whaling project had to be organised and designed to operate under 
harsh climatic circumstances and generate profits. Their late arrival was partly caused 
by technical problems with the whale catchers’ diesel engines on the voyage from Great 
Britain. 
 
The 1911–1912 hunting season was generally good for most companies that operated in 
South Georgia. From November until February, there were plenty of whales in the 
waters off the island, and several companies finished the season early.717 Most of the 
catches this season (95%) were humpback whales.718 Hunting from an abundance 
perspective and exploiting whales faster than they could rejuvenate was not sustainable. 
These concerns were discussed in contemporary newspapers such as Norsk 
Fiskeritidende and Hvalfangst Tidende where people called for increased restrictions to 
prevent overexploitation.719 In spite of this, the whaling industry produced 106,800 
barrels of whale oil in South Georgia in 1911–1912, which was more than the total 
global production of 1908.720 The Southern Whaling & Sealing Company managed to 
produce 9,000 barrels of whale oil during their first season, and an unknown amount of 
guano. There were, according to Risting, frequent storms and large swells during March 
and April, which occasionally made hunting impossible.721 This may explain why 
Andersen decided to close the hunting season at South Georgia early and sail for South 
                                                 
716 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. Vol: 2. P: 323 & 378. In: Den Modern 
Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 1967. 
717 Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1912. Kommendør Chr. Christensens Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. 
718 Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1915/16. P: 23. Kommendør Chr. Christensens Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. 
Norway. 
719 Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. 1911. Also in Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1912. Kommendør Chr. Christensens 
Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. 
720 Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. 1911. Kommendør Chr. Christensens Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. 
Norway. 
721 Risting. S. Av Hvalfangstens Historie. P: 376. 1922. 
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Africa to start the second phase of the hunting season. The company’s South Georgia 
production was sent to Great Britain aboard the Sound of Jura.722 
 
Over the period 1911–1915, Irvin and Johnson re-organised their whaling project. After 
the first season, the management realised that the hunting seasons in the two areas 
overlapped and that they had to improve their hunting and processing capability to 
maximise catches and output. With their factory ship S/S Restitution and their three 
catchers, the company lost valuable hunting time transferring the fleet from one region 
to the other. The higher number of fin and blue whales in South Georgia compared with 
the African west coast represented an opportunity to increase output and profit. To 
maximise the hunting season in both areas in 1912–1913 and onwards, and to 
successfully exploit fin and blue whales in South Georgia, Irvin and Johnson 
commissioned three new whale catchers, which were larger than the ones they already 
had.723 The same year, Irvin and Johnson developed their African activities further; they 
secured an additional whaling concession in Durban, South Africa724 and established a 
whaling station at Porto Alexandre in Angola where they also had a concession.725 
 
With a fleet of six whale catchers, one factory ship, and a whaling station, Irvin and 
Johnson increased their operational flexibility to exploit whales in two hunting areas. 
This had an immediate effect on the company’s production, which increased from 25 
barrels of whale oil per whale in the 1911–1912 season, to 35 barrels per whale in the 
1912–1913 season.726 The company increased its production in South Georgia by 10% 
                                                 
722 ”The History of the Irvin and Johnson Limited, Part 1 & 2. By Greenwood-Johnson.E, Abao.H,Rosenthal. E”. 
Unpublished confidential file. The Private Collection of Glenn McIntosh. Australia. 
723 These were the Southern Cross, the Southern Sea and the Southern Sky [110,7 feet, 73 Hkr and 174 tons, 
and were all considerably larger than C.O.J, G.D.I, and the T.W.I [99,5 feet, 58 Hkr and 137 tons. At the same 
time two of the older catchers that had been fitted with diesel engines, were sent to Great Britain to be re-
built and fitted with conventional steam engines. The failed experiment cost the company £7244. ”Letter 
from the Under Secretary of State, to the Secretary Board of Agriculture and Fisheries. August 25, 1915”. The 
Falkland Islands Archives. Vol: South Georgia. People – whaling. Vol 2 (1936 – 1964). According to Hart 
(2006, P: 74), the crews found it difficult to start the engines in the cold. 
Risting. S and Dahl. J. Hvalfangerflaaten. The Whaling Fleet. P: 36f. 1916. 
724 Risting. S. Av Hvalfangstens Historie. P: 493. 1922. 
725 ”The History of the Irvin and Johnson Limited, Part 1 & 2. By Greenwood-Johnson.E, Abao.H, Rosenthal. E”. 
Unpublished confidential file. P: 12. The Private Collection of Glenn McIntosh. Australia. See also: 
Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. Vol: 2. P: 448 and 456. In: Den Modern 
Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 1967. 




to 10,000 barrels of whale oil in 1913.727 This figure rose to 12,582 barrels of whale oil 
and 5,000 bags of guano in the 1913–1914 season, to 20,120 and 2,385 bags of guano in 
the 1914–1915 season, and to 31,000 barrels and 600 bags of guano in the 1915–1916 
season.728 
        
Fig 92 and 93. The Southern Whaling & Sealing Company’s whaling station at Porto Alexandre in Angola. The 
company erected this station in 1913 and operated it for two consecutive seasons.729 
 
Prices for whale oil had remained stable as the number of hardening factories increased 
in Norway, Great Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and elsewhere, creating 
demand for this raw material. Despite this, the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company 
was unable to make an economic success of their whaling projects. By the autumn of 
1915, their total losses were £51,454, which included £11,500 for depreciation of their 
investments and £7,244 for rebuilding two of the company’s whale catchers.730 Up until 
that point, Irvin and Johnson had invested approximately £90,000 in the project. 
Tønnesen (1967) argues that the primary reason for these losses was Irvin and 
                                                 
727 Norsk Fiskeritidende. No 11. November 1929. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. 
Sandefjord. Norway. In the end of the 1913 season, the Sound of Jura was sent to Glasgow with the 
production. On her way north, the ship was caught in a severe storm which broke the masts leaving her 
adrift in the South Atlantic. The ship was eventually rescued by the British steamer Uskmoor, and towed 
to St. Vincent. For further reading, see: Norsk Fiskeritidende. No 7, July 1913. Kommendør Chr. 
Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. 
728 “Letter from Richard Irvin & Sons Limited, to the Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office. August 18, 
1915”, and in “”Edw. B. Binnie, Stipendary Magistrate. Whaling Report. May 15, 1915, to the Honourable The 
Colonial Secretary, Falkland Islands”. Falkland Islands Archives. Vol: South Georgia. People – whaling. Vol 2 
(1936 – 1964). See also Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. No 11, November 1929. and Norsk Fiskeritidende. 
1915/16. Kommendør Chr. Christensens Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. 
729 The photo to the right has been scanned from Risting. S (1922), P: 507. The photo on the left has been 
published with the kind approval of G. McIntosh. 
730 ”Letter from Henry Lambert for the Secretary of State, to the Secretary Board of Agriculture and Fisheries. 
August 25, 1915”. The Falkland Islands Archive. Vol: South Georgia. People – whaling. Vol 2 (1936 – 1964). 
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Johnson’s lack of experience.731 But did this whaling project fail because the network 
builders were inexperienced or because of problems in their global or local networks? 
 
Irvin and Johnson had established and operated fishing and sealing projects in the past 
with success. However, they had no experience organising industrial projects in remote 
regions such as South Georgia. If they had, they would have known how other whaling 
companies were organising their production and what technologies they were using. 
The Southern Whaling & Sealing Company was managed and run by experienced and 
competent people. The main problem was organisation. Poor planning meant the 
hunting seasons overlapped, which reduced catches and production. There are 
unfortunately few archival sources that give insight into the company’s daily activities 
and organisation at South Georgia during the first few years. 
The size of S/S Restitution may have contributed to Irvin and Johnson’s economic 
failure. However, this is questionable since the ship was primarily a production platform 
and the Sound of Jura and Seabird were used to store the whale oil. They had been re-
built and fitted with internal engines and fixed tanks with this in mind.732 I believe that 
the main problem with S/S Restitution was its processing capacity, which was limited to 
only 14 cookers. In addition, whales were flensed alongside the ship, therefore the ship 
probably had difficulties keeping up with the whale catchers. Fieldwork done during the 
spring of 2009 also showed that Prince Olav Harbour is relatively exposed to winds and 
swell, which would have made flensing problematic. Limited cooking capability on S/S 
Restitution combined with difficult flensing created a bottle neck for production and 
explains why Irvin and Johnson finally decided to operate from a shore-based whaling 
station. 
 
                                                 
731 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. Vol: 2. P: 377. In: Den Modern Hvalfangst 
Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 1967. 
732 The purchase and rebuild of these ships consumed a substantial amount of the available capital. The 
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Another contributing factor to Irvin and Johnson’s financial failure was the outbreak of 
the First World War in the summer of 1914. At first, the war restricted the development 
of the Antarctic whaling industry. Following the introduction of export bans on coal 
from Great Britain, many companies experienced problems equipping expeditions.733 In 
addition to this, the war changed the market for whale oil. Before the war, whaling 
companies had been able to sell their produce at stable prices to margarine factories. 
During the first few months after the outbreak of the war, the market stood still. This 
was replaced with frantic activity as hardening factories tried to make contracts with 
whaling companies to secure several years of whale oil supply. The whaling companies 
saw an opportunity to force prices up and held back their production. However, this 
strategy failed since the market for whale oil almost disappeared after the British 
government declared whale oil as contraband in August 1914.734 Great Britain became 
the sole buyer of whale oil after issuing the Whale Fishery Ordinance of 1915, which 
banned the export of whale oil to other nations.735 
 
Great Britain’s motive for controlling the Antarctic whaling grounds was twofold. Firstly, 
it was important to secure oil and fats for edible purposes. Secondly, whale oil contains 
glycerine that could be used to produce explosives. With the Whale Fishery Ordinance of 
1915, conventional market mechanisms no longer applied. The whaling companies’ 
feared that the British authorities would enforce a fixed price for whale oil that would 
devastate their economy as the war had increased operational costs. Although the price 
for whale oil increased during the war – from £21 per ton in 1914 to £57 per ton in 
1918736 – the declining value of the British currency worsened the economic situation 
for most whaling companies, who paid their workers in other currencies.737 
 
                                                 
733 Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1915/16. Kommendør Chr. Christensens Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. 
Norway. 
734 “Brev fra Det Kgl. Utenriksdepartementet, til den Norske Hvalfangerforeningen. August 25, 1914”. 
Hvalfangerforeningen. Diverse Pakkesaker. Vol: 4, 1913-1920. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s 
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735 “Ordinance No 10, December 2, 1915. An ordinance to prohibit by Regulations the export of whale oil, 
except to the United Kingdom”. The Falkland Islands Archive. Vol: SG & DEP. Whaling – General. Vol 1. 
(1915 – 1921). 
736 Hart. I. B. Whaling in the Falkland Islands Dependencies 1904-1931. A history of shore and bay-based 
whaling in the Antarctic. P: 316. 2006. 
737 Galteland. O. Hvalfangst på Syd-Georgia – A/S Sandefjords Hvalfangerselskab / A/S Vestfolds fangst fra 
landstasjonen Strømnes 1906–1931. P: 130f. 2009. 
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Irvin and Johnson tried to counteract the effects of the war by expanding the capacity of 
the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company. They submitted an application to the 
Secretary of State for a second concession at South Georgia and the rights to use a fourth 
whale catcher to increase the company’s production capacity.738 Richard Irvin 
underlined the importance of their activities in ensuring that whaling operations in 
British waters remained in the hands of British nationals rather than foreigners. Such a 
project, they argued, should be backed by the British government as the company 
employed a large number of people in Great Britain and in Africa.739 
 
According to the British magistrate of South Georgia, the company’s losses were not 
caused by having only one concession but by the late arrival of their whaling fleet to 
South Georgia every year. The magistrate added that the company had twice the capital 
of competing whaling companies, who were still able to pay substantial dividends to 
their shareholders. The magistrate saw no reason to approve their application, other 
than further benefits for Great Britain740 and the Colonial Office turned them down. The 
company was granted the right to use a fourth whale catcher for the upcoming season at 
a cost of £100.741 
 
This was not enough, however, to compensate for the weakness in their local network. 
The S/S Restitution restricted the company’s production and profits at South Georgia. 
The company saw two different ways of dealing with this situation – either to cease their 
whaling operations in the area or to redesign and reorganise their local network. 
Despite their huge losses in South Georgia, they opted to reorganise their local network. 
This decision may have been influenced by the following statement from the British 
Minister of Munitions in early 1916: “ it is of urgent national importance to increase the 
output of best quality whale oil suitable for the manufacture of glycerine. I propose, 
                                                 
738 ”Letter from Henry Lambert for the Secretary of State, to the Secretary Board of Agriculture and Fisheries. 
August 25, 1915”. The Falkland Islands Archive. Vol: South Georgia. People – whaling. Vol 2 (1936 – 1964). 
739 “Letter from Richard Irvin & Sons Limited, to the Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office in London. 
August 18, 1915”. The Falkland Islands Archive. Vol: South Georgia. People – whaling. Vol 2 (1936 – 1964). 
740 “…there is no substantial ground local to South Georgia upon which Mr. Irvin’s application could be 
supported, and that, if it is to be entertained, that must be on Imperial grounds, such as the public services to 
the firm, the need for assisting it on account of disturbance in the fish business, or the desirability of 
increasing the supply of whale-oil”. In: Letter from Henry Lambert for the Secretary of State, to the Secretary 
Board of Agriculture and Fisheries. August 25, 1915”. The Falkland Islands Archive. Vol: South Georgia. 
People – whaling. Vol 2 (1936 – 1964). 
741 “Letter from H.J. Read for the Under Secretary of State, to Messrs Richard Irvin and Sons Limited. October 
1, 1915”. The Falkland Islands Archive. Vol: South Georgia. People – whaling. Vol 2 (1936 – 1964). 
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therefore, to grant additional licences to British firms for next season. I request that 
regulations on using whole carcass, towing, and buoying be restricted as far as you may 
judge necessary to increase output during the current season”.742 Another reason for 
reorganising their local network in the Antarctic might have been that the African 
hunting grounds had reached their peak, and that it was in the Antarctic where future 
possibilities lay. 
 
Tønnesen’s argument that Irvin and Johnson’s losses were caused by their inexperience 
is only partly true. Their organisation of using one platform in two different hunting 
grounds meant that hunting time was lost moving between the areas. However, their 
losses were primarily caused by the design of their local network (S/S Restitution) and 
unforeseen changes in the market caused by the First World War. 
 
Phase two (Irvin and Johnson 1916–1919) 
In the spring of 1916, Irvin and Johnson discussed how to turn their failing business 
around. They regarded their hunting grounds at South Georgia as more profitable and 
sustainable than the declining hunting grounds off the African coast, where they were 
only catching humpback whales.743 Therefore, they decided to focus exclusively on 
developing their whaling operations at South Georgia, and to redesign and reorganise 
their local network there. They established a shore-based whaling station for producing 
whale oil and guano, which had a significantly higher production capacity than S/S 
Restitution. Irvin and Johnson decided to disassemble their whaling station at Porto 
Alexandre and move it to South Georgia.744 The company maintained their whaling 
activities in southern Africa (despite the stagnating catches) by leasing three other 
whaling stations: one in Durban from the Shepstone Whaling Company, the second at 
Cape Kliphang from the Southern Cross Whaling Company, and the third at Donkergat in 
Saldanha Bay from the South African Whaling Company.745 Irvin and Johnson informed 
                                                 
742 ”Telegram from the Secretary of State, to Governor. February 9, 1916”. The Falkland Islands Archive. Vol: 
South Georgia. People – whaling. Vol 2 (1936 – 1964). 
743 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. Vol: 2. P: 456f. In: Den Modern Hvalfangst 
Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 1967. 
744 Norsk Fiskeritidende. No 9, September 1916. Kommendør Chr. Christensens Hvalfangstmuseum. 
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745 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. Vol: 2. P: 448. In: Den Modern Hvalfangst 
Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 1967. 
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the Colonial Office of their intentions to establish a whaling station at South Georgia, and 
that production would only take place at the whaling station. They planned to use S/S 
Restitution elsewhere.746 
 
Re-construction of the whaling station at South Georgia 
Irvin and Johnson’s plan was to move their whaling station from Porto Alexandre to 
South Georgia, but preferably not to Prince Olav Harbour. Instead they asked the 
Colonial Office and the Governor of the Falkland Islands for permission to establish their 
whaling station at Jason Harbour, which is located further south on the island and which 
they regarded as more suitable for a whaling station.747 In an attempt to secure this 
permission, Irvin and Johnson referred to the statements made by the Minister of 
Munitions that British authorities should assist British whaling companies and their 
activities in the Dependencies. 
 
Fig 94. Map of South Georgia indicating the locations of Prince Olav Harbour and Jason Harbour. Map data 
has kindly been supplied by the British Antarctic Surveys. 
 
                                                 
746 ”Telegram from the Secretary of State to Governor. July 1, 1916”. The Falkland Islands Archive. Vol: 
South Georgia. People – whaling. Vol 2 (1936 – 1964). 
747 ”Telegram from the Secretary of State to Governor. July 1, 1916”The Falkland Islands Archive. Vol: South 
Georgia. People – whaling. Vol 2 (1936 – 1964). 




Jason Harbour had been leased out for 21 years to the Argentinean whaling company 
Compañia Argentina de Pesca Sociedad Anónima.748 The Colonial Office asked the 
magistrate of South Georgia to investigate whether establishing a whaling station at 
Jason Harbour would interfere with the activities of the Argentinean company, and if 
Compañia Argentina de Pesca Sociedad Anónima were willing to move from Jason 
Harbour to Prince Olav Harbour.749 Compañia Argentina de Pesca Sociedad Anónima 
objected strongly to this proposal.750 The magistrate argued that the two could operate 
in the same area without interfering with each other.751 The negotiations continued 
throughout the autumn of 1916, while the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company 
disassembled the whaling station at Porto Alexandre. Irvin and Johnson also bought 
additional cookers, boilers, clearing tanks, larger storage tanks, new accommodation 
buildings for 250–300 men, and a new steam boiler house for a total cost of £125,000.752 
The combination of old and new technologies and buildings were documented and 
mapped during the LASHIPA 6/2009 expedition, and will be discussed further below. 
 
In November 1916, Irvin and Johnson’s ship S/S Woodville arrived in South Georgia with 
all the equipment. The negotiations between the magistrate and Compañia Argentina de 
Pesca Sociedad Anónima regarding Jason Harbour were unresolved. The magistrate 
instructed S/S Woodville’s captain to find another suitable site for erecting the whaling 
station.753 Irvin and Johnson and the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company were 
apparently determined to establish themselves in Cumberland Bay. At the magistrate’s 
request, the local manager, N. A. Andersen found a new site in the same bay, 754 but Carl 
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Anton Larsen, who was the manager of the Argentinean whaling company, argued that 
this site was too close and would interfere with their operations.755 To avoid further 
conflicts, S/S Woodville sailed to Prince Olav Harbour where all buildings and 
installations were unloaded. 
 
From the 1916–1917 season until the 1918–1919 season, the company constructed the 
whaling station at Prince Olav Harbour under the leadership of Nielsen.756 While the 
station was being constructed, the company used S/S Restitution to produce whale oil 
from the whales that were caught by the four whale catchers.757 Nielsen had a solid 
whaling background. He had worked for Svend Foyn and established Tenvik Trankokeri, 
which he operated until 1912 when it was sold to Tønsberg Hvalfangeri.758 He had also 
assisted in the construction of Sandefjord Hvalfangerselskab A/S whaling station in 
Stromness Bay in 1912, where he had stayed on as a cookery foreman before he was 
employed by the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company.759 Nielsen knew how to 
establish and design a whaling station and make it functional in the environmental 
conditions at South Georgia. The season’s result of 31,000 barrels of whale oil must have 
convinced Irvin and Johnson that their decision to increase their activities at South 
Georgia was correct.760 The oil was sent to Great Britain where it was sold at £30 per 
barrel.761 
 
On her way back from Great Britain to South Georgia, S/S Restitution sank off the 
southern tip of England. Although no lives were lost, the loss of S/S Restitution was 
devastating for the company since the ship had been their primary production unit in 
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the Antarctic up until that point. In spite of the loss, the company was still able to 
produce whale oil. The construction of the whaling station at Prince Olav Harbour had 
progressed faster than expected and the company managed to produce 27,400 barrels of 
whale oil that year.762 In an attempt to increase and maintain production while the 
station at Prince Olav Harbour was being completed, the management decided to lease 
the whaling station in Stromness Bay from Sandefjord Hvalfangeri A/S. According to 
Galteland, Sandefjord Hvalfangeri A/S decided to lease out Stromness Bay whaling 
station to the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company because of logistic problems created 
by the war.763 
 
Fig 95. Construction work at Prince Olav Harbour. In the foreground the upper meat cookery is being 
assembled, and the lower meat cookery is not yet assembled. Below on the shoreline is the tongue cookery. 
Neither the lemming nor the flensing platforms are built. The photo has been published with the kind 
approval of the Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Norway. 
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Irvin and Johnson hired the former captain of the S/S Restitution, Andersen, as the local 
manager at Stromness whaling station. The lease of this station included two whale 
catchers, so the company operated with six whale catchers throughout the 1917–1918 
season. Despite the increased capacity, the total production that year was 20,829 barrels 
of whale oil,764 which was 6,571 barrels fewer than the previous year. Several other 
whaling companies experienced similar reductions in production. Compared with the 
1916–1917 season, the industry as a whole caught 394 fewer whales and 65,824 fewer 
barrels of whale oil.765 Strikes at Prince Olav Harbour and Stromness Bay whaling 
stations also had devastating effects on output over the following seasons.766 
For the 1918–1919 season, the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company decided to extend 
the contract with Sandefjord Hvalfangeri A/S.767 
 
Strikes 
In the 1918 season, the company workers went on strike at Prince Olav Harbour and at 
Stromness Bay because (according to the magistrate of South Georgia) the manager of 
the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company had hired 170 men in Buenos Aires and 
promised to re-negotiate their initial contracts in South Georgia.768 When the manager 
failed to fulfil his promise, the men from Buenos Aires were discontent and the situation 
deteriorated. According to the magistrate, the workers argued that their salaries were 
too low.769 The 1918–1919 strike spread to Leith Harbour whaling station in South 
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Georgia.770 The strikes reduced the number of whales caught at South Georgia from 
4,471 in the 1916–1917 season to 3,196 in the 1917–1918 season. This reduced the 
amount of whale oil produced from 268,327 barrels to 202,503 barrels.771 
 
Another reason for the strikes at Prince Olav Harbour and Stromness Bay was that the 
manager promised the company would operate with eight whale catchers but they only 
operated with six, which affected the workers’ salaries. The Southern Whaling & Sealing 
Company had apparently miscalculated the amount of coal necessary to uphold 
production at Prince Olav Harbour and Stromness Bay whaling stations. The local 
managers considered halting production at Prince Olav Harbour to focus on the 
construction works, and moving all production to Stromness Bay. The workers 
demanded a 25% salary increase, a 100% raise of the part, and reduced prices in the 
company store.772 The local manager accepted the demands of a 25% salary increase, 
offered a Kr0.03 increase per barrel, and a guaranteed production of 53,000 barrels. The 
workers refused this offer and the manager eventually gave in and accepted their initial 
demands.773 
 
To prevent strikes like this from happening in the future, the magistrate of South 
Georgia wrote to the Colonial Office and suggested that “it would be of considerable value 
if ocular demonstrations of the government’s authority in the shape of a warship could be 
given”.774 The idea was that the warship be used as a tool in negotiations and exercise 
effective British authority in the area. Captain Andersen, who was the manager of the 
Southern Whaling & Sealing Company’s leased station at Stromness Bay, supported the 
initiative arguing that from an operational and economic point of view “that the display 
of force in the shape of a gunboat stationed on the island during the season would no doubt 
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have the desired effect, and settlement of wages with a Man of War present before leaving 
the Dependencies would undoubtedly facilitate the more peaceful pursuit of the companies’ 
operations”.775 Tønnesen argued that these strikes, which occurred in several whaling 
stations in South Georgia, were linked to problems the companies had in employing 
competent workers from Europe due to the war. The whaling companies tried to solve 
these problems by hiring workers in Buenos Aires. According to Høva, these workers 
were the primary reason for the conflicts that arose.776 This strengthens the image that 
European workers were reliable and faithful to the company and were not responsible 
for the strikes. The magistrate of South Georgia suggested a different explanation. He 
claimed that Norwegian, Swedish, and British workers played central roles in the 
negotiations between the management and the magistrate.777 
 
The situation worsened after that manager suggested reducing production because of a 
coal shortage. The workers demanded Kr20 per month more and a bonus of Kr0.02 per 
barrel and even more for the skilled workers.778 One can conclude that the manager of 
the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company is much to blame for the outbreak of the 
strike. 
 
But how did the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company and its local managers adapt 
their social strategies to prevent future strikes? Even though archival material does not 
reveal the answer, the fieldwork we have done at the stations has shown that the 
company used spatial planning, separating workers into different groups to create 
hierarchies within the work force and to establish the power needed to avoid similar 
events in the future.779 
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Whatever the company’s strategies were, they failed, since similar strikes broke out 
later, forcing the company to adapt once again. These strikes spread rapidly across the 
whaling stations on the island, suggesting that most of the workers had similar ideas and 
ambitions. It also shows that communication was good between the workers at different 
stations and that news travelled fast between the stations. Although the workers were 
very international, they used the momentum created at other stations to promote their 
own interests and perhaps express solidarity. The formation of workers’ unions and 
sympathies of solidarity and equality were part of a class movement that had been 
subdued. During the first few decades of the 20th century, workers started fighting to 
improve their working and living conditions by demanding union memberships, equal 
contracts, fixed working hours, overtime pay, rights to vote, and much more. Society and 
social classes were changing; a process which often collided with the economic 
ambitions of industrialists. 
 
These strikes, combined with the loss of S/S Restitution and having to lease another 
station to uphold production, did not help the company’s negative spiral. The company 
probably increased the number of African workers at the stations to reduce costs since 
the salary of one European worker was ten times that of an African worker.780 The war 
in Europe had substantially increased the costs for equipping, supplying, and insuring 
expeditions. For the management of the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company, the loss 
of S/S Restitution had been particularly difficult. Firstly, it represented the loss of their 
primary production unit while the station at Prince Olav Harbour was being constructed. 
Secondly, the ship was carrying technical equipment for the whaling station. Thirdly, the 
loss of the ship forced the company to lease Sandefjord Hvalfangeri A/S station to 
uphold production, which cost Irvin and Johnson an additional £28,000 for two seasons. 
These circumstances probably convinced Irvin and Johnson to withdraw from their 
project in South Georgia. 
 
When Lever Bros took over the whaling station at Prince Olav Harbour, they probably 
adopted the same social strategies that were used within the whaling industry in South 
Georgia. Lever Bros and Irvin and Johnson appear to have maintained their business 
                                                 
780 Børresen. D.I. There is plenty of black labour to be had, African labourers in modern whaling. Pp: 132. In: 
Whaling & History III. Editor: Ringstad. J.E. Publication No 33, Kommendør Chr. Christensens 
Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. 2010. 
 247 
 
relations after the sale. Johnson worked for Lever Bros in England for one year, and Irvin 
and Johnson were dragged into a legal dispute with Lever Bros after supplying the 
Southern Whaling & Sealing Company with African workers. The conflict was related to 
strikes that occurred at Prince Olav Harbour in the 1920 season. One year later, Lever 
Bros hired Zulu workers for the station. Besides the study made by Jackson (1978), 
there are few archival sources related to the activities of the Southern Whaling & Sealing 
Company during the 1920s. According to the Unilever archives, all documents (including 
the ones used by Wilson and Jackson in their works) were destroyed after the Second 
World War.781 Under the ownership of Lever Bros, the Southern Whaling & Sealing 
Company experienced one strike in the 1920 season. It is, however, difficult to say 
whether Lever Bros were more successful than their predecessor in establishing control, 
since few archival sources have been found relating to the activities at the whaling 
station. 
 
The 1920 strike was, according to Børresen, caused by unclear working contracts 
between the management and the approximately 100 African workers that the company 
had employed for the season from Irvin and Johnson.782 According to them, African 
workers were commonly contracted at fixed annual rates and were not part-holders in 
the production. At some point during the season, the local manager re-negotiated the 
contracts so that African workers were paid the same part-based salary as the rest of the 
workers at the station. When the African workers arrived back in Cape Town, however, 
the company did not fulfil the agreement. After that, the South African authorities 
proclaimed that the whole group had been illegally recruited.783 The problems were 
solved when the South African Native Affairs Department got involved and forced the 
                                                 
781 Unfortunately a large part of the archival sources relating to the whaling activities of Lever Bros/ 
Unilever used by Jackson (1978) in his study have been lost. (Personal correspondence with the Unilever 
archives). 
782 Børresen. D.I. There is plenty of black labour to be had, African labourers in modern whaling. In: Whaling 
& History III. Editor: Ringstad. J.E. Publication No 33, Kommendør Chr. Christensens Hvalfangstmuseum. 
Sandefjord. Norway. 2010. 
783 Børresen. D.I. There is plenty of black labour to be had, African labourers in modern whaling. Pp: 138. In: 
Whaling & History III. Editor: Ringstad. J.E. Publication No 33, Kommendør Chr. Christensens 
Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. 2010. 
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Southern Whaling & Sealing Company to compromise by giving the 100 workers a 20% 
raise and additional pay for special work.784 
 
Fig 96. A large blue whale has just been towed onto the flensing plan for processing. In the back of the photo, 
the small motor boat the workers used to tow the whale from the buoy to the station is visible. The photo has 
been published with the kind approval of the South Georgia Museum. 
 
The Southern Whaling & Sealing Company avoided strikes after this incident because of 
several factors. Firstly, Lever Bros increased production and economic profit, which had 
a positive effect on the workers’ salary. Secondly, the company invested in leisure 
activities (for example, they built a football field) for their workers. 
 
Fig 97. Football field located in the 
vicinity of the whaling station at 
Prince Olav Harbour. Much work 
went into creating the necessary 
level space for the field, and the 
company had to perform 
substantial work with explosives. 
This illustrated the importance of 
leisure activities for the workers’ 
mental well-being. Photo: Gustav 
Rossnes. LASHIPA 6/2009. 
                                                 
784 Børresen. D.I. There is plenty of black labour to be had, African labourers in modern whaling. Pp: 139. In: 
Whaling & History III. Editor: Ringstad. J.E. Publication No 33, Kommendør Chr. Christensens 
Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. 2010. 
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Prince Olav Harbour whaling station 
In this section, I will describe how the whaling station at Prince Olav Harbour was 
designed, how it functioned, and explain why the company organised their production of 
whale oil and other products the way it did. 
 
In 2009, an international team of researchers from the LASHIPA project surveyed and 
mapped the whaling stations at Prince Olav Harbour and at Ocean Harbour on South 
Georgia. The purpose of the fieldwork was to understand the design, organisation, 
technical choices, and adaptations at the station. 
 
Fig 98. Map of South Georgia and the area where Prince Olav Harbour is located. 
Map by U.I. Gustafsson, D.Avango, G.Rossnes and B.Basberg. Postprocessing by E.Bolhuis and F.Steenhuisen. 
 
A large part of South Georgia is permanently covered by ice and glaciers. As a result, 
there were few places suitable for establishing whaling stations. Prince Olav Harbour is 
the northernmost of the six stations on South Georgia, and it is located in Possession Bay 
on the north-western part of South Georgia. Our fieldwork in 2009 showed that the 
whaling station at Prince Olav Harbour was located in a small bay, which provided 
shelter from most wind directions. It became clear that the company had very limited 




Fig 99. The material remains of Prince Olav Harbour whaling station in 2009. 
Photo by U.I. Gustafsson. LASHIPA 6/2009. 
 
The company started to construct Prince Olav Harbour whaling station in 1916, 
although it is probable that it used the site to store supplies such as diesel, coal, and 
explosives before the whaling station was built. The building process lasted for several 
years and the station was not completed until 1922 when the guano factory was 
assembled. There were several reasons for this relatively slow construction. The 
company decided, along the way, to add a number of new components to their local 
network. Progress was also disrupted by strikes and other challenges related to the First 
World War. 
 
According to Jackson, the whaling station at Prince Olav Harbour was equipped with 60 
cookers and boilers, 15 clearing and storage tanks, an engineering shop, and an 
electricity plant.785 The fieldwork we conducted at the site gave us an opportunity to 
confirm whether this and other previous assumptions about the structure of the station 
were true. The results from this fieldwork will be discussed below. 
                                                 




The structure of the whaling stations at South Georgia has previously been investigated 
by the British Discovery expeditions in the 1920s, by Headland in 1984, and later by 
Basberg, Rossnes, Lunde, Løkken, and Nævestad during the NARE expeditions in 2004. 
In addition, a blue print map of Prince Olav Harbour whaling station was drawn by 
engineer William Gillner from Sandefjord of unknown date. These surveys and maps 
provided important information about the ambitions of individual companies, 
contemporary perceptions of social relations, and more. The accuracy and detail of these 
maps are limited, however, as they do not contain any information on the functions of 
different units and relationships between different production facilities. Although the 
1920 map gives an insight into the station’s leadership, it does not necessarily reflect 
what the company actually ended up building, because the companies may have adapted 
to the local circumstances. The archaeological data we collected during our fieldwork 
confirmed this. Maps and plans were often used to attract investors rather than being 
exact representations of reality. 
 
Knowledge of the interaction between whaling stations and their surrounding 
landscapes, as well as different perceptions on how to design them, can best be achieved 
with a methodological approach that combines the study and documentation of material 
remains and written sources. This approach has improved my ability to explain the 
social, economic, political, and ideological factors that influenced the way the whaling 
companies designed their stations.786 
 
                                                 
786 See Gustafsson and Basberg. Surveys of whaling stations in South Georgia from NARE to LASHIPA and 
beyond. In: Managing Industrial & Cultural Heritage: South Georgia in Context. Report on a conference held 




Fig 100. Total station map of Prince Olav Harbour whaling station and the surrounding landscape. Map by 
U.I. Gustafsson, D. Avango, B.L. Basberg and G. Rossnes. Postprocessing by: F. Steenhuisen and E. Bolhuis. 
 
Features of Prince Olav Harbour 
For details about the features of Prince Olav Harbour, please see the LASHIPA 6 
fieldwork report (2009). 
 
1 – Flensing platform   2 – Blubber cookery 
3 – Upper meat cookery   4 – Lower meat and tongue cookery 
5 – Bone cookery   6 – Guano factory 
7 – Guano store   8 – Elevated railway system 
9 – Winch house   10 – Boiler house 
11 – Provisions store   12 – General store 
13 – Refinery and laboratory  14 – Carpenter’s and butcher’s shop 
15 – Forge                           16 – Foundry 
17 – Bath house   18 – Workers’ barrack 
19 – Workers’ barrack   20 – Office and slop chest 




23 – Bakery    24 – Provision store 
25 – Old foremen’s house   26 – New foremen’s house 
27 – Manager’s villa   28 – Hen house 
29 – Jetty store   30 – Boiler/pump house 
31 – Pump house/oil tank  32 – Northern pig house 
33 – Southern pig house   34 – Cinema 
35 – Remains of railway system  36 – Red house/storage 
37 – Storage area   38 – Lower water pipe 
39 – Hut/storage   40 – Boilers and cookers on shore 
41 – Dam    42 – Upper water pipe 
43 – Wooden poles/ropeway  44 – Whale oil tank 
45 – Whale oil tank   46 – Whale oil tank 
47 – Whale oil tank   48 – Whale oil tank 
49 – Whale oil tank   50 – Foundations 
51 – Brick house   52 – Stairs 
53 – Rail system   54 – Stairs 
55 – Radio mast foundation  56 – Cemetery 
57 – Football field   58 – Ropeway foundation 
59 – Foundation fuel tank  60 – Foundation fuel tank 
61 – Foundation fuel tank  62 – Foundation fuel tank 
63 – Foundation fuel tank  64 – Foundation fuel tank 
65 – Foundation fuel tank  66 – Foundation fuel tank 
67 – Foundation fuel tank  68 – Foundation flagpole 
69 – Stairs    70 – Stairs 
71 – Pathway   72 – Block and tackle 
73 – Brutus wreckage   74 – Jetty 
75 – Wooden box   76 – Small jetty – A 
77 – Small jetty – B   78 – Concrete mooring 
79 – Jetty by guano store   80 – Water pipe 
81 – Metal artefacts   82 – Water pipe 
83 – Dam/water intake   84 – Tank 
85 – Sealer’s grave   86 – Drainage 
87 – Storage for pipes and rails  88 – Metal tower 
89 – Wooden pathway   90 – Anchor point 
91 – Quarry    92 – Ropeway foundation 
93 – Ropeway foundation  94 – Chicken house 
95 – Aerial ropeway 
   
 
The organisation of production   
Prince Olav Harbour whaling station was designed to process whales into whale oil and 
by-products on a large scale. The company organised their production line to maximise 
production. First, the whale catchers delivered their catch to a buoy, which was placed in 
a sheltered location in the bay immediately outside the station. From here, the workers 
used a small boat to tow one whale at a time to a double planked flensing platform (Fig 
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100,No 1). The whale was pulled onto the platform by a steel wire connected to the 
steam winches (Fig 100,No 9). The winches were made by various British 
manufacturers.787 Flensing started as soon as the whale was pulled onto the platform. 
     
Fig 101 and 102. The wooden flensing plane at Prince Olav Harbour in 2009. Right: A whale has just been 
towed onto the flensing plane, and flensing of the blubber layer has commenced. In the front of the photo, the 
small motor boats the workers used to tow the whale from the buoy to the station are visible. To the right are 
the two meat cookeries (upper and lower), and the tongue cookery. Photo taken by Gustav Rossnes. LASHIPA 




The blubber layer was cut into long strips and pulled from the whale using steam power. 
The strips of blubber were fed into a concealed container next to the blubber cookery 
(Fig 100,No 2), which contained a rotating blubber cutter. This was a steam-powered 
circular cutting device equipped with two sharp blades that rotated at high speed, 
cutting the blubber into smaller pieces. This minimised the cooking time of the blubber 
into whale oil. The blubber cutter was connected to an elevator, which transported the 
pieces of blubber to the top of the blubber cookery where they were distributed into the 
11 cookers. Fieldwork showed that the open cookers were vertical and positioned in 
two rows, and that each cooker had a rotating inner section, which kept the pieces of 
blubber in constant motion.788 This technology was uncommon in South Georgia. 
 
 
                                                 
787 The steam winches used at the whaling station were produced by: L Ford. Bros of Sunderland, J Lyn & Co 
Ltd of Sunderland, Chapman & Co LtD Gateshead, Clarke Chapman & Co LtD Gateshead, Cardiff Junction 
Engineering Comp LtD Cardiff, and R Rocher & Co LtD Stockton on Tees; All British manufacturers. 




Fig 103. Vertical blubber cooker with rotating mechanism at Prince 
Olav Harbour in 2009. The internal mechanism is visible underneath 
and through the rust hole in the cooker. Below is a measured drawing 
of the blubber cookery where these cookers are located. Photo: U.I. 









Once the cookers had been filled with blubber, steam was introduced until the blubber 
had melted into oil. The whale oil was pumped into the 22 settling tanks where it cooled 
down before being pumped into larger storage tanks. The remaining residues were 
taken out through a hatch in the front of the cooker and placed in a hand pushed wagon. 
The wagon contents were transported to the guano factory for processing. To control 
the quality of the whale oil, the station had a refinery/laboratory (Fig 100,No 13) 
immediately next to the blubber cookery. In addition to the 11 blubber cookers, the 
blubber cookery also had a mezzanine press. This type of technology was normally used 
for pressing oils from whale meat, but appears to have been used at Prince Olav Harbour 
for blubber. Archival sources state that the blubber cookery could process blubber from 
six blue whales or nine fin whales per day when running at full capacity.789 
 
                                                 
789 ”Report on the present capacity of South Georgia whaling stations, by Edw.B. Binnie, Stipendary 
Magistrate, to The Hon. The Colonial Secretary, Falkland Islands. August 5, 1919”. The Falkland Islands 
Archive. Vol: South Georgia. People – whaling. Vol 2 (1936 – 1964). 
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Fig 104 and 105. The design and internal layout of the blubber cookery at Prince Olav Harbour. Drawing by 
B.L. Basberg. LASHIPA 6/2009. Right: Overview over the blubber cookery. The cookers are located in the 
centre of the feature, and are surrounded by a large number of cooling/settling tanks. Photo: U.I. Gustafsson. 
LASHIPA 6/2009. 
 
After this, the meat and the tongue were cooked into oil. The fieldwork showed that the 
company had equipped Prince Olav Harbour whaling station with two meat cookeries, 
an upper (Fig 100,No 3) and a lower (Fig 100,No 4). The lower meat cookery also 
contained one extra row of cookers located immediately by the shoreline, which were 
the tongue cookery (Fig 100, No 4). Each of the two meat cookeries contained 18 
pressure cookers. The whale meat was placed on metal plates in a spiral form inside 
these cookers to maximise the effect of the steam and ease the outflow of oil from the 
meat. Each cooker had a sieve in the bottom so the oil could run out without being mixed 
with the residues after the cooking process. Fieldwork revealed that the two cookeries 
had different designs. The foundations of the lower row of cookers in the upper meat 
cookery were made of iron bars fixed in a bed of concrete, while the foundations of the 
upper row of the upper meat cookery and the entire lower meat cookery were made of 
wood. The upper meat cookery was probably designed in this way because of the angle 
of the lemming platform in relation to the flensing platform and the placement of the 
steam winches. These features meant the whale carcasses hit or slid alongside the wall 
of the upper meat cookery that faced the lemming platform, so it had to be reinforced. 
To reduce the impact of the whale carcass, the company designed the corners of both 
cookeries with reinforced and angled concrete constructions. 
 
The carcass was pulled from the flensing platform to the lemming platform by steam 
winches located at the end of the lemming platform. The lemming platform was a 
wooden platform that extended from the flensing platform (located between No 3 and 
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No 4 in Fig 100). Here, the meat was separated from the whale’s body until nothing but 
the bones remained. The meat was cut off in large chunks and pulled by hand into the 
four bucket elevators that faced the lemming platform. These elevators lifted the chunks 
of meat to the upper deck of the meat cookeries where it was chopped into suitable 
pieces and put into the cookers. 
                          
Fig 106 and 107. The internal design of a pressure cooker. The cooker was filled so that the centre grill was 
supported and the angled cooking grills were stacked with whale meat until the whole cooker was filled. The 
top was screwed solid and the steam was introduced. Right: One of the remaining bucket elevators at Prince 
Olav Harbour, filled with grill supports. Photo: U.I. Gustafsson. LASHIPA 6/2009. 
 
 
The whale bones were cooked into oil in the bone cookery (Fig 100,No 5). Fieldwork 
showed that the cookery was an immediate extension of the lemming platform and 
contained 22 cookers, and continued the flow of production. The bone cookery had an 
elevated wooden platform with steam winches and bone saws on top, and an angled 
wooden platform at the top where the bones were winched. On the platform, the bones 





Fig 108. The flow of production at Prince Olav Harbour whaling station. 
 
After each stage of the cooking process, the whale oil was tapped into clearing tanks 
before being pumped into the larger storage tanks behind the production area and by 
the main jetty (marked red in Fig 100). At the end of the season, the oil was pumped into 
cargo ships to be transported and sold. After each cooking process (blubber, meat, and 
bones) workers scraped out the remaining residues from the still warm cookers and 
placed them into a small railway car for transportation to the guano factory (Fig 100,No 
6). This represented the final stage of processing. As previously mentioned, the 
company’s initial plan was to design the station so that the full whale carcasses could be 
processed. Therefore, it included a guano factory. Archival sources show that the factory 
installations had already been delivered in 1919, but the company did not assemble it 
until 1922. The reason for this delay is unclear. The guano factory consisted of several 
technological elements produced by several different manufacturers, which the 
company shaped to function as one coherent production unit once the parts were on 
site. The guano factory at Prince Olav Harbour was equipped with three rows of guano 
producing units. Each contained a furnace, a heat fan, and a rotating tube with rails on 
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the inside to disintegrate the residues into a fine meal. The meal was tapped into canvas 
bags and stored in the guano store (Fig 100, 7) until the end of the season when they 
were loaded onto the cargo ships via a small ropeway system. 
   
Fig 109, 110, and 111. The guano factory at Prince Olav Harbour. The guano factory contained three 
individual units each fitted with one heater (left), one heat fan, and one large rotating metal tube inside 
which the residues were processed into a fine meal. At the end of the tube, the meals were connected by a 
small elevator and poured into canvas bags and stored away. Left photo by G. Rossnes. LASHIPA 6/2009. 
Middle and right: the guano factory was designed using several manufacturers of different nationalities. The 




The guano factory at Prince Olav Harbour contained technologies from Great Britain and 
the USA. Hacquebord has argued that this mixture of technologies represents the 
transition from the first to the second industrial revolution when the USA took over as 
the leading manufacturer of industrial technologies from Great Britain.790 I believe that 
these technical choices were motivated by a combination of availability and desires to 
achieve functionality at the best cost and efficiency. The choices of technology may 
reflect what the whaling companies considered to be the best technologies, and may also 
have had a social aspect. Well tested and simple processing technologies could be used 
without having to invest in training the workers. This also allowed the company to 
change or get rid of unwanted workers without affecting production. Using simple 
technologies made it easier to adapt and mend them if necessary, whereas untested and 
complex technologies could backfire. Therefore, it was strategic to base production on 
simple and well tested technologies. 
 
                                                 
790 Hacquebord. L. Hector station on Deception Island (South Shetland Islands, Antarctica), an environmental 
assessment study of a whaling-station. Pp: 72-97. In: Circumpolar Journal. 1-2, Volume 7, Antarctica; 
Research and nature conservation, future prospects. 1992. 
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Whaling companies organised their flow of production in this way because different 
parts of the whale had different cooking times. The number of barrels of oil the whaling 
companies could produce from each whale depended on the species, sex, size, and age of 
the whale as well as the time of year, machineries, and level of technology used at the 
whaling station. Prince Olav Harbour whaling station had ten blubber cookers, 41 
pressure cookers, and a large number of clearing and storage tanks. This allowed the 
station to process six blue whales or nine fin whales per day.791 
 
 
Fig 112. The primary activities at Prince Olav Harbour whaling station. 
 
Steam and electricity for all production units and steam winches were supplied by a 
boiler house in the centre of the production area (Fig 100,No 10). This house was 
originally equipped with seven boilers (four of which remain in situ today), coal storage, 
three water tanks, a dynamo house, and generators.792 Freshwater for steam production 
and drinking was supplied from two main sources: a small dam located in the small river 
                                                 
791 ”Report on the present capacity of South Georgia whaling stations, by Edw.B. Binnie, Stipendary 
Magistrate, to The Hon. The Colonial Secretary, Falkland Islands. August 5, 1919”. The Falkland Islands 
Archive. Vol: South Georgia. People – whaling. Vol 2 (1936 – 1964). 
792 Feature descriptions list by B.L. Basberg. LASHIPA 6/2009. 
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running down the valley to the production area, and a larger artificial lake, which the 
Southern Whaling & Sealing Company enclosed with a concrete dam (Fig 100,No 41). 
Fieldwork showed that water was pumped from this dam to the station area via an 
upper and lower water pipe (Fig 100, No 38 and 42). Having two pipes secured a good 
water flow and reduced the risk of production stopping if water in one pipe froze. 
 
The whaling station at Prince Olav Harbour was supplied with two railway systems: one 
elevated and one at ground level. The main production area was served by the ground-
based railway system, where cars were pushed by hand. There are few remains of these 
two systems today, as seen on Fig 100. 
 
Accommodations and ancillary functions 
There were several buildings and installations that had ancillary functions (marked 
green on Fig 100), and accommodation and leisure areas (marked purple on Fig 100) at 
Prince Olav Harbour whaling station. Although these did not have any direct part in 
production, they were vital to sustaining the station’s functionality. Fieldwork showed 
that the accommodation consisted of three houses for workers (Fig 100, No 18, 19 and 
22), two houses for the management (Fig 100,No 25 and 26), and one villa for the 
director (Fig 100,No 27). Ancillary buildings and installations included a hospital (Fig 
100,No 21), a mess and kitchen (Fig 100, No 22), a forge (Fig 100, No14), a piggery 
(Figure 100, No 32 and 33), and a bakery, among others. These supplied a number of 
services, including food and health services and maintenance services, such as 
straightening bent harpoons and changing wheel bearings on the railway carts. Used 
harpoons often got bent by the forces involved in killing and hauling a whale. Keeping 
the harpoons in working order ensured that production ran smoothly. 
 
All accommodation buildings were located on the south side, either by the beach or on a 
levelled ridge. At most other whaling stations on South Georgia, the management’s 
accommodation was situated away from the workers’ accommodation. At Prince Olav 
Harbour, however, there is not enough space for such a separation. Instead, the entire 
accommodation area was situated on one ridge and was divided by other means, 
probably to create hierarchical boundaries. 
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Fig 113 and 114. The local landscape of the former whaling station at Grytviken is large and flat, and as such 
suitable for establishing industrial operations. Consequently, the management of Compañia Argentina de 
Pesca Sociedad Anónima were able to design their workers’ accommodation area differently than the 
Southern Whaling & Sealing Company. The workers’ accommodation (yellow) was located east of the 
production area while the management (red) lived to the north and were separated from the workers by the 
meat cookery (no. 4) and the hospital (no. 35). Map by The Norwegian Antarctic Research Expeditions.793 
Right: Grytviken whaling station in 2009 after the asbestos clean-up project. Photo: U.I. Gustafsson. LASHIPA 
6/2009. 
 
How was this accommodations designed, and how were the workers divided? The 
fieldwork showed that all three of the workers’ accommodation houses had electric 
lighting. It appears, however, that only two of the workers barracks had a hot water 
supply. One of the barracks Fig 113,(No 19) was divided in two sections by an internal 
wall. The buildings had concrete foundations and a wooden frame with walls and a roof 
of corrugated steel plates. Corrugated steel was cheap and suited the environmental 
conditions. Some of the wooden material had been imported from Sweden via South 
Africa to the station.794 The houses were relatively simple and cheap constructions, but 
sturdy enough to withstand the local environment. 
 
Barrack No 18 had ten rooms on the lower floor and three on the upper. Each room was 
equipped with eight beds, giving the house an approximate capacity of 104 workers. The 
interiors of these rooms had little private space and were sparsely decorated. Although 
the barrack was equipped with electrical lighting and internal heaters, the heaters were 
only present in every second room. All three of the workers’ barracks had running cold 
                                                 
793 The map has been supplied by The Norwegian Antarctic Expedition: En Rapport fra prosjektet 
hvalfangstminneregistreringen på Syd Georgia 1992/93. 
794 During the LASHIPA 6 expedition the team recorded the text: 9 x ½ S (T) L Cape Town. Made in Sweden, 
on the wall of one of the ancillary buildings. 
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water on each floor. Hot water for washing was available at the bath house between 
barracks 18 and 19 and the production area. Here, the workers could wash after the 
day’s work before going to the barrack. The exteriors of barracks 18 and 19 were 
similar, but the interiors differed substantially. Barrack 19 was divided by an internal 
wall into two separate sections. The outer walls of the eastern section were insulated 
with tar paper insulated and the cornice was painted white. Although British armed 
forces used the same rooms later on and partly re-decorated them, there are no signs 
that any of the rooms in this section were equipped with similar bunk beds as in barrack 
18. The other side of barrack 19 was divided in two levels. The rooms here were 
decorated with wallpaper and curtains. It is difficult to make a comparison with barrack 
no 22 due to its poor state. Half of the building has collapsed and could not be surveyed 
for safety reasons. These findings imply that the workers were divided by living 
conditions, access to space and privacy, and small architectural details. The skilled 
workers probably enjoyed better living conditions than the unskilled workers. Below, I 
discuss why the company designed the houses in this way. 
  
Fig 115 and 116. In barrack 18, eight workers were accommodated in each room. In the eastern part of 
barrack 19, only two workers shared a room and the standard of these rooms was visibly higher . Photos: 
Gustav Rossnes. LASHIPA 6/2009. 
 
 
The foremen’s houses were located on a ridge slightly below the director’s villa. All of 
them were supplied with hot water from the steam house. Unfortunately, the foremen’s 
houses are no longer standing. They were probably moved to Leith Harbour by Salvesen 
& Co during the 1940s. The director’s villa (Fig 113,no 27) was a large two-storey 
wooden villa with a corrugated steel roof. The villa was strategically placed in the 
landscape so that the director could overlook the entire whaling station. According to 
Rossnes, a nice-looking and imposing villa was an important part of the company’s 
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impression since the quality of the director’s villa reflected the dignity, solidity, and 
significance of the company itself.795 The house had several rooms and a dining room of 
high standard, and a large porch that overlooked the whaling station. It had rooms for 
staff with a separate entrance, a kitchen, a washroom, a chicken house, and a flagpole. 
 
Fig 117. The director’s villa (Fig 113, 27) at Prince Olav Harbour. Photo by U.I. Gustafsson. LASHIPA 6/2009. 
 
Strategies for social control 
The design and spatial layout of the whaling station fulfilled secondary purposes beside 
production. There was no law enforcement on site so the company relied on a handful of 
loyal foremen and managers to support the company in case of conflict with their labour 
force. Although the British government had a magistrate on the island, he was hours 
away at Grytviken and could only negotiate in case of strikes. To compensate for this, the 
company developed ways to manifest leadership and create control. 
 
Architecture, settlement plans, and the local landscape were used to establish 
hierarchies that created social control by dividing the work force. The accommodation 
                                                 
795 Rossnes. G. Of whales and men – details of an industry: reflections on the value of the historical remains 
found in Prince Olav Harbour, South Georgia. P: 43. 2011. In: Managing Industrial & Cultural Heritage: 
South Georgia in Context. Pp: 42-51. 
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area was important for production since it created social control and stimulated 
efficiency. In more populated areas, labour conflicts were overcome by negotiation or by 
replacing undesirable workers. However, on South Georgia (and the polar regions in 
general), companies often had to use other strategies (like the buildings) to avoid labour 
conflicts. These were necessary because the geographic remoteness and seasonal 
character of whaling operations made the projects expensive and sensitive to 
disruptions. 
 
Using buildings to establish social control was common in the western world at that 
time.796 However, no one has studied how this was done at whaling stations in the polar 
regions. The archives show that control was achieved using salaries and contracts and 
fieldwork has revealed how this was achieved at individual whaling stations. 
 
To manifest hierarchy and power relations, the manager’s villa and the foremen’s 
houses were separated from the workers’ barracks by the hospital, the company 
store/slop chest, and a small trolley track. This distinction was supported by external 
and internal architectural features that emphasized their superior social status. The 
separation from the workers barracks created and enforced boundaries and manifested 
power relations. The elevated position of the manager’s villa allowed the manager to see 
what was going on at the station and gave the impression that he had full insight into 
how everyone was working. 
 
Two of the worker’s barracks were supplied with hot water and one was not, indicating 
that the company separated workers of different status. As mentioned above, barrack 19 
had fewer beds per room than barrack 18 and was divided into two sections by an 
internal wall. This indicates that workers of different statuses lived here and that they 
were physically separated by a wall. Barrack 18 probably accommodated skilled 
workers and barrack 19 unskilled workers. By separating the workers in the barracks 
with different living standards and salaries, the management created hierarchical 
divisions between the workers. The reason for this was to create a buffer for the 
                                                 
796 See for example Avango, Dag. Sveagruvan: svensk gruvhantering mellan industri, diplomati och 
geovetenskap 1910-1934. 2005. 
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management; workers with better living standards and better pay were less likely to 
create unrest or go on strike. 
The part-based salary system differed between skilled station workers, unskilled station 
workers, and whale catcher crew members in a way that created dependence between 
the groups. Nielsen (1929) has argued that the system was healthy and sensible since it 
made “the soil fruitless for Bolshevism” because everyone had to work hard and 
energetically.797 Isachsen, on the other hand, argued that “there is no more brotherhood 
in whaling than in gambling”.798 Whatever one’s opinion might be of this system, it is 
clear that it stimulated production and economic profit by linking to worker’s income to 
their own input. Everyone would suffer financially if production came to a halt. 
 
Until 1920, there was no collective salary agreement between the whaling companies 
and their workers. Instead, all workers were hired and contracted individually on a 
seasonal basis, with the exception of the gunners and captains. It was possible not to 
extend short term contracts if the workers misbehaved or disagreed with the 
management. The workers failed to unite and form unions, according to Tønnesen 
(1969), because they were an un-homogenous group that did not fit in any of the already 
established workers unions.799 This, however, does not mean that the whalers lacked 
ambitions to unify. On a number of occasions, workers at the whaling stations in South 
Georgia united and went on strike to achieve their goals. The first strike occurred in 
1909 at Chr. Salvesen & Co’s whaling station at Leith Harbour when 30 to 40 workers 
refused to work for a period of three months. The motive for their strike was that they 
had been hired for whaling and not for construction work, which paid less. After three 
months of negotiations the workers were sent home. In 1913, another attempt to create 
a workers’ union occurred at the whaling station of Compañia Argentina de Pesca 
Sociedad Anónima; the workers established Grytviken Workers Union with 129 
members.800 The company’s manager C. A. Larsen reported that the otherwise good 
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relationship between workers and the management had unfortunately been disrupted 
by socialistic elements after the union had declared “to all the workers at whaling 
stations across the world to unite to achieve equal working conditions at the stations”.801 
 
In an attempt to prevent similar events, Larsen sent the local policeman Joachim 
Petersen back to Norway to hire additional men so that they could get rid of what he 
regarded as the worst elements.802 Two days after the strike had broken out in 
Grytviken, it spread to Leith Harbour where workers complained about poor food and 
accommodation, bad healthcare, and young boys doing adult work for less pay.803 After 
the strikes, religion was introduced as a tool for social control by local management. 
Shortly after the strike at Grytviken, C.A. Larsen declared that he intended to build a 
church. One aim of building this church was probably to prevent future strikes by 
influencing the political and religious attitudes of the workers so they fitted the needs of 
the company. Several whaling companies also added precautionary clauses to the 
workers’ contracts, which prevented them from joining any union or “organising 
meetings to discuss and by force try to achieve things that violate against the contract and 
the company’s interest. In that case, I have forfeited my right to earned salary and part”.804 
 
To reinforce social control, the Norwegian Whaling Union was encouraged by Chr. 
Salvesen to initiate the black book system, which they did in 1913.805 The black book 
was a disclosed list that was updated annually by the local managers and distributed to 
all whaling companies.806 The black book provided a complete and updated list of 
workers, officers, and crew that were regarded as problematic and unwanted in the 
industry. Although the black book was used to share information between the whaling 
companies’ management, most employees were aware of its existence. The whaling 
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companies probably made sure that people knew about the black book system to create 
fear among the employees and encourage cooperative behaviour to avoid being included 
in the list. A listing had devastating effects for the employees and their families back 
home and for their future in the industry. 
 
Basberg, Børresen, and Hjeltnes have called whaling stations totalitarian institutions 
that were similar to ships, where the management exercised control over its workforce 
and where the workers were unable to leave without the consent of the local manager or 
captain.807 Despite this, a number of strikes occurred in South Georgia between 1917 
and 1920. The most severe of these strikes was in 1920. This strike spread from station 
to station and 220 workers went on strike at one station. The situation was not resolved 
until the British authorities despatched a warship, which was a powerful tool in the 
negotiations. These strikes were commonly caused by dissatisfaction with salaries and 
local costs at the company shop.808 
 
Organised leisure activities were offered to the workers by the whaling companies to 
enhance the company feeling and station’s identity. These included cinemas, theatres, 
libraries, choirs, football fields, and ski jump hills. Together, the whaling companies 
arranged annual “Olympics” where the whaling stations competed against each other in 
football, ski jumping, and running. Fieldwork showed that there was a cinema at Prince 
Olav Harbour, which was close to the workers’ barracks, as well as a football field to the 
south of the accommodation area. 
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Fig 118 and 119. Olympic games at Grytviken Whaling Station. The photo has been published with the kind 
approval of Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangst Museum in Sandefjord, Norway.809Right: The 
graveyard at Prince Olav Harbour contains at least nine graves with three different types of crosses (stone, 
iron, and unmarked wooden crosses). Out of the five marked graves, four were Norwegians and one was 
Bulgarian. 
 
The company used different strategies on their pelagic expeditions. The social structure 
onboard the ships was strictly hierarchical and the will of the captain was the law.810 It 
is likely that Lever Bros, much like other whaling companies, feared strikes onboard the 
whaling fleet. To avoid this, several whaling companies, in collaboration with the British 
authorities, compensated for declining catches at South Georgia by relaxing the ban on 
catching humpback whales. This allowed whaling companies to maintain high 
production when catches of other species dropped.811  
In addition to this, the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company paid their boat crews 
better than other companies, especially their gunners. This was done to secure the best 
and most experienced crews, which they hoped would increase catches and profits.812 
The leader of the Discovery expeditions suggested that that the British authorities 
prohibit the use of a graded bonus system to prevent unhindered increase of the 
gunner’s salary. He suggested the system used by the Southern Whaling & Sealing 
Company where the gunners were paid according to whale species and size. 
 
                                                 
809 Anderssons photo collection. Kommendør Chr. Christensens Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. 
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Southern Whaling & Sealing Company Ltd 
Gunners salaries for the 1925–1926 season 
FIXED/monthly (Kr) 400.00 
BONUS Blue whale 130.00 
  Fin whale 90.00 
  Humpback whale 50.00 
  Sei and sperm whale 50.00 
     
EXTRA 140 whales+ 1,000 
  Additional for every   
  tenth above 1,000 
Fig 120. Salaries paid to gunners employed by the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company in the 1925–1926 
season.813 
 
Fin whales were included in the Discovery expedition report. The suggested payment for 
the gunner was £8 for whales that were 60 feet or smaller, £13 for whales that measured 
61–68 feet, £18 for whales measuring 69–78 feet, and £23 for whales larger than 77 
feet.814 This system encouraged the gunners to hunt larger whales and avoid smaller 
ones. Attracting good and competent gunners had always been a decisive factor for any 
whaling expedition, because the expeditions’ success depended on the skills of the 
gunners. Good gunners were attracted by financial means. The accelerating trend of 
catches and production throughout the 1920s meant that huge salaries were paid to the 
gunners. 
 
Who were the people that ventured to the Antarctic to work there and what were their 
motives for going there? Was the motive purely financial, or were there other 
contributing factors? 
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Fig 121. Workers at Prince Olav Harbour whaling station standing in front of the mess. In the background the 
main jetty and the elevated railway system are visible together with some of the large metal tanks. The photo 




The term “whaler” has often been used to describe all those that worked in the whaling 
industry. The common image is one of a gunner standing at the stern of a whale catcher 
with a firm grip on the harpoon cannon. Many of the people that worked in the industry 
were, according to Tønnesen, farmers supplementing their income or young boys who 
had to work to help support their families.816 Although work is driven by survival, there 
may have been non-economic motives for working in the Antarctic, such as adventure, 
and the idea of becoming part of the polar hero myth and contemporary masculine 
                                                 
815 The Prince Olav Harbour photo collection. Kommendør Chr. Christensens Hvalfangstmuseum. 
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ideals associated with the whaling industry. Avango and Houltz have shown that such 
driving forces existed, and that working in one of the toughest and most challenging 
regions in the world gave a unique opportunity to prove one’s abilities.817 Although this 
was not studied in the context of the whaling industry, it is likely that these motives 
existed here. 
 
The workforces at the whaling stations on South Georgia were dominated by 
Norwegians. A visit to one of the whaling station’s cemeteries shows the international 
composition of the people that worked here. The tasks at the whaling station were 
diverse and consisted of flensers, lemmers, cooks, electricians, steam winch operators, 
stokers, chemists, gunners, blacksmiths, bakers, and many more. They all filled vital 
roles that enabled the industrial project to function as intended and generate economic 
profit for shareholders. It is interesting to note how workers at the whaling stations 
have been depicted by different authors at different times. Tønnesen and Johnsen 
(1954–1970) depicted the industry as a national activity arguing that “Norwegian 
whaling in the Southern Ocean is certainly the toughest and most hazardous industry in 
the world. The Norwegians are alone in it, and will stay so since no other people in the 
world would endure the harshness and dog-life down there”.818 This image fitted well with 
contemporary masculine and Darwinist ideals, and links the national abilities of 
industrial exploitation that fitted a desired narrative. 
 
Isachsen (1929) have described the same group as accumulators of scientific knowledge 
stating that “the Norwegian whalers discovered early on that whales in the northern and 
southern seas migrate to colder regions in spring and to warmer regions in autumn. They 
knew that whales migrated to find their food, drifting organisms which in spring develop in 
such enormous numbers that they colour the water”.819 In contrast, the same group have 
also been portrayed as “wrecked individuals, who are both spiritually and physically 
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broken. They are licentious criminals and escaped sailors who have ended up edgeways 
with society, and can hardly have been home over the last 15–20 years…”.820 This 
multifaceted portrait may be explained by growing fears of the socialistic sentiments 
leading up to the 1917 Russian Revolution. These sentiments gained support in several 
industrial settlements during the early 20th century. Similar strikes to those that 
occurred in South Georgia took place in Spitsbergen (Svalbard) in 1917–1918 when 
syndicalist groups organised and coordinated strikes that halted production at several 
coal mines. The strike there came to an end after Norway used it as an opportunity to 
show that the archipelago had to be nationalised and that Norway had the will and 
capacity to exercise the necessary control by sending up military forces that quickly 
rounded up the strikers and sent their leaders back to Scandinavia.821 
 
A group of workers, which until recently have been overlooked in the history of South 
Georgia and perhaps the whole whaling industry in the Antarctic, is the African workers. 
African workers were, according to Børresen (2010), common at several whaling 
stations in South Africa.822 African workers were cheap and the forced labour system 
(shibalo) made it attractive for the whaling companies to hire African workers. In 
addition to this, Børresen has pointed out that land confiscation and raised taxes in the 
African colonies at the turn of the 20th century resulted in a decline of agriculture and 
rise of unemployment.823 This benefited the whaling companies since it gave them an 
opportunity to reduce labour costs, particularly during the First World War when the 
companies were able to hire African workers who were much cheaper than European 
workers. In addition, African workers were less demanding when it came to the quality 
of food and accommodation.824 African workers were also accustomed to social 
segregation and were regarded as less prone to challenging authority than workers from 
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Norway, Sweden, and elsewhere where unions and socialistic ideas were taking shape. 
Irvin and Johnson were no exception, and they frequently used African workers in their 
sealing activities.825 When the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company was formed in 
1911, they continued to hire African workers for their whaling operations in Africa. In 
1913 and 1914, the company hired African workers for the S/S Restitution destined for 
South Georgia from the Shepstone Whaling Company in Durban.826 The company leased 
a whaling station from this company later on.827 These workers (50 in 1913 and 34 in 
1914) were paid substantially less than other skilled workers. African workers had one 
year contracts and were not included in the part system. The workers that the company 
contracted in 1913 and 1914 were paid a fixed salary of £4 per month, which included 
food and accommodation.828 Even though these salaries were lower than those of other 
workers, they were still approximately 25% higher than other salaries paid in Africa.829 
The Southern Whaling & Sealing Company frequently hired Zulu workers for their 
whaling activities in South Georgia, and continued to do so at least until the end of the 
1920 season, and probably until the station was closed in 1931. According to Børresen, 
African workers were also employed at Grytviken whaling station and at Ocean Harbour 
whaling station.830 
 
Fieldwork showed that the workers at Prince Olav Harbour were divided into several 
groups. African workers may have been accommodated in a separate barrack or on a 
separate floor. The graves at Prince Olav Harbour also reflect differences in social status. 
There are a number of unmarked graves with simple wooden crosses in the graveyard, 
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which are noticeably different from the decorative and informative iron and stone 
memorial crosses. 
 
Børresen argued that whaling companies hired African workers because the First World 
War made it difficult to contract and transport European workers to South Georgia.831 
There were, as mentioned earlier, both economic and social motives for hiring African 
workers. Børresen may be suggesting that the use of African workers increased because 
of the war. 
 
The international and multi-ethnic composition of the workers at whaling stations in 
South Georgia meant that many cultural aspects influenced the relationship between the 
working groups and the local management. Cultural and racial conflicts probably 
occurred at the stations. One should perhaps not overlook that Scandinavian workers 
feared that the increasing number of non-Scandinavians within the industry would 
ultimately replace them, or that they would have to reduce their salaries to avoid being 
replaced by cheaper workers who were gaining experience and knowledge over the 
years. 
 
The sale of Southern Whaling & Sealing Company’s local networks 
To what extent Irvin and Johnson actively looked to attract investors to their whaling 
company is unclear due to a lack of written sources. Jackson (1978) suggested that the 
group reacted quickly to the Lever Bros offer to purchase the assets, concessions, and 
lease of the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company.832 The whaling station had an 
estimated value in excess of £250,000.833 
 
Lever Bros wanted to buy the company from Irvin and Johnson to increase their control 
over whale oil for their soap and margarine business. The market for butter substitutes 
had increased because of the war and, according to Wilson, the demand was likely to 
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increase and new plants were either being built or were going to be built.834 These 
developments increased the need for whale oil. Once the opportunity presented itself, 
Leverhulme did not hesitate to increase his existing ownership and control of whale oil 
production.835 Buying the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company fitted well with Lever 
Bros’ strategy to control whale oil production, and as their production increased so did 
their need for whale oil. 
 
According to Jackson, the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company had done well during 
the war, and made larger profits than Salvesen had done in the post-war season.836 
There are, however, no sources to support such a conclusion. On the contrary, the 
available data indicate that Irvin and Johnson made substantial financial losses on their 
whaling project in South Georgia, and that these financial setbacks probably prompted 
Irvin and Johnson to sell their whaling station and company to Lever Bros. 
 
Phase three (Lever Bros/Unilever 1920–1931) 
Phase three can be divided into one shore-based operation at Prince Olav Harbour 
whaling station and one pelagic operation from 1922 onwards (as Lever Bros adapted 
their industrial activities in the Antarctic to increase their control of whale oil 
production). Although only the shore-based operation is relevant to the site under 
discussion in this thesis, I have chosen to incorporate the pelagic operation as well since 
it affected and dictated the developments and activities at the whaling station. The 
pelagic operation was an adaptation of the local network at Prince Olav Harbour. 
 
New management 
In September 1919, Lever Bros purchased the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company and 
its production facilities at South Georgia, including a small fleet.837 One of the first things 
that Lever Bros did was to hire a new management to run the company’s activities. 
Johnson stayed for one year after the purchase to assist the new management.838 The 
                                                 
834 Wilson, C. The history of Unilever. Vol: 1. P: 244. 1954. 
835 Wilson, C. The history of Unilever. Vol: 1. P: 245. 1954. 
836 Jackson. G. The British Whaling Trade. P: 193. 1978. 
837 Jackson. G. The British Whaling Trade. P: 174. 1978. 
838 ”The History of the Irvin and Johnson Limited, Part 1 & 2. By Greenwood-Johnson.E, Abao.H,Rosenthal. E”. 
Unpublished confidential file. P: 10. The Private Collection of Glenn McIntosh. Australia. 
 277 
 
board consisted of three directors: Harold Robert Greenhalgh, John Inglis, and Norman 
Charles Watt who was managing director.839 Watts had previously been employed by 
the British government as a customs officer at New Island in the Falkland Islands.840 As 
such, he had knowledge of the whaling industry, including its regulations and policy. 
 
Reconstructing the local network at Prince Olav Harbour 
Lever Bros had several local managers of the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company in 
South Georgia. The Norwegian Mathias Andersen was the local manager from 1919 to 
1921.841 He was replaced in 1922 by B.R. Bostock who stayed on until 1924 when he 
was replaced by the Norwegian Einar Abrahamsen.842 Abrahamsen was the local 
manager of company until the station closed in 1931. 
 
For the 1919–1920 season, the management decided not to continue leasing the whaling 
station of Sandefjord Hvalfangeri A/S. Instead, they decided to focus on whaling 
operations at Prince Olav Harbour. The station had, as mentioned above, ten blubber 
cookers and 41 pressure cookers, in addition to clearing and storage tanks that gave the 
station a processing capacity of six blue whales or  nine fin whales per day.843 The 
station still lacked a guano factory with full utilisation capacity, which, according to the 
concession, they were obliged to have.844 The Southern Whaling & Sealing Company had 
not built a guano factory for several reasons. Firstly, the original station that was moved 
from Africa did not have a guano factory. Secondly, the war had made it difficult to buy 
and transport technical equipment from Europe to the Antarctic. Thirdly, Irvin and 
                                                 
839 “Letter from the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company Ltd, to the Colonial Office. April 28, 1922”. Also in: 
“Letter from The Southern Whaling & Sealing Company Limited, to His Excellency the Governor in Stanley. 
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841 “Report on the whale oil industry of South Georgia for the six months from 1st July to 31st December 1919, 
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844 ”Letter from Richard Irvin & Sons Ltd, to The Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office in London. June 28, 
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Johnson had focused on maximising whale oil production in accordance with British 
demands. Irvin and Johnson had planned to build a guano factory at Prince Olav Harbour 
whaling station to comply with the British demand of full utilisation. In the summer of 
1919, the company had purchased the necessary technical equipment to build the 
factory,845 but for reasons unknown the manager Mathias Andersen did not put it into 
production until after Lever Bros had purchased the station in 1921. This is probably 
because Lever Bros prioritised whale oil production over the production of by-products, 
since their primary interest lay in oil. That the company did not prioritise operating the 
guano factory is supported by the fact that the company only produced 896 bags of 
guano from a catch of 933 whales.846 
 
The local manager Andersen applied a waste policy at the station. According to the 
magistrate of South Georgia, there were frequently too many whales buoyed outside the 
station waiting to be processed.847 Managers of competing whaling companies in South 
Georgia had also reported to the magistrate that they had often seen the Southern 
Whaling & Sealing Company’s spare whale catcher far out at sea towing whale carcasses 
for dumping. These reports encouraged the magistrate to visit Prince Olav Harbour in 
the season of 1921–1922, where he saw that 47 whales were lying buoyed waiting to be 
processed. The magistrate halted further hunting operations until the Southern Whaling 
& Sealing Company had processed the whales. In a report to the Colonial Office, the 
magistrate suggested that the British authorities should consider appointing a customs 
officer at Prince Olav Harbour to prevent the company from wasting raw materials. 
Their wasteful policy had apparently caused considerable annoyance at the other 
whaling stations because it reduced the available resources for all actors. These wasteful 
activities were reported to the magistrate. 
 
The local manager, Andersen, probably chose not operate the guano factory to save costs 
on coal. 
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846 ”Statement by The Southern Whaling & Sealing Company Ltd for the 1921/22 season. May 16, 1922”. The 
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Catches and production in South Georgia 1921–1922 season 
Company Catch Production Average No. catchers 
Southern Whaling & Sealing 933 64,679 69.3 5 
Vestfold Wh Company 702 52,155 74.0 5 
South Georgia Company 703 49,000 69.7 4 
A/S Tønsberg 574 45,050 78.5 4 
Cia Arg Pesca 438 34,878 79.6 4 
Figure 122. Catches and production in South Georgia (all companies) for the 1921–1922 season.848 
 
Fieldwork revealed that assembling a guano factory was a relatively difficult task since it 
could not be purchased pre-constructed from a manufacturer and assembled on site. 
Lever Bros engineers and workers constructed the guano factory from technical parts 
manufactured by a variety of companies in Europe and the USA, and assembled these 
parts into a production system that could produce guano from whale meat residues and 
bones. By doing so, the company adapted their local network to the political whaling 
conditions laid down by the British authorities. 
 
Fig 123 Left: A hot air fan produced by the American company Buffalo Forge Company in Buffalo, New York. 
The fan was an integrated part of the guano factory, where it was used to force large amounts of heated air 
into the rotating guano drier to dry the residues. Photo: U.I. Gustafsson. LASHIPA 6/2009. 
                                                 
848 Data from: “Report on the whale oil industry in South Georgia for the 1921-22 season. Edw. B. Binnie 
Magistrate, to The Honourable Colonial Secretary in Stanley. June 10, 1922”. The Falkland Islands Archive. 
Vol: South Georgia. Whaling. Vol 2 (1920-1939). 
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Besides the guano factory and the football field, Lever Bros made few additional 
investments at Prince Olav Harbour whaling station. This was because the whaling 
station, from the housing units to the production system, was relatively new and 
because whale oil prices had started to decline in the early 1920s. Lever Bros did, 
however, remodel the fleet in 1922–1923, keeping only the best vessels849 after securing 




Fig 124. Prince Olav Harbour whaling station in the 1920s. The main production area is located in the lower 
part of the photo, while the accommodation area is visible on the ridge in the back overlooking the entire 
area. The photo illustrates how restricted the available building space was in the area. The photo has been 
published with the kind approval of Kommendør Chr. Christensens Hvalfangstmuseum, Norway. 
 
                                                 
849 Jackson. G. The British Whaling Trade. P: 176. 1978. 
850 “Letter from the Crown Agents, to The Colonial Secretary at the Falkland Islands. September 27, 1922”. 
The Falkland Islands Archive. Vol: Dependencies. Whaling. Vol 2 (1920-1922). 
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Strikes, challenges, and changing circumstances 
The first phase of the 1919–1920 hunting season started well for Lever Bros. By the end 
of December, the company had caught 147 whales and produced 7,653 barrels of whale 
oil.851 In January, a strike broke out at the station, which reduced production. This strike 
was not confined to Prince Olav Harbour. A conflict had started at Grytviken whaling 
station just after New Year’s Eve 1920, and the workers had given the management of 
Compañia Argentina de Pesca Sociedad Anónima an ultimatum with a January 16 
deadline. The Argentinean whaling company asked the British authorities for assistance. 
The British authorities sent a warship into the harbour, which gave the magistrate and 
the company management a powerful tool for negotiations with the workers. The strikes 
at several whaling stations across the island suddenly stopped.852 The workers who 
(according to the managers) had instigated the strike at Grytviken were deported from 
the island.853 The use of warships had been discussed in the aftermaths of the 1919 
strike, when some workers had proclaimed their intention to make South Georgia a 
Bolshevik state. 
 
But how did the conflicts start, and how did they affect production at the station? Unlike 
the previous season, this strike broke out at the end of the season. The conflict was 
between the management and workers, which included approximately 100 African 
workers that were employed for the season. According to Børresen, the strike was 
motivated by unclear contracts. The African workers had been contracted at fixed 
annual rates and were not part-holders in the overall production. At some point during 
the season, the local manager re-negotiated the contracts between the company and the 
workers and changed them so the African workers were included in the part-based 
salary system. When the workers arrived back in Cape Town, the company failed to 
recognise their agreement after the South African authorities proclaimed that the whole 
group had been illegally recruited.854 The problems were solved by the South African 
                                                 
851 ”Report on the whale oil industry of South Georgia for the six months from 1st July to 31st December 1919, 
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Native Affairs Department, who forced the whaling company to give the 100 African 
workers a 20% pay rise and additional pay for special work.855 Although this strike took 
place at the end of the season and did not affect production much, the companies feared 
strikes and did everything to avoid them. Equipping and hiring personnel for a hunting 
season meant that large investments were made prior to the production of oil. Operating 
in the Antarctic was also dangerous, and investments could be lost in the ice. In addition, 
the Antarctic hunting season was relatively short and any disturbance in the flow of 
production could result in huge losses. The use of social strategies as described earlier 
must be understood and analysed on the basis of this. 
 
In early 1920, a fire broke out at Prince Olav Harbour whaling station and destroyed the 
bone cookery.856 The cookery was important for whale oil production and the company 
faced additional expenses to re-erect the cookery for the upcoming season. It is 
uncertain how much this affected overall production for this season. 
 
The British authorities’ policy regarding the distribution of whale oil also posed 
challenges for Lever Bros. The Southern Whaling & Sealing Company managed to catch 
550 whales and produced 27,663 barrels of whale oil in the 1919–1920 season,857 but 
British policy reduced their ability to use the oil for their own commercial purposes. 
During the First World War, Lever Bros had received whale oil through an agreement 
between the Minister of Munitions and the companies Joseph Crosfield & Sons Ltd and 
Joseph Watson & Sons Ltd. Britain’s policy was motivated by their interest in using 
whale oil to produce glycerine for explosives.858 These regulations did not end when the 
war ended. Instead, the British authorities decided to extend the control they had had 
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over the whaling industry’s production until the end of the 1920 season.859 As a result, 
the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company and Lever Bros had to sell 27,663 barrels of 
whale oil to the British authorities at a fixed amount of £62.10 per barrel.860 The 
extension of the war-time regulations only applied to the Southern Whaling & Sealing 
Company and Chr. Salvesen & Co, who were British companies. Their competitors from 
Norway, Argentina, and Chile were allowed to sell their produce on the open market for 
£20 more per barrel than the two British companies were able to sell for.861 Lever Bros 
were only allowed to purchase 47.4% of their whale oil, which was stipulated in the 
agreement at a fixed price.862 What effect this had on the Southern Whaling & Sealing 
Company’s first season profit is not known. 
 
Lever Bros could not have purchased the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company at a 
worse time. The expected increase in demand for whale oil and whale-related products 
on the world markets proved to be unfounded. Instead, competing vegetable oils began 
flooding the market, reducing the demand and prices for whale oil. By the end of 1921, 
the market had stagnated. This development surprised the soap and margarine 
manufacturing companies, who had expected a post-war increase in unemployment and 
a market for cheap margarine. Lever Bros had prepared for an improved post-war 
market by purchasing whaling companies (including Harris Whaling & Fishing Company 
as well as Harpunen Whaling Company in the Hebrides in 1922 after the domestic ban 
was lifted) and securing more than 50% of the shares in De-No-Fa.863 Throughout the 
1920s, these whaling stations largely functioned as testing and research platforms for 
Lever Bros Antarctic operations.864 These daughter companies had access to Lever Bros’ 
network, but never became profitable because the whale populations in these areas 
were depleted after decades of industrial exploitation. Yet Lever Bros chose to keep 
these whaling stations operational and cover their economic losses through the profits 
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made by the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company.865 The situation meant that Lever 
Bros were able to buy whale oil cheaply and stock up their supply. Having done so, the 
company were almost unharmed by the crisis despite being a producer themselves, and 
were not dependent on external suppliers. The market changes were positive for Lever 
Bros as competitors went bankrupt, enhancing their dominant position in the soap and 
margarine industries. 
 
In what appears to have been an attempt to counteract the dominant position of Lever 
Bros in the market, whale oil producers in Norway, Great Britain, and Africa tried to 
form a syndicate to prevent Lever Bros from using their position to influence whale oil 
prices. Many whaling companies feared that Lever Bros’ dominant position could have a 
devastating effect on their financial situation if Lever Bros increased their production to 
dump prices. According to Tønnesen, the attempt failed due to difficult economic 
circumstances and the strategic investments of Lever Bros, who seized control of the 
African Niger Company and formed a buyers ring together with Bergh & Jurgens.866 
 
Concerned that whaling companies would try to increase their catches and production 
to compensate for declining prices and decimate the whale populations, the British 
authorities introduced a system of open and closed seasons in South Georgia. The 
whaling companies were only allowed to hunt whales during the open period from 
September 15 until May 31.867 In 1921, Lever Bros and the Southern Whaling & Sealing 
Company started the hunting season at Prince Olav Harbour on October 1.868 Because of 
falling whale oil prices, the company decided to run the station at reduced capacity and 
only operate the blubber cookery until late December. This significantly reduced the 
overall output of the station since whale meat and bones were not processed into oil.869 
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Competition within the whaling industry increased during the 1920s as prices for whale 
oil dropped and companies increased their production to remain profitable. This was a 
natural reaction, necessary to generate the economic dividends to maintain support of 
global networks and to meet the increasing costs of Antarctic shipping. During the inter-
war period, Lever Bros became one of the largest producers of whale oil in the world, as 
well as one of the largest producers of soap and margarine. The modern whaling 
industry was dominated by the company both as a producer and buyer. The dropping 
whale oil prices were positive for Lever Bros since they used the oil to produce soap. 
Dropping prices and increasing production meant that they could secure more raw 
materials cheaply. This decision brought Lever Bros into conflict with several margarine 
producers who argued that the company should use whale oil to produce margarine 
rather than soap.870 
 
Pelagic whaling 
The demand for cheap whale oil to produce margarine in Europe, USA, and elsewhere, 
encouraged the whaling companies operating in the Antarctic to compensate for falling 
prices by increasing their production throughout the 1920s. This partly explains why 
the whaling industry shifted from shore-based whaling to pelagic whaling during this 
period. The hunting grounds in South Georgia were becoming overexploited and whale 
hunting could not be expanded, even if British management and concessions would have 
allowed it. To find new unrestricted hunting grounds in Antarctica, pelagic production 
units that operated in conjunction with larger and more powerful whale catchers were 
necessary. Even though prices for whale oil dropped from £37 to £12 per ton from 1924 
to 1931,871 the global production of whale oil increased from 716,246 barrels (1923–
1924 season),872 to 3,686,976 barrels (1930–1931 season) – an increase of 414.8%.873 
 
The Southern Whaling & Sealing Company transformed their local network from shore-
based to pelagic whaling. In the 1921–1922 season, the company secured a concession 
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for pelagic whaling operations in the South Shetland Islands and remodelled its fleet.874 
The company’s first pelagic expedition used the new factory ship Southern Queen and 
was led by Captain Lars Andersen.875 This ship had ten open cookers, 20 pressure 
cookers, 20 clearing tanks, and internal tanks that could carry 5121.7 tons of whale 
oil.876 Interestingly, this ship was owned by a subsidiary company under Lever Bros 
named A/S Southern Queen that was registered in Oslo, Norway, so she sailed under the 
Norwegian flag. The Norwegian manager of A/S Southern Queen, Thoresen, leased out 
the factory ship and its Norwegian crew to the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company.877 
  
Fig 125 and 126. The Southern Queen steaming and processing whales alongside the hull in the South 
Shetland Islands in the 1922–1923 season. The photos have been published with the kind approval of P. 
Waddingham’s Private Collection. 
 
The company upgraded the entire fleet of the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company and 
bought three new whale catchers (Southern Pride, Southern Flower, and Southern Floe). 
They kept the best whale catchers from the old fleet. These investments were covered 
by increasing the company’s nominal capital from £100,000 to £1,000,000.878 Hart 
(2006) claims that Lever Bros also re-built the whaling station at Prince Olav Harbour at 
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the same time.879 This seems unlikely, however, since the blubber, meat, and bone 
cookeries at Prince Olav Harbour had just been completed. Unfortunately, Hart did not 
give a source to support his claim. 
 
The result of the company’s first pelagic expedition was a catch of 518 whales,880 from 
which they produced 28,706 barrels of whale oil, an average yield of 55.4 barrels per 
whale.881 This was the second largest production of all pelagic expeditions in the area, 
only surpassed by S/S Ronald’s 37,098 barrels. It is interesting to note that the average 
production of 55.4 barrels per whale was far below the average of other expeditions, 
which produced up to 70.4 barrels per whale.882 This might be because the other 
expeditions caught larger whales, had better machinery therefore obtained a higher 
yield from the raw materials, or started the hunting season at a more optimal time. 
 
The company’s local network faced entirely new challenges when they moved from 
shore-based to pelagic whaling around the Antarctic Peninsula. Compared with 
contemporary whaling grounds in South Georgia and the South Shetland Islands, the 
environment was more demanding and the season was shorter, which complicated 
expeditions in the area. Fieldwork conducted in 2009 and 2010 showed that the 
companies adapted to these circumstances by establishing anchorages and storage 
points wherever land was exposed and where harbours could be accessed with large 
ships. 
Access to freshwater was another challenge facing pelagic expeditions. The peninsula is 
covered by an icecap, which the companies used as a source of freshwater in the 
summer. Like others, the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company collected and melted 
snow onboard the factory ship. They also collected melted water in water barges, 
allowing them to store relatively large quantities of water onboard the factory ship to 
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maintain constant production. Since the Southern Queen was smaller and unable to 
store enough freshwater for longer expeditions, the expeditions could not stay far from 
land for longer periods. 
     
Fig 127 and 128. Workers collecting water by digging trenches in the snow at the Antarctic Peninsula during 
the Southern Queen expedition in 1922–1923. The photo has been published with the kind approval of P. 
Waddingham's private collection. Right: Abandoned water barges at Enterprise Island, Antarctic Peninsula. 
Photo: U.I. Gustafsson. LASHIPA 8/2010. 
 
For the 1923–1924 season, the Southern Queen was joined by three 220-ton whale 
catchers the company commissioned the year before, as well as the tanker Southern 
King.883 This gave the company larger hunting capacity and better range. The combined 
profit of the two production units were in excess of £400,000.884 
 
Fig 129. The Southern King in the Antarctic. This tanker was purchased by the Southern Whaling & Sealing 
Company for the 1923–1924 season, and operated in conjunction with the Southern Queen factory ship in the 
South Shetland Islands. The photo has been published with the kind approval of G. McIntosh. 
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During the period 1922 to 1928, the whaling station at Prince Olav Harbour produced 
478,200 barrels of whale oil, while the Southern Queen expeditions produced 203,107 
barrels.885 According to Jenkins (1932) the British whaling companies Southern Whaling 
& Sealing Company, Chr. Salvesen & Co, and Hector Whaling Company paid dividends to 
their shareholders that ranged from 23.5% to 57.5% during this period.886 
 
The whaling companies realised that pelagic whaling was the future and that it was only 
a matter of time until whale stocks off South Georgia would be depleted. In spite of this, 
the Southern Queen expeditions were never able to match the production of Prince Olav 
Harbour until she was lost in the ice in 1928. This was partly because the whaling 
station had a much larger production capacity, but also indicates that the hunting 
grounds were not exhausted yet. Although prices for whale oil fluctuated throughout the 
period, varying from £28 to £37 per barrel,887 the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company 
supplied Lever Bros with plenty of oil and generated huge profits.888 While the company 
upheld their whaling operations at Prince Olav Harbour, the expansion of the Southern 
Whaling & Sealing Company under Lever Bros was pelagic. In the mid-1920s, the 
Southern Whaling & Sealing Company attempted to increase their pelagic activities by 
applying for a concession from the British authorities to operate in the Ross Sea.889 Even 
though the company was promised the next concession for the area, this expansion 
would need the company to invest in another factory ship to uphold operations in all 
areas. 
 
But how did the whaling companies that operated in these unregulated waters secure 
control over good and sheltered harbours for the factory ships? Fieldwork performed on 
the Antarctic Peninsula in 2010 revealed a large number of anchor points, anchor chains, 
and storages of wooden barrels, tanks, and other equipment on every available piece of 
land. These could have been used to show competing whaling companies that the area 
was already claimed. This was particularly common during the first phase of pelagic 
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888 Jackson. G. The British Whaling Trade. P: 197. 1978. 
889 Jackson. G. The British Whaling Trade. P: 198. 1978. 
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whaling before the factory ships were large enough for full utilisation, but was also to 
support production on entire fleets and ensuring sufficient storage capacity for whale 
oil. More research is needed to find out how and why these points were used the way 
they were. Nevertheless, these observations show that the Antarctic Peninsula was an 
industrial landscape. 
 
A turning point for the company occurred in 1928 when the Southern Queen was lost in 
the Antarctic ice. Prior to the loss of the ship, the company had discussed future whaling 
possibilities in the Antarctic, and were even considering taking over Chr. Salvesen & 
Co.890 The main issues were the effect the declining prices had on the whaling industry 
and the need for more oil since Lever Bros were using more whale oil to make soap and 
margarine than the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company could produce.891 Lever Bros 
invested in a new floating factory ship, the Southern Empress. This ship was larger than 
the Southern Queen892 and was, according to Jackson, the first floating factory ship that 
had enough cookers in relation to the number of whale catchers.893 
 
Lever Bros expected to save up to £15,000 annually in operational costs since tanker 
ships would not be needed to transport the oil. Lever Bros decided, despite pleas from 
captain Aanderud, not to send the ship to the Ross Sea. By the end of the 1928–1929 
season, the company had made a profit of £230,187, which excluded the 64,000 barrels 
of whale oil produced at Prince Olav Harbour.894 For the first time, the company’s 
pelagic units had produced more whale oil than Prince Olav Harbour whaling station 
had done. 
 
The total capital invested by Lever Bros in the two pelagic projects amounted to almost 
£1,000,000. Pelagic whaling not only increased production, it also lowered the costs per 
                                                 
890 In 1928 Harold Salvesen conducted a full-scale examination of future whaling possibilities in the 
Antarctic, in which he concluded that the best opportunities lay in whaling along the ice. For further 
reading, see Jackson. G (1978) P: 200f. 
891 Jackson. G. The British Whaling Trade. P: 205. 1978. 
892 This former tanker ship was rebuilt at a cost of £72 000 and was the first British floating factory ship to 
be fitted with a stern slipway. She carried a crew of 215 and was equipped with eighty-eight cookers and a 
storage capacity of 16 000 tons of whale-oil that enabled her to operate and process 4- to 5 whales an 
hour in the open sea. See: Report by E. Sveinung A/S entitled: Foran Sesongen 1929-30; utsikt over Norske 
og utenlandske hvalfangerselskaper siste fangstsesongs regnskaper. P: 34. 1929. 
893 Jackson. G. The British Whaling Trade. P: 199f. 1978. 
894 Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. No 11, November 1929. P: 317f. Kommendør Chr. Christensens 
Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway, and Jackson. G: The British Whaling Trade. P: 200. 1978. 
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ton of whale oil produced by £10 between 1927 and 1929. To be able to continue to 
generate economic profits and to pay dividends to their shareholders, several whaling 
companies increased their production even more. 




















































Fig 130. The global production of whale oil 1920 to 1932.895 
 
This increase in production was perhaps unexpected. Lever Bros almost ended up with 
too much whale oil since they agreed to purchase oil from several whaling companies. 
To deal with this, Lever Bros invested in new storage facilities and forced their soap and 
margarine companies to base their production almost exclusively on whale oil.896 It was 
difficult to regulate the development of pelagic whaling since most expeditions operated 
in areas outside British control. In an attempt to impose regulations and control pelagic 
whaling, the British authorities threatened to terminate land-based operations in South 
Georgia if the whaling companies continued pelagic projects without adhering to their 
regulations.897 The British authorities realised that pelagic whaling could only be 
restricted by the nation under which the expeditions sailed.898 In 1929, the Norwegian 
government banned all Norwegian companies from hunting calving mothers and 
demanded that the whales be better utilised. In 1930, they issued a ban on killing blue 
whales under 60 feet and fin whales under 50 feet in length. Despite these restrictions, 
overall catches and whale oil production rose from 1928 to 1931. 
 
                                                 
895 Roberts. B. Whale oil and other products of the whaling industry. P: 6. In: The Polar Record. No 11-18, 
1936-39. 
896 Jackson. G. The British Whaling Trade. P: 206f. 1978. 
897 “Promemoria. Hvalfangsten og forhandlingarne med Storbrittania. Oslo, 11 juni 1927. Johan Hjort”. 
Kommendør Chr. Christensens Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. Archive: Hvalfangerforeningen. 
Vol: Korrespondanse angående internasjonale avtaler. Vol 2. 1920-30 årene. 
898 Wamplew. W. The evolution of International whaling controls. P: 125. In: Maritime History 2, no 2, 1972. 
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Fig 131 and 132. Whale catches and whale oil production in the Antarctic from 1927 to 1931.899 
 
It is difficult to estimate whether these regulations affected the exploitation of whales. 
The regulations did not prevent further expansion of the industry because they did not 
restrict the number of catches, amount of whale oil produced, or the number of vessels 
that could be used.900 Unlike pelagic whaling, the overall catches and whale oil 
production of land-based operations in South Georgia declined. 








































Fig 133 and 134. Whale catches and whale oil production in South Georgia between 1920–1930. After 1925, 
the overall trend was declining despite a slight increase in 1927.901 
 
Many whaling companies operating in South Georgia discussed whether declining 
catches and production in South Georgia were due to difficult weather conditions, 
declining whale populations, or a combination of these factors.902 The Southern Whaling 
                                                 
899 The tables are based data supplied by: International Whaling Statistics. 1930, Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. 
No 3, March 1932. P: 53, and Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. No 4, April 1931. P: 89. Kommendør Chr. 
Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. 
900 Wamplew. W. The evolution of International whaling controls. P: 125. In: Maritime History 2, no 2, 1972. 
901 Then tables are based on data supplied by: International Whaling Statistics. 1930, and Norsk 
Hvalfangsttidende. No 11, November 1935. P: 183. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. 
Sandefjord. Norway. 
902 Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. No 12, December 1930. P: 349. Kommendør Chr. Christensens 
Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord. Norway. 
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& Sealing Company had made a profit despite covering approximately £25,000 of the 
Harris Whaling & Fishing Company’s losses throughout the 1920s.903 















Fig 135. The production of whale oil at Prince Olav Harbour from 1922–1923 until its closure after the 1931 
season. Although the station, together with the company’s pelagic expeditions, was able to generate 
substantial profits throughout the period, the data available reveal a declining trend.904 
 
Closure of Prince Olav Harbour whaling station 
The British authorities’ attempts to minimise the accelerating production of the whaling 
industry through regulations had little effect. Production continued and reached new 
heights. From 1929–1930 to 1930–1931, the overall production of the whaling industry 
in the Antarctic increased by 34% from 2,546,759 barrels to 3,427,177 barrels of whale 
oil. The Southern Whaling & Sealing Company alone increased their production by 27% 
in the same period.905 This massive overproduction meant that Unilever (formerly Lever 
Bros), the main buyer on the market, was unable to use all the whale oil produced. 
Consequently, prices fell by almost 50% from £21 in 1930, to £12 in 1931.906 Even 
though low whale oil prices were favourable for Unilever, they could not predict future 
market demands and price fluctuations, or the market for soaps and margarine. It was 
therefore important for Unilever to maintain the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company 
and their whaling operations in the Antarctic to ensure their own supply of whale oil. 
                                                 
903 Jackson. G. The British Whaling Trade. P: 209. 1978 
904 The chart is based on data collected from Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. No 11, November 1929. P: 317f, 
Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. No 4, April 1931. P: 89. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. 
Sandefjord. Norway, and Jackson. G. The British Whaling Trade. P: 248f. 1978 
905 The combined overall production of The Southern Whaling & Sealing increase from 30 474 tons in 
1929/30, to 38 714 tons in 1930/31. Jackson. G. The British Whaling Trade P: 248. 1978. 
906 Elliot. G. A Whaling Enterprise: Salvesen in the Antarctic. P: 31. 1998. Also in Hart. I. B. Whaling in the 




In the spring of 1931, Unilever announced that they would not be able to purchase all 
the whale oil they were likely to be offered. According to Tønnesen, the company had 
enough whale oil stored for almost two years of manufacturing.907 Unilever were taken 
to court and ordered to pay Globus and Polaris whaling companies £447,160 for 
breaking their contract.908 As a result, several whaling companies recalled their fleets. 
No Norwegian whaling companies sent expeditions to the Antarctic in the coming 
season, a period known as the silent year. In addition, several whaling companies chose 
to abandon their whaling stations in South Georgia. This closed season had devastating 
socio-economic effects in Norway. More than 10,000 Norwegians became unemployed 
at a time when the world was facing the largest economic crisis to date. 
 
The management of Unilever dealt with the situation in two ways. Firstly, they sent the 
Southern Empress and Southern Princess pelagic expeditions to the Antarctic hunting 
grounds. Secondly, they closed the whaling station at Prince Olav Harbour.909 This 
appears to have been a strategic business decision. Since the purchase of the whaling 
station in 1919, the management had turned the station’s negative output around to 
generate economic profit and had continued to do so until its closure. In addition, the 
21-year lease, which Irvin and Johnson secured in 1911, was expiring. Instead of 
renewing or extending the lease, it went back to the British authorities.910 
 
The Southern Whaling & Sealing Company had caught fewer whales and produced less 
whale oil over the last few years, like many other whaling companies that operated from 
South Georgia. Large-scale industrial exploitation had depleted the whale stocks. During 
the first decade, the whaling companies adapted to overexploitation by exploiting other 
species or by technological adaptations, such as extending the range of their whale 
catchers. The competition from pelagic whaling in uncontrolled waters made it difficult 
to maintain support for shore-based whaling stations in South Georgia. 
 
                                                 
907 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del II: 1914-1924. Den Pelagiske Fangst 1924-1937. Vol: 3. P: 
395. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og Utvikkling. 1969. 
908 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del II: 1914-1924. Den Pelagiske Fangst 1924-1937. Vol: 3. P: 
395. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og Utvikkling. 1969. 
909 Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. No 4, April 1931. P: 86. Kommendør Chr. Christensens Hvalfangstmuseum. 
Sandefjord. Norway. 




The whaling station at Prince Olav Harbour lay dormant until the autumn of 1936, when 
Chr. Salvesen & Co and the South Georgia Company leased it for a period of three 
years.911 Eventually, Unilever sold the whaling station to Chr. Salvesen & Co, one of the 
few companies to sustain their shore-based operations in South Georgia, operating from 
their whaling station at Leith Harbour. They did not purchase Prince Olav Harbour to re-
open it, but to use it as a resource for building parts, installations, and machineries that 
could be transferred to Leith Harbour. Over a period of 15 years, the South Georgia 
Company systematically dismantled the whaling station and transferred it to Leith 
Harbour.912 
 
Today, the remains of the whaling station at Prince Olav Harbour are a part of the 




The gradual development of the local network at Prince Olav Harbour whaling station 
was dictated by concessions and market demands, and occurred in three phases as 
described above. While archival sources have provided information on company 
structures, production, and salaries, the fieldwork has uncovered the organisation of 
production, the design and spatial layout of the station within the local landscape, the 
role and use of social strategies, and more. 
 
But why did the project fail under Irvin and Johnson? In the wake of the hydrogenation 
process, they saw whaling as a business and decided to start an industrial whaling 
project in the Antarctic. Firstly, they used the same platform to operate in two different 
areas, which was poor organisation. They decided to move and establish the whaling 
station at Prince Olav Harbour, but it took several years to assemble. Once the station 
was completed and operational, several strikes halted further construction and 
production. Whether Irvin and Johnson adapted the design and layout of the station as a 
                                                 
911 “Indenture on lease of Prince Olav Harbour for a period of three years. May 15, 1936”. The Falkland 
Islands Archive.Vol: South Georgia. Whaling – MISC. Non-Govt. Vol 1. 1936. 
912 Bystrøm. E. Et år på Syd-Georgia. 1944. 
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reaction to these events is unclear. But fieldwork clearly shows that workers were 
separated into different groups and that investments were made in leisure activities. 
 
The whaling station probably took so long to reconstruct because the First World War 
complicated logistics. The failure of the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company under 
Irvin and Johnson seems to be caused by difficulties creating social control, long lease 
agreements which were financially heavy, and the loss of S/S Restitution. One can argue 
that these challenges could all have been solved by better organisation and planning. 
This may reflect Irvin and Johnson’s lack of experience operating in the polar regions. 
The loss of S/S Restitution was not the sole reason for Irvin and Johnson selling their 
whaling project since it was probably insured. But the loss forced them to extend the 
lease on Sandefjord Hvalfangeri A/S station, which meant additional costs for the lease 
and personnel. The loss was one of many challenges and it was the combination of 
events that probably convinced Irvin and Johnson to withdraw from their project in 
South Georgia. Therefore, the project failed because the network builders lost control of 
their local network by failing to establish a functional and well-organised project. 
 
Under Lever Bros and later Unilever, the local network at Prince Olav Harbour was part 
of a large, well-organised multinational company with vast experience of industrial 
projects. Lever Bros had strategically purchased whaling companies and other 
producers of oil and fats to secure control of the raw materials needed to produce their 
soaps and margarine. Lever Bros reduced their operation costs in two ways: by 
controlling the production of raw materials and by collaborating with other producers 
to push prices and influence the markets. With the exception of production figures and 
some correspondence with the magistrate of South Georgia, we know little about the 
activities at Prince Olav Harbour during the 1920s. Archival photos combined with 
fieldwork have shown that Lever Bros organised production using the same strategies 
as Irvin and Johnson. This may be because Johnson was involved in the process shortly 
after the purchase. The company did invest in a football field as an additional leisure 
activity for the workers, but it was not completed, which indicates that work was either 




The decline of the market in the early 1920s, combined with the company’s desire to 
control the production of raw materials, motivated Lever Bros to invest in a pelagic 
project in addition to shore-based operations at Prince Olav Harbour. The declining 
catches at South Georgia indicated that the hunting grounds were becoming depleted 
and could not match the increase in catches and whale oil production that were achieved 
by pelagic expeditions in the 1920s. The only way to meet the need for increased 
production was to operate in unregulated waters. The drop in whale oil prices in the 
early 1920s escalated the development of pelagic whaling techniques. 
 
Fieldwork showed that all the buildings except the manager’s villa were wooden frame 
constructions on a concrete foundation and covered with corrugated steel plates. This 
type of construction was suited to the predominant climatic conditions in South Georgia 
and was sustainable and cheap. This meant that the whole station could be abandoned 
once it no longer generated enough profit to justify continued operation. Once the 
pelagic whaling industry became dominant, only a few whaling stations continued to 
operate in South Georgia; most were closed and abandoned. The whaling station was 
eventually closed in 1931 because the local network, despite high output in the 1920s, 
could no longer compete with the profits of pelagic expeditions in uncontrolled waters. 
 
Despite the works of Johnson and Tønnesen, Basberg and Rossnes, Jackson, Hart, and 
others there are still gaps in our knowledge of the whaling industry in South Georgia. 
More research is needed on these whaling stations after their closure, as well as on the 
Japanese whaling industry in Grytviken. Furthermore, it would be interesting to 
investigate how and why the whaling companies in South Georgia collaborated to 
enhance control, for example using the black book system. It would also be interesting to 
determine how pelagic whaling expeditions secured control and possession of good and 
sheltered harbours in unregulated waters. Finally, the role of African workers in the 
Antarctic whaling industry should also be investigated more deeply. I strongly advocate 
industrial archaeological approaches in future research. Although we can learn a lot 
from the archives, they tell us little about daily production and organisation unless 
material remains are also studied. Nor do they explain how whaling companies tried to 




8. Signy Island whaling station, South Orkney Islands 
Introduction 
The South Orkney Islands constitute an archipelago consisting of four main islands in 
the Antarctic below the Antarctic convergence in the Southern Ocean that is located 
between South Georgia and the Antarctic Peninsula. The islands are mountainous and 
approximately 90% of the archipelago is glaciated.   
            
Fig 136 and 137. Map showing the location of the South Orkney Islands. The whaling station was located at 
Borge Bay, which is marked on the map to the right. Maps produced by F. Steenhuisen, Arctic Centre, the 
Netherlands. 
 
The global network of the whaling station at South Orkney Islands 
The company 
The whaling station at Signy Island was established by A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri. This 
company was an initiative of the two brothers Bernt and Søren Sørensen.913 Both were 
experienced whalers and had worked as gunners for the Norwegian whaling company 
A/S Ørnen at Iceland, Spitsbergen, and the South Shetland Islands.914 Although there are 
no archival sources to support this, the two probably got the idea to establish their own 
business after seeing the potential of the Antarctic hunting grounds during their first 
expeditions with A/S Ørnen and the semi-pelagic factory ship Admiralen in the 1905–
1906 and 1906–1907 hunting seasons.  
                                                 
913 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. 1967. Vol: 2. P: 350. In: Den Moderne 
Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling.  
914 “Diary of Alex Lange, 1904-1907/08”. Kommendør Chr. Christensens Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord, 




Their own savings and those of Søren Berntsen, the son of Bernt Sørensen, amounted to 
Kr50.000. Even though this was a large sum at the time, it was not enough to start an 
industrial project in the Antarctic. In the spring of 1907, the three actors successfully 
convinced a handful of local businessmen and industrialists from the Tønsberg region in 
Norway to invest Kr50.000 (giving a total start capital of Kr100.000) and to be a part of 
the management for their whaling company.915 Enlisting these investors to their 
network was instrumental since none of the three Berntsens had any business or 
managerial experience. The management applied to the Colonial Office for a whaling 
concession and lease in South Georgia where they intended to construct their local 
network.916 The concession granted to the company was applicable from January 1, 
1908 and included a lease of an undefined area of 500 hectares at an annual cost of 
£250.917 
 
The British Colonial Office had started to issue whaling concessions and leases on 
January 1, 1906 when then Argentinean whaling company Compañia Argentina de Pesca 
Sociedad Anónima was granted rights to operate from their whaling station at Grytviken 
in South Georgia, 918 where they had operated since 1904.  
 
Having secured a concession and lease, the management of the intended company 
placed an advertisement in the local newspaper, Tønsberg Blad, where they invited the 
public to buy shares at the two local banks, Tønsberg Privatbank and Tønsberg 
                                                 
915 This group consisted of Oscar Hytten who had his own shipping- and assurance business, K. Ludv 
Henriksen who owned H. Henriksens Mek. Verksted together with his father, and brewery owner Johan 
Gmeiner. Gmeiner later became instrumental in the formation of the companies Tønsberg Tank A/S, 
Aktieselskabet Havsten, and Skibaktieselskabet Leiesten. He was also a board-member of De Nordiske 
Fabrikker (De-No-Fa) and Star Whaling Company to mention a few. For further reading, please see: 
Wasberg. G.C. Femti år I konkurranse og fremgang: Aktieselskabet Tønsberg Hvalfangeri 1907-1957. 1958. 
Vol: D5-1-4-2. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of the estate 
of David Wynn-Williams. For amount invested, see Shareinvitation in Tønsberg Blad, June 30, 1907. 
916 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. 1967. Vol: 2. P: 338. In: Den Moderne 
Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling.  
917 Wasberg. G.C. Femti år I konkurranse og fremgang: Aktieselskabet Tønsberg Hvalfangeri 1907-1957. 
1958. Vol: D5-1-4-2. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of the 
estate of David Wynn-Williams. See also: Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. 
1967. Vol: 2. P: 351f. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
918 ”Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Research and Development in the Dependencies of the 
Falkland Islands”. 1920. P: 5. 
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Handelsbank, for Kr5.000 per share. The shares were in a local stock holding company 
that intended to start whaling in the Antarctic.919 
 
Even though the shares were expensive, they sold them all generating a total available 
capital of Kr300.000920 Although this was Kr100.000 less than the group had hoped to 
generate in their share invitation, they decided to establish and register A/S Tønsberg 
Hvalfangeri. They were able to generate the necessary capital for their project relatively 
quickly because the industry had been and still was important for the development and 
prosperity of the town.  The whaling company intended to exploit the promising 
Antarctic hunting grounds and this attracted a lot of interest. 
 
Having succeeded in generating enough capital to materialise the project, Sørensen and 
their associates structured the company management by putting Hytten, Henriksen, and 
Gmeiner in charge of developing and operating the company’s business in Norway, and 
to build and maintain the global network there. Meanwhile, the Sørensen brothers and 
Berntsen took over development of the local network. In July 1907, the management 
held a preparatory meeting with a few invited shareholders to discuss the purchase of a 
factory ship and two whale catchers. The company decided to purchase the 1,847-ton 
factory ship Bucentaur, and the whale catchers Carl and Mathilde from the 
Norwegian/British/Swiss whaling company A/S Hvalheim.921  
                                                 
919 Wasberg. G.C. Femti år I konkurranse og fremgang: Aktieselskabet Tønsberg Hvalfangeri 1907-1957. 
1958. P: 5. Vol: D5-1-4-2. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of 
the estate of David Wynn-Williams. See also: Tønsberg Blad, June 30, 1907. There is a difference in the 
share-costs between Wasberg and the original share invitation as the former states that the costs per 
share was set at Kr 2500, the actual invitation states Kr 5000. 
920 Sørensen. G, Hoff. J.O, Halvorsen. L & Salicath. C. Hvalfangsten- Dens historie og mænd. 1912. P: 44. 
921 Ytreberg. N. A. Tromsø Bys Historie. 1962. Vol: 2. P: 211f. See also: Husvik Harbour. 2007. P: 3. Booklet 
issued by Husvik and Nes Velforening, Historielaget. October 2007- 2nd issue. According to Risting (1922) 
p: 254, the Bucentaur were built in 1875, and had been converted into a  factory ship and operated by A/S 
Hvalheim in Spitsbergen until the summer of 1907 when the company and all its assets were sold to A/S 
Tønsberg Hvalfangeri. According to Wasberg (1958), the purchase and rebuilding of Bucentaur and the 
two whale catchers Carl and Mathilde cost Kr 235 000 which was a considerable part of the available 
capital. After the rebuild, the Bucentaur had four pressure cookers in the aft and four cookers in the stern, 
and could process the blubber from five to ten whales per day when operating with two flensing stations 
alongside its hull 
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Fig 138 and 139. The floating factory ship Bucentaur under the ownership of A/S Hvalheim in Spitsbergen. 
Right: Bucentaur lying at anchor in Tønsberg, Norway.922 The right photo has been printed with the kind 
permission of Norsk FolkeMuseums Archive. The left photo is a re-print from the booklet “Husvik Harbour” 
issued by Husvik and Nes Velforening in 2007. 
 
Under the leadership of the Sørensen brothers, who were gunners and captains of the 
two whale catchers, and Søren Berntsen, who was captain of the Bucentaur, the 
expedition left Norway to establish a whaling station (the local network) at Husvik 
Harbour in South Georgia. According to Wasberg, the management took a considerable 
risk when forming the company since the project could fail.923  
 
Husvik Harbour, South Georgia 
Here, I will briefly discuss the establishment of the whaling station at Husvik Harbour on 
South Georgia and the company’s success there, as this is related to the later expansion 
of the company to Signy Island and elsewhere.  
 
The company decided to establish a shore-based whaling station at Husvik Harbour in 
1908. They realised that the size and capability of the Bucentaur was too limited to be 
sustainable; they had to discard a large percentage of the whale carcasses because the 
ship was too small, which reduced the potential output. The company had to restructure 
and adapt their local network to increase their economic profit.  
 
                                                 
922 The photo on the left has been published with the kind approval of Norsk FolkeMuseums Archive. The 
photo on the right is from: “Husvik Harbour”. 2007. P: 3. Booklet issued by Husvik and Nes Velforening, 
Historielaget. October 2007- 2nd issue. 
923 Wasberg. G.C. Femti år I konkurranse og fremgang: Aktieselskabet Tønsberg Hvalfangeri 1907-1957. 
1958. Vol: D5-1-4-2. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of the 
estate of David Wynn-Williams 
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Even though the results of the 1908–1909 and the 1909–1910 seasons had been good, 
giving the shareholders dividends of 18% and 60% respectively, this was not enough to 
finance a whaling station at South Georgia. To generate the necessary capital, the 
management decided to sell new shares, and by doing so they raised their available 
stock capital to Kr600.000.924 This was increased by Kr360.000 the following year to 
give a total available capital of Kr960,000. The dividends generated in 1909–1910 were 
reinvested in the company’s capital buffer.925 They invested this capital in building 
materials and components for the whaling station at Husvik Harbour and a few ships.926  
 


































   











































































Fig 140 and 141. Whale catches of and dividends for A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri, 1908–1920.  
 
The war was a difficult time for A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri. Declining catches and 
production had a negative effect on the economic output of the station and the dividends 
paid to the company’s shareholders. Throughout the war, operational costs increased 
and although prices for whale oil also increased they did not compensate enough for the 
increased costs.   
 
                                                 
924 Sørensen. G, Hoff. J.O, Halvorsen. L & Salicath. C. Hvalfangsten- Dens historie og mænd. 1912. P: 44. 
925 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. 1967. Vol: 2. P: 354. In: Den Moderne 
Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. Also in: Sørensen. G, Hoff. J.O, Halvorsen. L & Salicath. C. 
Hvalfangsten- Dens historie og mænd. 1912. P: 44. 
926 Wasberg. G.C. Femti år I konkurranse og fremgang: Aktieselskabet Tønsberg Hvalfangeri 1907-1957. 
1958. P: 23 & 118. Vol: D5-1-4-2. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind 
permission of the estate of David Wynn-Williams. Also in: Sørensen. G, Hoff. J.O, Halvorsen. L & Salicath. C. 
Hvalfangsten- Dens historie og mænd. 1912. P: 44. 
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Fig 142 and 143. Overall whale catches and production of whale oil in South Georgia 1906 to 1930. Data 
supplied by International Whaling Statistics. 
 
The development of the whaling industry in South Georgia after 1910 was primarily 
influenced by three factors. Firstly, the shift from humpback whales as the main target 
species to fin and blue whales. Secondly, the increasing market demand for whale oil, 
which had a positive effect on prices. Thirdly, the outbreak of the First World War, 
which increased the operational costs for the whaling companies since the availability of 
coal and supplies dropped and insurance became more expensive. Although catches 
declined in South Georgia from 1912 to 1914, this did not have a strong impact on the 
output of whale oil. This can partly be explained by the shift from hunting humpback 
whales to hunting larger fin and blue whales, which increased the overall yield per 
whale. Better utilisation of the raw materials at the whaling stations may also have 
played a role. 
            
Fig 144 and 145. Map indicating the geographical location of Husvik Harbour. Map by U.I. Gustafsson. Map 
data supplied by the British Antarctic Survey. Right: Husvik Harbour whaling station during the construction 
phase.927 
                                                 
927 The photo has been scanned from Husvik Harbour. 2007. P: 3. Booklet issued by Husvik and Nes 
Velforening, Historielaget. October 2007- 2nd issue.  
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Expansion to new hunting grounds 
Throughout the first two decades of the 20th century, whaling companies primarily 
concentrated their activities in two areas of the Antarctic region: South Georgia and the 
South Shetland Islands.928 Although whaling was established and developed 
simultaneously in the two areas, shore-based whaling stations dominated production in 
South Georgia while semi-pelagic factory ships dominated production in the South 
Shetland Islands. Although these pelagic production units were relatively small, the 
whaling companies that used them generated dividends of 15%–40% for their 
shareholders.929  
 
The outbreak of the war in 1914 halted the industry’s activities for four years. Catches 
and output did not reach the same heights until the 1923–1924 hunting season.930 
Positive developments in whale oil prices combined with the belief of a drained post-
war market were powerful incentives for whaling companies to expand to new hunting 
grounds in the Antarctic. This was perhaps necessary as the 1919 hunting season in 
South Georgia had been difficult. The weather had been severe and the catches of blue 
and humpback whales were low. On several occasions the whale catchers had been 
forced to sail 70–80 miles off the island to find whales, which increased the whaling 
companies’ operational costs.  
 
Basberg has argued that declining catches in South Georgia was the primary reason for 
the expansion of the modern whaling industry in the 1920s.931 It is correct that catches 
in South Georgia declined slightly from 1916 to 1920, but catches were not higher in 
other hunting grounds until the latter part of the 1920s.932 I believe that many of these 
projects (especially in the early 1920s) were already planned during the war and 
                                                 
928 See Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. 1967. Vol: 2, Risting. S. Av 
Hvalfangstens Historie. 1922. P: 303ff, Hart. I. B. Whaling in the Falkland Islands Dependencies 1904-1931: A 
history of shore and bay-based whaling in the Antarctic. 2006, Basberg. B.L. The Shore Whaling Stations at 
South Georgia – A Study in Antarctic Industrial Archaeology. 2004.  
929 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. 1967. Vol: 2. P: 384. In: Den Moderne 
Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling.  
930 International Whaling Statistics. 1930. Also in: Wasberg. G.C. Femti år I konkurranse og fremgang: 
Aktieselskabet Tønsberg Hvalfangeri 1907-1957. 1958. P: 46. Vol: D5-1-4-2. The Archive of the British 
Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of the estate of David Wynn-Williams. 
931 Basberg. B.L. Perspectives on the Economic History of the Antarctic Region. 2006. P: 292. In: 
International Journal of Maritime History. XVIII, No 2 (December 2006). Pp: 285-304. 
932 International Whaling Statistics. 1930 and 1951.  
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expectations that the market for whale oil was going to increase motivated many to 
expand their activities. Another important aspect for expansion during the 1920s was 
the drop in whale oil prices, which forced the whaling companies to increase their 
production to generate profits. British policies and regulations and technological 
developments also had an influence. For these reasons, whaling companies turned their 
attention to new, unexploited areas.933 
 
During the 1920s, Tønsberg Hvalfangeri expended their industrial activities to new 
hunting grounds in an attempt to increase whale oil production and generate profits for 
their shareholders. These projects were, unlike at Husvik Harbour, based on factory 
ships either entirely or in conjunction with a shore-based station. 
 
Fig 146. The primary whaling 
grounds in the Antarctic from 1904 
to 1931. Map by U.I. Gustafsson. Map 
data have been supplied by the 








The South Orkney Islands 
The Colonial Office’s decision not to issue any additional concessions or leases meant 
that there were no opportunities to expand the whaling operations in South Georgia. 
Therefore, any expansion had to be realized elsewhere. In 1920, the management of A/S 
Tønsberg Hvalfangeri decided to apply for a whaling concession and lease in the South 
Orkney Islands.  The decision to establish a second local network in the South Orkney 
Islands was motivated by the desire to maximise economic profits at a time when prices 
for whale oil were at an all-time high and by uncertainty regarding the whale 
                                                 
933 The South Orkney Islands, The Antarctic Peninsula and the Ross Sea. 
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populations in the waters off South Georgia. Spreading their activities and establishing 
themselves in an area with low competition reduced the risk of having to close business 
if whale populations collapsed in South Georgia and if regulations were tightened. 
 
The company negotiated a concession at Signy Island. Hans Borge had previously 
worked as a manager for A/S Rethval in this area and knew it well. His knowledge of the 
area and the maps he had made during his previous whaling expeditions probably 
played an important role in their choosing Signy Island.  
 
The company had decided to expand their whaling operations when prices for whale oil 
were high. However, they established their whaling station at Signy Island immediately 
after the collapse of the market in 1921 when prices for whale oil – and other raw 
materials – plummeted.934 It seems that they could not have started their whaling 
project at Signy Island at a worse time. Despite this temporary setback, their whaling 
station at Signy Island proved successful. Throughout the 1920s, the prices for whale oil 
remained relatively stable. To secure economic profit and prolong the support of 
shareholders, the Antarctic whaling industry adopted a policy of scale. By increasing 
their catches and output of whale oil, they compensated for low prices by sheer scale of 
production.  
 
Previous attempts to operate in the South Orkney Islands 
The whale populations in and around the South Orkney Islands were first exploited in 
the 1907–1908 season by the Newfoundland Steam Whaling Company using the factory 
ship Sobraon.935 Their project was short-lived as the company chose to abandon the area 
in favour of the South Shetland Islands further west.936 In 1910, the Norwegian Konow 
tried to secure exclusive rights for the South Orkney Islands for 21 years and establish a 
whaling station at Laurie Island. When the British Colonial Office only offered him an 
                                                 
934 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del II: 1914-1924. Den Pelagiske Fangst 1924-1937. 1969. 
Vol: 3. P: 179f. See also: Hart. I. B. Whaling in the Falkland Islands Dependencies 1904-1931: A history of 
shore and bay-based whaling in the Antarctic. 2006. P: 316-317. 
935 ”Letter from the Governments House in Stanley, to Sir William MacGregor; Governments House in 
Newfoundland. January 9, 1908”. The Falkland Islands Archive. Vol: General Letter Book/ Governor. 
November 1881-December 1908. Outward. Also in: Dickinson. A. B, and Sanger. C.W. Twentieth-Century 
shore-whaling in Newfoundland and Labrador. 2005. P: 80. 
936 ”The Whaling Industry of the Dependencies of the Falkland Islands. October 5, 1918”. The Falkland 
Islands Archive. Vol: SG & DEP. Whaling- General. Box 27.  
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annual licence, he withdrew his interest. The next whaling company to operate in the 
South Orkney Islands was the Norwegian company A/S Laboremus in the 1911–1912 
season. They based their operations on the factory ship Roald Amundsen.937 These two 
whaling companies were not the only ones with rights to operate in the area. The 
Norwegian company A/S Hektor had also secured a concession for the South Orkney 
Islands and the South Shetland Islands, and they erected a whaling station at Deception 
Island in 1911.938 Although they never operated in the South Orkney Islands, their 
concession gave them the option to do so if they wanted. Several whaling companies 
used the same strategy because, according to Hart, the secondary concessions kept 
competitors away and offered a backup in case catches failed elsewhere.939 
 
Shortly after the British authorities had issued the Royal Letters Patent and the Whale 
Fishery Ordinance in 1908,940 they proclaimed that no more concessions would be 
issued for South Georgia. The British authorities set a maximum of ten concessions for 
the South Shetland Islands and Graham Land.941 Competition for the available 
concessions became fierce. Until that point, most whaling companies had hunted 
humpback whales, a species that was scarce by 1910. Although the reasons for this were 
uncertain,942 no one wanted it to continue.  
  
                                                 
937 Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1915/16. P: 29f. Kommendør Chr. Christensens Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord, 
Norway. See also: Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. 1967. Vol: 2. P: 391. In: 
Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling, and: Hart. I.B. Whaling in the Falkland 
Islands Dependencies 1904-1931: A history of shore and bay-based whaling in the Antarctic. 2006. P: 146. 
938 ”Letter from N. Bugge, to the Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office in London. January 13, 1914”. The 
Falkland Islands Archive. Vol: Despatch Book Aug 1913 – Mar 1914. Inward. Vol 50.  
939 Hart. I. B. Whaling in the Falkland Islands Dependencies 1904-1931: A history of shore and bay-based 
whaling in the Antarctic. 2006. P: 147. 
940 Through these declarations, Great Britain formally proclaimed their sovereignty over South Georgia, 
the South Orkney Islands, the South Shetland Islands, South Sandwich Islands and Graham Land as 
dominions under the dependencies of the Falkland Islands.  
941 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. 1967. Vol: 2. P: 342. In: Den Moderne 
Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
942 C.A. Larsen, the local manager of Grytviken whaling station in South Georgia, argued that there was no 
reason to fear that large whales (humpback, blue and fin whales) would be exterminated, and that the 
primary reason why humpback whales had more or less disappeared from areas such as South Georgia, 
was due to food availability and the migration patterns of the species rather than being the effects of 
industrial exploitation. See: “Captain C.A. Larsen’s views on the question of a close time to avoid the risk of 
extermination of certain species of whales”. Archive: Hvalfangerforeningen. Korrespondanse angående 




In 1911–1912, A/S Rethval and A/S Thule were granted a concession to exploit whales 
in the South Orkney Islands and the South Sandwich Islands.943 These two companies 
based their operations on semi-pelagic factory ships, the Falkland and Thule.944 Their 
initial plan had been to operate in the South Sandwich Islands. Their initial 
investigations revealed extremely difficult conditions there, so they opted for the South 
Orkney Islands.945 During the time they operated there, they caught 2,055 whales.946 
Compared with other hunting grounds in South Georgia and the South Shetland Islands, 
this catch was small.947 From 1907 to 1915, the companies caught most whales around 
Saddle Island in Iceberg Bay and on the south-west side of Coronation Island.948 
 
From 1911 to 1915, when A/S Rethval operated in the area, their manager Hans Borge 
chartered and mapped several anchorages and sheltered bays in the area.949 These maps 
became important for later whaling projects in the area.  
 
Fig 147. The primary hunting 
grounds in the South Orkney 
Islands from 1907 to 1915. Map by 






                                                 
943 “Letter from H. J. Read on behalf of the Secretary of State, to the Secretary of the Norwegian chamber of 
commerce. August 15, 1914”. Vol: D5-1-1-4. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by 
kind permission of the estate of David Wynn-Williams. Also in: Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1912. P: 25. 
Kommendør Chr. Christensens Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord, Norway. 
944 Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1914. P: 162. Kommendør Chr. Christensens Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord, 
Norway. 
945 “Diary of Petter Sørrle”. Vol: D5-1-5-6.1. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by 
kind permission of the estate of David Wynn-Williams. See also: Isachsen. G. Modern Norwegian Whaling in 
the Antarctic. 1929. P: 393. In: Geographical Review, Vol 19, No 3 (July 1929).  
946 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. 1967. Vol: 2. P: 396. In: Den Moderne 
Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling.  
947 Over the same period in South Georgia and the South Shetland Islands were 26 360 and 22 571 
respectively. Nevertheless, these number as not comparable since the number of companies operating in 
these areas was several times larger than in the South Orkney Islands.  
948 “The Whaling Industry of the Dependencies of the Falkland Islands. October 5, 1918”. The Falkland 
Islands Archive. Vol: SG & DEP. Whaling- General. Box: 27. 
949 Roberts. B. Chronological list of Antarctic Expeditions. 1958. Vol: D5-1-4-5. The Archive of the British 
Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of the estate of David Wynn-Williams.  
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The most important achievement of these whaling operations was not their economic 
success, but the fact that they operated successfully in the South Orkney Islands. They 
showed there were enough whales to sustain large-scale industrial exploitation.  
 
During the First World War, the whaling companies focused their activities elsewhere. 
According to Tønnesen, the number of expeditions dropped, which reduced the number 
of whale catchers and factory ships that operated there. In Antarctica, the overall 
number of operational whaling stations and floating factories dropped from a pre-war 
level of six stations, 21 floating factories, and 62 whale catchers to six stations, six 
floating factories, and 44 whale catchers by 1916. The strategic importance of the 
industry meant that whaling companies had to maximise the output of whale oil, which 
negatively affected how the whales were processed and utilised. The trend in the 
industry’s relative share of global whale catches and whale oil production increased.950  
Increased costs for equipping Antarctic whaling expeditions was the most important 
factor in their decline. The price for coal, supplies, and insurance increased dramatically. 
Several whaling companies chose to rent out their large factory ships as cargo vessels to 
transport goods across the Atlantic, which proved a risky business.  
 
From 1915 to 1920, nobody established a whaling project in the South Orkney Islands, 
until the Norwegian company A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri was granted a concession to 
establish a whaling station there.  
 
Peru and Ecuador 
In 1923, A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri decided to expand its industrial operations further 
by establishing two new whaling companies: Cia Ballenera del Peru Ltda and Cia 
Ballenera del Ecuador.951 These two companies were established to exploit the hunting 
grounds off Peru and Galapagos using the factory ship Strombus and four whale 
                                                 
950 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del II: 1914-1924. Den Pelagiske Fangst 1924-1937. 1969. 
Vol: 3. P: 133. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
951 Wasberg. G.C. Femti år I konkurranse og fremgang: Aktieselskabet Tønsberg Hvalfangeri 1907-1957. 
1958. P: 49. Vol: D5-1-4-2. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of 
the estate of David Wynn-Williams. 
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catchers.952 The initiative proved to be an economic disaster resulting in huge losses for 
the company. In 1928, the management decided to stop all whaling activities in these 
areas. 
 
These projects represent companies’ ambitions to increase production by extending 
their whaling operations to new hunting grounds because production could not be 
increased in South Georgia. Even though their South American activities were brief, the 
combined activities of the projects in the Antarctic and South America increased A/S 
Tønsberg Hvalfangeri’s overall production and generated enough profit to maintain the 
support of the shareholders. Despite declining whale oil prices and their failed whaling 
attempts in South America, the company produced solid economic profits. From 1907 to 
1931, the overall value of the company’s production was Kr136.157,000, which gave a 
net profit after depreciation of Kr23.817,000. This enabled the company to pay its 
shareholders dividends of Kr22.542,000.953 



































































 Fig 148. Chart indicating the overall production (from Husvik whaling station in South Georgia, Signy Island 
whaling station and pelagic expeditions, and Cia Ballenera del Peru & Ecuador Ltda) of A/S Tønsberg 
Hvalfangeri from 1919–1920 to 1930–1931. The overall production increased constantly from 1919 to 1928, 
then dropped slightly, only to increase again in 1929. 
 
                                                 
952 Wasberg. G.C. Femti år I konkurranse og fremgang: Aktieselskabet Tønsberg Hvalfangeri 1907-1957. 
1958. P: 49. Vol: D5-1-4-2. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of 
the estate of David Wynn-Williams. 
953 From Wasberg. G.C. Femti år I konkurranse og fremgang: Aktieselskabet Tønsberg Hvalfangeri 1907-
1957. 1958. Vol: D5-1-4-2. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of 
the estate of David Wynn-Williams. 
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The economic recession in 1920–1921 and British regulations that limited the hunting 
seasons had a large impact on the development of the Antarctic whaling industry in the 
1920s. As new technical innovations emerged, the industry was able to explore and 
exploit new hunting grounds in the Ross Sea and the Antarctic Peninsula.954 This 
allowed the whaling companies to counteract declining prices by increasing catches and 
production and thereby generate economic profits. The same strategy led to massive 
overproduction and the world economic collapse in 1929–1930, which had a 
devastating effect on the Antarctic whaling industry. 
 
After a final attempt to make profits, the combined production of the whaling companies 
operating in the Antarctic was 3,700,000 barrels of whale oil after the 1930–1931 
season. This was the largest annual production in history. At the same time, whale oil 
prices dropped drastically from £28 per ton in 1929 to £12 per ton in 1931.955 The 
economic crisis had devastating effects on A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri, and in 1932 the 
management closed their whaling station at Husvik Harbour and recalled their pelagic 
expeditions in the South Orkney Islands after a loss of Kr1.065,277.956  
 
In 1932, the company agreed to the production quota made by the Norwegian Whaling 
Union after a sales agreement with Unilever of £13 per ton of whale oil.957 Even though 
the 1930s was a decade of difficulties and restructuring of the modern whaling industry, 
A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri prevailed. From 1931 to 1945, the company’s management 
equipped several pelagic expeditions, which generated an economic profit of 
Kr2.473,000.958 Prior to the 1945–1946 season, the management re-opened the whaling 
station at Husvik Harbour and operated it until 1961, when they closed it for good.959 
 
                                                 
954 Hart. I.B. Whaling in the Falkland Islands Dependencies 1904-1931: A history of shore and bay-based 
whaling in the Antarctic. 2006. P: 195ff. 
955 Hart. I. B. Whaling in the Falkland Islands Dependencies 1904-1931: A history of shore and bay-based 
whaling in the Antarctic. 2006. P: 316-317. 
956 Wasberg. G.C. Femti år I konkurranse og fremgang: Aktieselskabet Tønsberg Hvalfangeri 1907-1957. 
1958. P: 62. Vol: D5-1-4-2. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of 
the estate of David Wynn-Williams. 
957 Basberg. B.L. Productivity in the 20th century Antarctic pelagic and shore station whaling- Growth and 
stagnation in two technological regimes. 1995. P: 11. 
958 Wasberg. G.C. Femti år I konkurranse og fremgang: Aktieselskabet Tønsberg Hvalfangeri 1907-1957. 
1958. P: 59-70. Vol: D5-1-4-2. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind 
permission of the estate of David Wynn-Williams. 
959 Basberg. B.L. The Shore Whaling Stations at South Georgia- A Study in Antarctic Industrial Archaeology. 
2004. P: 61. 
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Concessions, leases, and politics in the South Orkney Islands 
To successfully establish a whaling operation in the South Orkney Islands, the company 
also needed to enrol the support of the British authorities, who claimed to have control 
of the South Orkney Islands. A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri appointed Hans Borge to take 
charge of the company’s negotiations with the British authorities for a concession and 
lease in the South Orkney Islands. 960 The choice to assign Borge was strategic since he 
had extensive whaling experience having been the manager of A/S Kastor961 and A/S 
Rethval.962 He had been the local manager of A/S Rethval from 1911 to 1915 when the 
company had operated in the South Orkney Islands. Borge had knowledge of local 
conditions, good anchorages, and freshwater supplies in the area. This put him in a 
unique position to assess and suggest a location for the company’s industrial operations. 
The management’s decision to expand their local network in the Antarctic by applying 
for a concession in the South Orkney Islands was probably influenced by Borge on the 
basis of his knowledge and previous experience there. Borge’s maps and local 
knowledge were probably also instrumental in securing the shareholders’ support for a 
potentially risky industrial project in one of the harshest areas in the Antarctic. 
 
Borge applied for a concession and lease for five years to establish a whaling station at 
the South Orkney Islands. The company intended to operate with two whale catchers.963 
The application was discussed internally at the British Colonial Office and they realised 
that the South Orkney Islands had not been exploited since the area was abandoned by 
A/S Rethval after the 1914–1915 season.964 Therefore, there were no environmental 
reasons to decline the application. It was also argued that granting the company’s 
application would benefit the British Dependencies Committee, as it could act as a 
support base during their visits to the area. The magistrate in South Georgia further 
                                                 
960 Wasberg. G.C. Femti år I konkurranse og fremgang: Aktieselskabet Tønsberg Hvalfangeri 1907-1957. 
1958. P: 105. Vol: D5-1-4-2. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission 
of the estate of David Wynn-Williams. 
961 Sørensen. G, Hoff. J.O, Halvorsen. L & Salicath. C. Hvalfangsten- Dens historie og mænd. 1912. P: 45. 
962 Roberts. B. Chronological list of Antarctic Expeditions. 1958. Vol: D5-1-4-5. The Archive of the British 
Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of the estate of David Wynn-Williams.  
963 ”Letter from G. Grindle at the Colonial Office, to Herr. Borge (Tonsberg Whaling Co). July 12, 1920”. Also 
in: “Letter from the Crown Agents to the Tonsberg Whaling Co. November 21, 1921”, and “Letter from W. A. 
Thompson, acting Colonial Secretary to the Crown Agents for the Colonies. September 1, 1921”. The Falkland 
Islands Archive. Vol: D5-1-4-5. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind 
permission of the estate of David Wynn-Williams. 
964 Roberts. B. Chronological list of Antarctic Expeditions. 1958. Vol: D5-1-4-5. The Archive of the British 
Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of the estate of David Wynn-Williams.  
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supported the company’s application because they had already transported parts of the 
station to Husvik Harbour ready to transport them on to Signy Island and start 
construction when the application was approved.965  
 
The British authorities’ were probably worried about losing control of the South Orkney 
Islands after Fridtjof Nansen, Norwegian Minister in London at the time, had questioned 
the British Foreign Secretary Edward Grey about the validity of the 1906 British claims 
to the Antarctic .966 The Norwegian government was not satisfied with the answer but 
wanted to protect Norwegian economic interests so chose not to challenge the British 
claim. Instead the Norwegian Chargé d’affaires in London, Johannes Irgens, suggested in 
September 1907 that the British government should amend the declaration of their 
territory.967 On July 21, 1908 the British government did just that with the Letters 
Patent, where it declared that the South Orkney Islands and several other areas in the 
Antarctic were now under the newly formed British Antarctic Dependencies.968 The 
Letters Patent stated that “the group of islands known as South Georgia, the South 
Orkneys, the South Shetlands, and the South Sandwich Islands, and the territory known as 
Grahams Land, situated in the South Atlantic Ocean to the south of the 50th parallel and 
south latitude, and lying between the 20th and the 80th degrees of west latitude, are part of 
our dominions”.969  
 
There was nothing over which the British authorities in the Falkland Islands could 
exercise sovereignty in the South Orkney Islands until A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri and 
other whaling actors showed a renewed interest in the area. These companies supplied 
the British authorities with a platform on which to base their territorial claim. 970  The 
                                                 
965 ”Letter from Edw. B. Binnie, Magistrate of South Georgia, to H.E. the Governor in Stanley. August 13, 
1920”. The Falkland Islands Archive. Vol: Vol: SG&DEP. WHALING-General (1), 1915-1921. SGD/WAH/1. 
966 “Angående forhandlinger mellem Norge og England vedrörende den Britiske anneksjon av Syd-Shetland – 
Syd-Georgia området”. Archive: Hvalfangerforeningen. Korrespondanse angående internasjonale avtaler. 
Vol: 2. 1920-30 årene. Kommendør Chr. Christensens Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord, Norway. 
967 Aagaard. B.Antarktis 1502-1944. Oppdagelser, naturforhold og suverenitetsforhold. 1944. P: 62. In: 
Meddelelser No 60. Norges Svalbard og Ishavs-Undersøkelser.  
968 “British Letters Patent of 1908, and 1917 constituting the Falkland Islands Dependencies”. 1948. In: Polar 
Record. Vol 5, January-July 1948.  
969 “British Letters Patent of 1908, and 1917 constituting the Falkland Islands Dependencies”. 1948. In: Polar 
Record. Vol 5, January-July 1948. P: 241. See also: Smedal. G. Acquisition of sovereignty over Polar Areas. 
1931. P: 75. In: Skrifter om Svalbard og Ishavet, No 36. Norges Svalbard og Ishavs-Undersøkelser.  
970 Several whaling companies applied for concessions in the South Orkney Islands; among them were the 
Norwegians Chr. Christensen and Ingvald Bryde. “Letter from Ingvald Bryde, to the Colonial Office. 
November 8, 1921”, and “Letter from Chr. Christensen, to the Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office. 
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stations could also act as a support base for British officials and scientific expeditions. 
British attempts to increase control over the whaling industry were not limited to the 
Falkland Islands Dependencies. In 1923, the British government tried to incorporate the 
Ross Sea into their territory by issuing an Order in Council on July 30, 1923, which 
claimed that “all islands and territories between Long. 160º E and 150º W south of Lat. 60º 
S” were British.971 This claim was not well supported within the whaling industry. The 
area was regarded as a part of the high sea and free to exploit. Great Britain could not 
“rightly claim sovereignty over the lands bordering the Ross Sea”.972  
 
In 1923, the Interdepartmental Committee was replaced by the Discovery Committee.973 
The purpose of this research organisation was to materialise the suggestions made by 
the Interdepartmental Committee. This included increasing the influence and 
participation of British nationals in the Antarctic whaling industry.974 The primary 
reason behind this, according to Tønnesen, was related to the societal situation in Great 
Britain after the First World War. It was important to create employment for 
demobilised soldiers and other unemployed people.975 Although this was undoubtedly 
important, one should not overlook the interest to increase British knowledge of the 
industry and overcome the Norwegian dominance. The Committee also made 
suggestions for sustainable exploitation of whales,976 and surveyed and produced 
maps.977 An additional motive behind producing maps may have been to nationalise the 
areas within the Falkland Islands Dependencies through naming and publications. 
                                                                                                                                                        
November 12, 1921”. Vol: D5-1-4-4. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind 
permission of the estate of David Wynn-Williams. 
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Dodds has remarked that place names recorded colonisation and settlement, and were 
public reminders of territorial sovereignty.978 Similarly, Latour has shown how map-
making enabled “domination at a distance”.979  
 
Maps had practical and symbolic purposes. Attempts to establish sustainable and long-
term exploitation of the whale populations within the Falkland Island Dependencies was 
most likely motivated by the desire to enhance control of the whaling industry. The 
British authorities exercised sovereignty and implemented control mechanisms and 
regulations, which legitimised the scientific observations made by the Discovery 
Committee’s expeditions. Ironically, these expeditions were was funded by the industry 
they aimed to regulate.  
 
From the mid-1920s onwards, Norwegian industrialists also started supporting 
scientific research expeditions such as the Norvegia expeditions, which also had 
imperialistic motives. The logistical capability and knowledge of the whaling industry 
were vital tools for claiming national sovereignty over newly discovered areas. Official 
Norwegian scientific expeditions with the same intentions would have risked political 
conflicts in the area. From 1927–1931, the Norwegian Lars Christensen went on several 
expeditions to locate and survey new whaling grounds in the Southern Ocean. These 
expeditions had geo-political purposes since their secondary task was to discover 
territories that could be claimed on behalf of Norway.980 The expeditions were 
successful; they resulted in several whaling expeditions981and Bouvet Island was 
claimed in 1927 and Peter I Island in 1929.982 During the last expedition in 1930–1931, a 
small airplane983 was used to spot whales and to drop the Norwegian flag at Dronning 
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Maud Land, which was claimed by Norway in 1939 and became the largest Norwegian 
claim in the Antarctic.984 
 
Fig 149. The Norvegia (former 
Vesleper) being repaired in a 
dry dock at Grytviken whaling 
station at South Georgia in 1928 
after a serious incident at 
Bouvet Island. The photo has 
been published with the kind 





By the late 1920s, the British authorities were using long-term regulations and control 
of the modern whaling industry in the South Orkney Islands to legitimize their 
sovereignty.  
 
In preparation for an official statement and standpoint to the Argentinean government 
on the South Orkney Islands, a confidential despatch was sent from Amery at Downing 
Street to the Falkland Islands’ administration in October. Amery requested that the 
authorities in the Falkland Islands present “any facts relating to the grant of permits 
covering the use of the South Orkney Islands for whaling purposes or otherwise, the issue of 
which would indicate the exercise of sovereignty by His Majesty’s Government of sovereign 
rights in the South Orkneys”.986 This statement demonstrated the transformation of 
British interest in the area from 1908 onwards, as well as the strategic role of the 
Antarctic as a platform for scientific and meteorological observations in the post-war 
years. The Antarctic also provided a subsidiary income, which contributed to financing 
                                                 
984 Elstad. Å. Den første norske oljealderen. 2004. P: 291. In: Norsk Polarhistorie. Vol: 3. Editors: Drivenes, 
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985 Ref: The Andersson photo-collection. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord, 
Norway. For more information about the Norvegia expeditions, please see: Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 
1883-1924. Del II: 1914-1924. Den Pelagiske Fangst 1924-1937. 1969. Vol: 3. P: 307f. In: Den Moderne 
Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
986 “Confidential despatch from L.S. Amery, to the Office administering the Government of the Falkland 
Islands. October 17, 1928”. The Falkland Islands Archive. Vol: Dependencies-Whaling 3, 1923-1929. S of S 
CS [C4/28]. Fldr: 24.  
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the activities of the British Discovery Committee and its expeditions. A supplement was 
also paid to the Falkland Islands government for administrative costs.  
 
Contacting the British Colonial Office to get a permit for whaling operations in a specific 
area supported British claims to the archipelago since the application was recognition of 
British claims. The processing, approval, and issuing of whaling concessions and leases, 
which occasionally included a visit from the magistrate of South Georgia or his officers, 
were acts of sovereignty that enforced and sustained British claims to the archipelago.987 
 
The concession and lease of A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri was granted in August 1920. It 
was a loosely defined lease of 500 acres of land at Signy Island for an annual rent of 
£250988 for a period of five years.989 After the lease and concession expired in 1925, it 
could be renewed for another five years, including the rights to extend it for another 
three years if desired.990 The concession and lease demanded the whales caught be fully 
utilised. According to the concession, the whales did not necessarily have to be 
processed exclusively at Signy Island, but could be divided between Signy Island and 
another platform such as the company’s whaling station at Husvik Harbour in South 
Georgia. 
 
However, the approval did not include the rights to use a factory ship so the board of 
Tønsberg Hvalfangeri decided to establish a whaling station that could process meat and 
bones and store the blubber onboard the sailing ship for later processing at the whaling 
station in South Georgia.991 The concession and lease were probably designed like this to 
                                                 
987 “Letter from R.L. Craigie at the Foreign Office, to the Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office. March 14, 
1929”. Vol: D5-1-4-5. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of the 
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988 Enclosure of despatch No 92 of August 13, 1920 to Aktieselskabet Tonsberg Hvalfangeri. Tonsberg, July 27, 
1920”. See also: “LEASES Sc: Orkneys. No 668/20. Secretary of State No 81. 12 July 1920”. The Falkland 
Islands Archive. Vol: SOUTH GEORGIA. PEOPLE – Whaling (1), 1915-1935. STACK. 
989 ”Whaling Permits Issued for the South Orkney Islands”. See also: “Re/ Tonsberg Whaling Companys 
Licence at South Orkney, to the Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office. July 26. 1924”. Vol: D5-1-4-5. The 
Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of the estate of David Wynn-
Williams. 
990 ”Whaling Permits Issued for the South Orkney Islands”. See also: “Re/ Tonsberg Whaling Companys 
Licence at South Orkney, to the Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office. July 26. 1924”. Vol: D5-1-4-5. See 
also: The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of the estate of David 
Wynn-Williams.  
991 ”C.S.O No 668/20. Letter from Stipendary Magistrate Thompson, South Georgia 4. october 1920, to H.E. 
The Governor». SOUTH GEORGIA. PEOPLE – Whaling (1), 1915-1935. STACK. 
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force the whaling company to establish a whaling station and enforce effective British-
approved occupation of the area. The installations communicated a political message of 
ownership, control, and effective management. Another benefit to granting the 
application was that the infrastructure could be used by the British Dependencies 
Committee. A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri were forced to build an infrastructure on land to 
process the whales they caught. Fieldwork performed at the site in 2010 showed that 
the company’s station was relatively small and simple. This small investment in the 
station shows that the company’s primary interest was the harbour at Borge Bay and the 
freshwater sources there, rather than their whaling station at Signy Island.  
 
Fig 150. Map of the South Orkney Islands.992  
 
Securing a five-year concession and lease at Signy Island gave the company a platform 
upon which to expand their industrial activities in the Antarctic.  
 
                                                 
992https://www.google.no/search?q=south+orkney+islands.png&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ah
UKEwiXp9Dc3u7bAhWDWSwKHRzaASIQ_AUICigB&biw=1251&bih=576#imgrc=BspXLt1qddP4XM:&spf=
1529927140829. Accessed 25.06.2018. 
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A changing market  
As discussed earlier, the company picked a bad time to expand its whaling operations in 
the Antarctic because the market and prices for whale oil had plummeted. Other raw 
materials such as coal also plummeted on the post-war market. This was partly due to 
national economic and political instability across Europe, combined with beliefs in a 
demand for cheap margarine. The situation became worse as merchants in Great Britain 
and the Netherlands joined forces to form a buyers’ union, offering the whaling 
companies £30.20 per ton of whale oil.993 In August 1921, the whaling industry 
responded by demanding £32.10 per ton for their oil. The ultimatum had the intended 
effect and several whaling companies sold their oil at £32.50 per ton. Although this was 
an improvement, it represented merely 33% of the prices they had received the 
previous season.994 
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Fig 151 and 152. Prices for whale oil in relation to coal in the USA, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. Prices 
for both dropped suddenly as a reaction to the post-war recession.995 Basberg has argued that although there 
were brief periods when prices for whale oil went up, the overall trend after 1920 was a downward one.996 
The period 1918–1920 may have been an anomaly and the sudden price drop in 1920–1921 may represent a 
return to “normal” price levels.  
 
The management of Tønsberg Hvalfangeri reacted to the poor market conditions by 
stopping their activities in the South Orkney Islands in 1921–1922.997 Under these 
                                                 
993 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del II: 1914-1924. Den Pelagiske Fangst 1924-1937. 1969. 
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994 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del II: 1914-1924. Den Pelagiske Fangst 1924-1937. 1969. 
Vol: 3. P: 180. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
995 The chart is based on Hart. I.B. Whaling in the Falkland Islands Dependencies 1904-1931. A history of 
shore and bay-based whaling in the Antarctic. 2006. P: 316-317. The chart illustrating coal-prices and their 
indexes have been kindly supplied by H. R. De. Haas, Arctic Centre, University of Groningen, Netherlands. 
996 Basberg. B.L. Technological transformation in the Norwegian Whaling Industry in the Interwar Period. 
1985. P: 93. In: The Scandinavian Economic History Review and Economic and History. Vol: XXXIII, No 2. 
Pp: 83-107. 
997 “Letter from Tonsberg Hvalfangeri, to the Crown Agents. Tonsberg, November 11, 1921”. The Falkland 
Islands Archive. Vol: Dependencies- Whaling 2, 1920-1922. S of S CS [668/20]. Fldr: 7. 
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conditions, it was a financial risk to equip an expedition to Signy Island. Instead, the 
company and its shareholders decided to wait and see whether the market improved 
before resuming their activities in the area.998 The magistrate Edward Binnie, who had 
supported the company’s application, suggested that the company use a factory ship 
rather than transporting the blubber to Husvik Harbour for processing.999 There might 
have been underlying political motives (to increase industrial activity in the area) for 
this recommendation. In the spring of 1922, the British authorities supported the 
magistrate’s recommendation and allowed the whaling company to use a factory ship in 
conjunction with the whaling station at Signy Island. The authorities may have feared a 
repeat of the 1914–1915 situation (when the whaling companies withdrew from the 
area) if they did not ease the operational conditions for the whaling company. This must 
have been a pleasant surprise for A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri since it gave them the 
manoeuvrability to make their activities in the area more efficient and to increase their 
production to compensate for the falling prices.  
 
Tønnesen (1969) argued that the whaling station at Signy Island only functioned as a 
provisional production platform because it was impossible to maintain a station there. 
The station was abandoned during winter and the company dug it from the snow only to 
find it almost demolished. This was, according to Tønnesen, the reason the company got 
permission to use a factory ship for the 1922–1923 season.1000 The company only got 
permission to use the factory ship for one season (1923–1924) because many of their 
machines had suffered from the winter and had to be replaced.1001 
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Constructing the local network at Signy Island 
A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri established a whaling station at Signy Island and developed it 
through the 1920s. Here, I discuss how the company constructed its local network and 
how they designed, organised, and adapted it. I will also discuss why they shaped their 
local network as they did. This section is based on results from archaeological fieldwork 
during the LASHIPA 8 expedition in 2010. This fieldwork explored how and why the 
local network was designed the way it was, and how the production lines functioned. 
The results from the fieldwork completed the archival sources and allowed me to 
answer questions related to the design and organisation of the local network. This 
information is important to establish whether problems in the local or global networks 
caused the project to fail. 
 
The local network at Signy Island can be subdivided into four different phases: 
 
• Phase 1 – construction of the whaling station 
• Phase 2 – operations in the station and Orwell I 
• Phase 3 – operations in the station and Orwell II 
• Phase 4 – closure of the project 
 
Signy Island was subdivided into three main areas during the fieldwork: 1) the station 





 Fig 153. Map showing the main survey areas of the LASHIPA 8 fieldwork at Signy Island in 2010. Map by U.I. 
Gustafsson, D. Avango, and F. Steenhuisen, Arctic Centre, the Netherlands. 
 
Phase 1 – construction of the whaling station 
The first expedition of A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri to the South Orkney Islands in 1920–
1921 was led by Captain Søren Berntsen, who was the first local manager of Husvik 
Harbour whaling station.1002 The expedition consisted of the sailing ship Teie, which 
carried boilers and cookers for the whaling station, and two whale catchers. The 
expedition was accompanied by William Barlas, an officer from the magistrate’s office in 
                                                 
1002 Wasberg. G.C. Femti år I konkurranse og fremgang: Aktieselskabet Tønsberg Hvalfangeri 1907-1957. 
1958. P: 116. Vol: D5-1-4-2. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission 
of the estate of David Wynn-Williams. 
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South Georgia.1003 He participated because he wanted to obtain enough information to 
define and complete the lease granted to the company. Barlas sketched a map of the area 
at Signy Island where A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri chose to establish their local network 
and defined it as: “The lot or parcel of land situated on Signy Island in the South Orkneys 
hereby leased is 500 acres more or less, in the harbour marked Bruce Harbour, with meters 
and bounds as follows: that is to say: Bounded on the north by a road reserved to His 
Majesty, bounded to the south by Crown Lands, and on the east by the coast line of the 
island, and on the west by Crown Lands rising from the land at sea level. , and the lot or 
parcel of land being part of the island called Signy Island, hereby leased, is coloured blue on 
the sketch or plan”.1004 
 
 
Fig 154. The map of Bruce Harbour produced by the acting magistrate William Barlas during the 1920–1921 
expedition.1005 
 
                                                 
1003 “Whaling Permits issued for the South Orkney Islands”. Vol: D5-1-4-5. The Archive of the British 
Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of the estate of David Wynn-Williams. The position as 
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a period by Mr. Barlas. For further reading, please see: Hart. I. B. “Antarctic Magistrate: a life through the 
lens of a camera”. 2009. 
1004 “Letter from the Magistrate Edw. B. Binnie to the Colonial Secretary. March 9, 1921”. The Falkland 
Islands Archive. Vol: South Georgia. PEOPLE – Whaling (1), 1915-1935 (STACK). 
1005 “Letter by the Governor J. Middelton. February 9, 1926”. The Falkland Islands Archive. Vol: South 
Georgia. PEOPLE – Whaling (1), 1915-1935 (STACK). 
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Barlas’ role was modest since his only purpose was to draw a map that would define the 
extent of the lease. His participation may also have exercised sovereignty through 
effective management of the area. Barlas was an official representative of British 
authorities onboard the expedition and could influence the local manager’s choice of 
location for the intended whaling station. Furthermore, producing the map (which was 
the reason he accompanied the expedition) was an important part of British colonisation 
of the area, as it displayed the empire’s territorial extent in case of dispute. Furthermore, 
as Dodds points out, the production of maps and placing of names was an important part 
of exercising effective occupation.1006 Wråkberg has remarked that the production and 
publication of maps and other geographical observations, including the naming, could be 
regarded as manifestations of interest over the areas in question.1007 The board of A/S 
Tønsberg Hvalfangeri and the manager Berntsen had probably decided where their 
whaling station would be located prior to the expedition, and they probably based this 
decision on the maps and local knowledge of board member Hans Borge. They likely 
already had access to maps and surveys of the area similar to those that Petter Sørrle 
made in 1911.1008 
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Fig 155. Petter Sørrle’s map over the South Orkney Islands, with detailed surveys of the anchorages at Bruce 
Harbour/Borge Bay and Powell Island. It is likely that the Sørrle’s local knowledge of the area was one of the 
primary reasons for the arrival of the factory ship Lancing in 1925.1009 
 
When the expedition arrived at the site, the members offloaded the materials for the 
whaling station and erected the buildings and technical installations. There are 
unfortunately no written sources describing this process. Fieldwork performed at the 
site by LASHIPA 8 in 2010 showed that this must have been a swift and relatively simple 
process since the station was small, consisting of a wooden flensing platform (Fig 155, 
No 2) that faced the bay to the east, one boiler house (Fig 155, No 9), one elevated meat 
and bone cookery (Fig 155, 3), one accommodation house (Fig 155, No 1), and one 
explosives shed (Fig 155, No 4).1010 The fieldwork showed that the site and the harbour 
were located behind a ridge and were well protected from winds, and that the bay was 
deep and relatively protected from swells and strong winds. This was important for 
flensing, transporting blubber to the factory ship, and the transportation of freshwater. 
                                                 
1009 Map from: Holtedahl. O. On the geology and physiography of some Antarctic and South-Antarctic Islands. 
Scientific results of the Norwegian Antarctic Expedition 1927-29. Det Norske Videnskaps-Akademien i Oslo. 
1929. Vol: D5-1-4-7. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of the 
estate of David Wynn-Williams. See also: Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. 
1967. Vol: 2. P: 390. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling.  
1010 Gustafsson Ulf I, Avango Dag et.al. "LASHIPA 8: Archaeological Expedition to South Orkney, South 
Shetland and the Antarctic Peninsula 6 March - 2 April 2010," (Forthcoming). 
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Freshwater was initially gathered from small glacial runoff streams – but this was time 
consuming and an unreliable source. Later, Tønsberg Hvalfangeri built a small pump 
house on the other side of the bay that pumped freshwater through metal pipes from a 
nearby lake to the shoreline (see figure 161). From the shoreline, the pipes were 
connected to the factory ships via hoses. The company also established a small cemetery 
where five people are buried (see figure 164).  The British Antarctic Survey (BAS) has 
established a research station on the site where much of the whaling station stood. This 
has limited investigation of the remains.  
 
 Fig 156. Map of the site at Signy Island where the whaling station was located. Today, the site is occupied by 
a British Antarctic Survey research station. Map by U.I. Gustafsson and D. Avango during the LASHIPA 8 




Features of the whaling station at Signy Island  
For more detailed information of the features, please see the upcoming LASHIPA 8 
fieldwork report. 
1 – Accommodation house   2 – Flensing platform 
3 – Remains of cookery    4 – Explosives shed 
9 – Steam boiler  
 
According to Wasberg, the initial whaling station was only equipped with five pressure 
cookers for processing meat and bones.1011 As the photo below shows, these five cookers 
were located in one row that faced the bay. This made it easier to throw residues into 
the bay. After cooking, the whale oil was tapped into the settling tanks on the opposite 
side of the construction. From the photo below, it seems likely that the station was 
equipped with at least two settling tanks. Compared with Husvik Harbour, this was a 
rather small and confined whaling station. This might indicate that the expedition took a 
careful approach to hunting here and were aware of the severe environmental 
circumstances that forced earlier expeditions to abandon the area.  
       
Fig 157 and 158. Remains of the A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri whaling station at Signy Island. The photo on the 
right shows the station at the bottom of Bruce Harbour. The production area is located in the centre of the 
image, with the accommodation overlooking. Both photos have been published with the kind approval of the 
estate of David Wynn-Williams.1012 
 
The whaling station at Signy Island was designed to process meat and bones into whale 
oil, while the blubber was processed on the factory ship. The fieldwork revealed how the 
                                                 
1011 Wasberg. G.C. Femti år I konkurranse og fremgang: Aktieselskabet Tønsberg Hvalfangeri 1907-1957. 
1958. P: 46. Vol: D5-1-4-2. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of 
the estate of David Wynn-Williams. 
1012 Vol: D5-1-0-10.4 & D5-1-5-4. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind 
permission of the estate of David Wynn-Williams. 
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production line was organised. Whales were brought to the whaling station by two 
whale catchers. At the station, the whales were attached to an iron wire that was 
connected to one of three steam winches and hauled onto the flensing platform. Here, 
the workers separated the blubber from the carcass in long strips and chopped it into 
smaller pieces. These pieces were manually loaded onto one of three barges and taken to 
Teie, which lay anchored in the bay outside the whaling station. Meanwhile, the workers 
at the whaling station continued to process the whale carcass. Until the company 
replaced Teie with the factory ships Orwell I and later Orwell II, all flensing was done at 
the whaling station and blubber was towed between the two units. Once the two factory 
ships were introduced, the company changed the organisation of production and whales 
were flensed and processed onboard both ships.  
 
On the flensing platform, the workers separated the meat and bones from the remaining 
carcass and pulled it onto the elevated wooden platform (the lemming platform) under 
which the cookers were located using a steam winch. This was done because meat and 
bones have different cooking times. On the elevated lemming platform, whale bones 
were cut into smaller pieces using a bone saw and distributed into the cookers. Once the 
cookers were filled, the top lid was screwed in place and steam was introduced to cook 
the bones. Steam for producing whale oil was supplied by a single steam boiler located 
in a small wooden building immediately east of the cookery. After cooking, the whale oil 
was tapped into a settling tank before being tapped into and stored in wooden barrels. 




 Fig 159. The steam boiler that was used at the whaling station lies on the shore in front of present day BAS 
research station where it is deteriorating. Photo by U.I. Gustafsson. Arctic Centre. LASHIPA 8, 2010. 
 
Steam made from freshwater is vital for the production of whale oil. Freshwater was 
transported to the station and factory ships using two water barges. During the first few 
seasons, water was collected from one of the many glacial rivers in the area. However, 
this was time consuming and inefficient. It relied on temperatures being warm enough 
for melting so was not a reliable water source. The local network needed to find a 
solution to this bottleneck to increase production.  
 
Phase 2 – operations with the station and Orwell I 
In the autumn of 1920, the company re-built their ship Orwell in Rotterdam, equipping it 
with enough cabins to accommodate 173 men.1013 When it became clear that the 
Colonial Office and the magistrate favoured the use of a factory ship, Tønsberg 
                                                 
1013 Wasberg. G.C. Femti år I konkurranse og fremgang: Aktieselskabet Tønsberg Hvalfangeri 1907-1957. 
1958. P: 46. Vol: D5-1-4-2. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of 
the estate of David Wynn-Williams. 
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Hvalfangeri acted fast and converted their ship into a factory ship with 14 small 
pressure cookers and six large open cookers.1014 
 
 
Fig 160. The 3880-ton Orwell 1 was built in 1897 and was purchased by A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri in 1911 as 
a cargo ship. In 1922, she was re-built into a factory ship.1015 
 
During the 1922–1923 season, the company integrated the 3880-ton factory ship Orwell 
I into their production unit in the local network at Signy Island. To be able to take 
advantage of their increased processing capability, they needed to find a reliable 
freshwater supply. The local manager, Berntsen, decided to extend the local network 
and build a pump house (Fig 160,No 5) by the shore of one of the glacial lakes near the 
whaling station. This pump house was connected to the beach via a 1000-metre metal 
                                                 
1014 “Letter from the Magistrate Edw. B. Binnie, to the Colonial Secretary in Stanley. December 15, 1922”. The 
Falkland Islands Archive. Vol: DEPENDENCIES – Whaling (2), 1920-1922. STACK.  This ship operated in 
conjunction with the whaling station at Signy Island until the 1925/26 season when the ship was replaced 
by the 10 500 tonnes Orwell II. The investment in this larger ship signalled the ambitions of the Tønsberg 
Hvalfangeri to increase their production and to expand their industrial operations to become increasingly 
pelagic based rather than shore based, and which was the overall trend and development within the 
modern whaling industry from 1925 onwards. 
1015 The photo has been scanned from Husvik Harbour. 2007. P: 21. Booklet issued by Husvik and Nes 
Velforening, Historielaget. October 2007- 2nd issue. 
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pipe (Fig 160,No 6) and to the ship via a 75-metre hose.1016 This improved the local 
network’s water supply. The fieldwork showed that the metal pipe was exposed all the 
way from the pumping station to the shoreline where the hose was located. This system 
was therefore sensitive to low temperatures, which caused the water to freeze.  
 
 
 Fig 161. Map of the freshwater area at Signy Island. According to participants of Operation Tabarin, the 
pump house still worked when they built their research station at Signy Island in the 1940s. Map by U.I. 
Gustafsson and D. Avango during the LASHIPA 8 expedition. Postprocessing by F. Steenhuisen, Arctic Centre. 
 
                                                 




Features of the Signy Island freshwater area 
5 – Pump house  6 – Water pipe 
7 – Mooring 
 
This solved the freshwater supply problems and enabled the company’s two production 
units to operate at full capacity, which was necessary to increase production and keep 
up with processing the raw material brought in by the whale catchers. In the 1925–1926 
season, the local network was enlarged further by the addition of an explosives shed, 
which the workers built on the shore immediately north of the whaling station.1017  
   
Fig 162 and 163. In 1923, Berntsen extended the local network at Signy Island by establishing a pump house 
next to a nearby glacial lake. This was connected to the beach by an iron pipe to secure a  constant supply of 
freshwater. In the 1950s, the house was still in situ. Today, it has collapsed and is in a poor state. The photo 
on the left has been published with the kind approval of the archival services of the British Antarctic 
Survey.1018 Right: Photo by U.I. Gustafsson. LASHIPA 8/2010.  
 
Having access to two production units allowed Berntsen and Hansen to change the 
production line and increase the overall processing capacity. The factory ship was large 
enough for several flensing stations alongside its hull, and blubber could be processed 
onboard. Consequently, flensing, transport, and processing of the whales became more 
effective and allowed the local network to better deal with the raw materials brought in 
on the whale catchers. It also allowed the company to change the factory ship’s position 
when drift ice started filling the bay. This was important since it allowed them to 
maintain their largest production unit. 
 
                                                 
1017 ”Søren Berntsens Private Dagbøker. Sesongen 1925/26”. Courtesy of the Private Archive of Karl Jan 
Skontorp, Norway. 
1018 Ref: AD6-19-2-H. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. 
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 Fig 164 and 165. Map of the graveyard area at Signy island. Map by U.I. Gustafsson and D. Avango during the 
LASHIPA 8 expedition. Postprocessing by F. Steenhuisen, Arctic Centre. Right: Photo of the five gravecrosses. 
Photo by U.I. Gustafsson. Arctic Centre. LASHIPA 8, 2010. 
 
Features of Signy Island graveyard area 
Five graves with the following inscriptions (left to right): 
1 – No name visible  2 – Henry Larsen Thorstensen 
3 – Aksel Olsen Helstad  4 – Unknown whaler 
5 – John Johnsen 
 
It is uncertain when the graveyard at Signy Island was established. The wooden crosses 
have been maintained and preserved by the personnell of the British Antarctic Survey 
station over the years. One of the graves is marked only with “unknown whaler” and no 
date is given. The oldest readable date is 1914 and is the grave of a person who worked 





Fig 166. The explosives shed at Signy Island was erected during the 1925–1926 season. Its location on the 
northern-most point of Signy Island allowed the whale catcher crews to access explosives even if the bay was 
filled with ice and they couldn’t  access the whaling station. It is unclear whether the shed in the photo is the 
original construction, but the foundation are. Photo by G. Rossnes. LASHIPA 8 /2010. 
 
 
The waters of the South Orkney Islands were good hunting grounds and the company 
was able to increase its catches. Therefore, the production line needed to be able to keep 
up with the raw materials that came in. The pump house and the connecting pipe 
established in 1923–1924 helped with this, but they were limited as to how much they 
could increase the production capacity. During this season, the company was only able 
to use the factory ship because the whaling station machinery had been damaged by 
heavy snowfall in the winter, and had to be replaced.1019 The local managers and the 
company board realised that they had to reorganise their local network in the South 
Orkney Islands to increase production. One of the ways in which the company tried to do 
so was to upgrade Orwell I with a new boiler plant, an additional 6 open cookers, and 20 
                                                 
1019 «Letter from the officer administrering the Government of the Falkland Island, to Downing Street. 10. 
october 1923». Despatch Book, Jan 1923 – Dec 1923. Inward. The Falkland Islands Archive.  
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open cookers. They hoped that this would be enough to keep up with the raw materials 
brought in by the whale catchers.1020  
 
The hunting grounds around the South Orkney Islands were the key to generating the 
economic profit needed to maintain the support of shareholders in the company’s global 
network. These hunting grounds allowed for little expansion – all the company could do 
to increase production was upgrade their whale catchers and utilise the raw materials 
more fully. The company chose to continue investing in developing their local network 
at the South Orkney Islands by purchasing the 10,500-ton ship Orwell II in 1925.1021 
Investing in their local network had constantly increased production so the company 
was convinced that this investment would increase their overall profits and secure their 
future in Antarctic whaling. A ship of this type could be transferred to potentially more 
profitable hunting grounds if needed.  
A/S Tonsberg Hvalfangeri. Overall production of whale-oils 












































































Fig 167. The overall production of whale oil by A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri expeditions in the South Orkney 
Islands from 1920–1921 to 1931–1932.1022  
 
                                                 
1020 ”Letter from Aktieselskabet Tonsberg Hvalfangeri, to the Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office. July 26, 
1924”. The Falkland Islands Archive. Vol: DEPENDENCIES – Whaling (3), 1923-1929. STACK. 
1021 Wasberg. G.C. Femti år I konkurranse og fremgang: Aktieselskabet Tønsberg Hvalfangeri 1907-1957. 
1958. P: 119. Vol: D5-1-4-2. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission 
of the estate of David Wynn-Williams. 
1022 The chart is based on data collected from Wasberg. G.C. Femti år I konkurranse og fremgang: 
Aktieselskabet Tønsberg Hvalfangeri 1907-1957. 1958. P: 46 & 115. Vol: D5-1-4-2. The Archive of the 
British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of the estate of David Wynn-Williams, and 
Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. No 6, June 1925. P: 1. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. 
Sandefjord, Norway. “Søren Berntsens Private Dagbøker”. Courtesy of the Private Archive of Karl Jan 
Skontorp, Norway, and International Whaling Statistics. 1930. 
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Phase 3 – operations with the station and Orwell II 
The Orwell II (former Knight Templar) had been purchased by Alfred Holt & Co in 
Liverpool and the company re-built it into a factory ship in Rotterdam. This ship was 
approximately three times larger than its predecessor and could accommodate 260 
workers and a crew of 40.1023 She was equipped with 42 pressure cookers and 8 open 
cookers in the stern, which gave her a theoretical processing capacity of 900 barrels per 
day, including the ability to utilise the whales better. This ship was, according to Hart, 
the most effective floating factory that operated in the Antarctic since the First World 
War.1024  
 
 Fig 168. The 10,500-ton Orwell II purchased in 1925 and used as a production platform in the South Orkney 
Islands in the 1925–1926 season.1025  
 
In addition to this investment, the company upgraded the whale catching fleet at Signy 
Island with three catchers (Busen 1, 2 and 3) which had radio communication and 
                                                 
1023 Wasberg. G.C. Femti år I konkurranse og fremgang: Aktieselskabet Tønsberg Hvalfangeri 1907-1957. 
1958. P: 119. Vol: D5-1-4-2. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission 
of the estate of David Wynn-Williams. 
1024 Hart. I. B. Whaling in the Falkland Islands Dependencies 1904-1931: A history of shore and bay- 
Based whaling in the Antarctic. 2006. P: 181. 
1025 Volume D5-1-4-8. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of the 
estate of David Wynn-Williams. 
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homing devices.1026 These three boats were comparably larger and more powerful than 
the whale catchers they had used earlier in the area.1027 The increased size and engine 
power gave them more towing capacity and extended their operational range, which 
meant they could hunt and exploit whales in a larger hunting ground.  
 
 Fig 169. The flow of production at Signy Island 














The size and processing capacity of this ship had two important effects on the local 
network. Firstly, she increased the processing capability of the whaling station. 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, she allowed the company to move away from 
British control and operate in a true pelagic sense, since she was equipped with a 
destillators and was large enough to support a fleet of whale catchers. When the 
Lancing, the first pelagic factory ship, visited the hunting grounds at the South Orkney 
Islands during the 1925–1926 season, Berntsen expressed his concerns over increased 
competition to the Colonial Office by stating that “the whalers of the floating factory 
Lancing are catching in the same whaling grounds as ours, and we do not think that the 
                                                 
1026 ”Søren Berntsens Private Dagbøker. Sesongen 1925/26”. Courtesy of the Private Archive of Karl Jan 
Skontorp, Norway. 
1027 Busen 1,2 and 3 had been built in 1922 or later, and were equipped with 650-690 Hkr engines, while 
the former whale catchers Husvik, Ruggen and Viking had been built 1908-1912 and had 350-450 Hkr 
engines. The whale catcher Sperm stands in this context out, having been built in 1912, but had been 
purchased on behalf for the whaling company in 1919, and equipped with a 700 Hkr engine. For further 
reading, see Wasberg. G. C. 1958. 
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whaling grounds about the South Orkneys can stand more than one whaling factory”.1028 
The three whale catchers of A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri consequently had to compete 
with the four whale catchers of the Lancing for whales and as a result caught fewer 
whales.1029 Berntsen argued that their expedition in the South Orkney Islands had 
suffered greatly and that there was “very little possibility now in the after season to expect 
balanced catch”. He asked for permission to operate with the Orwell I from South 
Georgia as compensation.1030 This could have been an attempt to persuade the Colonial 
Office to take action against their competitors. It fulfilled its intended purpose, and the 
British authorities granted the company permission to operate with Orwell I in the 
waters off the Falkland Islands until May 31.1031  
 
Fig 170. The factory ship Lancing. This ship was the first true pelagic factory ship that could operate 
independent of land. Whale carcasses could be hauled onboard and processed.1032 
                                                 
1028 “Letter from the Tonsberg Whaling Company, to the Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office. February 8, 
1926”. Vol: D5-1-4-5. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of the 
estate of David Wynn-Williams. See also:”Søren Berntsens Private Dagbøker. Sesongen 1925/26”. Courtesy 
of the Private Archive of Karl Jan Skontorp, Norway. 
1029 ”Søren Berntsens Private Dagbøker. Sesongen 1925/26”. Courtesy of the Private Archive of Karl Jan 
Skontorp, Norway. 
1030 “Letter from the Tonsberg Whaling Company, to the Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office. February 8, 
1926”. Vol: D5-1-4-5. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of the 
estate of David Wynn-Williams. 
1031 ”Letter from G. Grindle, to the Tonsberg Whaling Company. February 20, 1926”. Vol: D5-1-4-5. The 
Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of the estate of David Wynn-
Williams. 
1032 Volume D5-1-4-8. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of the 
estate of David Wynn-Williams. 
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The company designed their settlement at Signy Island differently to the station at 
Husvik Harbour. The station at Signy Island had only one accommodation house for the 
workers. Unfortunately, there are no written or archaeological sources pertaining to the 
internal architectural design. The use of a single house indicates that the company had 
not bothered to create hierarchies among the workers with separate accommodation. 
However, as local manager, Berntsen probably lived either in a separate room in the 
barrack or onboard the sailing ship, Teie. Since the ship lay anchored in the bay outside 
the whaling station, this would have allowed Berntsen to overlook work at the station. 
This hierarchical structure is similar to the ones used at Walrus Bay on Bear Island.   
 
The landscape at Signy Island was more confined and topographically challenging that 
Husvik Harbour at South Georgia. The harbour was one of the few locations in the South 
Orkney Islands that was relatively sheltered and had a protected harbour deep enough 
for larger ships. Moreover, it also had a sheltered piece of land suitable for erecting 
buildings and installations. Combined with a freshwater supply in the vicinity, these 
features made the site a strategic choice for establishing the local network. Hans Borge’s 
local knowledge was probably instrumental in selecting the site. The organisation and 
production of the whaling station at Signy Island were similar to A/S Hektor’s whaling 
station at Deception Island in the South Shetland Islands. This whaling station was 
constructed between 1911 and 1914 and was operated in conjunction with a floating 
factory ship, which lay anchored immediately beside the whaling station.1033 
 
                                                 
1033 Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. No 4, April 1914, and No 9, September 1914. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s 




Fig 171. A/S Hektor’s whaling station at Deception Island. The station was initially designed to process the 
whale carcasses that other whaling expeditions had discarded. Later on, the company started hunting 
themselves and processed whales in conjunction with a factory ship. Although the company also held a 
concession for the South Orkney Islands, they never made use of it. The company probably maintained both 
concessions as a backup and to keep competitors away. The photo has been published with the kind approval 
of the Norwegian Polar Institute.  
 
Although the two stations were organised in a similar way and had the same level of 
utilisation, their processing capabilities were different. This might be because the 
companies had different plans and ambitions, but the spatial differences between the 
two sites also affected the sizes of the stations that could be built there.  
 
Although Tønsberg Hvalfangeri operated with a whaling station and factory ships, their 
largest investments were in the ships. There are no sources showing that investments 
were made in the station to increase its production. Although the whaling station was 
important, it represented only a small percentage of the overall production capacity of 
the local network. The cooking capacity of Orwell I and II was greater than that of the 
station. The only shore-based investments made by the whaling company were the 





Fig 172. A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri whaling station at Signy Island as it stood when finished. In the centre of 
the photo is the meat and bone cookery and the flensing platform. The blubber and water barges are visible. 
To the left immediately above the cooker is the accommodation house. The photo has been published with the 
kind approval of the estate of David Wynn-Williams.  
 
Strategies and adaptations 
Previous attempts to exploit whales in waters around the South Orkney Islands had 
been modest and were not sustainable, despite abundant whale populations in the area. 
It is surprising that A/S Tønsberg invested in this area after other whaling companies 
had failed. What strategies did the company use to avoid the failures of their 
predecessors? The study of material remains in the field fill the gaps of information in 
written and printed sources. The company worked out a strategy to create control over 
their workers and over resources such as freshwater. Their choice of technologies, 
organisation of production, and their way of dealing with the local environment were 
also important. These factors were not separate entities, but affected one another. For 
example, good technological choices were important from an economic point of view 
since they allowed the station to operate well. They were also socially important as the 
workers knew how to operate and adapt them to local environmental conditions. 
Technological installations also symbolised an effective occupation, so served a political 
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function. In summary, technological choices and the ability to adapt were essential for 
creating and sustaining a local network.  
 
Technological choices and the ability to adapt technologies and the organisation of 
production were important, and the local manager had to consider these to secure high 
production. If the station manager made poor technical and organisational choices or 
failed to adapt them to local circumstances, then the local network would not be able to 
produce enough whale oil to generate the necessary profit to maintain the support of 
investors. Furthermore, if the network builder failed to control its employees, then 
strikes or unrest could obstruct production and they would lose the support of the 
global network. Therefore, it was vital to choose technologies that the workers were 
familiar with, that functioned, and that could be adapted to local conditions. Similarly, if 
the network builder failed to secure control of sheltered harbours and freshwater 
supplies, then whale oil could not be produced and the project could not be sustained. 
Consequently, strategies and the ability to adapt them to local circumstances were 
decisive in the success or failure of whaling projects in the Antarctic.  
 
Industrial companies planned their settlements to achieve social control at the turn of 
the 20th century. The modern whaling industry achieved social control in a variety of 
ways, including the part-based salary system, which linked the workers position and 
production to his salary. Combined with one-year contracts, this system segregated 
skilled from un-skilled workers and discouraged strikes as these would directly affect 
the workers’ salaries. Salaries were determined by the individual whaling companies. 
Although they were similar throughout the industry, there were some differences that 
may have caused unrest. To avoid this, the Norwegian Whaling Union established a 
committee to suggest salary agreements for all the whaling companies.1034 This was an 
attempt to reduce the financial motives behind strikes that had become more frequent. If 
all companies offered the same payment, then this motive for striking would be 
removed. Although the committee’s suggestion was a good one, it was never fully 
adopted since salaries were a tool for attracting the best workers.  
 
                                                 




One could argue, and perhaps interpret the part-based salary system as a democratic 
way of sharing risks and any eventual success. Establishing a whaling company and 
equipping an expedition to the Antarctic was not only potentially hazardous due to the 
remoteness and environmental conditions, it was also a costly affair. Spreading financial 
risks via shareholders was one way of preventing bankruptcy. Economic risks were also 
minimised by a salary system that did not commit to a fixed amount, which could 
backfire if the hunting season was low, production failed, or the market deteriorated. 
The part-based salary system was also a democratic way of rewarding the workers for 
their input, and the workers indirectly took their burden of responsibility in shared the 
financial risk by not demanding high salaries. This system also created control, 
promoted hard work, and minimised disturbance of the production line.  
 
Other strategies for social control were black listing, leisure activities, and the design of 
settlement and accommodations (as I have discussed earlier). These strategies were not 
exclusive to the modern whaling industry but were an integral part of almost all 
industrial settlements and company towns at the turn of the 20th century. However, the 
remoteness and seasonal character of the modern whaling industry probably made it 
more sensitive to disruption than industries in more temperate areas. All the season’s 
supplies (coal, foods, barrels, fuels, etc.) had to be shipped there in advance, meaning the 
costs were high before production even started. The fleet also had to be insured. 
Furthermore, the whaling industry operated in remote areas lacking indigenous 
populations, therefore workers could not be easily replaced.  
 
Social life within the modern whaling industry has not been well studied. Elstad and 
Hart studied life at the Argentinean whaling station at Grytviken. Both argued that the 
social life at Grytviken whaling station was good and healthy and that the local manager 
C.A. Larsen had a genuine interest in the spiritual wellbeing and education of his 
workers, actively making sure that their life away from home was as comfortable as 
possible.1035 Like many other whaling stations at South Georgia, Grytviken experienced a 
number of strikes before the church and cinema were built. C.A. Larsen’s investment in 
                                                 
1035 Elstad. Å. Den første norske oljealderen. 2004. P: 278. In: Norsk Polarhistorie Vol: 3. Editors: Drivenes. 
E-A, and Jølle. H. D. Hart. I. B. PESCA: The History of Compañia Argentina de Pesca Sociedad Anónima of 




the church may have been an attempt to reinforce social control at the station. The 
company hired priests and it is likely that these priests proclaimed messages that were 
aligned with the company’s best interests.  
 
Police and a doctor were also hired for the whaling station. Hiring a local police force 
suggests that the local management believed their workers needed to be kept under 
control and disciplined if necessary. As mentioned in the previous chapter, historical 
literature depicts interesting contradictions of workers and social life within the whaling 
industry. It is important to interpret these descriptions critically and not mimic the same 
rhetoric in our own study.  
 
These social strategies were most likely used at Husvik Harbour in South Georgia. 
Similar strategies had to be adapted to the circumstances in the South Orkney Islands. 
The whaling station at Signy Island was small and only had one accommodation 
building, which offered limited space for social segregation and hierarchical division. 
However, the whaling station represented only a small part of the total processing 
capacity and any strikes at the station would have had little effect on the overall 
production of the local network. Therefore, investing in strategies to promote social 
control were not necessary. Once the Orwell and Orwell II were integrated in the local 
network, the need for social control increased.  
 
Ships have more limited space than whaling stations. Despite differences, Basberg 
suggested that the social structure at a whaling station resembled that of a ship in three 
primary ways. Firstly, both were, as Aubert and Arner described, total institutions.1036 
This meant that the workers were confined to and dependent on their working 
environment for long periods of time. Secondly, the organisation of work and social life 
had a maritime character, which was often enhanced by informal rituals. For example, 
new workers or novices were baptised on the voyage to hunting grounds by a fellow 
sailor dressed as Neptune. Thirdly, the fleet was an integral part of the whaling 
station.1037 Consequently, one could expect that social strategies were the same at 
                                                 
1036 Aubert. V and Arner. O. On the social structure of the ship. 1959. P: 201. In: Acta Sociologica, Vol 3. No 4. 
Pp: 200-219. 
1037 Basberg. B.L. A ship ashore? Organsation and living conditions at South Georgia whaling stations, 1904-
1960. 2002. P: 17f. In: International Journal of Maritime History. Vol: XIX, No 1. 
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whaling stations and onboard ships. However, there were similarities and differences 
that should be discussed further.  
 
The station and the ship had formalised structures with defined, non-negotiable 
positions. Each worker was contracted for a certain position before departure of the 
expedition. This meant that each worker knew what was expected of him and what his 
role was, and little adjustment was required.1038 This allowed the workers to transfer 
companies easily between seasons and also allowed the employers to replace unwanted 
workers at relatively short notice. Station workers and seamen were hired on one-year 
contracts, which probably reduced their motivation to cause disruption in the 
workplace. Furthermore, the introduction of pelagic whaling technologies and increased 
production capabilities motivated many whaling companies to introduce two-shift 
instead of one-shift systems to maximise whale oil production. This new structure 
encouraged teamwork within the shift units since each was motivated to surpass the 
production of the other unit.1039  
 
There were important spatial differences between the whaling station and the factory 
ship which undoubtedly affected the social strategies. The whaling company could use 
the surrounding landscape to enhance hierarchical division and create leisure activities 
at the whaling stations, but there was little room for that onboard the ships. On ships, 
hierarchical divisions were created by invisible barriers between the captain and his 
subordinates. Engineers and workers were separated into the bridge, the engine room, 
and the deck. Even though interaction was necessary for daily operations, the captain, 
engineers, and workers were largely separated in their own quarters.  
 
An important social ritual in the whaling industry was the baptism of newcomers who 
crossed the equator for the first time. From 1910 onwards, this ritual involved having 
one’s head shaved, the entire body being dipped into a mixture of soap and fat, and 
                                                 
1038 ”Interview with Laurits Bakkeli in 1979. Whaling interviews performed by Tønsberg Museum”. Vol: D5-1-
4-7. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of the estate of David 
Wynn-Williams. 
1039 Elstad. Å. Den første norske oljealderen. 2004. P: 302. In: Norsk Polarhistorie Vol: 3. Editors: Drivenes. 
E-A, and Jølle. 
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finally a baptism in a flensing boat filled with seawater.1040 Later on, a fellow whaler 
dressed as Neptune took the role of master of the ceremony. These rituals were a 
welcome amusement on the voyage south; they created a good spirit and team feeling. It 
is interesting that the whaling station managers and factory ship captains chose to 
isolate themselves and avoid interacting with the workers, despite having worked 
through the ranks to their current positions. The situation was different onboard whale 
catchers, where the captain filled the role of gunner and where team work was vital for a 
successful hunting season. Since the gunner was the key to good catches and economic 
profit, he was allowed to hire his own crew. Despite the close relationship between the 
captain and his crew onboard the whale catchers, he remained the undisputed leader. 
 
The quality of the food was another common reason for strikes and social unrest. Food 
had social, cultural, and emotional value for everyone (management and workers 
included) since it was one of the few links to home. It was not an easy task to produce 
tasty food that was cheap and easy to prepare.1041 The workers were not responsible for 
tasks that were a part of everyday life at home, such as cooking food, transport, and 
taking care of accommodation – these were taken care of by the company. The whaling 
company also arranged the transfer of money to the workers’ families back home. The 
workers knew that if they misbehaved, their family may suffer financial consequences if 
the company held back payment. A whaling expedition to the Antarctic was a long-term 
commitment that lasted months at a time. The absence of a husband and father in the 
household changed the gender roles in many ways, since the wife filled both roles.1042 
 
The strategies used by A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri in the South Orkney Islands were 
probably similar to those commonly used in the industry. This was especially true in the 
latter part of the 1920s when whaling companies operating in the Antarctic introduced a 
                                                 
1040 ”Interview with Laurits Bakkeli in 1979. Whaling interviews performed by Tønsberg Museum”. Vol: D5-1-
4-7. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of the estate of David 
Wynn-Williams. 
1041 Aubert. V and Arner. O. On the social structure of the ship. 1959. P: 204. In: Acta Sociologica, Vol 3. No 4. 
Pp: 200-219. 
1042  For further reading, please see Garmel, H. Whalers Wife’s in Vestfold, Norways during the Pelagic 
Period. 2010. P: 161-168. In: Whaling & History III. Publication No 33. Kommendør Chr. Christensens 
Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord, Norway. 
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uniform salary system.1043  Salaries were often different between companies and 
hunting grounds and each company had its own rewards when a certain number of 
catches or production target was surpassed.1044 These rewards created an additional 
incentive for the gunner, his crew, and the shore workers. In the South Orkney Islands, 
the part per whale was doubled after 150 whales were caught. Leisure activities were 
limited in the South Orkney Islands, and workers were restricted to games and listening 
to radio via the Argentinean Meteorological station at Laurie Island. This was popular 
since it often broadcasted music from Rio De Janeiro and Montevideo.1045  
 
Mathiesen, Hoel, Avango, and Berg have demonstrated that actors and companies in the 
Arctic actively used territorial strategies to secure control over certain geographical 
areas.1046 Non-living actants such as buildings and installations were vital for 
commuting a message of occupation, ownership, and control. Hacquebord has shown 
that this strategy was already used in the 17th century.1047 Strategies such as these were 
common in regions where governance was undetermined or at least uncertain at the 
turn of the 20th century. It is therefore reasonable to ask whether or not the whaling 
station at Signy Island, with all its interconnected installations, was used to fulfil geo-
political ambitions. Although the whaling station was designed as a production unit and 
had an economic function for the whaling company and its shareholders, it was also 
erected and operated under British approval, therefore was a recognition of British 
sovereignty in the area. An industrial project in the area reaffirmed British sovereignty 
because the Colonial Office were able to control the company’s activity through 
legislations and regulatory decisions.  
 
                                                 
1043 Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. No 7, July 1928. P: 141. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. 
Sandefjord, Norway. 
1044 Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. No 7, July 1928. P: 141. Kommendør Chr. Christensen’s Hvalfangstmuseum. 
Sandefjord, Norway. 
1045 “Søren Berntsen. Diverse Brev,1923/24”. The private collection of Karl Jan Skontorp, Norway. 
1046 Se Mathinsen. T. Svalbard in International Politics 1871-1925. 1954, Hoel. D. Svalbards Historie 1596-
1965. Vol: 1-3. 1966-67. Avango. D. Aktanter I Ingenmanslandet. 2003. Pp: 173- 206. In: Industrins 
Avtryck: Perspektiv på ett forskningsfält. Editors: Avango. D, and Lundström. B. Of the same author see 
also: Sveagruvan: svensk gruvhantering mellan industri, diplomati, och geovetenskap. 2005, and Berg. R. 
Norge på egen hånd 1905-1920. 1995. 
1047 See Hacquebord & Avango 2016. Industrial heritage sites in Spitsbergen (Svalbard), South Georgia and 
the Antarctic Peninsula: Sources of historical information. Polar Science, 10 (2016) 433-440. 
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Although there are few sources to validate the idea, the low level capital and material 
investment in the whaling station at Signy Island probably reflects the company’s 
ambitions to control the harbour and resources in Borge Bay.  
 
The investment in a pump house undoubtedly increased the output of the local network 
since it provided a more or less constant flow of water. The placement of a pipe and hose 
indicates that its primary function was to support the factory ship. Although it was 
probably an easier technical solution than water barges, the design of the system caused 
problems. Water ran down from a cold glacial melt water lake, through a 100-metre 
metal pipe along the ground to the nearby beach, where it was connected to the factory 
ship via a 75-metre hose.1048 Low temperatures and strong winds regularly froze the 
water in the pipe.1049 Berntsen considered this to be a serious problem for the overall 
function and survival of the local network. In an attempt to adapt the system to the 
environment, Berntsen and the machine engineer of the Orwell designed a thawing 
device that included a petrol burner and a heated plate made of corrugated steel, which 
they placed over the water pipe. On one occasion, they built a huge fire on the beach 
from whale bones, baleen, and fat to thaw the lower section of the metal pipe.1050 The 
freezing problem meant that they could not abandon the use of water barges entirely1051 
and they remained a vital component of the local network. The low temperatures also 
meant there was little meltwater from the nearby glacier. This was not enough 
freshwater to meet the demands of constantly processing whales. The failure to adapt to 
the low temperatures was the reason Berntsen stopped the 1925–1926 season early in 
April.1052  These installations were built at the same time the factory ship Lancing 
arrived in the area. The Lancing operated without a concession from the Colonial Office. 
A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri though it important to secure exclusive access and rights to 
this area, and these new buildings were probably an attempt to enforce these rights.  
 
                                                 
1048 “Søren Berntsens Private Dagbøker. Sesongen 1923/24”. Courtesy of the Private Archive of Karl Jan 
Skontorp, Norway. 
1049 “Søren Berntsens Private Dagbøker. Sesongen 1923/24”. Courtesy of the Private Archive of Karl Jan 
Skontorp, Norway. 
1050 “Søren Berntsens Private Dagbøker. Sesongen 1925/26”. Courtesy of the Private Archive of Karl Jan 
Skontorp, Norway. 
1051 “Søren Berntsens Private Dagbøker. Sesongen 1923/24”. Courtesy of the Private Archive of Karl Jan 
Skontorp, Norway. 




The company’s efforts to adapt to the local environment in the South Orkney Islands 
were important. The geographical location of the South Orkney Islands immediately 
north of the Weddell Sea contributed to a high influx of sea ice and icebergs which, 
combined with strong winds and low temperatures, affected whaling companies that 
operated in the area and industrial development of the South Orkney Islands as hunting 
grounds. The whale populations were first exploited here by the Newfoundland Steam 
Whaling Company in 1907–1908.1053 This company had a concession for the South 
Orkney Islands, the South Shetland Islands, and Graham Land. The expedition was based 
on the factory ship, Sobraon, and the two whale catchers, Lynx and Puma.1054  
 
Even though the company considered the hunting grounds in the South Orkney Islands 
to be rich and profitable, they moved their operations to the South Shetland Islands 
further west.1055 According to Dickson, sea ice and icebergs presented severe problems 
and prevented the company from catching enough whales to generate a profit.1056  A few 
years later, in the 1911–1912 season, A/S Laboremus attempted another whaling 
expedition using the factory ship Roald Amundsen.1057 Much like their predecessor, A/S 
Laboremus was unable to adapt their operations to the local environmental 
conditions.1058   
 
Although two whaling expeditions had already failed to successfully exploit the area, the 
South Orkney Islands had a reputation of being “an area where whales are abundant and 
where there are no expenditures except for ordinary licence”.1059 This was most likely 
what attracted the Norwegian whaling companies A/S Rethval and A/S Thule to the area 
                                                 
1053 ”Letter from the Governments House in Stanley, to Sir William MacGregor; Governments House in 
Newfoundland. January 9, 1908”. The Falkland Islands Archive. Vol: General Letter Book/ Governor. 
November 1881-December 1908. Outward.  
1054 Dickinson. A. B, and Sanger. C.W. Twentieth-Century shore-whaling in Newfoundland and Labrador. 
2005. P: 80. 
1055 ”The Whaling Industry of the Dependencies of the Falkland Islands. October 5, 1918”. The Falkland 
Islands Archive. Vol: SG & DEP. Whaling- General. Box 27.  
1056 Dickinson. A. B, and Sanger. C.W. Twentieth-Century shore-whaling in Newfoundland and Labrador. 
2005. P: 80. 
1057 Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1915/16. P: 29f. Kommendør Chr. Christensens Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord, 
Norway. See also: Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. 1967. Vol: 2. P: 391. In: 
Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling, and: Hart. I.B. Whaling in the Falkland 
Islands Dependencies 1904-1931: A history of shore and bay-based whaling in the Antarctic. 2006. P: 146. 
1058 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. 1967. Vol: 2. P: 387. In: Den Moderne 
Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
1059 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. 1967. Vol: 2. P: 387. In: Den Moderne 
Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
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in 1911–1912. These two companies operated with the two factory ships Falkland and 
Thule1060 after receiving concessions to exploit whales in the South Orkney Islands and 
the South Shetland Islands.1061 The companies wanted, according to Petter Sørlle, to 
establish themselves in the South Sandwich Islands, but realised the area was too 
difficult to operate in.1062  
 
By 1913, A/S Rethval and A/S Thule realised their factory ship, Falkland, was too large 
to successfully operate in the South Orkney Islands. They made a deal with the 
Norwegian whaling company A/S Ørnen. A/S Rethval took over the smaller factory ship 
Ørn,1063 while A/S Ørnen took the Falkland.1064 Even though the Ørn was smaller and 
had less capacity than the Falkland, she was regarded as more suitable and effective for 
the environmental conditions in the South Orkney Islands.1065 The Falkland’s large size 
made her less manoeuvrable and too expensive to operate in relation to catches and 
output.  
 
Environmental conditions were extremely severe in the hunting seasons of 1913–1914 
and 1914–1915 with reoccurring storms and difficult ice conditions. This, combined 
with increased operational costs after the outbreak of the First World War, which 
increased operational costs, meant that no whaling company operated in the South 
Orkney Islands during this time.  
 
The British authorities knew that environmental conditions in the area were tough. The 
Governor of the Falkland Islands, Allardyce, reported that the environmental difficulties 
experienced by whaling companies in the area made it impossible for them to generate 
                                                 
1060 ”Letter from H.J. Read on behalf of the Secretary of State, to the Secretary of the Norwegian Chamber 
of commerce. August 15, 1914”. Vol: D5-1-1-4. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reprocuced by 
kind permission of the estate of David Wynn-Williams. 
1061 Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1912. P: 25. Kommendør Chr. Christensens Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord, 
Norway. 
1062 ”Diary of Petter Sørrle”. Vol:  D5-1-5-6.1. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reprocuced by 
kind permission of the estate of David Wynn-Williams. See also: Isachsen. G. “Modern Norwegian Whaling 
in the Antarctic”. 1929. P: 393. In: Geographical Review, Vol: 19, No 3. (July 1929).  
1063 This ship was after the transaction re-named Falkland II. See: Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-
1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. 1967. Vol: 2. P: 396. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og 
utvikkling. 
1064 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. 1967. Vol: 2. P: 392. In: Den Moderne 
Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 




the same profit as elsewhere in the Antarctic.1066 This may be why he and the magistrate 
allowed A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri to start using a factory ship as well as their whaling 
station at Signy Island. Although the whaling companies largely anchored their factory 
ships in the shelter of land, they often had to abandon the safety of land due to the 
drifting ice, which hindered access to the ship and endangered the entire expedition. 
Therefore, whaling companies often resolved to operate in the drift ice.1067 Although this 
reduced vulnerability to the accumulating ice, it restricted their access to freshwater for 
producing steam and land for storing coal and equipment. As a result, the factory ships 
could never stray far from the islands. 
 
 
Fig 173. The wreckage of A/S Corral’s factory ship, Tioga. The ship was wrecked in a storm in 1913 and 
drifted on land with a cargo of 4,700 barrels of whale oil. The photo has been reproduced with the kind 
permission of D. Laws. 
 
                                                 
1066 ”Letter from the Governor W. L. Allardyce, to Lewis Harcourt, Secretary of State for the Colonies. April 11, 
1913”. Vol: D5-1-5-5. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reprocuced by kind permission of the 
estate of David Wynn-Williams.  
1067 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del 1: 1883-1914. 1967. Vol: 2. P: 396. In: Den Moderne 
Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
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To what extent the local knowledge of sheltered harbours and freshwater supplies were 
shared between the companies that operated in the area remains unknown. Sørrle and 
Borge were the first to initiate map-making for economic purposes.1068 Together they 
produced several maps that laid the foundation for the geographical knowledge of the 
South Orkney Islands. Their contributions are visible in many of today’s place names.1069 
 
The whaling station at Signy Island was established because the company wanted to 
secure access to what was considered to be the best harbour in the archipelago. 
However, the company was not always able to make full use of the station or its harbour. 
On numerous occasions, the expedition was obstructed by extensive ice belts and 
icebergs as it approached the area at the start of the hunting season. The ice stretched 
for kilometres and made it impossible for the ships to pass through.1070 Consequently, 
the fleet often had to operate in the ice. The local manager, Berntsen, frequently 
positioned the factory ship in the drift ice, which minimised the effects of the swell and 
allowed the expedition to commence with hunting and processing despite not having 
access to the harbour.1071   
 
Technically, this was not devastating because the factory ships had a higher production 
capacity than the whaling station. However, it caused problems. Firstly, the factory ship 
could only store a certain amount of freshwater to produce steam. Steam was needed to 
produce whale oil, generate heat, and propulsion. This meant that the expedition could 
only operate at full capacity with a water supply. Secondly, the drift ice offered some 
stability but made flensing more difficult. Thirdly, the company’s production capacity 
was reduced since they were unable to use the whaling station. The local environmental 
conditions had an enormous impact on the choices of technology and organisation of 
production.  
 
                                                 
1068 Roberts. B. Chronological list of Antarctic Expeditions. 1958. Vol: D5-1-4-5. The Archive of the British 
Antarctic Surveys. Reprocuced by kind permission of the estate of David Wynn-Williams.   
1069 Signy Island was for example named after Hans Borges wife; Signy. 
1070 “The Private Diaries of Søren Berntsen 1923/24- 1930/31”. The Private Collection of Karl Jan Skontorp. 
Norway. See also: Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1925/26. P: 21. Kommendør Chr. Christensens 
Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord, Norway. 
1071 “The Private Diaries of Søren Berntsen 1923/24- 1930/31”. The Private Collection of Karl Jan Skontorp. 
Norway. See also: Norsk Fiskeritidende. 1925/26. P: 21. Kommendør Chr. Christensens 
Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord, Norway. 
 353 
 
The whaling station at Signy Island was constructed out of necessity rather than as a 
primary production unit. This is reflected in the low investment in production 
machinery, steam production, accommodation, and supplementary installations such as 
a forge and carpenters. Instead, the island provided shelter and a source of freshwater 
for the company’s factory ships. Without access to and control of Signy Island, the board 
and shareholders would probably not have invested in Orwell II and developed a local 
network in the area. To make the project sustainable, Berntsen had to create social 
control and adapt is strategies, technologies, and organisation of production to the local 
environment of the South Orkney Islands. Dividing production between the whaling 
station at Signy Island and the floating factory ships Orwell I and II maximised the 
capacity and the output of the local network. In addition, investing in refitting and 
purchasing new factory ships rather than the whaling station increased the overall 
capacity of the local network. At the same time, it gave the operational flexibility 
necessary to develop the project and generate enough profit to maintain the 
shareholders’ support. 
 
Choosing and adapting technologies and organising production were stepwise 
processes. Firstly, the whaling station had to be established. This allowed them to secure 
control of the area, providing the basis to extend the whaling operation. Construction of 
the station was briefly halted in the 1920–1921 season after whale oil prices suddenly 
collapsed. What motivated the decision to invest in the South Orkney Islands? The 
company probably thought that the project could generate huge economic projects 
because the local conditions were hazardous and therefore local competition was 
unlikely in South Georgia. The choice to re-build and convert Orwell I into a factory ship 
as their main platform was an adaptation to the local circumstances. It also shows that 
the actor network believed the project had the potential to be successful. The actors 
behind the company were reluctant to invest heavily in developing a whaling station 
that was hard to access due to environmental factors and that was likely to fail.  
 
The company’s choice to primarily invest in floating factories was motivated by several 
factors. Firstly, it allowed them to start hunting and production early on in the hunting 
season. It also gave them flexibility to manoeuvre in the ice and operate in the ice floes. 
It may have also increased the hunting season and subsequently production and profit. 
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In addition, factory ships could easily be transferred to other areas if local conditions 
became unfavourable for production. 
 
Results of the whaling operations 
Tønsberg Hvalfangeri’s first hunting season in 1920–1921 was relatively short, lasting 
from February until March.1072 They probably started late because their ships arrived 
late in South Georgia. All the technical equipment destined for Signy Island had to be 
loaded onto the ships. It also took the company some time to erect the whaling station 
and make it operational. Because of this, the company caught and processed 61 whales 
into 409 barrels of whale oil. In addition, they brought an additional 450 tonnes of 
blubber onboard Teie.  
 
In the following season, the board of the company decided not to send an expedition to 
the area because whale oil prices fell from £88 per ton in 1920 to £37 per ton in 
1921.1073 The Colonial Office changed the operational conditions in the company’s 
concession for the South Orkney Islands and allowed them to use a floating factory ship. 
This was probably to give the company an incentive to maintain and develop the local 
network. The company immediately decided to re-design the Orwell for this purpose. 
The expedition consisted of the factory ship Orwell and three whale catchers.1074 
Berntsen seems to have been in charge of the overall expedition and of coordinating 
activities. It is not clear what Hansen’s role was.1075  
 
There appears to have been some confusion between the whaling company and the 
Colonial Office as to the new operational conditions. Tønsberg Hvalfangeri believed that 
they did not have to use the whaling station at Signy Island. But the lease and concession 
under which they operated stated that they had to base their production on the whaling 
                                                 
1072 “Letter from W. A. Thompson, acting Colonial Secretary, to the Crown Agents for the Colonies. September 
1, 1921”. The Falkland Islands Archive. Vol: SOUTH GEORGIA, PEOPLE – Whaling (1), 1915-1935. STACK. 
1073 Hart. I. B. Hart. I. B. Whaling in the Falkland Islands Dependencies 1904-1931: A history of shore and bay-
based whaling in the Antarctic. 2006. P: 316-317. 
1074 “Whaling permits issued for the South Orkney Islands”. Also in: “Letter from the Crown Agents to the 
Colonial Secretary in Stanley. October 23, 1923”. The Falkland Islands Archive. Vol: DEPENDENCIES – 
Whaling (3), 1923-1929. STACK. 
1075 Wasberg. G.C. Femti år I konkurranse og fremgang: Aktieselskabet Tønsberg Hvalfangeri 1907-1957. 
1958. P: 116. Vol: D5-1-4-2. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission 
of the estate of David Wynn-Williams. 
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station and use the Orwell in addition. The decision to allow the whaling company to use 
a factory ship in addition to the station was not an act of good will; it fulfilled the 
company’s economic interest and the political motives of the British authorities, as 
discussed earlier. To ensure that the whaling company fulfilled the constituted 
agreement, the magistrate, Binnie, allowed the company to proceed with their 
expedition after having sent along his colleague, Simon, as an observer.1076 There were 
several motives for this. Firstly, it allowed the whaling company to expand their 
operations in the area and avoided potential conflict that may have caused the whaling 
company to abandon the area. Secondly, it fulfilled the British authorities’ geo-political 
interests of creating the impression of effective occupation. It was undoubtedly 
considered vital to avoid withdrawal of the company and lose their support of British 
sovereignty. 
 
The board of A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri were probably aware of the circumstances 
surrounding their operations in the South Orkney Islands. They tested the willingness of 
the Colonial Office to enforce regulations upon the company. They knew that not using 
the whaling station was in violation of the contract, but they also knew that their 
activities were a part of the British authorities’ strategy to enhance their control over 
the South Orkney Islands, especially since Argentina had a strong foothold in the 
archipelago through decades of active presence at Laurie Island. The whaling company 
believed that the British authorities would not enforce regulations that hindered their 
whaling operations, since their activities supported British political goals. The company 
was also aware that the British authorities had limited control in the South Orkney 
Islands because there was no magistrate to enforce regulatory restrictions.  
 
Binnie’s decision to send one of his officers on the company’s expedition would 
therefore have come as a surprise to the company. The whaling company probably did 
not want to use the whaling station for production. Their primary interest was the 
harbour, the freshwater, and the storage space on land for explosives. Operating the 
whaling station was more time consuming than only using the factory ship, and it is 
possible that this played a role in the company’s reluctance to use it.  
                                                 
1076 “Letter from the Magistrate E. Binnie to the Colonial Secretary in Stanley. December 15, 1922”. The 
Falkland Islands Archive. Vol: SOUTH GEORGIA – People – Whaling (1), 1915-1935. STACK. 
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As I have discussed earlier, having two individual production units allowed Berntsen 
and Hansen to increase the overall processing capacity of the local network. The Orwell 
was manoeuvrable and large enough to have several flensing stations alongside its hull. 
The British authorities were concerned that the Orwell was too small to process all the 
whales caught by the company’s three whale catchers. Tønsberg Hvalfangeri had 
initially received permission to use the factory ship for one year. To prolong this, the 
company was ordered to demonstrate that it could increase its utilisation of the whales. 
After this, the Governor of the Falkland Islands would decide whether or not to grant a 
continuation.1077  
 
In reaction to the Governor’s decision, Chr. Salvesen & Co argued that they had turned 
down a concession and lease for the South Orkney Islands prior to A/S Tønsberg 
Hvalfangeri because the area was unfavourable for operating a whaling station. They felt 
that the British authorities’ approval to use a factory ship was in violation of the 
concession.1078 This was not the first time that Chr. Salvesen & Co objected to the actions 
of the British authorities. The firm had earlier, according to Tønnesen, tried to convince 
the Colonial Office to grant them monopoly rights for whaling in South Georgia, arguing 
that Great Britain benefitted little from the revenues and taxes that were paid by 
Norwegian and Argentinean companies.1079 Having received little reaction to their 
complaints, Chr. Salvesen & Co accused the Colonial Office and the Governor of the 
Falkland Islands of adopting an anti-British policy.1080   
 
For the hunting season of 1924–1925, the board of A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri renewed 
their application for a lease and concession in the South Orkney Islands.1081 In the 
application, they openly stated that their intentions were to base all operations on the 
                                                 
1077 ”Letter from the Office administering the Government of the Falkland Islands, to Tonsberg Whaling 
Company. October 10, 1923”. The Falkland Islands Archive. Vol: Despatch Book. January 1923-December 
1923. Inward.  
1078 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del II: 1914-1924. Den Pelagiske Fangst 1924-1937. 1969. 
Vol: 3. P: 298. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
1079 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del II: 1914-1924. Den Pelagiske Fangst 1924-1937. 1969. 
Vol: 3. P: 251f. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
1080 Jackson. G. The British Whaling Trade. 1978. P: 173. 
1081 ”Letter from H.J. Read, to the Tonsberg Whaling Company. August 27, 1924”. The Falkland Island 
Archives. Vol: 3, Dependencies- Whaling 1923-1929. Fldr: S of S CS [667/23]. 
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re-constructed Orwell,1082 which had the capacity to process all the whales caught by the 
three whale catchers.1083 Although this violated the terms of their original licence, Binnie 
agreed to the company’s terms as long as they could fulfil the utilisation demands.1084 On 
16 August 1924, Tønsberg Hvalfangeri received permission to operate in the South 
Orkney Islands basing their industrial operations exclusively on the Orwell I.1085 
 
This meant that for the first time in five years, Berntsen could focus all his attention on 
developing the local network around the factory ship. He did not have to spend time and 
resources making whaling station operational or transporting blubber between the two 
units. Moreover, by 1925 the whaling company was well established in the South Orkney 
Islands and had established several additional installations that symbolised their 
effective occupation and fulfilled the political ambitions of the British authorities. That 
the whaling station at Signy Island became redundant as a production unit was not a 
serious loss for the whaling company or the British authorities. Furthermore, the 
investment in the factory ship and the decision to make all operations pelagic probably 
reflected the expansionistic ambitions of the whaling company. By the 1925–1926 
season, the Orwell I had been replaced by the Orwell II and two new daughter 
companies had been established: Cia Ballenera del Peru Lda and Cia Ballenera del 
Equador Lda. The former was financially supported by the shareholders of A/S Tønsberg 
Hvalfangeri while the latter was a private enterprise of Johan Gmeiner, one of the co-
founders of A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri.1086  
 
The catches and production generated by the local network in the South Orkney Islands 
increased constantly, and support from the global network grew. The decision to 
purchase, re-build, and re-name the 10,500 deadweight ton cargo ship Knight Templar 
                                                 
1082 The Orwell had been refitted with a new boiler plant, six open and twenty pressure cookers which 
increased its processing capacity. 
1083 ”Letter from Aktieselskabet Tonsberg Hvalfangeri, to the Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office. July 
26, 1924”. The Falkland Islands Archive. Vol: 3, Dependencies- Whaling 1923-1929. Fldr: S of S CS 
[667/23]. 
1084 ”Letter from the Magistrate Edw. B. Binnie, to the Colonial Secretary. August 6, 1924”. The Falkland 
Islands Archive. Vol: 3, Dependencies- Whaling 1923-1929. Fldr: S of S CS [667/23]. 
1085 ”Letter from H. Henniker-Heaton; Colonial Secretary, to the Acting Magistrate on South Georgia. 
August 16, 1924”. Vol: 3, Dependencies- Whaling 1923-1929. Fldr: S of S CS [667/23]. 
1086 Wasberg. G.C. Femti år I konkurranse og fremgang: Aktieselskabet Tønsberg Hvalfangeri 1907-1957. 
1958. P: 105. Vol: D5-1-4-2. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission 
of the estate of David Wynn-Williams. 
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from the British company Alfred Hold & Co in Liverpool to the factory ship Orwell II1087 
was an important step. Not only did it allow the company to increase its production, but 
it also gave them the flexibility to expand their whaling operations away from land and 
regulated waters.  
 
This investment was an adaptive strategy that allowed the company to expand its 
industrial activities in the South Orkney Islands and move to uncontrolled and 
unregulated waters. The company’s success in the area had not gone unnoticed by its 
competitors. The increasing interest in the whaling grounds around the South Orkney 
Islands offered the British authorities a platform to exercise sovereignty by stationing a 
whaling officer onboard the Orwell II.1088 
 
In the 1925–1926 hunting season, the un-licensed factory ship Lancing competed with 
A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri’s expedition by whaling in the same area. This caused the 
board and the local manager considerable annoyance. In early February, after months of 
complaints, the Lancing and its whale catchers left the South Orkney Islands, most likely 
to escape the constant conflict and competition over whales. Throughout the remainder 
of the hunting season, A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri operated without competition. The 
company increased their catches and production to 459 whales and 27,050 barrels of 
whale oil. Berntsen decided to close the hunting season in early April.1089 Combined with 
the whaling station at Husvik Harbour in South Georgia, the company’s overall season 
production was 61,629 barrels of whale oil. This was almost 20,000 barrels less than the 
previous season (82,915 barrels).1090 Although whaling grounds in South Georgia had 
maintained their leading role for more than a decade, other areas such as the South 
Orkney Islands were successively starting to take over.  
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Fig 174. Total catches for A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri in 1908– 1931.  
 
Closure of the whaling station 
The whaling company maintained their operations in the area for the next five hunting 
seasons, but they invested and relied increasingly on pelagic operations. The factory 
ships produced a substantially larger percentage of the local network’s production. In 
the 1927–1928 season, the local network’s output in the South Orkney Islands exceeded 
that of Husvik Harbour in South Georgia and all other daughter companies, despite 
increasing competition in the South Orkney Islands.1091 The company abandoned the 
whaling station at Signy Island in 1925. Now, the local manager and his employees could 
focus all their attention on Orwell I and II.  
                                                 
1091 For the 1926/27 season, the British authorities had granted Chr. Salvesen & Co, and The Southern 
Whaling a & Sealing Company rights to operation in the area. See: “Whaling Permits issued for the South 
Orkney Islands”. Ref: D5-1-4-5. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind 
permission of the estate of David Wynn-Williams. Also in: “Letter from Søren Berntsen to his family in 
Norway. South Orkney Islands. 6/1-1926”. Courtesy of the Private Archive of Karl Jan Skontorp, Norway. 
 360 
 













































Fig 175. Total production and distribution between hunting grounds for A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri. 
 
The company stopped operating the whaling station for several reasons. Even though 
the whaling station contributed to the overall output of the local network, it represented 
only a small part of the company’s annual production. Moreover, access to the station 
was frequently blocked by ice in Bruce Harbour/ Borge Bay. Getting the whaling station 
operational was always time consuming since the machinery was damaged by heavy 
snowfall throughout the winter. Maintaining the station demanded a constant supply of 
freshwater, coal, and whales which was a constant battle against sea ice, prevailing wind 




Fig 176. The remains of Signy Island whaling station during the 1940s. Today there are few remains of the 
whaling station, as much of it was removed during the building of the British Antarctic Survey research 
station. The tilting planes between the flensing and the elevated lemming platform are visible, as are the 
steam boiler and one of the barges that were used to transport blubber and water. The photo has been 
published with the kind approval of the estate of David Wynn-Williams.  
 
Ceasing operations at Signy Island was therefore a cost effective decision. Using the 
factory ship was more favourable as it was the largest of the two production units. 
Furthermore, closing the station and focusing on pelagic expeditions allowed the 
company to process whales when there was lots of drift ice. The factory ship could also 
be moved to other hunting grounds if necessary. The flexibility the ship offered had 
profound effects on the organisation of the hunting season in the second half of the 
1920s, when competition over the resources in the South Orkney Islands increased. In 
his diary, Berntsen wrote that “when we arrived at the island there were a few whales, but 
the floating factories of the South Shetland Islands came along and took anchorage here, 
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four of them, and within three days all the whales were gone”.1092 Furthermore, sea ice, 
icebergs, reoccurring storms, and low temperatures caused continuous problems.1093 
 
From 1928 onwards, Tønsberg Hvalfangeri started using a different strategy, which 
signalled a transition to more pelagic operations beyond the control of the British 
authorities. Instead of going to the South Orkney Islands as they had done in the past, 
the Orwell and its whale catchers tested the hunting grounds north-east of the South 
Sandwich Islands and west of Bouvetøya, which had been claimed by Norway. Between 
1928 and 1931, the company maintained Husvik Harbour and Orwell II, through which 
they adopted a new strategy. Instead of using Orwell II in one hunting ground for an 
entire season, Berntsen shifted hunting grounds depending on the time of year. Using 
this strategy, the company could hunt whales as they migrated, and thereby increase 
their overall production from 44,700 barrels of whale oil in 1927–1928, to 60,000 in 
1928–1929, to 60,303 in 1929–1930, and to 73,837 in 1930–1931.1094 This greatly 
increased the overall economic profit of the company. After the 1930–1931 season, 
when the company produced 104,687 barrels of whale oil and 34,371 bags of guano, the 
company made a profit of Kr1.701,438.1095  
 
The primary motives for moving away from the hunting grounds in the South Orkney 
Islands and British control were the reduced whale catches due to competition, sea ice, 
and the desire to continuously increase their output of whale oil. To realise a high 
output, the company had to adapt their entire organisation of production in the 
Antarctic and expand their operations to new hunting grounds. This included closing the 
whaling station at Signy Island and focusing on pelagic operations using the Orwell II 
and Husvik Harbour.  
                                                 
1092 “Søren Berntsens Private Dagbøker. Sesongen 1927/28”. Courtesy of the Private Archive of Karl Jan 
Skontorp, Norway. 
1093 “Søren Berntsens Private Dagbøker. Sesongen 1927/28”. Courtesy of the Private Archive of Karl Jan 
Skontorp, Norway. 
1094 Wasberg. G.C. Femti år I konkurranse og fremgang: Aktieselskabet Tønsberg Hvalfangeri 1907-1957. 
1958. P: 59 & 111f. Vol: D5-1-4-2. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind 
permission of the estate of David Wynn-Williams. 
1095 Wasberg. G.C. Femti år I konkurranse og fremgang: Aktieselskabet Tønsberg Hvalfangeri 1907-1957. 
1958. P: 59 & 111f. Vol: D5-1-4-2. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind 
permission of the estate of David Wynn-Williams. 
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Fig 177. The overall production of A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri from 1920 to 1931. From 1928 onwards, the 
company’s South Orkney expeditions dominated the company’s overall production. The so-called South 
Orkney expeditions in the table were not exclusively located here, but operated in a variety of areas in the 
Antarctic.  
 
The primary motive behind this expansion was, according to Hart, a result of improved 
market conditions in Europe and the United States of America.1096 Attempts in Europe to 
establish large buyer’s pools (De-No-Fa and Lever Bros) undoubtedly contributed to 
stabilizing prices since they controlled the market in Europe. In the United States, a 
similar position was held by Proctor & Gamble, who via their Norwegian agent had 
established contact with the Norwegian Whaling Union and negotiated the purchase of 
whale oil shipments from the Antarctic.1097 Even though prices were lower than before 
1920, they were stable enough to allow whaling companies to compensate by increasing 
their catches and production.  
 
As un-licensed pelagic whaling industry developed throughout the latter part of the 
1920s. Many reacted to its devastating effects on the industry and called for stricter 
regulations to prevent further destruction. The Norwegian chargé d’affaires in Paris 
expressed that if the industry continued to develop in this way, “we risk the world having 
a negative opinion of the Norwegian whaling industry. As a result, we may lose valuable 
                                                 
1096 Hart. I. B. Whaling in the Falkland Islands Dependencies 1904-1931: A history of shore and bay-based 
whaling in the Antarctic. 2006. P: 181. 
1097 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del II: 1914-1924. Den Pelagiske Fangst 1924-1937. 1969. 
Vol: 3. P: 189f. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
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licences or be forced to transfer our companies to other nations”.1098 Tensions were 
fuelled by the Australian polar scientist Douglas Mawson, who said that “the slaughter by 
the Norwegian whaling industry would result in that there were no more whales left in 20 
years”. According to Tønnesen, this statement motivated the Imperial government to call 
for the cancellation of all whaling concessions to foreign companies.1099  
 
The introduction of new regulations 
The British authorities introduced new regulations to prevent further whaling 
operations in an effort to prevent whale populations becoming extinct. Although catches 
had increased exponentially in the latter part of the 1920s, the British authorities 
probably also had economic motives for introducing new regulations (loss of 
concessions and taxations) as well as political motives (loss of third party recognition 
and activities over which they could exercise sovereignty). The British authorities tried 
to prevent the development of un-licenced whaling by threatening whaling companies 
operating within the Falkland Island Dependencies that they would lose their rights to 
operate their whaling stations if they invested in un-licensed pelagic factory ships.1100 
All attempts to regulate the development of un-licensed whaling caused several 
Norwegian whaling companies, together with the Norwegian Whaling Union, to turn to 
the Norwegian government for support. In 1929, the Norwegian government introduced 
a new whaling law that banned hunting of certain species and specified the hunting 
season. It also demanded full utilisation, report-duty of catches, and inspectors onboard 
the ships.1101  
 
Efforts to slow down development of the whaling industry caused internal conflicts, also 
within the industry itself. As a consequence, the Norwegian Whaling Union was 
dissolved and replaced by The Association of Whaling Companies which, unlike its 
predecessor, had an international composition. After the silent year in 1931–1932, when 
                                                 
1098 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del II: 1914-1924. Den Pelagiske Fangst 1924-1937. 1969. 
Vol: 3. P: 263. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
1099 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del II: 1914-1924. Den Pelagiske Fangst 1924-1937. 1969. 
Vol: 3. P: 263. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
1100 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del II: 1914-1924. Den Pelagiske Fangst 1924-1937. 1969. 
Vol: 3. P: 258f. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
1101 Norsk hvalfangfangsttidende, 1929. Kommendør Chr. Christensens Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord, 
Norway. See also: Elstad. Å. Den første norske oljealderen. 2004. P: 294. In: Norsk Polarhistorie. Vol: 3. 
Rikedommene. Editors: Drivenes. E-A, and Jølle. H. D. 
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most whaling fleets laid dormant, the need for international regulations became 
apparent. Clarke suggested in his economic analysis of biological resources that reduced 
productivity results from two social conditions: competitive exploitation of common 
property and maximization of private property profits. Whale populations, which had an 
economic value but a low reproductive capability, might become extinct in either 
situation.1102 In an attempt to avoid this, a voluntary quota system using the blue whale 
unit (BWU) was introduced as one of the first attempts of the modern whaling industry 
to self-regulate without the interference of national governments.1103 
 
In spite of these attempts, political intervention (both national and international) 
became inevitable. The League of Nations commissioned a report in 1931 that estimated 
the size of the whale population and the whaling industry.1104 The British were reluctant 
to sign the 21 article agreement, therefore it did not come into force until 1935. This 
may be because the agreement overruled many regulatory decisions made by the British 
authorities regarding the Falkland Islands Dependencies. Furthermore, the British 
probably viewed signing the agreement as admitting their failure to control the 
development of un-licenced pelagic whaling industry in the Antarctic region.  
 
Throughout the 1930s, a number of international agreements and species protection 
acts were signed, with varying success.1105 According to Heazle, these attempts were 
only partially successful because they were based on economic factors rather than on 
creating an awareness of conservation measures for the industry.1106 The international 
composition of the whaling industry made it difficult to find a common platform 
regarding laws and regulations. The escalating conflict between economic, political, and 
environmental interests when deciding how to regulate the whale populations in 
international waters led nowhere since agreements were largely being ignored by 
                                                 
1102 Clarke. C. W. The Economics of Overexploitation. 1973. In: Science. Vol: 181, No: 4100. Pp: 630-634. 
1103 Elstad. Å. Den første norske oljealderen. 2004. P: 294. In: Norsk Polarhistorie. Vol: 3. Rikedommene. 
Editors: Drivenes. E-A, and Jølle. H. D.  
1104 Norsk Hvalfangsttidende. No 2, February 1935. P: 19. Kommendør Chr. Christensens 
Hvalfangstmuseum. Sandefjord, Norway.See also: Into the Ice: The History of Norway and the Polar Regions. 
2006. P: 182. Editors:Drivenes. E-A, and Jølle. H.D. 
1105 Southern Right whales, north-Atlantic and north-Pacific Right whales, Grey whales and Bowhead 
whales were all given limited protection in the 1930s.  Blue- and Humpback whales followed suit in the 
1960s, while Fin and Sei whales were given the same status in the 1970s. For further information, please 
visit the website of the International Whaling Commission.  
1106 Heazle. M. Scientific uncertainty and the politics of whaling. 2006. P: 37f. 
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signatory members.1107 The International Whaling Commission (IWC) was established in 
1946 during a conference in Washington. The primary role of the IWC was “to establish a 
system of international regulation for the whale fisheries to ensure proper and effective 
conservation and development of whale stocks on the basis of the principles embodied in 
the provisions of the International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling, signed in 
London on 8 June 1937, and the protocols to that agreement signed in London on 24 June, 
1938, and 26 November, 1945. ; and having decided to conclude a convention to provide for 
the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly development of 
the whaling industry.”1108 In short, the IWC was to function as an administering body for 
the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. 
 
Ever since its formation, the IWC has had the difficult role of ensuring sustainable 
exploitation of the world’s whale population while preserving the whaling industry. 
According to Kalland, this was difficult because debates on population estimates and 
sustainability were in deadlock, with all parties trying to blame the others.1109 Banning 
the exploitation of whales was suggested in the early 1970s and the movement against 
the whaling industry gained popularity based on ecologic, moral, and ethical arguments. 
In 1982, a revised management procedure (RMP) was introduced that imposed a 
temporary ban on commercial whaling from 1986.1110 Today, the IWC is an unanimity, 
which, according to Stoett, has challenged the legitimacy of the organisation by nation 
states. New bodies, such as the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO), 
have been formed.1111   
 
For A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri and the rest of the whaling industry, the period after the 
1930–1931 season was characterised by falling whale oil prices and difficult market 
conditions as it was difficult to attract buyers. Buyers offered low prices and sent their 
own expeditions to the Antarctic despite the availability of whale oil. Prices for whale oil 
declined because of the global economic recession, the overproduction of whale oil, and 
                                                 
1107 Heazle. M. Scientific uncertainty and the politics of whaling. 2006. P: 38. 
1108 “International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, and its Protocol signed in Washington 2 
December, 1946”. In: Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission. 2004. P: 139. 
1109 Kalland. A. Fiendebilder i hvalfangstdebatten. 2001. P: 183f. In: Miljøkonflikter; om bruk og vern av 
naturresurser. Editors: Kalland. A, and Rønnow. T.  
1110 Kalland. A. Fiendebilder i hvalfangstdebatten. 2001. P: 185. In: Miljøkonflikter; om bruk og vern av 
naturresurser. Editors: Kalland. A, and Rønnow. T. 
1111 Stoett. P. J. The International Politics of Whaling. 1997. P: 131. 
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competition from vegetable oils that flooded the market. Whale oil prices first dropped 
in 1920 and stabilised by 1930; this situation was overcome by increasing catches and 
production. This was achieved by regional expansion to new Antarctic hunting grounds 
and the introduction of pelagic factory ships and new processing technologies, which 
increased the yield of oil per whale. These measures were essential to maintain the 
support of the global networks and the industry as a whole. The continued development 
of pelagic whaling fleets from 15 factory ships and 75 whale catchers in 1929–1930 to 
41 factory ships and 200 whale catchers in 19301112 was a final attempt to overcome 
declining prices. To coordinate sales, the Norwegian Whaling Union tried to convince the 
whaling companies to unite against the buyers pool.1113 This failed because several 
companies had signed contracts with Unilever, which was the largest buyer of whale oil. 
 
This economy of scales strategy was the beginning of the end of the industry, since it 
prevented the companies from responding to changing market conditions. Subsequently, 
when prices dropped from £28 in 1929 to £21 in 1930, and to £12 in 1931,1114 many 
whaling companies lost money. Despite this, huge quantities of unsold whale oil 
remained in storage. The crisis was politicised when the Norwegian government and the 
supreme court in England (the House of Lords) acted as negotiators between the 
producers and Unilever.1115 In 1931–1932, Unilever did not buy any whale oil and only 
used the oil produced by their own whaling companies. In the absence of a buyer, many 
whaling companies had to have a closed season.  
 
The result for A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri was devastating. In 1931–1932, their 
operations were limited to repairing the Orwell fleet at home and the company’s fleet at 
Husvik Harbour in South Georgia.1116 Having costs and making no profit meant the 
                                                 
1112 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del II: 1914-1924. Den Pelagiske Fangst 1924-1937. 1969. 
Vol: 3. P: 384. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
1113 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del II: 1914-1924. Den Pelagiske Fangst 1924-1937. 1969. 
Vol: 3. P: 390. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
1114 Hart. I. B. Whaling in the Falkland Islands Dependencies 1904-1931: A history of shore and bay-based 
whaling in the Antarctic. 2006. P: 316. 
1115 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del II: 1914-1924. Den Pelagiske Fangst 1924-1937. 1969. 
Vol: 3. P: 392f. In: Den Moderne Hvalfangst Historie- Opprinnelse og utvikkling. 
1116 Wasberg. G.C. Femti år I konkurranse og fremgang: Aktieselskabet Tønsberg Hvalfangeri 1907-1957. 
1958. P: 62. Vol: D5-1-4-2. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of 
the estate of David Wynn-Williams. 
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company made a financial loss of Kr1.065,277.1117 The board of the company ceased all 
operations at Husvik Harbour and sent most workers home. A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri’s 
quota and whale catchers were transferred to Star Whaling Company Ltd, which they 
had a large investment in. Despite these attempts to minimise losses, the company lost 
Kr707.049 in 1932–1933.1118  
 
The company re-opened Husvik Harbour in 1945–1946. Until then, the board of A/S 
Tønsberg Hvalfangeri maintained the company by tactical investments, selling, pawning, 
and leasing away their ships. As a result, the company generated profits from 1935–
1936 to 1937–1938, which enabled them to pay a 10% dividend to their 
shareholders.1119 The general assembly re-opened the whaling station at Husvik 
Harbour in December 1945, which had been maintained by a small group of workers 
since its closure in 1932. However, although the market conditions had improved since 
the early 1930s, the whaling industry had suffered substantially, especially during the 
Second World War when a large part of the fleet had been lost. The company operated 
Husvik Harbour with relative success until 1961 when it was closed permanently.1120  
 
Conclusions 
The local network at Signy Island developed gradually and was dictated by the lease and 
concession, company strategies, and market demands. The local network had three 
different phases. Archival sources have revealed the company structure, production, and 
salaries, while fieldwork has answered questions related to the organisation of 
production, the interaction with the local landscape, the design and spatial layout of the 
station, social strategies, and environmental challenges and adaptations. 
 
                                                 
1117 Wasberg. G.C. Femti år I konkurranse og fremgang: Aktieselskabet Tønsberg Hvalfangeri 1907-1957. 
1958. P: 63. Vol: D5-1-4-2. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of 
the estate of David Wynn-Williams. 
1118 Wasberg. G.C. Femti år I konkurranse og fremgang: Aktieselskabet Tønsberg Hvalfangeri 1907-1957. 
1958. P: 63. Vol: D5-1-4-2. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of 
the estate of David Wynn-Williams. 
1119 Wasberg. G.C. Femti år I konkurranse og fremgang: Aktieselskabet Tønsberg Hvalfangeri 1907-1957. 
1958. P: 68. Vol: D5-1-4-2. The Archive of the British Antarctic Surveys. Reproduced by kind permission of 
the estate of David Wynn-Williams. 
1120 Basberg. B. L. The Shore Whaling Stations at South Georgia: A Study in Antarctic Industrial 
Archaeology. 2004. P: 61. 
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Why wasn’t the whaling station a central component of the local network in the South 
Orkney Islands, and why did pelagic platforms succeed? There are several reasons for 
this. Firstly, production at the whaling station was time consuming and ineffective. 
Whales were brought to the whaling station where the blubber layer was stripped off 
and loaded onto barges to be towed to the Teie for transfer to Husvik Harbour whaling 
station for processing. When the Orwell I was introduced, blubber was cooked on site. 
Using two separate production units was ineffective. Even though the Orwell I had a 
large cooking capacity, it could only cook blubber that was brought from the whaling 
station. The flensing process became a bottleneck to production, which limited the 
output of the local network.  
 
When the company started to flense whales alongside Orwell I, production increased. 
This meant that the whale remains had to be transported from Orwell I to the whaling 
station.  Valuable time was spent on logistics – transporting blubber, meat, and bones 
between the two platforms.  
 
Environmental factors played an important role. Securing a reliable flow of freshwater 
was necessary for all aspects of the production line, but finding a reliable source was 
problematic. The company tried to adapt to this by collecting water from runoff streams 
and by pumping water from a nearby lake. From December to March, the average 
temperature was approximately 3.5°C and fell to -12.8°C in July.1121 The low 
temperatures froze the freshwater, making it inaccessible. The local manager 
constructed a device that could cover the pipe when the water froze. Even during the 
short summer months, ice drifted into the area from the Weddell Sea. This ice 
obstructed access to the whaling station and the harbour, and it was a danger to the 
boats. Despite these challenges, the ice was also useful since it subdued the swell, 
allowing the company to start hunting when they arrived. The ice could also be melted 
for freshwater. 
 
The ambitions of A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri differed from the demands that were set 
down in the lease and concession. Low investment in the whaling station suggests that 
developing the whaling station into the main platform was not the company’s primary 
                                                 
1121 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Orkney_Islands. Retrieved 23.12.2016. 
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interest. Instead, they used the station to secure control of the harbour, freshwater 
supply, and hunting grounds. The company operated the station at a low level to comply 
with the conditions set down in their permit and to secure support from the Colonial 
Office and magistrate in case of competition over resources in the area. The company 
benefitted from this support on several occasions. At the same time, the Colonial Office 
were able to exercise their authority through effective management.  
 
Finally, global events during the 1920s meant that A/S Tønsberg Hvalfangeri (like all 
other whaling companies in the Antarctic) had to adapt to new circumstances. 
While the whaling station at Signy Island might have been profitable prior to the price 
drop in the early 1920s, it was simply too small to deliver the necessary output in the 
face of lower prices. Only a larger platform with more cooking capacity, such as the 
Orwell I and II, could be profitable. Therefore, the company invested in developing the 
pelagic platform, which had enough capacity, was flexible in terms of manoeuvrability, 
and could be transferred to new hunting grounds if whales became scarce in the South 
Orkney Islands. 
   
During the 1920s, it was not possible to make the whaling station at Signy Island 
profitable because there was limited space for erecting new installations, there was 
















9. Comparison of polar whaling stations 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I compare the four case studies on the modern whaling industry in the 
Arctic and Antarctic to draw conclusions about the development of the modern whaling 
industry in the first three decades of the 20th century. Successive developments within 
the local and global networks will be discussed, with special attention to environmental, 
technical, social, and geo-political factors. 
 
Local networks 
The whaling companies’ local networks consisted of human, material, and 
environmental elements – all of which were used to catch whales, produce whale oil, and 
build the necessary infrastructures for transporting oil, equipment, and personnel 
between the polar areas and other parts of the world. With the local networks, the 
companies generated the economic and geo-political resources that their global 
networks desired. The whaling stations, with all their technologies, buildings, 
constructions, and layouts, were the central production facilities, even though some 
companies included in this thesis operated with additional production units during parts 
of the season or throughout parts of their operational lifespan, or in conjunction with 
factory ships. The local networks also included the whale catchers, towing boats and 
other vessels, the physical landscape, water supply (liquid, snow, and ice), and 
recreational space. 
To maintain the support of the actors in their global networks, the company leaderships 
had to make sure all the components in their local networks operated and functioned as 
one unit. Failure to do this could reduce production and profits, threatening the support 
from the actors in the global networks and endangering the survival of the actor 
network and operations. 
There are large variations in how the companies designed their production lines at the 
stations. While some were designed to exploit only blubber and discard the rest of the 
whale, other companies designed their stations (such as Hektor whaling station at 
Deception Island) to process other parts of the whale into oil. Some stations, like the one 
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at Signy Island, operated in conjunction with a factory ship. The factors that dictated 
these differences were licenses and concessions, topographic constraints, changing 
market demands, access to technologies, and available capital for investments. Being 
able to adapt the production line, especially as prices dropped and production had to 
increase, was important. Old and well-tested technologies used more time and energy 
than the cookers that were introduced later. These old technologies did, however, 
ensure stability and a constant flow of oil. Nonetheless, without capital to increase 
production either by new technologies or by adding more cookers, whaling companies 
had difficulties sustaining their project. The local network, with all its technologies and 
buildings, was dependent on investments from the global network, which allowed the 
network builder to create a flexible production line that used raw materials effectively 
and generated profit. 
 
Oil can be extracted from all parts of a whale carcass and, to meet the demands of their 
concessions, the whaling companies had to do just that. However, different parts of the 
whale had to be cooked at different temperatures to extract the oil so the different parts 
were cooked separately at the stations. Open cookers remained the dominant cooking 
technology until the turn of the 20th century when pressure cookers became 
increasingly common. Pressure cookers reduced the cooking time and sped up 
production, and reduced the consumption of coal and freshwater reserves. Open cookers 
were often used to melt the blubber since this method improved the quality of the oil. 
There was little development of processing technologies until 1910, primarily because 
there were plenty of raw materials. Later, as whales became increasingly depleted, more 
investments were made in technologies to make processing and hunting more efficient. 
Hartmann and later Kværner cookers increased the yield of oil per whale. Archaeological 
fieldwork in the LASHIPA project showed that another type of cooker (with a stirring 
function) was used in the blubber cookery at Prince Olav Harbour. This cooker was 
probably used to maximize output and to speed up the cooking process. 
The number of cookers and the capacity to operate them at each station was also 
important. Fieldwork showed that there were approximately 70 cookers at Prince Olav 
Harbour whaling station. The local network of the whaling station at Signy Island 
consisted of the shore-based whaling station and the two factory ships Orwell I and 
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Orwell II factory ships. Together these had 25 and 55 cookers respectively. In the Arctic, 
the station at Finneset had 13 cookers and the station at Bear Island had six cookers, 
showing the large difference in number of cookers at whaling stations in the Arctic and 
Antarctic. The types of cookers and the numbers used depended on the availability of 
whales and how many whales were caught, which were both higher in the Antarctic 
compared with the Arctic. In addition, investors saw more potential for whaling in the 
Antarctic than the Arctic so were more willing to take risks and invest in these stations. 
Investing in more cookers did not necessarily increase the cooking capacity. To do this, 
similar investments were also needed in boilers that supplied energy for the process and 
in securing a supply of freshwater. Fieldwork showed that the whaling stations at 
Finneset, Walrus Bay, and Signy Island each had one boiler to produce steam. 
Environmental conditions prevented a constant flow of freshwater. Prince Olav Harbour 
had four large boilers and a generator to produce electricity.1122 Fieldwork revealed that 
the company constructed two dams to provide a supply of freshwater: one small dam 
immediately above the station and another one with two separate pipelines to give them 
flexibility. 
The lack of such investments at the other three stations suggests that the companies and 
their global networks considered these stations to be temporary. Tønsberg Hvalfangeri 
A/S designed their local network at Signy Island to cope with geo-political 
circumstances rather than production. The company kept their investments in the 
station to a minimum, most likely because they considered the area to be too 
environmentally challenging for whale oil production. They based their production on 
their factory ship and operated the station at minimum costs to comply with the 
demands of their concession and lease. This example of adapting production lines to the 
particular geo-political and environmental situations in the Arctic and Antarctic shows 
how and why whaling stations in the polar regions differed from stations elsewhere. 
The whaling stations also contained buildings and objects that were not part of the 
production line but were nevertheless indispensable for production. Examples include 
accommodation, piggeries, the slop chest, storage facilities, and recreational facilities 
such as cinemas and football fields. These gave employees places to sleep, eat, and relax. 
                                                 
1122 LASHIPA 6 fieldwork report. P: 17. 2009. 
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The whaling companies also used them to create and maintain social control. This was 
important because there was no state authority to dissolve strikes and prevent conflict. 
The magistrates at South Georgia and at Deception Island did not have the resources to 
prevent strikes or to arrest those who took part in them. The whaling companies had to 
find their own ways of dealing with the problem. The fear of strikes and social unrest 
were likely heightened by the rapidly growing and radicalizing labour movement at the 
time. To avoid costly and potentially dangerous unrest among their labour forces, the 
whaling companies designed their local networks to satisfy the workers and reduce the 
likelihood of strikes due to, for example, poor accommodation. Whaling projects in the 
polar regions had short hunting, production, and shipping seasons. Strikes stopped 
production and could have a devastating effect on profits. 
Whaling companies organised production at their whaling stations to process whales 
into oil and guano quickly and efficiently. When plenty of whales were caught, whale oil 
production had to be maximized to make the most of the relatively short hunting season. 
Production was organised at the Signy Island whaling station so that whale catchers 
brought whales to the whaling station where the blubber layer was flensed. Blubber was 
then loaded (probably manually) onto barges and transported to their factory ship, 
anchored next to the whaling station, where it was boiled into oil. The remainder of the 
whale was hauled onto an elevated lemming platform and processed into whale oil. 
Consequently, the company spent a lot of time hauling and moving blubber between the 
two production units. There was no flow to the production line and one whale had to be 
flensed and loaded before the next whale could be processed. The company improved 
the flow in their production when they added a second factory ship, Orwell II, to their 
production line. 
At Prince Olav Harbour, Irvin and Johnson and later Lever Bros/Unilever organised their 
production line so that whales were attached to a buoy in the bay outside the whaling 
station. The workers towed the whales from the buoy to the flensing platform where the 
carcasses were flensed. After the blubber was removed, the carcass was pulled onto the 
lemming platform and another whale was pulled on the flensing platform. Once the meat 
was removed on the lemming platform, the whale’s skeleton was pulled on a platform on 
top of the bone cookery to be sawn into pieces and cooked. The residues from all three 
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cooking stages were collected in carts that ran on a railway system connected to the 
whaling station. This flow of production was highly efficient. 
Production at Finneset whaling station was organised in a similar way as at Prince Olav 
Harbour. Here, whales were stored on the shoreline before being towed onto the 
flensing platform. The blubber and meat were removed then the bones were collected in 
piles next to the station. This meant that time and energy were spent moving raw 
material that was not utilised. This improved once the guano factory was built since the 
bones could be transported there from the lemming platform and processed. 
At Walrus Bay on Bear Island, the company only utilised the blubber, and whales were 
attached (similar to Prince Olav Harbour) to a buoy before being transported to the 
station for processing. Unlike the other whaling stations, the carcasses were dumped 
into the sea once the blubber had been removed. Not only was the utilisation low, but 
resources and fuels were spent on tasks that did not contribute to producing oil. Rather 
than improving the production flow at the station, Ingebrigtsen invested in new hunting 
ships for his fleet. This meant they could operate in several areas at the same time, 
which increased catches and allowed production to continue if one hunting unit was 
lost. Although this increased the flexibility of the whaling operation and made it less 
vulnerable to environmental challenges, it did not increase the production of whale oil 
because whale populations were declining. 
Out of the four stations, Walrus Bay wasted the most raw materials because they did not 
use the whole carcass. Yet, Ingebrigtsen often caught more whales and produced more 
oil than many of his competitors further north in Spitsbergen. This was because he 
caught a high number of blue and fin whales, which are the largest whale species, 
therefore give more oil. The stations with the most efficient utilisation and production 
were Prince Olav Harbour and Finneset whaling station, even though both had problems 
making their guano factories operational. 
During the early season in Spitsbergen and Bear Island, several whaling companies, 
including A/S Spitsbergen and later A/S Nimrod, operated and flensed along the ice. 
They included the ice in their local network by flensing the whales on it and by using it 
as a source of freshwater to produce steam. Many companies adapted to the 
environmental conditions during the early season in Svalbard by equipping boats with 
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cookers and producing whale oil while stuck in the ice rather than wasting time trying to 
break through the ice to reach the harbour or whaling station. 
The different adaptations made by the companies that operated Finneset whaling 
station and Ingebrigtsen are noteworthy. Apart from equipping a boat with a few 
cookers so that whales could be processed alongside the ice in the early part of the 
season, they changed little. 
The whaling companies also adapted their whaling to cope with the environmental and 
geographical circumstances in the polar areas. The most important adaptation was to 
expand their range and capacity. The whaling fleets were constantly adapted. The ships 
were often designed for operation in a specific area, especially the whale catchers, as 
Basberg has shown.1123 Companies operating the first whale catchers in the polar 
regions often copied ship building technologies from the sealing industry, which 
designed ships for operating in ice floes. In the 1920s, shipbuilding firms like Kværner 
and Framnæs started to design the bows of the whale catchers higher to protect the 
gunner and the crew from large waves. This was probably suggested by whaling 
companies that operated in the polar regions and needed better protection; these 
companies were operating further and further from land, in more environmentally 
challenging areas. To increase the whale catcher’s operational range, speed, and capacity 
to haul more whales, the companies invested in new and more powerful steam engines. 
There was no need for such investments before 1910, but as competition grew and the 
catchers had to go further from the station to catch whales, it became necessary to 
invest in new and powerful engines. Some, like the Southern Whaling & Sealing 
Company, equipped their new whale catchers with diesel engines1124 because it was 
easier to transport diesel than coal. According to Basberg, the primary reason for this 
change was the transition to new hunting grounds and ice and pelagic whaling.1125 One 
must remember, however, that this development was gradual. As ship building and 
engine technologies progressed, the whaling industry adopted these changes quickly to 
continuously increase catches and the output of whale oil. These investments and 
modifications were made because there were: 1) enough resources (whales), 2) a 
                                                 
1123 See Basberg. B.L. Innovasjonsteori, patenter og teknologisk utvikling i norsk hvalfangst ca. 1860-1968. 
P: 109. Masters dissertation originally printed in 1980. 2015 
1124 Please see chapter 6. 
1125 Basberg. B.L. Innovasjonsteori, patenter og teknologisk utvikling i norsk hvalfangst ca. 1860-1968. P: 
109. Masters dissertation originally printed in 1980. 2015. 
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market demand for the whale oil produced, and 3) local environmental contexts. These 
factors created the economic incentive to invest in technologies to increase production. 
If whale populations in the Arctic were similar as in the Antarctic, similar investments 
would probably have been made there too. 
When the whaling industry moved from northern Norway to Spitsbergen and Bear 
Island, they mainly used the technologies and ships that were used in northern Norway. 
The catchers were not upgraded because: 1) there was little incentive to invest because 
the market for whale oil was limited, 2) the primary hunting grounds were close to the 
coast, and 3) the move from northern Norway happened quickly after the 1904 whaling 
ban was introduced. The whale catching boats used in the Antarctic were, especially 
after 1910, new and were built with a different design and engines. This allowed the 
companies to expand their hunting grounds and increase catches. In the Arctic, the 
companies refrained from investing in new whale catchers and used tugboats to extend 
the hunting grounds. 
 
The early floating factories must not be confused with the pelagic factory ships that 
became more common in the late 1920s. The early factory ships were semi-pelagic and 
were usually sailing ships equipped with a few cookers.1126 Even though whaling 
companies had used them in northern Norway before the 1904 ban, they were primarily 
designed and intended to be used in peripheral hunting grounds where there was little 
or no infrastructure, such as in the polar areas. 
 
Some of the earliest factory ships used cookers that were square iron boxes. Blubber 
was manually transported to these simple cookers from a cutting machine. In the iron 
boxes, blubber was melted with steam.1127 These early factory ships were relatively 
small with limited cooking and storage capacity. Therefore, they often used less of the 
whale carcass than whaling stations with more space did. Unlike ships that were built 
later on, they did not have internal tanks, so whale oil was stored in wooden barrels. The 
                                                 
1126 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del II: 1914-1924. 1969. Vol: 3. P: 38. In: Den Moderne 
Hvalfangst Historie. 




advantage of using this type of production platform compared with shore-based whaling 
stations was that it allowed the company to move their operations from area to area 
depending on the local conditions. Flensing and cooking had to be done in sheltered 
waters so a deep and sheltered harbour with access to land and plenty of freshwater 
was essential. During the first two decades of the 20th century only a few ships were 
designed as floating factories; one of the first was Chr. Christensen’s Admiralen in 1905. 
Factory ships in the Arctic and Antarctic differed in design, capacity, and size. Factory 
ships in the Arctic were converted sailing ships with limited capacity and storage. In the 
Antarctic, factory ships were purpose built ships with steel hulls and steam engines that 
were used for propulsion and to process whales. Until factory ships became pelagic, 
these were the primary differences in factory ships between the Arctic and Antarctic. 
Flensing was commonly done alongside the hull in both areas, and this needed to change 
before factory ships could become fully pelagic. But why was it important to become 
pelagic? There were several reasons. Firstly, being independent of land meant that the 
companies could operate without paying fees or taxes. Secondly, there were no 
restrictions on pelagic whaling operations. Thirdly, companies were free to choose their 
hunting grounds for pelagic expeditions, depending on the season. This maximized 
catches as they could move on if local conditions were not profitable. Whale companies 
introduced factory ships to cope with environmental challenges in the polar areas and to 
deal with the political circumstances. In short, there were many reasons for whaling 
companies to invest in technologies that enabled pelagic whaling. 
Hauling whales on board for processing was not a new concept. Attempts had been 
made by the Norwegian whaler Ingebrigtsen at Bear Island in 1906 to increase 
production of the local network.1128 Ingebrigtsen tried it again in Africa in 1908.1129 
Gjertsen, Davidsen, and many others also tried to establish pelagic whaling operations. 
1130 Although the idea of processing whales onboard in open waters had existed for a 
long time, there had been no real incentive to do so since there were plenty of whales 
available in the waters around the whaling stations. Despite this, some whaling 
companies, such as A/S Quilimane of Norway, already invested in new technologies like 
                                                 
1128 Dagbog D/S Skytten. 1906. National Library of Norway. Oslo. MS Fol 3905. 
1129 The private archive of the Hay-Ingebrigtsen family, Norway. 




the Sommermeyers rotating cooker, a guano plant, and evaporators that produced 
freshwater in 1911–1912. These investments gave the company increased flexibility.1131 
The South African/British whaling company the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company 
made similar investments when they bought the factory ship Restitution.1132 
 
Even though the output of the whaling industry reached new heights in the Antarctic 
hunting grounds, pelagic technologies did not progress until Petter Sørrle introduced his 
innovative ship design in the 1920s. Why were pelagic technologies not developed prior 
to 1920 if there were advantages to it? I see three main reasons for this. Firstly, the 
upgraded whale catching fleets that operated from the whaling stations brought in 
plenty of whales for processing until the early 1920s. There was no need to process 
whales in the open sea while there were plenty of whales close to the whaling stations. 
Secondly, before the First World War, whaling companies had big fleets that worked 
together with whaling stations and many of these ships were lost during the war. 1133 
Thirdly, the sudden drop in whale oil prices after 1920–1921 meant that whaling 
companies had to exploit new hunting grounds if they wanted to generate profits in a 
situation with low but stable prices. A production of scale without state imposed 
restrictions was needed. The only way to achieve this was to move away from regulated 
waters into the ice and open sea. This required a platform that was large enough to 
support a number of whale catchers and could carry enough coal to sustain production 
for longer periods. 
By the mid-1920s, vaporisation technologies had become more effective. From this 
perspective, the invention of pelagic technologies was the result of a multitude of 
factors. Although some actors might have wanted these developments to occur earlier, 
there were no incentives. Prices were high enough to generate profits despite declining 
catches. When prices dropped, the whaling industry was forced to adapt to the situation 
by: 1) seeking new hunting grounds, 2) investing in larger and more powerful catchers, 
3) investing in larger factory ships, 4) investing in processing technologies to improve 
                                                 
1131 Tønnesen. J.N. Verdensfangsten 1883-1924. Del II: 1914-1924. 1969. Vol: 3. P: 62. In: Den Moderne 
Hvalfangst Historie. 
1132 See chapter 5. 




utilisation of the raw material, and 5) ceasing operations in areas that were declining or 
no longer profitable. 
Sørrle’s design opened up new hunting grounds within the Antarctic and allowed 
expansion of the industry to uncontrolled and unrestricted international waters. These 
new pelagic factory ships were large enough to supply a whole fleet of whale catchers 
with coal and supplies, to accommodate many workers, and to store large quantities of 
whale oil in its internal tanks. Building and fitting these ships were huge investments, 
and the ships had to deliver huge outputs. The development of pelagic whaling 
technologies was a progressive process. It started with converted wooden sailing ships 
fitted with a few cookers and wooden barrels for storing whale oil. These progressed to 
larger ships with steel hulls and internal tanks, and eventually the enormous pelagic 
factory ships of the 1920s with stern slipways and whale claws with onboard flensing 
and lemming planes, as well as guano plants.1134 
As I mentioned earlier, the whaling companies designed their local networks to cope 
with and transform the local environments in the polar regions where they operated. 
The climate at Spitsbergen and Bear Island is influenced by the Gulf stream on the west 
coast and by the polar current on the east coast. The Gulf stream makes the climate more 
hospitable compared with other areas in the Arctic. The climate in the Subantarctic is 
more complex, with several ocean currents influencing the climate in different ways. 
Compared with Antarctica, the climate in South Georgia is relatively temperate. Mixing 
and upwelling of waters close to the Antarctic Convergence create conditions that 
promote the productivity of krill, which attracts whales. This is why whaling companies 
decided to place whaling stations there. South Georgia has frequent violent storms and 
katabatic winds. The climate in the South Orkney Islands is dictated by the proximity of 
the Larsen and Ronne-Filchner ice shelfs in Western Antarctica and by the currents in 
the surrounding Antarctic Ocean. Strong winds, low temperatures, sea ice, and icebergs 
that drift in from the Weddell Sea are common. These conditions influenced whaling 
activities in the area. 
Finding access to freshwater and the presence of sea ice were challenges the modern 
whaling industry had to adapt to in the Arctic and Antarctic. How did the whaling 
                                                 




industry adapt and why did they adapt the way they did? And were adaptation 
strategies different between the Arctic and Antarctic? 
Securing access to freshwater was one of the main challenges the whaling companies 
had to deal with in the Arctic and Antarctic. Freshwater was needed to produce steam 
for propulsion and production, but was scarce since precipitation in the polar areas was 
low; most freshwater was locked up in glaciers, sea ice, and snowfields. Failure to solve 
this problem would reduce production, resulting in less profit and risking the loss of 
support from shareholders. According to Rossnes, the early semi-pelagic factory ships 
required approximately 40 tons of freshwater per day to maintain production.1135 
The whaling companies in the Arctic and Antarctic worked out similar strategies to 
access freshwater. They invested in infrastructures to catch water from the area 
surrounding their stations and hunting grounds, such as dams, pipes, pumping stations, 
and water barges. These were time-consuming, inefficient solutions. Some companies 
collected runoff water from the melting snow, while others collected ice that they 
melted. 
  
Fig 178 and 179. Collecting meltwater was one way of securing enough freshwater to maintain production. 
By selecting snow layers that were exposed to the sun, and cutting drainage ditches, the whalers could collect 
water in purpose built barges. The photo has been published with the kind approval of Glenn McIntosh’s 
private collection. 
                                                 
1135 Rossnes. G. Hvalfangsten og kulturminner Hektor Hvalfangststasjon. Særtrykk av Norsk 
Sjøfartsmuseum Årsberetning 1996. P: 142. 1997. 
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The archaeological fieldwork we conducted in the LASHIPA project shows that whaling 
companies in Spitsbergen and Bear Island established their stations at sites they thought 
would provide the best conditions for profitable production. These sites had: 1) access 
to freshwater, 2) good harbour conditions, and 3) dry land suitable for building 
factories, houses, and warehouses for storing whale oil. The ideal locations in 
Spitsbergen were as close as possible to the west coast of the archipelago where the best 
hunting grounds were. Whaling companies also claimed freshwater resources and 
harbours located away from their main stations. 
The environmental challenges of whaling at Spitsbergen were increased by its legal 
status as a no man’s land since claims to sites could be challenged by any competitor. In 
the Antarctic, on the other hand, concessions awarded by the British authorities gave 
exclusive rights to freshwater resources.1136 
The archaeological fieldwork and archival research in this thesis shows that the local 
climate influenced the strategies that whaling companies used to find a supply of 
freshwater. In Spitsbergen and Bear Island, low temperatures were only a problem 
during the start of the season, when ice belts were extensive and runoff rivers froze. 
During the latter part of the season, securing enough water to maintain high production 
became a major challenge. At Finneset whaling station, the companies dealt with this by 
building a dam and collecting water from a glacial runoff river at Sandefjord Point 
further south. They eventually claimed this site to prevent competitors in the mining 
industry from taking it over. At Signy Island in South Orkney, access to a deep and 
sheltered harbour seems to have been the company’s primary motive for their choice of 
location, which reflected the company’s plan to conduct semi-pelagic and later pelagic 
whaling expeditions rather than running the shore-based station, which was less 
flexible. 
Sea ice in the Arctic and Antarctic was both an obstacle and a resource. Sea ice often 
prevented the companies from accessing their harbours and stations, forcing them to 
develop new ways of organising their activities. But the sea ice was stable enough for 
whale carcasses to be processed on them, so the floating factories were anchored along 
                                                 
1136 To what extent this was the case during the early phase of whaling in South Georgia is uncertain. There 
appear to have been local competition over resources in spite of this regime, as the conflict between Irvin 
and Johnson and Cia Argentina de Pesca over Jason Harbour show, as well as with Chr. Salvesen of Leith 
over rights to Prince Olav Harbour show. 
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the edge of the sea ice during the early season and the crew began producing whale oil, 
albeit slowly. Many companies, such as A/S Spitsbergen, redesigned their boats so they 
could process whales alongside the fjord ice while waiting for it to break up and melt. In 
the Antarctic, the companies do not appear to have tried that method. 
In the Antarctic, glaciers and shelf ice produced large icebergs that were potentially 
hazardous to the whaling fleets. Once the whaling industry started operating in more icy 
waters, the general trend was to invest in larger and more powerful boats. Whaling 
companies had to monitor the ice continuously, especially those that operated semi-
pelagic factory ships that were stationed in harbours. When there was a lot of sea ice 
and strong winds, the ice could easily trap the boats and stop all production. 
The archaeological surveys within the framework of this project in the Antarctic 
Peninsula revealed many anchor points that allowed the whaling companies to quickly 
relocate to new hunting areas and re-start production. This was how they adapted to the 
ice conditions. They also placed replacement barrels, flensing boats, and barges at 
different locations in case they were destroyed by the ice. In this way, the companies 
incorporated large parts of the landscapes in their local networks. The whaling 
companies seem to have used the local environment in more innovative ways in the 




The political context differed between the Arctic (Spitsbergen and Bear Island) and 
Antarctic (South Georgia, South Orkney and adjacent areas in the Antarctic Peninsula). 
This influenced the way the companies built their global networks in these areas. While 
Spitsbergen and Bear Island were internationally recognized as no man’s land, Britain 
had claimed sovereignty over the South Atlantic archipelagos. Although the legal status 
of the South Orkney Islands and the South Shetland Islands were uncertain, the whaling 
companies never challenged the British claims to them. By applying to the British 
authorities for licences and leases to operate there, the industry – whether they liked it 
or not – recognized British authority in the region. How did the different legal statuses in 
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these areas affect the whaling companies that operated there? How did the companies 
adapt, and how did the actions of the companies affect the geo-political situation there? 
The no man’s land status in Spitsbergen and Bear Island meant that no state could 
introduce concessions or restrictions on whaling or mining activities there. This had 
several consequences for the companies that operated there. Firstly, the companies 
were free to catch whales without restrictions and regulations. They could follow their 
characteristic pattern of rapid overexploitation and low utilisation and high waste of the 
raw material, which decimated the whale populations. Secondly, the absence of a state 
power meant that there was no authority to manage territorial disputes and strikes. 
Therefore, the whaling companies used several strategies to maintain social control and 
avoid conflicts. 
The geo-political situation in the Subantarctic and Antarctic was more complex, with 
overlapping claims and perceived possessions. For this reason, in the opening years of 
the 20th century, the whaling companies were uncertain about the legal status of South 
Georgia, the South Orkney Islands, and other areas in the Subantarctic and Antarctic. 
Great Britain affirmed its claims through the Letters Patent of 1908 and the whaling 
companies did not challenge the claims. 
The fact that Great Britain controlled a large part of the Antarctic in which the whaling 
industry operated meant that they could impose step-wise measures to avoid 
overexploitation of the whale populations. Restricting exploitation of the whale 
populations was a political act that sustained the whaling industry rather than 
preserving the whale populations. Managing industrial exploitation became a political 
act that was effective since it involved third party recognition of sovereignty, which was 
important. In addition, whaling companies applied for licences and concessions and paid 
taxes, which further supported and legitimized the British claims. Managing the whaling 
industry was therefore an important tool for Great Britain and the colonial office to 
maintain their territorial claims. However, whaling companies in Spitsbergen and Bear 
Island adopted similar strategies, despite the no man’s land status. 
Whether a whaling company was a joint stock company or a private enterprise affected 
the availability of capital and other important resources for the development and 
success of their whaling operations. Two joint stock companies owned and operated the 
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Finneset whaling station (Firma Severin Dahl and later Christen Nielsen & Co), while an 
entirely private enterprise owned Walrus Bay. Prince Olav Harbour was privately 
owned at first by the Irvin and Johnson group, and was later owned by a shared stock 
company (Lever Bros/Unilever). Signy Island whaling station was owned by a shared 
stock company (Tønsberg Hvalfangeri A/S) throughout its operational lifespan. 
Shared stock companies were not a new phenomenon within the whaling industry. In 
the Netherlands, shared stock whaling companies existed in the second half of the 17th 
century. In the late 1800s, whaling entrepreneurs in northern Norway secured funding 
for their whaling projects by enrolling people in their home towns to invest in their 
planned projects, and thereby share both risks and potential profits. Irvin and Johnson, 
on the other hand, deliberately kept their whaling operations private, with only a limited 
number of investors, probably to make larger profits like other whaling companies did. 
Limiting the number of investors in their whaling projects increased their financial risk 
but also increased their potential to gain wealth. Ingebrigtsen probably had similar 
motives. Keeping their whaling projects private also allowed the company leaders to 
make fast decisions and be more flexible. On the other hand, every decision carried 
potential risks, which could backfire if enough capital was not available or if they failed 
to maintain support from the banks. 
In a shared stock company, the risks and profits were shared with a large number of 
investors. These companies could get additional funding for a new whaling station or to 
upgrade its fleet by new stock emissions, by re-investing profits, or by asking the 
shareholders for more funding. The drawback was that the companies had to 
continuously convince shareholders to keep supporting their whaling projects. Before 
starting a new whaling operation, they had to write reports and prepare statements that 
described the future possibilities and likely success of the proposed project. These 
reports were often written by actors whose statements would be trusted. Once the 
whaling operations were up and running, the company leaders had to secure the 
continued support of their shareholders by generating profits that could pay dividends. 
Based on our investigations, it is inconclusive whether the structure of the companies’ 
global networks affected the outcome of their whaling projects. Both Irvin and Johnson 
and Ingebrigtsen had the necessary capital to make large investments and to develop 
and adapt their local networks, and they did not have to share profits with shareholders. 
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On the other hand, they took larger risks than the shared stock companies, which might 
have endangered their projects. 
The whaling companies also enrolled political actors, including state representatives 
such as foreign ministries, to their global networks. The Norwegian Foreign Ministry 
wanted the whaling companies to support their effort to make Spitsbergen a part of 
Norway. However, the whaling companies probably saw little to gain from Norwegian 
sovereignty there following the Norwegian government’s ban on whaling in Norway in 
1904. Two whaling companies did claim territories on Spitsbergen from 1908, but they 
probably did this for their own interests and not those of the Norwegian Foreign 
Ministry. They probably claimed these territories in response to increasing competition 
from the coal mining industry over natural harbours and fresh water supplies. 
The Norwegian Foreign Ministry most likely used the whaling companies’ claims in 
Spitsbergen as part of their campaign for sovereignty in Spitsbergen. They added these 
claims to an already extensive list of economic activities carried out by Norwegian 
citizens on the archipelago. The Norwegian government used these economic activities 
to argue that Norway should influence the future of Spitsbergen. However, the geo-
political role of the modern whaling industry was small compared with the mining 
industry and scientific research. There were not many whaling companies, and the 
companies did not have many employees. They carried out most of their business at sea, 
and ended their activities before the Spitsbergen Treaty was settled in 1920, which 
granted Norway sovereignty over the archipelago. 
In the South Atlantic, the whaling companies had more reasons to comply with the 
demands of the British authorities than to challenge them. When granted a concession, 
the whaling companies had exclusive rights to hunting grounds and a natural harbour 
for their whaling stations. Similarly, if their whaling operations suffered because of 
strikes, the companies could ask the British authorities for support. This was done at 
South Georgia in 1918, when the whaling companies asked the British authorities to 
send a warship to prevent an impending strike. Preventing strikes was also in the 
interest of the British authorities as it allowed them to exercise authority and 
sovereignty over South Georgia. 
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The shift from shore-based to pelagic whaling also changed the involvement of state 
actors in the global networks of the whaling companies. The state actors no longer had 
to deal with British authorities in the Antarctic when operations moved beyond British 
control into unregulated waters. However, they still had a geo-politic role in the 
Antarctic. The search for new hunting grounds led to the discovery of new islands. 
During the Norvegia expeditions, state actors gave the whaling entrepreneur Lars 
Christensen (from Sandefjord) the authority to claim these new found lands on behalf of 
Norway. In other words, states with competing interests used the modern whaling 
industry to strengthen their influence in the Antarctic – either by exercising sovereignty 
through concessions or by staking claims. 
After the whaling industry abandoned their shore-based whaling stations, the British 
authorities continued to use them to exercise sovereignty in the region. They 
repurposed whaling stations for science and military activities and later defined them as 
cultural heritage sites that needed proper management. Although one may argue these 
were good intentions, the primary motive was probably to exercise sovereignty and 
control. Furthermore, choosing which and whose history to preserve were geo-political 
decisions. 
States with sovereign interests in the Antarctic benefitted from supporting the whaling 
industry. For example, while searching for new hunting grounds, some pelagic whaling 
firms claimed sovereignty of the lands they discovered on behalf of their government. 
State actors were interested in supporting those industries that could fulfil such a role. 
In addition to this, several whaling companies contributed to scientific research by 
collecting information on where they caught whales, their species and sex, and by 
measuring the whales before processing them. By gathering this knowledge and having 
the infrastructure in place to support scientific research, the whaling companies could 
count on the support of scientists and their state sponsors. 
By comparing the construction of whaling projects in the Arctic and Antarctic and how 
different actors built their global and local networks, I have gained insight into how 
different actors attracted support for their projects. I have also compared the 
development of whaling in the Arctic and Antarctic and have shown how the actors 
adapted their whaling stations and operations to the geography, environment, political 
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status, and changing market conditions. These findings have contributed to our 
understanding and knowledge of the history of modern whaling, and indeed to the 
industrial history of the polar regions as a whole, and have shown that it is highly 
important to consider more than economic interest and markets when explaining the 

































In the introduction of this thesis, I argued that it is necessary to consider more factors 
than economic interests and markets to understand and explain the development of the 
modern whaling industry in the Arctic and Antarctic during the first decades of the 20th 
century. These include the political situation and the ability of the industry to deal with 
adverse environmental and geographical conditions. Moreover, I argued that it is 
necessary to consider how the industry adapted to these factors when designing their 
production networks in the polar areas. 
The main objective of this thesis is to analyse and explain the rise and fall of modern 
station-based whaling in the Arctic and Antarctic in the opening decades of the 20th 
century in a multi-disciplinary way. 
The research questions are: 
• What were the societal contexts and structures that provided opportunities that 
motivated actors in the whaling industry to establish whaling operations in the 
Arctic and Antarctic? 
• Who were the actors behind the construction of the actor networks, and how did 
they use the political, environmental, and geographical factors to build their 
projects? 
• Why and how did the actors adapt their whaling operations to the political, 
environmental, and geographical conditions in the polar regions? 
 
The theoretical framework of actor network theory (ANT) and methodological 
approaches from industrial archaeology and industrial heritage research have been 
important in fulfilling the objectives of this thesis. The industrial archaeological method 
of combining material remains, local environmental data, and written records have 
created a more complete understanding of the historical changes studied in this thesis. 
Combining these methods made it possible to gain a deeper understanding of local 
conditions. Historical accuracy was also improved because I could compare different 
sources with one another. 
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This approach also revealed how the whaling companies designed their global and local 
networks. By exploring written sources from a wide variety of archives, I could map how 
the whaling entrepreneurs interacted with investors and authorities (global network) to 
realize their whaling projects. I combined written and archaeological sources to explore 
how whaling operations were designed to succeed in the political and environmental 
circumstances of the Arctic and Antarctic. This approach uncovered the important 
choices that were made regarding technology and settlements, as well as the 
consequences of these choices. 
This theoretical-methodological approach has allowed me to explain the complex web of 
economic and political factors that drove and sustained the industry, and eventually led 
to the decline of shore-based whaling in the late 1920s. I have also shown how the 
companies that operated the four sites adapted and shaped their local networks to the 
environmental and political circumstances in the polar areas, thereby ensuring the 
success of their whaling operations and the support of their owners and shareholders. 
The main conclusions are: 
1) The modern whaling industry had more reasons to move its operations to the 
polar regions at the turn of the 20th century than previously assumed.  
  
There is no doubt that economic factors were the most important motivations 
for establishing whaling stations in the polar regions. When the first whaling 
companies established their stations there, whale oil held a relatively small 
part of the global market for oils and fats. When hydrogenation technology 
was introduced, the market for cheap whale oil grew. Before the companies 
closed their stations, whale oil had become a major product on the global 
market, largely driven by the expanding needs of the margarine and fat 
industry. The actor networks I have studied were developed and shaped 
during a time of accelerating industrialization. Increasing globalisation and 
nationalism increased the need for oils and other raw materials to meet the 
demands of the new industrialized economy and new social groups. 
 
However, there were also political factors that favoured whaling in the Arctic 
and Antarctic. In the Antarctic, whaling companies could get exclusive rights 
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to hunting grounds and whaling station locations. In the Arctic, the legal 
status of Spitsbergen was uncertain, which created insecurity because nobody 
could secure exclusive ownership of the resources. Nevertheless, conditions 
in the Arctic were still favourable for the whaling industry. Norwegian 
authorities supported the land claims of Norwegian whaling companies to 
extend their political influence. This protected their territorial claims in case 
of conflict. The whaling companies occasionally supported the geo-political 
schemes of states – an example is the Norvegia expedition. However, the 
whaling companies only supported the political motivations of states when it 
suited their own economic interest – they were interested in money, not 
politics. 
 
2) Many initiatives to create the whaling projects came from people with 
previous experience in the industry (Finneset, Signy island, and Walrus Bay) 
but who lacked the networks to set up whaling operations in the polar areas. 
To secure the necessary financial support to build their whaling stations 
(local networks), these actors strategically enrolled suitable investors (global 
network). It is not surprising that most initiatives came from people with 
whaling experience. They had the necessary knowledge and experience in 
constructing local whaling networks in harsh and cold environments. And 
although the Arctic and Antarctic were both polar regions, to the actors they 
were just another area in which to set up a whaling operation. Apart from the 
remote location and uncertain legal status, polar whaling did not differ too 
much from whaling projects elsewhere (e.g., Norway, Iceland, Newfoundland, 
and Africa). Attracting investors to support their whaling projects was, in 
most cases, an easy task as other companies had generated huge dividends for 
their shareholders. Often, the projects were supported financially by political 
actors. 
 
One of the three stations mentioned above, Walrus Bay, operated as a private 
enterprise throughout its operational lifespan. Of the four stations included in 
this study, only Prince Olav Harbour was established by a group (Irvin and 
Johnson) that did not have extensive whaling experience in the polar areas. 
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Irvin and Johnson had worked in the sealing industry before setting up their 
whaling company. Much like Ingebrigtsen, who had plenty of polar 
experience, they chose to keep their enterprise private. Unlike the other 
projects, they operated in two areas using the same platform, which 
negatively affected production. Despite this, the company was the first to 
introduce diesel-powered whale catchers to extend the range and speed of 
their catchers and maximize catches. Whether Irvin and Johnson’s lack of 
whaling experience was to blame or not, their actor network in South Georgia 
failed after just a few years when the local network lost the support of the 
owners. 
By generating dividends, exploiting political agendas, and adapting their 
activities to the environment and changing market, the local networks were 
able to maintain the support of the global network. 
 
3) Spitsbergen and Bear Island were No-Man’s Lands, while South Georgia and 
the South Orkney Islands were British claims – but the whaling industry 
designed their local networks in both locations in a similar way. This was 
necessary because of the labour movement at the time and the challenges that 
weak state representation brought to whaling operations in the polar regions. 
The whaling companies used strategies to maintain social control when 
building their local networks. These included contracts, salaries, the black 
book system, leisure activities, architecture, iconographic expressions, 
settlement plans, and topography to emphasize hierarchies – all active tools 
to build and reinforce power relations. 
 
Changing conditions on the global market stimulated whaling companies, like 
the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company and Tønsberg Hvalfangeri A/S, to 
look for new ways to adapt their activities. They achieved this by expanding 
their operations in the Antarctic and elsewhere, and establishing new 
production platforms. While the Southern Whaling & Sealing Company chose 
a pelagic platform, Tønsberg Hvalfangeri A/S chose a combination of whaling 
stations and pelagic whaling. The industry pushed the development of pelagic 
technologies so they could move out of restricted waters and explore new 
 393 
 
hunting grounds. This was important because whaling companies were under 
pressure to increase their production in response to declining whale oil prices 
in the 1920s. Therefore, it was not only environmental and political factors to 
which the whaling companies adapted their local networks, but also the 
changing market. 
 
Furthermore, the whaling companies’ local networks in the polar landscapes 
fulfilled a geo-political role for states wishing to exercise sovereignty or build 
political influence there – although the industry itself did not have such 
aspirations. Their presence demonstrated economic activity – actants 
representing effective occupation – which played an important geo-political 
role. This fulfilled the economic and political needs of different global actors. 
 
4) The expansion of pelagic whaling from the late 1920s challenged established 
power relations and political control; the whaling companies were able to 
move out of controlled waters into international waters where they could find 
new hunting grounds and operate without restrictions. The changing market 
conditions and new technological developments in whale processing, 
vaporization, and radar detection  meant that whaling companies had to 
change their local networks to maintain the support of their global networks. 
The closure of the two whaling stations at South Georgia and Signy Island was 
the result of this process. 
 
The globalisation of the whaling industry and the discovery of new hunting 
grounds in Africa, South Georgia, and the Antarctic attracted whaling 
companies from Spitsbergen and Bear Island. The lure of more prosperous 
hunting grounds together with the poor catches and difficult environmental 
conditions in the Arctic led to the closure of the Arctic whaling stations. The 
actors abandoned the hunting grounds there. The brief reopening of Finneset 
whaling station later on was driven by the opportunity to supply a national 
market with whale oil after the First World War and the belief that whale 
populations had recovered from earlier exploitation. But the project failed 





The sources I have used in this thesis consist of printed and unprinted material, as well 
as of fieldwork data and photos. The data collected have been stored in a database 
developed within the framework of the International Polar Year 2007-2008.   
Below I have listed the sources that I have referred to in the text. The unprinted sources 
consist of archival material both from public archives and from private collections. The 
printed sources consist of books, chapters and of articles, as well as of other 
publications. These have been listed below alphabetically with no consideration to their 






Norwegian Polar Institute, Tromsø 
• Photo collection  
 
The Norwegian Telemuseum 
• Photo collection 
 
Tromsø State archive 
• Det Konglige Utenriksdepertementet. Beretning. Miljøverndepartementet. Norsk 
PolarInstitutt. Norges Svalbard og Ishavsundersøkelser (NSIU) 1928. Vol: 0085: 
E-Korrespondanse of saksdokumenter. 
• Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani archives. Private Archive No. 73.  
o Vol: 452. (1914-1916) 
o Vol: 451. Fldr: 1909-1923 Green Harbour, A/S Nimrod. 
• Norsk Svalbard og Ishavsundersøkelser (NSIU) 1928. Vol: 0085. E-
Korrespondanse og saksdokumenter. ”Beretning” 
• Miljøverndepartementet. Norsk Polarinstitutt. Vol: 0054. E- Korrespondanse og 
saksdokumenter.  
 
Sandefjord Whaling Museum 
• The Diary of Alex Lange 1904- 1907/08. 
• Hvalfangerforeningen.  
o Korrespondanse ang salg av hvalolje. Vol: 1. 1907-1939. 
o Diverse Pakkesaker. Vol: 3. (1912-1922). 
o Diverse Pakkesaker. Vol 4. 1913-1920. 
o Korrespondanse. Vol: Div angaaende hvalfangstens historie. 1913. 
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o Korrespondanse angående internasjonale avtaler. Vol: 1, 1915-1919. 
o Korrespondanse angående internasjonale avtaler. Vol 2. 1920-30 årene. 
• Norges Hvalfangstførbund, Korrespondanse ang Hvalfangstens Historie. Vol 5. 
Transcribed ”intervju 25/10-1960 med skipteknisk konsulent Herman 
Christensen, Oslo”.  
• Hvalrådet. Fångstdagbøker 1931-1943. Vol: 15. Fldr: Hvalfangstselskapet 
Haugar A/S.  
• Skipsjournaler. F-skipsjournaler, D/S Ulv 1. Vol: 0230. Fldr: 1926-1927. 
• Anderssons photo collection. 
• Norsk Fiskeritidende 
• Norsk Hvalfangsttidende 
• The Prince Olav Harbour photo collection. 
 
Riksarkivet, Oslo 
• The Norwegian Foreign Ministry. Series: P7.  
o Vol: B5145- Iversen. 
o Vol: 5145- Finneset. 
o Vol: B5146. Fldr: Finneset 
o Vol: 5174. 
• Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani archives. Private Archive No 73. Vol: 451. 
Fldr: 1909- 1923, Green Harbour/ AS Nimrod. 
 
The Norwegian National Library, Oslo 
• Oversiktskart over Spitsbergen – Sjøkarter optat av Ritmester Isachsens norske 
Spitsbergenekspedition med Marinen d/s Farm 1909-1910. Reference no-
kb_krt_00560.  
• MS Fol 3905Logbook of D/S Skytten. 
 
Gamvik Museum 
• Photo collection 
 
The private archive of the Ingebrigtsen-Hay family  
• Photo collection 
 
The private Archive of Karl Jan Skontorp 
• The Private Diaries and letter of Søren Berntsen, seasons 1923/24- 1930/31 
  
Germany 
 Senckenberg museum 
• Photo collection 
 
Australia 
The Private Collection of Glenn McIntosh  





The British Antarctic Surveys, Cambridge  
• AD6-19-2-H 
• The private archive of the Estate of David Wynn-Williams. 
o D5-1-4-2  
o D5-1-4-4  
o D5-1-4-5 






• Dick Laws Private collection 
o A 30-37 
o B30-36 
o B 35-10 
o C 18-31 
o C 89-41 
o C 89-42 
o XIV 79 
 
Edinburgh University  
• The Centre for Research Collections, Edinburgh University. Vol: William Speirs 
Bruce Manuscripts, Gen. 1646 6/10.  
 
The United States of America  
Michigan Technological University Archive, Houghton 
• The Longyear Collection. The Archival of Michigan Technological University. 
Houghton, Michigan, USA. Ref: No reg 2007-07-26-04. 
• Longyear Spitsbergen Collection.  MS-031. Box 4. Fldr 22. 
• The Arctic Coal Company. Scott Turner Collection. Box: CC, Fldr: CC13. 
 
The Falkland Islands 
The Falkland Islands Archives, Stanley 
• General Letter Book/ Governor. November 1881-December 1908. Outward. 
• SG & DEP. Whaling- General. Box 27. 
• Dependencies-Whaling 3, 1923-1929. S of S CS [C4/28]. Fldr: 24.  
• General Letter Book/ Governor. November 1881-December 1908. Outward.  
• Despatch Book. January 1923-December 1923. Inward.  
• Dependencies- Whaling 1923-1929. Fldr: S of S CS [667/23]. 
• F. Confidential despatch book Jan 1909 – Aug 1911. No 40. 
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• G. Confidential despatch book. Jan 1907 – Dec 1911. Outward. No 8.   
• F. Despatch book. Aug 1911 – June 1912. Inward, No 45. 
• Confidential despatch book. May 1927 – Dec 1936. Inward. 
• F. Despatch book. Aug 1911 – June 1912. Inward. No 45. 
• F. Confidential despatch book. Aug 1911 – June 1913. Inward. No 47. 
• F. Despatch book Aug 1913 – Mar 1914. Inward. No 50. 
• SG & DEP. Whaling – General. Vol 1. (1915 – 1921). 
• South Georgia. People – whaling. Vol 2 ( 1936 – 1964). 
• South Georgia. People – whaling. Vol 1. ( 1915-1935 ) 
• SG & DEP. Whaling – General. Vol 2 (1922-1929). 
• Dependencies. Whaling. Vol 3 (1923-1929). 
• Dependencies. Whaling. Vol 2 (1920-1922). 
• South Georgia. Whaling. Vol 2 (1920-1939). 
• South Georgia. Whaling – MISC. Non-Govt. Vol 1. 1936. 
 
The Netherlands 
The Dutch National Archives  
• Archive: 2.05.21. Inventaris van het archief van het ministerie van Buitenlandse 
zaken: A-dossiers, 1919-1940. 1723 
Sweden 
The national Museum of Science and Technology. Stockholm. 
• William Olsson’s Archive 1899-1922. Vol: F2:20 
 
LASHIPA fieldwork data and reports  
• The LASHIPA fieldwork data is available at 
http://gcmd.nasa.gov/getdif.htm?Historical_Resource_Exploitation_Avango_IPY
10_NL. 
• LASHIPA 4 Archaeological expedition on Svalbard, August 2-25, 2007. Arctic 
Centre, University of Groningen, Netherlands. 
• LASHIPA 5 Archaeological expedition on Spitsbergen (and Bear Island) 
27.July – 17.august 2008. Arctic Centre, University of Groningen, Netherlands. 
• LASHIPA 6 Archaeological expedition on South Georgia, 3 March – 12 April 
2009. 
• Svenska Polarforskningssekretariatets årsbok. 2010. 
 
Printed sources  
 
Aagaard. B.  Oppdagelser i Sydishavet fra middelalderen til 
sydpolens erobring. In: Meddelser, No 26. Norges 
Svalbard og Ishavs-undersøkelser. 1946. 
Aagaard. B.  Antarktis 1502-1944. In: Meddelser No 60. Norges 
Svalbard og Ishavs-undersøkelser. 1944.  
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Abbink. P.  Antarctic Policymaking & Science in the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Germany 1957-1990. 2009. 
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early industrial age. 1992. 
Arlov, T.B.  Whaling and Sovereignty – The role of whaling in the 
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Pp: 81- 90. 1993. 
Arlov, T. B.   A Short History of Svalbard. Oslo: Norwegian Polar 
Institute. 1989. 
Arlov, T.B.  Svalbard’s Historie 1596-1996. Oslo, 1996 
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Aubert. V and Arner. O On the social structure of the ship. In: Acta Sociologica, 
Vol 3. No 4. Pp: 200-219. 1959. 
Avango, D  Sveagruvan: Svensk Gruvhantering Mellan Industri, 
Diplomati och Geovetenskap. Stockholm: Jernkontoret. 
2005. 
Avango. D.  Aktanter I Ingemanslandet: Den svenska 
gipsbrytningen på Svalbard.. P: 173. In: Industrins 
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